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

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# THE NEW REVOLUTION IN POLITICAL SCIENCE*

DAVID EASTON
*University of Chicago*

A new revolution is under way in American political science. The last revolution—behavioralism—has scarcely been completed before it has been overtaken by the increasing social and political crises of our time. The weight of these crises is being felt within our discipline in the form of a new conflict in the throes of which we now find ourselves. This new and latest challenge is directed against a developing behavioral orthodoxy. This challenge I shall call the post-behavioral revolution.

The initial impulse of this revolution is just being felt. Its battle cries are *relevance* and *action*. Its objects of criticism are the disciplines, the professions, and the universities. It is still too young to be described definitively. Yet we cannot treat it as a passing phenomenon, as a kind of accident of history that will somehow fade away and leave us very much as we were before. Rather it appears to be a specific and important episode in the history of our discipline, if not in all of the social sciences. It behooves us to examine this revolution closely for its possible place in the continuing evolution of political science. Does it represent a threat to the discipline, one that will divert us from our long history in the search for reliable understanding of politics? Or is it just one more change that will enhance our capacity to find such knowledge?

## I. NATURE OF THE POST-BEHAVIORAL REVOLUTION

The essence of the post-behavioral revolution is not hard to identify. It consists of a deep dissatisfaction with political research and teaching, especially of the kind that is striving to convert the study of politics into a more rigorously scientific discipline modelled on the methodology of the natural sciences. Although the post-behavioral revolution may have all the appearances of just another reaction to behavioralism, it is in fact notably different. Hitherto resistance to the incorporation of scientific method has come in the form of an appeal to the past—to classical political science, such as natural law, or to the more loosely conceived non-methodology of traditional research. Behavioralism was viewed as a threat to the status quo; classicism and traditionalism were responses calculated to preserve some part of what had been, by denying the very possibility of a science of politics.

The post-behavioral revolution is, however, future oriented. It does not especially seek to return to some golden age of political research or to conserve or even to destroy a particular methodological approach. It does not require an adherent to deny the possibility of discovering testable generalizations about human behavior. It seeks rather to propel political science in new directions. In much the same way, behavioralism in the 50's, by adopting a new technology, sought to add to rather than to deny our heritage. This new development is then a genuine revolution, not a reaction, a becoming, not a preservation, a reform, not a counter-reformation.

Post-behavioralism is both a movement, that is, an aggregate of people, and an intellectual tendency. As a movement it has many of the diffuse, unstable, even prickly qualities that the behavioral revolution itself once had in its own youth. It would be a serious mistake, indeed, a grave injustice, to confuse this broad, inchoate movement with any organized group either inside or outside the profession. Nor ought we to attribute any special political color to post-behavioralists in the aggregate. They range widely, from conservatism to the active left. Nor has this movement any particula methodological commitments. It embraces rigorous scientists as well as dedicated classicists. Neither does it appeal to any one age group alone. Its adherents include all the generations, from young graduate students to older members of the profession. This whole improbable diversity—political, methodological, and generational—is bound together by one sentiment alone, a deep discontent with the direction of contemporary political research.

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* Presidential Address delivered to the 65th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2–6, 1969. New York City.

Even though today the organized cleavages within our profession are writing most of the dramatic scenarios, in the end these cleavages may prove to be the least interesting part of what is happening. What will undoubtedly have far deeper meaning for us is the broader intellectual tendency that provides the environment within which current divisions have taken shape. It is on the purely intellectual components of post-behavioralism, therefore, that I shall focus.

New as post-behavioralism is, the tenets of its faith have already emerged clearly enough to be identifiable. They form what could be called a Credo of Relevance[1] I would describe the tenets of this post-behavioral credo as follows:

1. Substance must precede technique. If one *must* be sacrificed for the other—and this need not always be so—it is more important to be relevant and meaningful for contemporary urgent social problems than to be sophisticated in the tools of investigation. For the aphorism of science that it is better to be wrong than vague, post-behavioralism would substitute a new dictum, that it is better to be vague than non-relevantly precise.

2. Behavioral science conceals an ideology of empirical conservatism. To confine oneself exclusively to the description and analysis of facts is to hamper the understanding of these same facts in their broadest context. As a result empirical political science must lend its support to the maintenance of the very factual conditions it explores. It unwittingly purveys an ideology of social conservatism tempered by modest incremental change.

3. Behavioral research must lose touch with reality. The heart of behavioral inquiry is abstraction and analysis and this serves to conceal the brute realities of politics. The task of post-behavioralism is to break the barriers of silence that behavioral language necessarily has created and to help political science reach out to the real needs of mankind in a time of crisis.

4. Research about and constructive development of values are inextinguishable parts of the study of politics. Science cannot be and never has been evaluatively neutral despite protestations to the contrary. Hence to understand the limits of our knowledge we need to be aware of the value premises on which it stands and the alternatives for which this knowledge could be used.

5. Members of a learned discipline bear the responsibilities of all intellectuals. The intellectuals' historical role has been and must be to protect the humane values of civilization. This is their unique task and obligation. Without this they become mere technicians, mechanics for tinkering with society. They thereby abandon the special privileges they have come to claim for themselves in academia, such as freedom of inquiry and a quasi-extraterritorial protection from the onslaughts of society.

6. To know is to bear the responsibility for acting and to act is to engage in reshaping society. The intellectual as scientist bears the special obligation to put his knowledge to work. Contemplative science was a product of the nineteenth century when a broader moral agreement was shared. Action science of necessity reflects the contemporary conflict in society over ideals and this must permeate and color the whole research enterprise itself.

7. If the intellectual has the obligation to implement his knowledge, those organizations composed of intellectuals—the professional associations—and the universities themselves, cannot stand apart from the struggles of the day. Politicization of the professions is inescapable as well as desirable.

No one post-behavioralist would share all these views. I have presented only a distillation of the maximal image. It represents perhaps a Weberian ideal type of the challenges to behavioralism. As such the credo brings out most of the salient features of the post-behavioral revolution as it appears to be taking shape today.

## II. SHIFTING IMAGES OF SCIENCE

What has this developing new image of political science to offer us? In the United States behavioralism has without doubt represented the dominant approach in the last decade. Will post-behavioralism destroy the undeniable gains of the behavioral revolution or is post-behavioralism only a valuable addition that can and should be incorporated into our practices?

One thing is clear. In a rapidly changing world surely political science alone cannot claim to have completed its development. Only on the assumption that behavioral political science has said the last word about what makes for adequate research and an appropriate discipline can we automatically read out of court any proposals for change.

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[1] Compare with the Credo of Behavioralism as described in D. Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 7.

The history of the various theoretical sciences, like physics and chemistry, reveals that every discipline rests on certain fundamental assumptions. It is a captive of what has been described as a research paradigm.[2] Over the years political science has been no less prone to develop models of what constitutes a good discipline or adequate research, and these models have undergone marked transformations.

The behavioral model of this century has been but the last in a long chain. It has shifted the balance of concern from prescription, ethical inquiry, and action to description, explanation, and verification. Behavioralism has justified this shift on the grounds that without the accumulation of reliable knowledge, the means for the achievement of goals would be so uncertain as to convert action into a futile game. The growing success of the scientific enterprise in political science cannot be denied.

New conditions of the modern world, however, force us to reconsider our image of what we want to be. Scientific progress is slow, and however more reliable our limited knowledge about politics has become in the last fifty years, social crises of unforeseen proportions are upon us. Fear of the nuclear bomb, mounting internal cleavages in the United States in which civil war and authoritarian rule have become frightening possibilities, an undeclared war in Vietnam that violates the moral conscience of the world, these are continuing conditions entirely unpredicted by political science, behavioral or otherwise. The search for an answer as to how we as political scientists have proved so disappointingly ineffectual in anticipating the world of the 1960's has contributed significantly to the birth of the post-behavioral revolution.

In this perspective the legitimacy of raising doubts about the adequacy or relevance of political science in the contemporary world of crises cannot be questioned. We can join the post-behavioral movement at least in asking: Must we be committed eternally to an unchanging image of the discipline, behavioral or otherwise? Is it not incumbent on us to take account of changing conditions and to be ready and willing to reconsider old images and modify them to the extent deemed necessary? Must political science continue to do what it has been doing over the last few decades, in the hope that some "normal" period will one day return in which time will be on the side of those who seek to develop a more reliable understanding of political processes?

The negative answer that many individuals from all generations of political scientists are giving is clear. One of the probable underlying reasons for this answer we can readily understand. Mankind today is working under the pressure of time. Time is no longer on our side. ~~This in itself is a frightening~~ new event in world affairs. An apocalyptic weapon, an equally devastating population explosion, dangerous pollution of the environment, and, in the United States, severe internal dissension of racial and economic origin, all move in the same direction. They move toward increasing social conflict and deepening fears and anxieties about the future, not of a generation or of a nation, but of the human race itself. Confronting this cataclysmic possibility is a knowledge of the enormous wealth and technical resources currently available in a few favored regions of the world, the spectacular rate of increase in man's material inventiveness and technology, and the rich potential just on the horizon for understanding social and political processes. The agony of the present social crisis is this contrast between our desperate condition and our visible promise, if we but had the time.

In the face of a human situation such as this, the post-behavioral movement in political science (and in the other social sciences simultaneously) is presenting us with a new image of our discipline and the obligations of our profession. It pleads for more relevant research. It pleads for an orientation to the world that will encourage political scientists, even in their professional capacity, to prescribe and to act so as to improve political life according to humane criteria.

We can respond by refusing to budge, much as the classicists and traditionalists once did in the face of the onslaught of the behavioralists. Or we can recognize the need for change and explore the best ways of reconstructing our conception of our discipline and of the related professional institutions of which we are part. It is the second course that I propose we consider.

## III. THE IDEAL COMMITMENTS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

A decision to contemplate revising the image of our discipline and profession places the political scientist in a strange and difficult predicament. Fierce pressures are building up for solutions to immediate problems. Yet the nature of basic research is to shift the focus away from current concerns and to delay the application of knowledge until we are more secure about its reliability.

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[2] T. S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

This dilemma of contemporary political science is perhaps best revealed in the ideal commitments of behavioralism. For example, according to the behavioral image of science, those very epistemological characteristics of political research to which the post-behavioralists so strongly object would seem to be unavoidable, indeed, highly desirable. Post-behavioralism deplores what it views as technical excesses in research. Yet no one could possibly deny that technical adequacy is vital. Without it the whole evolution of empirical science in all fields of knowledge in the last two thousand years would have been in vain. Despite some post-behavioral objections to scientific abstractness and remoteness from the world of common sense, by its nature science must deal with abstractions. No science could by itself cope with the whole reality as it is interpreted by the politician. Only by analysis, by chopping the world up into manageable units of inquiry, by precision achieved through measurement wherever possible, can political science meet the continuing need of a complex, post-industrial society for more reliable knowledge. Even to appeal to science to discard abstract theory and models as the test of relevance for research and to put in their place the social urgency of problems, is to ask it to sacrifice those criteria which have proved most successful in developing reliable understanding.

Furthermore, it appears that the use of the methods of behavioral science favors the very kind of sociological position for the political scientist to which post-behavioralism so strenuously objects. These methods help to protect the professional scientist from the pressures of society for quick answers to urgent if complicated problems. The history of the natural sciences shows us how slowly basic research moves. The overshadowing new ideas in the natural sciences—Newtonian mechanics, Darwinian evolution, Einstein's relativity, or modern cybernetics—come infrequently, on a time scale of centuries. But during the intervals between new ideas, great or small, science seeks to work out their implications with a passion for details, even if research seems to lead away from the practical, obvious problems of the day. These seemingly remote, often minute details, about scales, indices, specialized techniques for collecting and analyzing data and the like, these details are the building blocks of the edifice in which more reliable understanding occurs.

What is true about the slow pace of basic research in the natural sciences and about its remoteness we can expect to apply with equal force to the social sciences. Indeed in social research we even have difficulty in agreeing on the great discoveries, so undeveloped are our criteria of adequacy. In addition, even if the political scientist begins with an immediate social problem, as he so often does, in the process of investigation he will be likely to restate the problem in more researchable terms. This reconceptualization usually leads him back to the very kind of fundamentals that appear irrelevant to initial practical concerns.

The ideology of pure or basic research and its success in the better developed sciences in providing a reliable base of knowledge have seemed to justify this research strategy, slow and painstaking as it is. In helping to protect scholarship from the daily pressures of society for quick and ready answers, this ideology has freed science to pursue truth in the best way it knows how.

This same concern for generalized, verifiable understanding has forced social scientists to discriminate with extreme care about what we can and cannot do with our premises and tools. We can describe, explain, and understand but we cannot prescribe ethical goals. The value question is thus set aside, not because we consider it inconsequential, but only because we see it as unresponsive to the tools useful in analyzing and explaining the empirical world.

These then are some of the normal ideal commitments of science: technical proficiency in the search for reliable knowledge, the pursuit of basic understanding with its necessary divorce from practical concerns, and the exclusion of value specification as beyond the competence of science. It is these ideals that behavioral research in political science has sought to import into the discipline.

### IV. NEW STRATEGIES FOR SCIENCE

Today these traditional ideals of science are confronted with a set of social conditions which have no historical precedent. This extraordinary circumstance has created the predicament in which behavioral research now finds itself. It derives from the fact that we are confronted with a new and shortened time scale in the course of human events, one in which the future may need to be discounted more heavily than ever before. For many, nuclear war or civil strife, with authoritarianism as a credible outcome, are clear and present dangers, to be counted in decades at the most. For many, without immediate and concentrated attention to the urgent issues of the present day, we may have no future worth contemplating, however uncertain our findings or inadequate our tools. How then can behavioral research, with its acknowledged glacial pace and apparent remoteness, hope to meet the demands now being placed upon our discipline?

For some among post-behavioralists, the fear of physical and political self-destruction has led to the abandonment of science altogether. For them science is simply incapable of measuring up to contemporary needs. Others, who have always considered science to be inherently defective, now feel justified in their convictions. But for those post-behavioralists who continue to place their hopes in modern behavioral science, the current crisis poses the issue about the wisdom of continuing our commitment to a "normal" strategy of scientific research. These kinds of post-behavioralists have been driven to conclude that we have no alternative but to make our research more relevant. For them we can do so only by devoting all our professional energies to research, prescription and action with regard to the immediate issues of the day. In short, we are asked to revise our self-image by postponing the demands of slow-moving basic research and by acting in our professional capacity so as to put whatever knowledge we have to immediate use.

For all of us this plea poses some critical questions. Even in the face of the social crises of our time, do we really need to subordinate the long-run objectives of the scientific enterprise to the undeniably urgent problems of the day? Is there any other way in which we can cope with this transparent need for practical relevance? And if so, can we hope to retain for political science those conditions of theoretical autonomy, precision, and relative insulation so vital if we are to continue to be able to add to our capital stock of basic understanding?

I would argue that we do not need to abandon the historical objectives of basic science. There is a strategy that will enable us to respond to the abnormal urgency of the present crises and yet preserve these traditions. By adopting this course, post-behavioralism need not be considered a threat to behavioral research but only an extension of it necessary for coping with the unusual problems of the present epoch.

To appreciate the strategy implied, we must remember one thing. Even if it *is* arguable that the time scale in terms of which we must think has been greatly shortened, mere projection cannot fully persuade us that the future needs to be counted in decades, not centuries. What little solace we may get from it, we know that our intuitions have been wrong in the past. We may still have centuries rather than only decades ahead of us.

This realistic possibility suggests that we ought to pursue an optimizing strategy in which there is some apportionment of resources for the long run as against the short run, just in case we are not in fact all dead. The cost of devoting our efforts exclusively to short-run crises is far too high. It might easily assure that if we do in fact survive the present crises, the failure to continue to add to our capital accumulation of basic social knowledge will see us tragically unprepared for even greater crises in the more distant future. We will then have lost every chance to prevent the self-annihilation of mankind or the collapse of those political institutions we cherish.

Is there any sensible way in which we can provide for some satisfactory use of our resources without distracting excessively from the attention and altered research orientations that the major issues of the country and the world require? It is to this question that those of us who still have some hope that we may survive the certain and greater crises of the near future ought to be devoting some of our energies. Various courses of action are possible and we need to consider them as they apply to the discipline as well as to the profession.

## V. THE DISCIPLINE

### *Basic vs. applied research*

For the discipline, the post-behavioral revolution suggests the appropriateness of revising our ideal image at least as it has been incorporated into behavioralism. It is vital to continue to recognize the part that basic research ought to play. But in the allocation of financial and human resources we must also consciously recognize that a shift in emphasis must occur at once to take into account the critical times in which we live.

In terms of any ideal distribution of our efforts, basic research ought to command a disproportionate share. Although socially useful results from such research are usually a long time in coming, they are in the end more dependable. But under the inescapable pressure of current crises the emphasis needs to be reversed. A far larger part of our resources must be devoted to immediate short-run concerns. We need to accept the validity of addressing ourselves directly to the problems of the day to obtain quick, short-run answers with the tools and generalizations currently available, however inadequate they may be. We can no longer take the ideal scientific stance of behavioralism that because of the limitations of our understanding, application is premature and must await future basic research.[3]

In truth this proposal represents less of a shift in our practices than a change in our ideological posture. The behavioral revolution has never been fully understood or absorbed into the discipline; we are still grappling with its meaning. Any casual inspection of ongoing research would reveal that, regardless of any ideal apportionment, at no time has pure research really consumed more than a very small fraction of the discipline's resources. We have been only too ready to advise federal, state and local agencies on immediate issues and political parties and candidates about their campaigns. It is just that with the behavioral revolution the ideals of the discipline as incorporated in research ideology were beginning to change. This new image legitimated that kind of basic research, the pay-off of which might not be immediately apparent, but the future promise of which was thought to be considerable. Today we need to temper our behavioral image of the discipline so that in these critical times we no longer see it as commanding us to devote most of our efforts to the discovery of demonstrable basic truths about politics. We will need to obtain more of our satisfactions from seeking immediate answers to immediate problems.

This kind of shift in disciplinary focus will call urgently for the systematic examination of the tasks involved in transforming our limited knowledge today into a form far more consumable for purposes of political action. Certain difficulties stand in the way of applying our knowledge. In the first place, contemporary social problems far outrun the capacity of political science alone or in concert with the other social sciences to solve them. Our basic knowledge is itself limited. What little we have is not necessarily directly applicable to practical issues.

In the second place, like medieval medicine, we may still be at the stage in which we are letting blood in the hope of curing the patient. Because of our low capacity for sorting out the complex causal connections between our advice and its social consequences, we have little assurance that we may not be doing more harm than good. Some efforts are currently under way to correct this situation. In the broadening quest for social indicators we are inventing techniques for isolating the outcomes of policy outputs[4] and for comparing these consequences with the presumed policy goals.[5] Thereby we shall have a measure of the effects of our intervention in the social processes. But the success of these efforts lies some distance in the future.

In the third place, political science alone is unable to propose solutions to social problems; these normally involve matters that call upon the specialized knowledge and skills of other social scientists. Yet seldom do policy makers seek the collective advice of comprehensive teams of social scientists.

These and many other difficulties have stood in the way of the application of our knowledge to specific situations. They have contributed to the low academic esteem of applied science, in comparison at least with basic research. Past efforts at application have experienced too little success to attract the best minds of the day.[6] In temporarily modifying the immediate priorities of the discipline, we will need to devise ways for elevating the self-conscious development of applied knowledge, inappropriately called social engineering, to the respectability that behavioralism has succeeded in acquiring for basic research.

To assign all of our research resources to the present, however, as some post-behavioralists seem to be suggesting, would be to discount the future far too heavily. We need to keep alive and active the legitimate long-range interests of all science. Social problem-solving is not totally inconsistent with this objective. The line between pure and applied research is often very fine. Those of us who choose to adopt the long-run point of view, optimistically expecting the survival of mankind, will find much from which to profit in the research undertaken by those concerned with applied problems. Yet this cannot relieve us of the need to continue to devote specific attention to basic problems in the discipline—to the reconceptualization of our significant variables, to the continuing search for adequate units of political analysis, to the exploration of alternative theories and models about the operation of various types of systems, and to our basic methodological assumptions and technical requirements. Admittedly these persisting concerns often lead us far from the practical issues of the day. Yet without attending to these basic problems we cannot hope to add to our store of reliable knowledge, and thereby to prepare ourselves for equally critical political crises in the more distant future.

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[3] See D. Easton, *The Political System* (New York: Knopf, 1953), pp. 78 ff.

[4] For the difference between outcomes and outputs see D. Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 351.

[5] For the literature on social indicators see R. A. Bauer (ed.), *Social Indicators* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966); "Social Goals and Indicators for American Society," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, vols. 371 (May, 1967) and 373 (September, 1967).

[6] See H. W. Riecken, "Social Science and Contemporary Social Problems," 23 *Items* (1969), 1–6.

### *Value premises and research interests*

In addition to suggesting this temporary reallocation of our resources as between basic and applied research, we need to become increasingly aware of the fact that basic research is not without its own substantive deficiencies. This is the message underlying the constant post-behavioral complaint that our research is not relevant. It is argued that excessive preoccupation with techniques and with factual description has distracted us from the significant questions about the operation of the American democratic system in particular. We have learned a great deal about this system but all within a value framework that accepts the ongoing practices as essentially satisfactory and at most subject only to the need for incremental improvements. As a discipline we have proved incapable of escaping a commitment to our own political system. This research myopia, the post-behavioralists argue, has discouraged us from posing the right questions for discovering the basic forces that shape the making and execution of authoritative decisions.

Here the post-behavioralists are alerting us, once again, to what has been repeatedly revealed over the years, by Marx, Weber, and Mannheim, among others, namely, that all research, whether pure or applied, of necessity rests on certain value assumptions. Yet the myth that research can be value-free or neutral dies hard. We have continued to develop our discipline as though the subjects we select for research, the variables we choose to investigate, the data we collect, and the interpretations we generate, have all some extraordinary pristine purity, unsullied by the kinds of value premises to which we subscribe, consciously or otherwise. We do not consistently ask the question, central to the sociology of knowledge: To what extent are our errors, omissions, and interpretations better explained by reference to our normative presuppositions than to ignorance, technical inadequacy, lack of insight, absence of appropriate data, and the like? Behavioralists have indeed failed to insist, with the same fervor we have applied to our technological innovations, that our operating values be brought forward for self-conscious examination and that their impact on research be assessed.

Today the hazards of neglecting our normative presuppositions are all too apparent. There can be little doubt that political science as an enterprise has failed to anticipate the crises that are upon us. One index of this is perhaps that in the decade from 1958 to 1968, this REVIEW published only 3 articles on the urban crises; 4 on racial conflicts; 1 on poverty; 2 on civil disobedience; and 2 on violence in the United States.[7]

In some considerable measure we have also worn collective blinders that have prevented us from recognizing other major problems facing our discipline. For example, how can we account for the failure of the current pluralist interpretations of democracy to identify, understand, and anticipate the kinds of domestic needs and wants that began to express themselves as political demands during the 1960's? How can we account for our neglect of the way in which the distribution of power within the system prevents measures from being taken in sufficient degree and time to escape the resort to violence in the expression of demands, a condition that threatens to bring about the deepest crisis of political authority that the United States has ever suffered? How can we account for the difficulty that political science as a discipline has in avoiding a commitment to the basic assumptions of national policy, both at home and abroad, so that in the end, collectively we have appeared more as apologists of succeeding governmental interpretations of American interests than as objective analysts of national policy and its consequences? Finally, in even so recent a major research area as political socialization, how can we account for the natural, effortless way in which inquiry has sought to reveal the contributions of preadult political learning to the stability of systems, virtually ignoring the equally significant function of socialization in bringing about political change?[8]

There is no single explanation for the narrow vision of our discipline. We can, however, at least go so far as to offer this hypothesis: Whatever the reasons, the failure to broaden the vision of our basic research may be due in good part to a continuing hesitation to question our normative premises and to examine the extent to which these premises determine the selection of problems and their ultimate interpretations.

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[7] This undoubtedly reflects only the few articles on this subject submitted for publication rather than any editorial predisposition.

[8] See D. Easton and J. Dennis, *Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), chapter 2.

*Creative speculation*

How are we to make those serious efforts necessary to break out of the bonds imposed on basic research itself by ongoing value frameworks? How are we to create those conditions that will help us to ask fundamental questions about the operation of political systems, that will lead us to pose those "outrageous hypotheses" about which Robert Lynd once chided us?[9] A new awakening to the part that our value commitments and other social influences play in limiting the range of our basic research may partly correct the errors of our ways. But this moral self-scrutiny may not be enough. If we are to transcend our own cultural and methodological biases, such self-awareness can carry us only part of the way. We may need to take stronger measures and find additional help by returning to an older tradition in political research but in a thoroughly modern way.

Many years ago, in *The Political System*, I argued for the urgent need to reconsider our approach to value theory at the same time as we began the equally critical task of constructing empirical theory.[10] The latter task is now under way in our discipline. The first one, creative construction of political alternatives, has yet to begin.

To enrich their own understanding and to give broader meaning to their own social reality, the great political theorists of the past found it useful to construct new and often radically different conceptions of future possible kinds of political relationships. By formulating such broad, speculative alternatives to the here and now we too can begin to understand better the deficiencies of our own political systems and to explore adequate avenues of change that are so desperately needed. This, I would argue, must now be considered part of the task and responsibility of science if it is to retain its relevance for the contemporary world. Those philosophies that seek to revive classical natural law and that reject the possibility of a science of man have thereby forfeited their opportunity and put in question their fitness to undertake this creative task of theory. We require boldly speculative theorizing that is prepared to build upon rather than to reject the findings of contemporary behavioral science itself and that is prepared to contemplate the implications of these findings for political life, in the light of alternative, articulate value frameworks.

The significance for political science of this kind of creative speculation cannot be overestimated. For those who seek to understand how political systems operate, such speculation provides alternative perspectives from which to determine the salience of the problems they choose for research and analysis. If we take seriously the conclusions of the sociologists of knowledge, then our scientific output is very much shaped by the ethical perspectives we hold. In that event, by failing to encourage within the discipline creative speculation about political alternatives in the largest sense, we cannot help but imprison ourselves within the limitations of the ongoing value framework. As that framework begins to lose its relevance for the problems of society, its system-maintenance commitments must blind us to the urgent questions emerging even for the immediate future.

And this is precisely what has happened to political science. Both our philosophers and our scientists have failed to reconstruct our value frameworks in any relevant sense and to test them by creatively contemplating new kinds of political systems that might better meet the needs of a post-industrial, cybernetic society. A new set of ethical perspectives woven around this theme might sensitize us to a whole range of new kinds of basic political problems worth investigating. It might also point up the significance of inquiry into these problems with new or radically modified types of relevant empirical theories. Thereby we could perhaps be freed from that occupational myopia brought about by excessive attention to the facts as they are. We would perhaps be less prone to stumble into the pitfall of "empirical conservatism,"[11] or commitment to system-maintenance perspectives, of which political science has with justice been accused[12] by post-behavioralists and others.

In these several ways, then, does our discipline need reordering. Basic research needs to be maintained as an investment for the future. But even *its* priorities need to be rearranged in the light of a better understanding of its own value assumptions. Applied, action-oriented research requires more systematic attention than ever before. We need greater awareness of the limits that our value premises have imposed on our research; and on the solid foundation of knowledge constructed by behavioral research, alternative possible rearrangements of our political relationships need to be seriously contemplated.

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[9] R. S. Lynd, *Knowledge for What?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939).

[10] D. Easton, *The Political System*, chapters 9 and 10.

[11] H. Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964). chapter 4.

[12] See C. A. McCoy and J. Playford (eds.), *Apolitical Politics* (New York: Crowell, 1967) and D. Easton, *The Political System*, chapters 2 and 11.

### VI. THE PROFESSION AND THE USE OF KNOWLEDGE

Not only our discipline, however, but our profession needs restructuring to bring it into harmony with the changing conceptions of social science. Our ~~discipline refers to our intellectual~~ enterprise; our profession, to the trained and expert scholars who participate ~~in the discipline.~~ Post-behavioralism suggests that behavioral commitments create not only a discipline but a profession that shows a declining relevance to the political world around it.

*The behavioral image of the profession*

Two basic reasons account for this decline, it is in effect argued. First, professionalization of the discipline in behavioral terms has nourished an image of political science in which knowledge and action have been carefully separated and compartmentalized.[13] As scientists possessed of special skills, we see ourselves as purveyors of something called professional expertise. Our task as experts is to offer advice about means only, not about the purposes to which our knowledge might be put. As the well-worn adage puts it, we are on tap, not on top.

In fact, as post-behavioralism correctly asserts, the expert has never lived by this rule. In the discipline, as we have already noted, behavioral inquiry has not been able to attain any real measure of ethical neutrality. This has had serious consequences for basic research. In the profession too, the critics point out, ethical neutrality is no less spurious. In the application of his knowledge the political scientist explicitly or unwittingly accepts the value premises of those he serves. His posture of neutrality has the added consequence of undermining his will or capacity to challenge the broader purposes to which his knowledge is put.

A second reason accounts for the decline of professional relevance. Here post-behavioralism breaks sharply with the prevailing professional paradigm about the moral relationship between research and action. In the behavioral interpretation, the possession of knowledge imposes no special obligation on the political scientist to put his knowledge to use in the service of society. He remains free to choose whether or not he ought to step outside his scientific role for this purpose. This laissez faire attitude towards political engagement has been an accepted moral premise of the profession. It has permitted if not encouraged withdrawal from political strife. Knowledge is divorced from action.

For post-behavioralism, however, the line between pure research and service begins to fade. Knowledge brings an awareness of alternatives and their consequences. This opportunity for rational choice imposes special obligations on the knower. The political scientist as a professional is the knower *par excellence.* It is therefore immoral for him not to act on his knowledge. In holding that to know is to bear a responsibility for acting, post-behavioralism joins a venerable tradition inherited from such diverse sources as Greek classical philosophy, Karl Marx, John Dewey, and modern existentialism.

*Criteria for the use of knowledge*

The implications of this post-behavioral shift in the image of the professional's role in society are considerable. If the political scientist is to evaluate the uses to which his knowledge is being put and if he is himself to bring his knowledge to bear on social issues, what criteria are to guide his choices? Here post-behavioralism returns to the humanist conception of the intellectual as the guardian of those civilized, humane values known to most men. It is incumbent on the professional to see to it that all society, not just a privileged part, benefits from his expertise. His obligations are met only if he takes into account the broadest spectrum of interests in society.

Many post-behavioralists scrutinize the activities of scholars in recent years and conclude that the talents of political scientists have been put in the service largely of the elites in society—in government, business, the military and voluntary organizations. The professional is seen as having little communication and contact with those who characteristically benefit least from the fruits of modern industrial society—the racial and economic minorities, the unrepresented publics at home, and the colonial masses abroad. These are the groups least able to command the resources of expertise for which political science stands. The social responsibility of the political science expert is to rectify the imbalance.

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[13] See especially T. Roszak (ed.), *The Dissenting Academy* (New York: Random House, 1968), Introduction.

In this post-behavioral view, the application of expert knowledge in the service of social reform becomes competitive with the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. Reform becomes inseparable from knowledge.

Clearly there is in birth a new image of the professional, one in which science is not necessarily denied its place but in which the scientist is no longer free to divorce the life of the mind from the life of social action. Weber's differentiation between the vocation of the scientist and that of the politician no longer wholly suffices.

This new image leads to the politicization of the profession. If the individual professional is called upon to utilize his knowledge on behalf of society, those collectivities of experts that we call the professional associations are themselves equally culpable if in their corporate capacity they fail to challenge the purposes to which their expertise may be put or if they fail to act when their knowledge warns them of danger. Herein lie the moral and intellectual roots of the constant pressure of the professional associations to take positions on public issues about which their competence may give them special knowledge.

### *The politicization of the profession*

This post-behavioral tendency to politicize the professional associations has met with great resistance. Objection arises less from principled argument than from the practical fear that our professional associations will no longer be able to fulfill their normal scientific purposes. Let us grant the plausibility of this practical consideration. Even so, do we need to reject entirely the new moral image being developed by post-behavioralism?

One fact is clear. The crisis of our times spares no group, not even the social sciences. The pressures to utilize all of our resources in critically evaluating goals as well as in providing effective means are too great to be denied. For increasing numbers of us it is no longer practical or morally tolerable to stand on the political sidelines when our expertise alerts us to disaster.

In accepting this new (but ancient) obligation of the intellectual, however, we need to recognize that the professional political scientist may engage in three distinguishable kinds of activity. These are teaching and research on the one hand and practical politics on the other. Somewhere between these the political scientist acts as a consultant and an adviser. Each of these kinds of activity—as a scholar, politician, and consultant—shapes and influences the other. Is it feasible to construct a single organization that will serve the collective purposes of the profession for facilitating all three of these kinds of activities? It seems highly unlikely. Can we provide some sensible division of labor among different organizations that will permit the fullest expression for all those activities into which these critical times are pressing the professional political scientist? This seems possible.

We can conceive of some professional organizations being devoted largely to that kind of action that helps to add to our store of basic knowledge and that eases communication among ourselves and among succeeding generations of political scientists. These we already have in our professional associations. They are designed to aid both teaching and research. We can, however, also conceive of other types of professional organizations that would be concerned with structuring the application of our expertise to ongoing critical social problems. This kind of organization we do not yet have in political science, or, for that matter, in the social sciences as a whole.

But here if we consider the matter only as political scientists we create insurmountable difficulties for ourselves. Social problems do not come neatly packaged as economic, psychological, political and the like. Our crises arise out of troubles that involve all aspects of human behavior. Our professional associations are oriented toward the disciplines, and these are analytic fields. Of necessity they piece up reality into specialties that have meaning largely for the pursuit of fundamental understanding. For purposes of setting goals and determining means for solving social problems, however, we need to draw the disciplines together again into a single organization, one that can mobilize the resources of all the social sciences and bring them to a focus on specific issues.

To this end it is time that we accept our special responsibility as students of politics. We must take the initiative by calling for the establishment of a Federation of Social Scientists, a proposal that has already been advanced by one of our colleagues.[14] The tasks of such a Federation would be to identify the major issues of the day, clarify objectives, evaluate action taken by others, study and propose alternative solutions, and press these vigorously in the political sphere.

Without collectively politicizing ourselves in this way, by the very act of standing by while the problems of the world continue to increase in numbers and intensity, we thereby uncritically acquiesce in prevailing policies. We in fact adopt a political position. By acting collectively in our professional capacities through a Federation of Social Scientists, we will have an opportunity to justify our policies intellectually and morally. Thereby we may begin to satisfy our growing sense of political responsibility in an age of crisis. At the same time we shall be able to preserve our historic institutions, the professional associations, for the continuing pursuit of fundamental knowledge.

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[14] David Singer of the Mental Health Research Institute, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, in personal correspondence.

Such a Federation would fail in its responsibilities, however, if it became merely an echo of national goals, an instrument of official policy, or a bland critic of things as they are. If Mannheim is correct in describing the intellectual as the least rooted of all social groups, the professional social scientist ought to view himself as committed to the broadest of humane values. These need to be the touchstone that he brings to bear on social isuses. Yet many barriers block the way. Of these identification with the goals and interests of one's nation is prominent. Political scientists have still to escape the crippling effects for scholarship of unwitting commitment to national goals and perspectives. Just as science as a set of disciplines has pretensions to being international in scope, so the social scientist himself needs to be denationalized. Some day, like the ideal international civil servant, the professional social scientist too may be permitted to achieve maximum freedom from national commitments by being obliged to carry an international passport and to conduct himself accordingly.

For the profession, therefore, the emerging post-behavioral phase is encouraging the development of a new norm of behavior. It sees policy engagement as a social responsibility of the intellectual whatever the institutional form through which this may be expressed. Some day it may also require the release of the social scientist from bondage to the unique needs and objectives of his own national political system.

It is clear that changing times require radical re-thinking of what we are and what we want to be both as a discipline and as a profession. Post-behavioralism is a pervasive intellectual tendency today that reveals a major effort to do just this. Its very pervasiveness prevents it from becoming the possession of any one group or of any one political ideology. It supports and extends behavioral methods and techniques by seeking to make their substantive implications more cogent for the problems of our times. Post-behavioralism stands, therefore, as the most recent contribution to our collective heritage. For that very reason, as an intellectual tendency it is not the threat and danger that some seem to fear. Rather, in the broad historical perspectives of our discipline, the post-behavioral revolution represents an opportunity for necessary change. We may choose to take advantage of it, reject it, or modify it. But to ignore it is impossible. It is a challenge to re-examine fearlessly the premises of our research and the purposes of our calling.

# POLITICAL THEORY AS A VOCATION*

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The purpose of this paper is to sketch some of the implications, prospective and retrospective, of the primacy of method in the present study of politics and to do it by way of a contrast, which is deliberately heightened, but hopefully not caricatured, between the vocation of the "methodist"[1] and the vocation of the theorist. My discussion will be centered around the kinds of activity involved in the two vocations. During the course of the discussion various questions will be raised, primarily the following: What is the idea which underlies method and how does it compare with the older understanding of theory? What is involved in choosing one rather than the other as the way to political knowledge? What are the human or educational consequences of the choice, that is, what is demanded of the person who commits himself to one or the other? What is the typical stance towards the political world of the methodist and how does it compare to the theorist's?

The discussion which follows will seek, first, to locate the idea of method in the context of the "behavioral revolution," and, second, to examine the idea itself in terms of some historical and analytical considerations. Then, proceeding on the assumption that the idea of method, like all important intellectual choices, carries a price, the discussion will concentrate on some of the personal, educational, vocational, and political consequences of this particular choice. Finally, I shall attempt to relate the idea of the vocation of political theory to these same matters.

## I. THE IDEA OF "METHOD" IN THE BEHAVIORAL REVOLUTION

In compiling its recent *Biographical Directory*, the American Political Science Association distributed a questionnaire which in its own way helped raise the present question, "What is the vocation of the political theorist?" Political Theorists were invited to identify themselves by choosing among "Political Theory and Philosophy (Empirical)," "Political Theory and Philosophy (Historical)," and "Political Theory and Philosophy (Normative)." Although the choices offered may signify vitality and diversity, they may also testify to considerable confusion about the nature of political theory. For their part, political theorists may think of it as an identity crisis induced by finding themselves officially assigned a classification which others have defined, a classification traceable to a set of assumptions about the nature of the theoretical life perhaps uncongenial to many theorists.

Beyond the matter of professional identity there are far more compelling reasons for raising the question of vocation. Whatever one's assessment of the "behavioral revolution," it clearly has succeeded in transforming political science. What is less clear is the precise nature of that revolution. Among leading spokesmen of the profession it has become stylish to interpret that revolution as a close facsimile of the sorts of scientific changes discussed by Thomas Kuhn in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.[2] Accordingly, the behavioral revolution is described as the inauguration of a new theoretical paradigm. Such a view, I think, is mistaken. It blurs the significance of the change. A more accurate account is suggested by the following: "One of the most significant recent developments in the social sciences is the revolution in data gathering and data evaluation. This revolution depends upon the developments in techniques by which data can be collected and analyzed. . . . "[3]

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* This is a revised version of a paper delivered September, 1968, before the Conference for the Study of Political Thought.

[1] "*Methodist.* One who is skilled in, or attaches great importance to, method; one who follows a (specified) method." *Oxford Universal Dictionary.*

Although most social scientists would contend that actual research rarely conforms to a step-by-step procedure, it remains the case that such procedure stands as a model for what they aim at. Thus, in a section of a text-book on research methods entitled "Major Steps in Research," the authors insert the qualification above but acknowledge that "published research strongly suggests the existence of a prescribed sequence of procedures, each step presupposing the completion of the preceding one." Claire Selltiz *et al.*, *Research Methods in Social Relations*, rev. ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), pp. 8–9.

[2] I have discussed Kuhn's interpretation and its relevance to political science in "Paradigms and Political Theories," *Politics and Experience. Essays Presented to Michael Oakeshott*, ed. P. King and B. C. Parekh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 125–152.

Assuming that this statement reflects a widespread sentiment which guides the actual practice of the profession, it provides a clue to the nature of the changes, what they are and what they are not, and what they signify for the vocations of political scientists and theorists. Despite claims to the contrary, political science has not undergone a revolution of the type described by Kuhn in which a new and dominant theory is installed. Although an abundance of new "theories" is available to the political scientist, it should be remembered that, by Kuhn's canon, the mere existence of new theories, or even the fact that some theories have attracted a following, are not conclusive evidence of a revolution. What counts is the enforcement by the scientific community of one theory to the exclusion of its rivals.

Although it is sometimes contended that "systems theory" constitutes the paradigmatic theory of the revolution, it is doubtful that this claim is tenable. Not only is there confusion about which of the several versions of the theory is the preferred one, or even whether any version is useful, but, above all, the popularity of systems theory followed rather than produced the behavioral revolution.

Whatever else it may be, a revolution without an initiating theory cannot qualify as a revolution by Kuhn's criterion. It may be, rather, a typically American revolution in which theories play a minor role. American political scientists, for the most part, have not only generally supported the traditional American diffidence toward theories, but they have elevated it to scientific status. The suspicion of theories is alleged to be a powerful contributor to the political stability of America and to its genius for pragmatic rather than ideological politics. In making this assertion I am not unmindful that there is hardly to be found a journal of political science in which some contemporary has not noted that "the mere accumulation of data without a guiding theory is, etc. . . . " Nor has it escaped my attention that a wide variety of theories exists for the political scientist to choose among. To call them political theories is, in the language of philosophy, to commit something like a category mistake. Systems theories, communication theories, and structural-functional theories are unpolitical theories shaped by the desire to explain certain forms of non-political phenomena. They offer no significant choice or critical analysis of the quality, direction, or fate of public life. Where they are not alien intrusions, they share the same uncritical—and therefore untheoretical—assumptions of the prevailing political ideology which justifies the present "authoritative allocation of values" in our society.

Nonetheless, to say that there has been no political theory which has inspired the revolution in political science is not to say either that there has been no revolution or that no intellectual patterns are being widely promoted throughout the discipline. There has in fact been a certain revolution in political science, one that reflects a tradition of politics which has prided itself on being pragmatic and concerned mainly with workable techniques. Like all technique-oriented activity, the behavioral movement presupposes that the fundamental purposes and arrangements served by its techniques have been settled and that, accordingly, it reenforces, tacitly or explicitly, those purposes and arrangements and operates according to a notion of alternatives tightly restricted by these same purposes and arrangements. The emphasis upon methods does not signify simply the acquisition of a "kit" of new "tools," but presupposes a viewpoint which has profound implications for the empirical world, the vocation and the education of political scientists, and the resources which nourish the theoretical imagination.

To contend that the idea of method is the central fact of the behavioral revolution is merely to repeat what the revolutionaries themselves have stated. "Most important, perhaps, the criteria by which one accepts or rejects statements about social life are of a special nature. The ultimate criterion is the method by which they are gathered."[4] If it should be the case that a widespread set of assumptions is commonly held among those committed to the primacy of method, it is of little consequence that the techniques are diverse and changing. What matters are the common assumptions and consequences which accompany the emphasis on technique. The extent of this transformation is such as to suggest that the study of politics is now dominated by the belief that the main objective—acquiring scientific knowledge about politics—depends upon the adoption and refinement of specific techniques and that to be qualified or certified as a political scientist is tantamount to possessing prescribed techniques. Concurrent with this development there has been an effort to imbue political scientists with what is understood to be the ethic of science: objectivity, detachment, fidelity to fact, and deference to intersubjective verification by a community of practitioners. These changes add up to a vocation, a *vita methodica,* which includes a specified set of skills, a mode of practice, and an informing ethic. This vocation, and the education which it requires, may mark the significance of the behavioral revolution.

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[3] G. A. Almond and S. Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 43.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

At this point a protest might be made that too much is being read into the idea of method. Methods *per se* do not presuppose a philosophical view of things, but are neutral or instrumental, analogous to the technician in being indifferent to the purposes of their master. Such an argument is not only wrong but superficial. In the first place, the elevation of techniques has important curricular consequences. The requirement that students become proficient in an assortment of technical skills preempts a substantial portion of their time and energy. But more important, training in techniques has educational consequences for it affects the way in which the initiates will look upon the world and especially the political portion of it. "Methodism" is ultimately a proposal for shaping the mind. Social scientists have sensed this when they have noted that research methods are "tools" which "can become a way of looking at the world, of judging everyday experience."[5]

In the second place, the alleged neutrality of a methodist's training overlooks significant philosophical assumptions admittedly incorporated into the outlook of those who advocate scientific inquiry into politics. These assumptions are such as to reenforce an uncritical view of existing political structures and all that they imply. For the employment of method assumes, even requires, that the world be of one kind rather than another if techniques are to be effective. Method is not a thing for all worlds. It presupposes a certain answer to a Kantian type of question, What must the world be like for the methodist's knowledge to be possible? This presupposition is illustrated by a recent example which listed the major assumptions alleged to underly the "movement" of political behavior. The first item was: "*Regularities.* These are discoverable uniformities in political behavior. These can be expressed in generalizations or theories with explanatory and predictive value."[6] It follows that the methodist is in trouble when the world exhibits "deformities" or emergent irregularities. As the unhappy state of theories of "development" or "modernization" suggests, similar trouble appears when the world manifests "multiformities."[7]

This is but to say that there are inherent limits to the kinds of questions which the methodist deems appropriate. The kind of world hospitable to method invites a search for those regularities that reflect the main patterns of behavior which society is seeking to promote and maintain. Predictable behavior is what societies live by, hence their structures of coercion, of rewards and penalties, of subsidies and discouragements are shaped toward producing and maintaining certain regularities in behavior and attitudes. Further, every society is a structure bent in a particular and persistent way so that it constitutes not only an arrangement of power but also of powerlessness, of poverty as well as wealth, injustice and justice, suppression and encouragement.

It is symptomatic in this connection that political scientists have increasingly taken to describing themselves as "normal scientists."[8] The phrase is Kuhn's and he used it to designate a type of scientist whose vocation is not to create theories or even to criticize them but to accept the dominant theory approved by the scientific community and to put it to work. But if we ask, what is the dominant theoretical paradigm of our normal (political) scientists, the answer is that, in Kuhn's sense, there is none. Yet, surely, although there is no paradigm derived from what Kuhn calls "an extraordinary theory," such as Galileo or Newton produced, there must still be some guiding assumptions or framework which the methodist follows. The answer, I have suggested, is that there is such a framework of assumptions. It is the ideological paradigm reflective of the same political community which the normal scientists are investigating.[9] Thus when a researcher takes "the normal flow of events in American politics" as his starting point, it is not surprising to find him concluding that "the long-run stability of the system depends on the underlying division of party loyalties."[10]

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[5] Selltiz, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 6–7.

[6] D. Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 7.

[7] As a recent work on political socialization (which is described as "a universal feature of political life . . .") admits: " . . . the reader is forewarned that the treatment is heavily biased in favor of a model appropriate to western democracies, particularly in the United States."

[8] See, for example, H. Eulau's language in I. de Sola Pool (ed.), *Contemporary Political Science* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 58–59; and the more cautious remarks in A. Somit and J. Tanenhaus, *The Development of American Political Science* (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1967), pp. 174ff.

[9] This may appear contentious, but, in reality, it is only a restatement of what appears in G. A.

These considerations become even more compelling if we concentrate for a moment upon the "systems" theorist. If society is conceived to be a system of decision-making, and if the recurrence of unjust decisions is commonly acknowledged, it follows that the system is, to some persistent degree, a structure of systematic injustice, otherwise the idea of a system is an inadequate account. The built-in embarrassments of a particular system have sometimes been recognized, as when it is asserted that a supposedly democratic system requires a certain measure of indifference or apathy, especially on the part of the poor and the uneducated. This reservation about systems which purport to be democratic, and hence participatory, is sometimes stated more bluntly when the system in question is non-Western:

> In the Congo, in Vietnam, in the Dominican Republic, it is clear that order depends on *somehow compelling* newly mobilized strata to return to a measure of passivity and defeatism from which they have recently been aroused by the process of modernization.[11]

For the most part, however, the systems theorist prefers to emphasize more formal regularities. Thus, for example, the political system is defined as a special form of "social interactions . . . that are predominantly oriented toward the authoritative allocation of values for a society."[12] What is most revealing about this definition is the location of the word "predominantly": it is placed so as to qualify the "interactions" and thereby to enable subsequent research to distinguish political from social interactions. If the same word had been used, instead, to qualify the "allocations," a substantially different view of a system would have emerged, one in which the allocations would be seen to favor some interactions rather than others. It is acknowledged in the work cited that the favored theory may "inadvertently" exclude "some elements of major importance,"[13] but not that a system may require deliberate and systematic exclusion of major elements. Rather, it is agreed that "a systems approach draws us away from a discussion of the way in which the political pie is cut up and how it happens to get cut up in one way rather than another." The remedy for this "*status quo* bias" is to fall back upon "partial theories" which deal with selected aspects of the *same* system, e.g., theories of "decision-making, coalition strategies, game theories, power, and group analysis."[14] What is conveniently overlooked by this recipe is that it merely reaffirms in different form, the same culinary assumptions about the common pie, for each partial theory claims to be a plausible account of the same whole.

That a discussion of method should naturally lead to considering some prominent theories current among political scientists is not surprising. Most contemporary theories are dependent upon the behavioral revolution, not only in the methodological sense that the theories in question look to behavioral techniques for confirmation or disconfirmation, but in the more important sense of sharing the same outlook regarding education, philosophical assumptions, and political ideology. The close linkage between contemporary ideas of theory and of methods justifies treating them as members of the same family, forming a community of common features which I have labelled "methodism." As the earlier pages have tried to suggest, the idea of method has come to mean far more than was implied by Bentham, for example, when he called it "the order of investigation."[15] It can be better understood as constituting an alternative to the *bios theoretikos*, and, as such, is one of the major achievements of the behavioral revolution. To grasp the nature of the *vita methodica* is not only important for its own sake, but should help in distinguishing it from the activity and vocation of theory.

## II. HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF "METHOD"

One way to get at the idea of method is to recognize that it has a history reaching back to ancient Greek philosophy. Like *philosophia*, *methodus* was often used in association with the notion of a "way" (*aporie*) to truth.[16] Before

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Almond, "Political Theory and Political Science," *American Political Science Review*, LX (1966), 873–875.

[10] A. Campbell, "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change," in A. Campbell *et al.*, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966), p. 45.

[11] I. de Sola Pool, "The Public and the Polity," in Pool (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 26 (emphasis added).

[12] Easton, *Framework*, p. 50.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

[14] D. Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 475.

[15] *Works*, ed. J. Bowring, 11 vols. (Edinburgh, 1843), Vol. II, p. 493.

[16] Heraclitus, frags. 203, 235; Parmenides,

long, *methodus* and *philosophia* began to diverge. Generally speaking, while *philosophia* and its sister, *theoria*, tended to stress the arduous difficulties awaiting those who sought truth, the devotees of *methodus* began to emphasize the economy of being methodical, that is, of faithfully following a prescribed sequence of mental steps, a "straight road" in Descartes' phrase.[17] The old metaphor of the "way" was subtly altered and became associated with the advantages of adhering to a beaten path rather than "blazing" a trail. A premonition of this change appeared in the Middle Ages when *methodus* tended to acquire the connotation of a "short-cut." It found popular expression in numerous attempts to compose *compendia* on various subjects.[18]

During the Middle Ages and well into the sixteenth century the idea of method remained encumbered by Aristotelian and scholastic logic. As a result, method was tightly bound by logical procedures whose main aim was to sift and order inherited knowledge and experience rather than to discover new things. Thus the two main procedures of scholastic logic were "invention" (*inventio*), or the methods by which contestable propositions could be analyzed pro and con, and "judgment" or "disposition" (*iudicium*), which comprised the methods of arranging words into propositions, then into syllogisms or inductions, and finally into whole discourses. The conservatory quality of method was illustrated in a sixteenth-century work, *The Rule of Reason*, written by Thomas Wilson and published in 1551. Declaring that "a reason [is] easier found than fashioned," he compared the logic of "invention" with the sort of traditional lore acquired by huntsmen, saying that "he that will take profite in this parte of logique, must be like a hunter, and learne by labour to knowe the boroughes. For these places [i.e., a marke whiche gieuth warnyng to our memory what we maie speake probablie] be nothyng els but couertes or boroughes, wherein if any one searche dilígentlie, he maie fynd game at pleasure." In his definition of "method," Wilson clearly expressed the view of one who saw it primarily as an ordering and clarifying procedure, "the maner of handeling a single Question, and the readie waie howe to teache and sette forth any thyng plainlie, and in order, as it should be, in latine *Methodus*."[19]

Throughout the sixteenth century method continued to be thought of mainly in organizational terms. Petrus Ramus, the most influential writer of the period, reflected this tendency. "Method," according to his definition, "is of arrangement, by which among many things the first in respect to conspicuousness is put in the first place, the second in the second, the third in the third, and so on. This term refers to every discipline and every dispute. Yet it commonly is taken in the sense of a direction sign and of a shortening of the highway."[20] Despite the static nature of Ramus's conception, there was some anxiety about "the new devised aid." With his customary irony, Richard Hooker entered some reservations:

> Of marvellous quick despatch it is, and doth shew them that have it as much almost in three days, as if it dwell threescore years with them . . . Because the curiosity of man's wit doth many times with peril wade farther in the search of things than were convenient; the same is thereby restrained unto such generalities as every where offering themselves are apparent unto men of the weakest conceit that need be. So as following the rules and precepts thereof, we may define it to be, an Art which teacheth the way of speedy discourse, and restraineth the mind of man that it may not wax over-wise.[21]

Scarcely a generation later the restraints were rejected and Descartes introduced a new "way of speedy discourse" that promised to make men "the lords and possessors of nature."[22] The crucial step between Hooker and

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frags. 342, 344–7. G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957). The idea reappears in Machiavelli, *Discorsi*, Bk. I, Preface; Tocqueville, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. J.-P. Mayer (Paris: Gallimard, 1961–), Vol. I, p. 293.

[17] *Discourse on Method*, tr. J. Veitch, *The Method, Meditations, and Philosophy of Descartes* (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., n.d.), Pt. I, p. 149.

[18] See W. Ong, *Ramus. Method and the Decay of Dialogue* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 53ff.; N. W. Gilbert, *Renaissance Concepts of Method* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 3ff.

[19] All quotations are from W. S. Howell, *Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500–1700* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1961), pp. 21, 23–24. The Ramist influence upon the American Puritans has been discussed by Perry Miller, *The New England Mind, The Seventeenth Century* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1939, 1961), p. 154ff. and Appendix A.

[20] Howell, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

[21] *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885), I.vi:4.

[22] *Discourse on Method* (Veitch trans.), Pt. VI, p. 192.

Descartes had been taken by Bacon who developed a distinction between two kinds of *inventio*, one a technique for the discovery of things not previously known, the other for the rediscovery of something previously known but temporarily forgotten.[23] Rightly understood, method promised not only "the use of knowledge" but, above all, "the *progression* of knowledge."[24]

With the gradual development of the idea of method, its significance soon extended beyond the simple advantages of economy and efficiency of mental effort. In following a shortcut, the mind was literally "conducting" inquiry, that is, comporting itself in a special way, following a code of intellectual conduct which, while it might not automatically lead to new truths, would for the most part prevent the methodist from wandering into grievous errors. Thus method came to mean, among other things, a form of discipline designed to compensate for unfortunate proclivities of the mind. "I am indeed amazed," Descartes exclaimed, "when I consider how weak my mind is and how prone to error."[25]

Descartes was among the first to realize that the adoption of the methodical point of view was at least as important as the acquisition of specified techniques. To adopt a method was not equivalent to buying a new suit, to a transaction in which only the external appearance of the purchaser was altered. It was, instead, a profound personal choice, perhaps the closest functional equivalent to conversionary experience that the modern mind can achieve. At the very least, it was intended as a form of reeducation, as one of Descartes' works, *Regulae ad directionem ingenii,* implied. The educational force of the title has been partially lost in translation, *Rules for the Direction of the Mind. Ingenium* carries the meaning of "nature, character, temperament," rather than the more narrowly intellectualistic connotations of "mind." That work described the specific steps for conditioning and disciplining the *ingenium* of the novice, for "rendering [it] more apt in the discovery of yet other truths." The human tendency "to guess unmethodically, at random," not only produced error but mental flabbiness as well. "In so proceeding we are bound to weaken the mind's powers of insight" and, therefore, a strict program was required. "We ought to train ourselves first in those easier matters, but methodically. Thereby we shall accustom ourselves to proceed always by easy and familiar paths, and so, as easily as though we were at play, to penetrate ever more deeply into the truth of things."[26]

The celebrated Cartesian principle of doubt formed a vital part of the new regimen for the mind. Doubt was the means of preparing the mind for *regulae* by first depriving it of the major forms of resistance. Bacon, anticipating the difficulty, had noted that "a new method must be found for quiet entry into minds so choked and overgrown" that only an *expurgatio intellectus* would suffice.[27] Radical doubt was Descartes' version of the purge. Before the mind could proceed methodically, it must be turned upon itself, stripping off acquired habits, beliefs, and values until compelled to face the primordial truth of the *cogito* whose *sum* now stood divested of its cultural heritage in an ahistorical silence. "... Those who have learned the least of all that has hitherto been distinguished by the name of philosophy are the most fitted for the apprehension of truth."[28] What Bacon had exultingly proclaimed earlier, "I have purged and swept and levelled the floor of the mind,"[29] had now been programmed by Descartes.

Descartes attached certain self-denying ordinances to his program that are not without interest in the light of the recent evolution of political science. He singled out some subjects, God among them, as privileged and, therefore, protected from the destructive effects of doubt and methodical probing. He cautioned especially against bringing the new method to bear upon questions of morality and practical action. He himself had decided to accept existing moral values as a "provisional code" before submitting all else to doubt, "lest," as he explained, "I should remain irresolute in my actions . . ." More tellingly, since conflicting opinions often existed about what was right, he would regulate "[his] conduct in conformity with the most moderate opinions, those furthest removed from extremes . . ."[30] On political matters he was equally cautious, but more ambivalent. On the one hand, he expressed great admiration for those political societies which exhibited the rational symmetry legislated by a single intelligence; on the other, he abstained from drawing practical conclusions from this, saying only that most societies manage to work tolerably well over the long-run.[31]

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[23] *Works of Francis Bacon,* ed. R. L. Ellis, J. Spedding and D. D. Heath, 7 vols. (London: 1887–92), Vol. VI, pp. 268–269.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 289. "We know that the founders [of New England] studied Francis Bacon." Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

[25] *Meditations,* II in *Descartes. Philosophical Writings,* tr. N. K. Smith (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 189.

[26] Rules X–XI (tr. N. K. Smith), pp. 43–44, 47.

[27] Cited in P. Rossi, *Francis Bacon. From Magic to Science,* tr. S. Rabinovitch (London: Routledge, 1968), p. 141.

[28] "Preface to the Principles of Philosophy" (tr. Veitch), p. 288.

[29] *Francis Bacon. Selected Writings,* ed. H. G. Dick (New York: Random House, 1955), pp. 435, 533. See also Descartes, *Discourse on Method* in N. K. Smith (ed.), *Descartes. Philosophical Writings,* Pt. IV, p. 118.

Although these political remarks underscore Descartes' preference for rational method over inherited knowledge, they are mainly significant for revealing the reason for his support of the *status quo:* fear of disorder. He was convinced that upheaval invariably followed fundamental reform and that innovators should be warned away:

> Great public institutions, if once overthrown, are excessively difficult to re-establish, or even to maintain erect if once seriously shaken; and their fall cannot but be very violent.[32]

From a preference for the existing scheme of institutions and for "the most moderate" morals it was easy to pass to an identification of the two so that existing arrangements were taken to be the expression of what was reasonable and "furthest removed from extremes." Such a political world snugly fits the methodist's need, not only for the security it provides for his investigations, but also for the assured regularities it gives him to investigate.

What sort of political commitment is likely from a self which has been purged of inherited notions, pledged to the support of existing political and moral schemes, yet inhibited by the belief that they are "provisional"? A self of this type is likely to treat politics and morals in a way that avoids fundamental criticism as well as fundamental commitment. This lack of commitment is connected with the special form which the fear of fundamental change takes with the political methodist. He will boldly renounce any belief in a natural structure of political societies, and declare that "any set of variables selected for description and explanation may be considered a system of behavior. At the outset, whether it is a system given in nature or simply an arbitrary construct of the human mind, is operationally a pointless and needless dichotomy."[33]

Once doubt has abolished all privileged beginnings, there is no compelling reason why *this* rather than *that* should constitute the point of departure or the way of conceiving the problem, just as there is no logical or scientific reason for siding with the status quo. And yet the astonishing culmination of these arbitrary choices is not a truly sceptical temper but, as Descartes frankly admitted, rigidity and single-mindedness.

> My second maxim was to be as unwavering and as resolute in my actions as possible, and having once adopted opinions to adhere to them, however in themselves open to doubt, no less steadfastly than if they had been amply confirmed.

Descartes embellished the point by a contrast between the person who clings steadfastly to a chosen belief and the confused traveller who constantly changes directions. "Even though at the start it may have been chance alone which determined . . . [the] choice of direction," and even though what the resolute person takes to be "very certain and true" may be very doubtful, he is still likely to get *somewhere,* and, at the same time, he most certainly will be relieved from "all the repentings and feelings of remorse which are wont to disturb the consciences" of those who vacillate.[34]

How does the state of contemporary political science compare with the Cartesian philosophy of method? Despite occasional deference paid to "the tradition of political theory," there is a widely shared belief that that tradition was largely unscientific where it was not antiscientific and that the defining characteristic of a scientific revolution is to break with the past.[35] This animus against tradition will be considered at greater length when we try to assess its significance for the study of politics.

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[30] *Philosophical Writings* (ed. Smith), *Discourse on Method,* III, p. 111.

[31] *Ibid.,* II, pp. 103–104, 112.

[32] *Ibid.,* Pt. II, p. 103.

[33] Easton, *A Framework,* p. 30.

[34] *Discourse on Method,* tr. Smith, Pt. III, pp. 111–113.

[35] "It is the very essence of the theoretical enterprise that, if and when it seems appropriate, it should feel free to sever itself from the bonds of traditional ways of looking at political life." Easton, *A Framework,* p. viii.

There is no doubt that breaking with the past has been a feature of all great theoretical innovations, including those in the history of political theory. Yet the matter is not that simple, as witness Plato's respect for tradition, Aristotle's deference to his predecessors, Augustine's retrieval of major aspects of classicism, and Machiavelli's insistence on restoring certain forms of classical political knowledge. Hobbes was probably the first writer to advocate a break in the modern sense. Some aspects of his attempt will be discussed in my forthcoming essay, *Hobbes: Political Theory as Epic* (University of California Press).

Here we are concerned with Descartes' view of politics and especially with his counsels about political change. It is easier and safer, he declared, to reconstitute the foundations of knowledge than to attempt "the slightest reformation in public affairs."[36] An echo in contemporary political science is the following:

> A political system is an accident. It is an accumulation of habits, customs, prejudices, and principles that have survived a long process of trial and error and of ceaseless response to changing circumstance. If the system works well on the whole, it is a lucky accident—the luckiest, indeed, that can befall a society . . . To meddle with the structure and operation of a successful political system is therefore the greatest foolishness that men are capable of. Because the system is intricate beyond comprehension, the chance of improving it in the ways intended is slight, whereas the danger of disturbing its workings and setting off a succession of unwarranted effects that will extend throughout the whole society is great.[37]

It might be objected that many contemporary political scientists would disavow this formulation as extreme and would draw attention to their repeated efforts at reform. Without wishing to deprecate these efforts, the contention remains that most proposals for reform on the part of political scientists represent a narrow range of alternatives founded on the assumption that the system has no inherent defects, or if it has, that these are acceptable "costs." The result is to foreclose a genuinely theoretical discussion which would seriously question and reflect upon the qualities of the system as a whole. Accordingly, the political scientist tends to follow the Cartesian path of extolling the existing as "the most moderate" or "further removed from extremes," and then defending it as though it were "very certain and true." This has taken the by now familiar form of identifying the American political system with "normal politics" and then seeking to establish by empirical methods the factors which produce it. There then follows the general explanation that the system has functioned normally, i.e., in a stable way, because it has avoided immoderation, i.e., "extremism" or "intensity." America has been spared these evils, it is alleged, not because of the excellence of her institutions or her citizens, but because of such factors as: the absence of ideological conflicts and political passions, a healthy amount of voter apathy, a measure of voter ignorance, political parties whose genius is to abstain from presenting clearly defined alternatives, the influence of cross-pressures which fragment the citizen's loyalties and reduce his commitments to the consistency of Jello, a strategy of decision-making which favors "small or incremental change" because it is not disruptive,[38] and a system where the access to power succeeds in keeping at bay the poor, ignorant, deviant, and deprived.

## III. CONSEQUENCES OF "METHODISM" IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCIENCE

It would be easy, especially at the present time when attacks upon liberal pluralism are increasing, to dismiss as an unfortunate lapse the way in which contemporary political science has come to such good terms with American politics. To accuse political science of an ideological bias is not to explain why it succumbed to the bias, or whether the nature of political science in America is or has always been such that identification with the going scheme of things is a recurrent temptation. Only a superficial view would hold that the condition of American political science can be remedied merely by substituting an opposing ideology. Perhaps the problem is far more deeply rooted in the past of American political science and American political society itself. If this should be the case, it would be mere *ante bellum* nostalgia to attempt to return to the state of political science before the behavioral revolution. If such an attempt were made, it is likely that both political science and political theory would be found similarly tainted.

To expose the common root of a problem as vast as this is patently beyond our present scope, but a suggestion as to its nature is perhaps possible. Two assertions by Tocqueville supply the starting-point. The first is: "Hardly anyone in the United States devotes himself to the essentially theoretical and abstract portion of human knowledge." The second is: "Among democratic nations . . . the woof of time is every instant broken and the track of generations effaced."[39] These may be characterized as a diffidence toward theory and history. Rather than attempt to trace the course of this diffidence, let us try to suggest how it is manifested in contemporary political science, but remembering that today's political science is remarkable for its Cartesian methodism and for its protestations about the importance of theory as a guide for empirical research. The possibility to be explored is whether the age-old problem of America, its suspicion of theory and of the human past, has not been worsened by the behavioral revolution, especially in the domain of education.

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[36] *Discourse on Method*, Veitch tr., Pt. II, p. 158.

[37] Edward C. Banfield, "In Defense of the American Party System," *Voting, Interest Groups, and Parties*, ed. B. Seasholes (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1966), p. 130.

[38] D. Braybrooke and E. Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision* (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 73.

[39] *Democracy in America* (ed. P. Bradley), 2 vols. New York: Knopf, 1945), Vol. II, pp. 42, 99.

The first methodistic act for the Cartesian was to purge the self of the opinions acquired by upbringing, education, and common experience. The contemporary methodist performs the same act of divestment, except that he will use the language of social science in order to explain that he must, as far as possible, rid the mind of biases and preconceptions, such as those produced by class, status, occupation, family, religious upbringing, or political attachments. In so doing, he is performing a true ritual, the reenactment of the archetypal American experience of breaking with the past. Or, if this seems too esoteric, perhaps the purged methodist is merely a footnote to Tocqueville's remark that "America is one of the countries where the precepts of Descartes are least studied and are best applied."[40]

This anti-traditionalist bias, cultivated in the name of the elimination of bias, has manifested itself on numerous occasions during the past decades as the effort to diminish the significance of "traditional political theory," as it has revealingly been called. Some have wished to have it eliminated entirely from the education of political scientists, while others have been mainly concerned to substitute a more scientific version of theory, and still others have wished to rescue individual "propositions" from the corpus of the ancient literature and submit them to operational testing. Leaving aside the criticisms which are anti-theoretical in principle, the other responses are interesting because what they are objecting to is not "theory" but a tradition of theory. Stated differently, what is bothersome about the history of theory is that it displays the working out of an inherited form, which is what a tradition is all about. Political theory has been perhaps the only field of study in all of American political science to exhibit this peculiar feature. Moreover, since the vast bulk of the literature which composes the tradition is European, as well as ancient, it is not difficult to see why it should be an object of suspicion.

This same bias is also manifested against the traditional forms of knowledge to which the methodist falls heir when he chooses to become a student of politics. As an ancient field of study, political science has acquired considerable knowledge about laws, constitutions, institutions, and unwritten practices. This inherited knowledge evokes a typically Cartesian and American response:

> . . . traditional methods [of political science]—i.e., history writing, the description of institutions, and legal analysis—have been thoroughly exploited in the last two generations and now it seems to many (including myself) that they can produce only wisdom and neither science nor knowledge. And while wisdom is certainly useful in the affairs of men, such a result is a failure to live up to the promise in the name of political *science*.[41]

Although one might be troubled by the kind of human concern which would provoke a confrontation between "political wisdom" and "political *science*," the antithesis has the merit of opening the question, What is political wisdom? Put in this vague form, the question is unanswerable, but it may be reformulated so as to be fruitful. The antithesis between political wisdom and political science basically concerns two different forms of knowledge. The scientific form represents the search for rigorous formulations which are logically consistent and empirically testable. As a form, it has the qualities of compactness, manipulability, and relative independence of context. Political wisdom is an unfortunate phrase, for, as the quotation suggested, the question is not *what* it is but *in what* does it inhere. History, knowledge of institutions, and legal analysis were mentioned. Without violating the spirit of the quotation, knowledge of past political theories might also be added. Taken as a whole, this composite type of knowledge presents a contrast with the scientific type. Its mode of activity is not so much the style of the search as of reflection. It is mindful of logic, but more so of the incoherence and contradictoriness of experience. And for the same reason, it is distrustful of rigor. Political life does not yield its significance to terse hypotheses, but is elusive and hence meaningful statements about it often have to be allusive and intimative. Context becomes supremely important, for actions and events occur in no other setting. Knowledge of this type tends, therefore, to be suggestive and illuminative rather than explicit and determinate. Borrowing from Polanyi, we shall call it "tacit political knowledge."[42]

The acquisition of tacit political knowledge is preeminently a matter of education of a particular kind and it is on this ground that the issue needs to be joined with the political methodist. The mentality which is impatient of the past and of traditional political theory is equally curt with the requirements of tacit political knowledge which is rooted in knowledge of the past and of the tradition of theory. The knowledge which the methodist seeks is fairly characterized in his own language as composing a "kit of tools" or a "bag of tricks." To acquire knowledge of techniques is no small matter, for they are often difficult and require considerable "retooling," which is to say that they imply a particular kind of program of instruction in specific methods.

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[40] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 3.

[41] W. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. viii, emphasis in the original.

[42] M. Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), *passim*.

Tacit political knowledge, on the other hand, accrues over time and never by means of a specified program in which particular subjects are chosen in order to produce specific results. Whatever may be the truth of the adage that he who travels lightest travels farthest, diverse, even ill-assorted baggage, is needed because the life of inquiry preeminently demands reflectiveness, that is, an indwelling or rumination in which the mind draws on the complex framework of sensibilities built up unpremeditatedly and calls upon the diverse resources of civilized knowledge. But if the life of inquiry is narrowly conceived as the methodical "pursuit" of knowledge, it is likely to become not a pursuit but an escape from the spare and shabby dwelling which Descartes literally and symbolically occupied when he composed his *Meditations*. Even those who would wish to address their minds to "data" are aware that data are constituted by abstractions, and that usually what has been culled from the phenomena are the subtle traces of past practices and meanings which form the connotative context of actions and events.

To recognize the connotative context of a subject matter is to know its supporting lore; and to know the supporting lore is to know how to make one's way about the subject-field. Such knowledge is not propositional, much less formulary. It stands for the knowledge which tells us what is appropriate to a subject and when a subject-matter is being violated or respected by a particular theory or hypothesis. Although appropriateness takes many forms, and we shall return to some of them, it is impossible to reduce its contents to a check-list of items. For example, can we say with exactness what is the precise knowledge which makes us uneasy with statements like the following?

> The interesting issues in normative political theory are in the end generally empirical ones. . . There does exist, however, *one interesting problem in political theory* which is strictly normative. That is the problem of evaluating mixes of desiderata. . . . It may be called the 'utility problem' or in still more modern terminology, the 'dynamic-programming problem.' . . . On this strictly normative problem of program packages more progress has been made in the past half century than in all the previous 2,000 years of political theory put together.[43]

Although these assertions may appear absurd, it is not easy to say why, except that some important political and theoretical questions are being rendered unrecognizable. Behind the assertions, however, lie some revealing attitudes towards knowledge. These bear upon the contrast between methodistic knowledge and the forms of theory congenial to it, and, on the other hand, the kind of knowledge characteristic of tacit political knowledge and the forms of theory built upon it. The methodistic assumption holds that the truth of statements yielded by scientific methods has certain features, such as rigor, precision, and quantifiability. The connection between the statements and their features is intimate so that one is encouraged to believe that when he is offered statements rigorous, precise, and quantifiable, he is in the presence of truth. On the other hand, an approach to the "facts" consisting of statements which palpably lack precision, quantifiability, or operational value is said to be false, vague, unreliable, or even "mystical." In actuality, the contrast is not between the true and the false, the reliable and the unreliable, but between truth which is economical, replicable, and easily packaged, and truth which is not. Methodistic truth can be all these things because it is relatively indifferent to context; theoretical truth cannot, because its foundation in tacit political knowledge shapes it towards what is politically appropriate rather than towards what is scientifically operational.

Questions concerning appropriateness, context, and respect for a subject do not concern effete matters, but very practical ones. They involve the resources, or the lack thereof, which we draw upon when the decision concerns matters for which there can be no certitude. What "belongs" to a given inquiry is one such matter, and how to decide between one theory and another, or between rival methods, are others. Yet the kind of knowledge necessary to these decisions, tacit political knowledge, is being jeopardized by the education increasingly being instituted among political scientists. To illustrate the problem, we might consider the implications for tacit political knowledge of a typical proposal for increasing the student's mastery of methods. Our example is a recent volume on survey research methods for undergraduates and graduates in political science. In the spirit of Descartes' *regulae*, the authors describe it as a "handbook" or "manual," "a check-list" or inventory of "do's and don'ts," whose aim is to encourage the "empirical emphasis" in political science. Not content with offering a manual of technical instruction, the authors claim advantages of an educational and vocational kind will be promoted if survey research is made part of the curriculum. Thus the instructor, impaled by the twin demands of teaching and research, is reassured that the two can be reconciled if students are put to work learning survey methods while conducting his research. Further, the method is extolled as a way of overcoming the shortcomings of "the lone scholar" whose skills are inadequate for dealing with the size and range of problems confronting empirical political science. The imperative, "resources must be increased," decrees that the lone scholar be replaced by "group activity and teamwork." In the same vein, it is claimed that "the educational advantages for students are impressive" and among the putative advantages are the acquisition of an *ingenium* with traits congenial to the new emphasis:

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[43] Pool, *op. cit.*, pp. 23–24 (emphasis added).

> . . . students gain the opportunity to learn more about themselves . . . Too few students get the experience of fighting to remain neutral while carefully probing attitudes hostile to their own. Such instruction in self-control is valuable for the headstrong and overprotected.

Despite the tenor and direction of this conception of education, it is insisted that the new generation of students will be able to do "what was not expected of the previous generation of college students—i.e., to discover new knowledge as well as to acquire old."[44]

But will they? As for acquiring "the old," the authors bemoan the fact that political science departments have been hampered by the "lack of knowledge of research skills" and that the conventional academic calendar does not afford sufficient time for students to learn "sampling, interviewing, coding, analysis, etc." Exactly how the student will "acquire the old" when the demands of the "new" are so great is not discussed. In this connection it is relevant to recall Kuhn's description of the way scientific education has been affected by this determination to consolidate scientific advances and insure cumulative knowledge. He characterized scientific education as "narrow and rigid . . . probably more so than any other except perhaps in orthodox theology." It is not well designed "to produce the man who will easily discover a fresh approach," but it is admirably suited for preparing "normal scientists" and for enabling the community to re-adapt itself when a fundamental change occurs in theoretical orientations. " . . .Individual rigidity is compatible with a community that can switch from paradigm to paradigm when the occasion demands."[45] To the best of my knowledge, political scientists who otherwise approvingly cite Kuhn have consistently declined to take up the implications of his analysis of scientific education.

Although the invention of methods, like the invention of theories, demands a high order of creativity and is entitled to the highest praise something important, perhaps ironical, occurs when that discovery is institutionalized in a training program. The requirements for those who are to use the theory or method are very different from the talent which discovered them, although, paradoxically, the technical skills may be the same. Descartes noted that a child might become as proficient as the genius in following the rules of arithmetic, but he never argued that the child could discover the rules. This is so, not simply because of the chance element in discovery, but because of the more baffling questions of the personal and intellectual qualities of the discoverer and of the cultural conditions of discovery.[46]

In this context the contemporary methodist's notion of training becomes significant. The idea of training presupposes several premeditated decisions: about the specific techniques needed and how they will be used; about what is peripheral or irrelevant to a particular form of training; and about the desired behavior of the trainee after he has been released from his apprenticeship. The idea of theorizing, on the other hand, while it presupposes skills, cannot specify briefly and simply the skills needed, their degree, or combinations. Kepler's followers could be contemptuous of their master's Platonism and astrology, as Newton's admirers were of his religious fascinations; but it would be risky to discount the influence of these extra-scientific considerations upon the formation of the respective theories.

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[44] C. H. Backstron and G. D. Hursh, *Survey Research* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963), ed. J. Robinson, pp. xi-xv, 4, 13.

[45] T. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 165.

[46] R. Taton, *Reason and Chance in Scientific Discovery*, tr. A. J. Pomerans (New York: Science Editions, 1962), p. 64ff.

The impoverishment of education by the demands of methodism poses a threat not only to so-called normative or traditional political theory, but to the scientific imagination as well. It threatens the meditative culture which nourishes all creativity. That culture is the source of the qualities crucial to theorizing: playfulness, concern, the juxtaposition of contraries, and astonishment at the variety and subtle interconnection of things. These same qualities are not confined to the creation of theories, but are at work when the mind is playing over the factual world as well. An impoverished mind, no matter how resolutely empirical in spirit, sees an impoverished world. Such a mind is not disabled from theorizing, but it is tempted into remote abstractions which, when applied to the factual world, end by torturing it. Think of what must be ignored in, or done to, the factual world before an assertion like the following can be made: "Theoretical models should be tested primarily by the accuracy of their prediction rather than the reality of their assumptions."[47] No doubt one might object by pointing out that all theorizing does some violence to the empirical world. To which one might reply, that while amputations are necessary, it is still better to have surgeons rather than butchers.

It is not enough, therefore, to repeat commonplaces, viz., that facts are senseless without theoretical concepts, or that the meaning which facts acquire from a theory is purchased at the price of shaping the facts by the theoretical perspective employed. It is not enough because so much depends upon the kind of theory being used and the personal and cultural resources of the user. Perhaps it is some debilitating legacy of Puritanism that causes us to admire "parsimony" in our theories when we should be concerned that the constitution of the factual world depends upon the richness of our theories which, in turn, depends upon the richness of the inquiring mind. This concern may well be what fundamentally unites the scientific theorist and the so-called traditional theorist.

When a scientist observes a fact, he "sees" it through concepts which are usually derived from a theory. Facts are, as one philosopher has neatly put it, "theory-laden." Kepler, for example, observed many of the same facts as his predecessors, but because he viewed them differently a new era of science was ushered in.[48] The same might be said of Machiavelli, as well as of every major theorist from Plato to Marx. Some theorists, as Tocqueville suggested, see differently, others see farther. All would probably have agreed with Tocqueville that, for the theorist, nothing is more difficult to appreciate than a fact,[49] and nothing, it might be added, is more necessary as a condition for theorizing than that facts not be univocal. If they were, creativity and imagination would play a small role and it would be appropriate to speak of theorizing as a banal activity, as "theory-construction." If facts were simply "there" to be collected, classified, and then matched with a theory (or with the observation-statements derived from it), the political scientist might well declare, "Whether [a] proposition is true or false depends on the degree to which the proposition and the real world correspond."[50] But although everyone is ready to acknowledge that facts depend upon some criteria of selection or of significance, what is less frequently acknowledged is that such criteria usually turn out to be fragments of some almost-forgotten "normative" or "traditional" theory.

Because facts are more multi-faceted than a rigid conception of empirical theory would allow, they are more likely to yield to the observer whose mental capacities enable him to appreciate a known fact in an unconventional way. As one philosopher has said, "Given the *same* world it might have been construed differently. We might have spoken of it, thought of it, perceived it differently. Perhaps facts are somehow moulded by the logical forms of the fact-stating language. Perhaps these provide a 'mould' in terms of which the world coagulates for us in definite ways."[51] Once again we are confronted by the warning that the richness of the factual world depends upon the richness of our theories: "The paradigm observer is not the man who sees and reports what all normal observers see and report, but the man who sees in familiar objects what no one else has seen before."[52] Thus the world must be supplemented before it can be understood and reflected upon.

Vision, as I have tried to emphasize, depends for its richness on the resources from which it can draw. These extra-scientific considerations may be identified more explicitly as the stock of ideas which an intellectually curious and broadly educated person accumulates and which come to govern his intuitions, feelings, and perceptions. They constitute the sources of his creativity, yet rarely find explicit expression in formal theory. Lying beyond the boundaries circumscribed by method, technique, and the official definition of a discipline, they can be summarized as cultural resources and itemized as metaphysics, faith, historical sensibility, or, more broadly, as tacit knowledge. Because these matters bear a family resemblance to "bias," they become sacrificial victim to the quest for objectivity in the social sciences. If scientists have freely acknowledged the importance of many of these items,[53] how much more significant are these human creations for the form of knowledge, political science, which centers on the perplexities of collective life, on objects which are all too animate in expressing their needs, hopes, and fears.

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[47] A. Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), p. 21.

[48] N. R. Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 5ff.

[49] The remarks from Tocqueville are to be found in *Oeuvres complètes*, Vol. I, pp. 12, 14, 222.

[50] R. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 8

[51] Hanson, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

Doubtless the objection will be raised that if a discipline is to be empirical its practitioners must be equipped to "handle" data in ways approximative of the sciences which have been more successful, and that to suggest otherwise is to consort with the heresy of saying that philosophical and moral knowledge may lead to a better empiricism. Yet we might consider the following.

Throughout the history of political theory a student will find a preoccupation with the phenomenon of "corruption." Today, however, we scarcely know how to talk about it,[54] except when it flourishes in non-Western societies. Yet it is a common and documented fact that "organized crime" exerts significant power and influence, controls enormous wealth, and exhibits many of the same features which ordinarily arouse the interest of political scientists, e.g., organization, authority, power, kinship ties, rules, and strong consensus. Despite the promising research possibilities, no textbook on American government provides a place for organized crime in "the system," no study of "polyarchy" or community-power has taken cognizance of it. It is not far-fetched to suggest that this empirical oversight is connected with the belief that moral knowledge is empirically irrelevant.

Or, to take another example, one can think of many fine empirical studies which have never been conducted because contemporary political science has substituted the bland, status quo-oriented concept of "political socialization" for the ancient idea of "political education." If, instead of blinkering the inquiring eye with a postulate that "conduct is *politicized* in the degree that it is determined by considerations of power indulgence or deprivation of the self by others,"[55] we took seriously an old-fashioned hypothesis, such as that advanced by J. S. Mill, that "the first element of good government . . . being the virtue and intelligence of the human beings composing the community, the most important point of excellence which any form of government can possess is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves,"[56] we might be better sensitized to the importance of genuinely empirical studies of truly fundamental political concern. For example, think of the empirical richness of an inquiry into the current structure of income taxes, especially in terms of the moral and political implications it holds for civic education. The structure of income taxes is a registry of the power and powerlessness of our social, economic, and ethnic groups; of the official way we rate the value of various social activities by the one standard generally accepted. It is also a system of incentives for behavior that define what is virtuous, unvirtuous, and morally indifferent; and, by tacitly encouraging behavior otherwise deemed blameworthy, encourages the gradual legitimation of that behavior, and thereby shapes what used to be called "the virtue of the citizenry." It would be difficult to imagine a richer field for behavioral inquiry, or one more likely to yield important knowledge about the quality of life in this republic. Yet it remains unharvested because our impoverished understanding of civic virtue and education has caused us to neglect the field.

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[53] E.g., K. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York: Science Editions, 1961), pp. 19, 38.

[54] An exception would be S. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, Vol. 17 (April, 1965), 386–430. As an illustration of a contemporary way of dealing with the problems the reader is referred to A. A. Rogow and H. D. Lasswell, *Power, Corruption, and Rectitude* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963). This work criticizes Acton's epigram, points out how a like animus against power led to the separation of powers doctrine, how the latter frustrates the majority, and how the problem can be handled by organizational and bureaucratic sanctions.

[55] H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, *Power and Society. A Framework for Political Inquiry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 145.

[56] *Representative Government*, Ch. II (Everyman edition, p. 193). My point would not be affected if political socialization were defined in some other contemporary mode, e.g., learning "roles," or as "a readiness to tolerate outputs that are perceived to run contrary to one's wants and demands. . . . ": Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Science*, p. 272.

Finally, one cannot help wondering whether political science, having jettisoned "metaphysical" and "normative" preoccupations about justice in favor of research into "judicial behavior" and the "judicial process," are not reaping the results: an inability to address a major phenomenon like the dangerous rash of *political* trials in America today and to reflect upon what these trials signify for the future of the authority and legitimacy of the state.

If the presence or absence of the moral and philosophical element affects the process by which theories constitute the empirical world, the choice among theories would seem to be a serious matter. But again, the contemporary mood trivializes what is involved in a theory's formulation and thereby obfuscates the importance of the choice among rival ways of constituting the world. The following quotation may be extreme but it does disclose the fantasies of the behavioral scientist about theories:

> In a report entitled *Communication Systems and Resources in the Behavioral Sciences*, the Committee on Information in the Behavioral Sciences outlines an ideal system that would in effect provide researchers with a computer analogue of the intelligent, all-informed colleague. Such a colleague would read widely, have total recall, synthesize new ideas, always be accessible, and be sensitive to each researcher's needs . . . The computer based system could respond to an individual's direct request for facts, data, and documentation; it could take the initiative and stimulate the researcher by suggesting new ideas, facts, or literature of interest; it could react intelligently to a scientist's work (analyze its logic, trace implications, suggest tests); and it could help disseminate ideas and provide feedback from the scientific community.[57]

If we can safely assume that choosing a theory or a method is not quite the same as choosing a helpful friend who, as Nietzsche taught, must be worthy of being your enemy, we might want to press the question further. When we choose a theory or a method, are we choosing something momentous, like a self, or something innocuous, like an "intellectual construct" or "conceptual scheme"? or something depersonalized, like "a series of logically consistent, interconnected, and empirically verifiable propositions," or like "a generalized statement of the interrelationships of a set of variables"?

Undoubtedly these characterizations tell us something about the formal features of a theory, but they are deceptive in their parsimony. If the question is slightly reformulated to read, what is the human significance of choosing a theory?, then it becomes evident that much more is involved. Choosing a theory is significant for two conflicting reasons: it initiates new ways of thinking, evaluating, intuiting, and feeling; and it demands a substantial sacrifice in the existing forms of these same human processes. The first point is obvious, the second less so. This is because, like the law of treason, history books tend to be written by the victors and hence the sacrifices which accompany the triumph of a new theory are apt to be overlooked or bathed in a kind of Jacobite nostalgia.

The history of political theory is instructive on this score, for many of the great innovative theorists were highly self-conscious about choosing among theoretical alternatives. They knew that the true drama of theorizing involved offering a theory which could not be accommodated within prevailing values and perceptions of the world. When Hobbes allowed that his readers would be "staggered" by his theory,[58] he was not merely stating the obvious fact that his views concerning religion, authority, rights, and human nature were incompatible with traditional religious and political notions, but the more profound point that unless his readers were prepared to revise or discard those notions, they would not be able to grasp the full meaning of the theory and the theory itself could not become an effective force in the world. The same general assumptions had been made by Plato in his challenge to traditional Greek values and to the democratic ethos of Athens, and by Augustine in his effort to demolish classical notions of history, politics, virtue, and religion. Among more recent writers, none has been as sensitive as Max Weber to the emotional and cultural losses attendant upon the commitment to scientific rationalism.

Where our contemporary way of talking has not obscured the drama and demands of theorizing, it has trivialized them. Theories are likened to appliances which are "plugged into" political life and, since it is the nature of appliances to be under sentence of built-in obsolescence, "theories are for burning," leaving only a brief funereal glow which lights the way to "more scientific theories and more efficient research procedures."[59] If adopting a theory were equivalent to "trying out an idea," testing an hypothesis, or selecting a technique, there would be little reason to object to treating it casually.

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[57] *Political Science.* Newsletter of the American Political Science Association, Vol. I, No. 1 (Winter, 1968), p. 25 (col. 1).

[58] *De Cive*, Pref. *ad finem.*

[59] D. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. x.

At the very least, a theory makes demands upon our time, attention, energy, and skills. More fundamentally, the adoption of a theory signifies a form of submission with serious consequences both for the adopter and for those who imitate him, as well as for the corner of the world which the theory seeks to change our mind about. A certain sensibility is needed, qualities of thinking and feeling which are not readily formulable but pertain to a capacity for discriminative judgment. Why is this so? To compress the answer severely, in political and social matters we tend to think in one of two ways: in trying to explain, understand, or appraise we may ask, what is it like?; or we may ask, what is appropriate? The first way invites us to think metaphorically, e.g., Hobbes' argument that a representative is like an agent, or the contemporary notion of a political society as a system of communications. Ever since Plato, theorists have recognized the fruitfulness of metaphorical thinking, but they have also come to realize that at certain crucial points a metaphor may become misleading, primarily because the metaphor has a thrust of its own which leads to grotesque implications for the object or events which it is supposed to illuminate. A recent example of this pitfall is provided by Professor Deutsch's *Nerves of Government*, which argues for the concept of a communications system as a useful and proper model for political theory. The argument rests on a combination of metaphors and the success of the argument depends upon a confusion of the two. The first metaphor consists in likening the nature of human thinking and purposive action to the operation of a communications system, e.g., the 'problem of value" is like a "switchboard problem," or "consciousness" is "analogous" to the process of feedback.[60] The second metaphor involves the reverse procedure: a communications system may be treated like a person. Human qualities, such as "spontaneity," "freedom of the will," and "creativity," can be "built into" a machine, and then it becomes possible to propose empirical propositions about society derived from the operations of the machine. But the whole argument depends upon, first, mechanizing human behavior and, second, humanizing mechanical processes. Once this is accomplished, grotesque results follow, e.g., internal rearrangements in a system, or in a person, which reduce goal-seeking effectiveness are described as "pathological" and resemble "what some moralists call 'sin'."[61]

A second way of judging asks, what is appropriate? Appropriateness of judgment cannot be encapsulated into a formula. This is because it depends upon varied forms of knowledge for which there is no natural limit. This dependence is rooted in the basic quest of political and social theory for theoretical knowledge about "wholes" made up of interrelated and interpenetrating provinces of human activity. Whether the primary theoretical task be one of explanation or critical appraisal, the theorist will want to locate "divisions" in the human world and embody them in theoretical form. For example, what aspects of that division which we call "religion" have a significant bearing on the activity called "economic"? Perforce, a political theory is, among many other things, a sum of judgments, shaped by the theorist's notion of what matters, and embodying a series of discriminations about where one province begins and another leaves off. The discriminations may have to do with what is private and what is public, or they may be about what will be endangered or encouraged if affairs move one way rather than another, or about what practices, occurrences, and conditions are likely to produce what states of affairs. The difficulty is the same regardless of whether the theoretical intention is to provide a descriptive explanation, a critical appraisal, or a prescriptive solution. By virtue of their location in a whole, one province shades off from and merges into others: where, for example, does the cure of souls end and the authority of the political order over religion begin? where do the effects of technical education merge into questions about ethics and character? where does the autonomy of administrative and judicial practices start and the "mysteries of state" stop? how much of the impetus for the Crusades is to be assigned to religious motives and how much to political or economic considerations?

If, as Plato suggested long ago, the task of theory is to locate "the real cleavages" in things and to "avoid chopping reality up into small parts" or drawing false boundaries,[62] then the sense of what is appropriate is critical. Given the theorist's preoccupation with wholes, the interconnectedness of human provinces, the values and expectations with which men have invested each of their provinces, and the ultimate bewildering fact that man is single but his provinces are multiple, a theoretical judgment which, by definition, must discriminate can only be restrained from rendering inappropriate determinations if it is civilized by a meditative culture. To be civilized is not only the quality of being sensitive to the claims and characters of many provinces, but, according to an older definition, rendering what is proper to a civil community.

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[60] *The Nerves of Government* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1963), pp. 94, 98.

[61] *Ibid.*, pp. 91–92.

[62] *Politicus*, 262 b-c.

### IV. THE VOCATION OF THE POLITICAL THEORIST

If the preceding analysis has any merit it will have suggested that the triumph of methodism constitutes a crisis in political education and that the main victim is the tacit political knowledge which is so vital to making judgments, not only judgments about the adequacy and value of theories and methods, but about the nature and perplexities of politics as well. Here lies the vocation of these who preserve our understanding of past theories, who sharpen our sense of the subtle, complex interplay between political experience and thought, and who preserve our memory of the agonizing efforts of intellect to restate the possibilities and threats posed by political dilemmas of the past. In teaching about past theories, the historically-minded theorist is engaged in the task of political initiation; that is, of introducing new generations of students to the complexities of politics and to the efforts of theorists to confront its predicaments; of developing the capacity for discriminating judgments discussed earlier; and of cultivating that sense of "significance" which, as Weber understood so well, is vital to scientific inquiry but cannot be furnished by scientific methods; and of exploring the ways in which new theoretical vistas are opened.

For those who are concerned with the history of political theories, the vocation has become a demanding one at the present time. How demanding it is can be seen by glancing at Kuhn's account of the manner in which scientific invention treats its own past.[63] In the formative period of their education students are required to master textbooks rather than to familiarize themselves with the creative writings of the great scientists of the past. The characteristic teaching of scientific textbooks, according to Kuhn, is to show how the great achievements of the past have prepared the way for the present stage of knowledge and theory. As a result, discontinuities are smoothed over, discarded, or unsuccessful theories are assumed to have been inferior, and the idea of methodical progress dominates the entire account.

How easy it is to impoverish the past by making it appear like the present is suggested by the way in which social scientists have lapsed into the same idiom as Kuhn's scientific textbooks. "As Aristotle, the first great behavioral scientist, pointed out a long time ago . . ."[64] or, again, "the behavioral persuasion in politics represents an attempt, by modern modes of analysis, to fulfill the quest for political knowledge begun by the classical political theorists," although it is admitted that classical theory is "predominantly prescriptive rather than descriptive."[65] What seems to have been forgotten is that one reads past theories, not because they are familiar and therefore confirmative, but because they are strange and therefore provocative. If Aristotle is read as the first behavioralist, what he has to say is only of antiquarian interest and it would be far more profitable to read our contemporaries.

What we should expect from a reading of Aristotle is an increase in political understanding. What we should expect from the study of the history of political theories is an appreciation of the historical dimension of politics. The cultivation of political understanding means that one becomes sensitized to the enormous complexities and drama of saying that the political order is the most comprehensive association and ultimately responsible as no other grouping is for sustaining the physical, material, cultural and moral life of its members. Political understanding also teaches that the political order is articulated through its history; the past weighs on the present, shaping alternatives and pressing with a force of its own. At the present time the historical mode is largely ignored in favor of modes of understanding which are inherently incapable of building upon historical knowledge. One of the most striking features of game theory, communications models, and mechanical systems is that in each case the organizing notion is essentially history-less.

The threat to political understanding is not to be denied by arguing that we can substitute more precise functional equivalents for older language or that we can translate older notions into more empirical terms. From time immemorial writers have talked of the "burdens" of ruling, the "anguish" of choosing, and the "guilt" of actors who must employ coercion. To assimilate these actions to the calculations of gamesters or to describe them as "decision-making" or "outputs" is to distort both sides of the analogy. If in game-playing, for example, anguish, burdens, and guilt were recurrent features, the whole connotative context surrounding the idea of a game would be lost and nobody would "play." The ancient writer Philostratus once remarked of painting that no one could understand the imitative techniques of the painter without prior knowledge of the objects being represented. But when the attempt is being made to convey knowledge, not by imitative techniques, but by abstract signs and symbols which stand for objects commonly understood, everything depends on whether one truly understands what the symbol means. Does he understand, for example, the kinds of discriminative judgments which have been suspended when the symbol of an "input" is made to stand equally for a civil rights protest, a deputation from the National Rifle Association, and a strike by the U.A.W.? Does he understand that what allows him to discriminate between these "inputs" is a tacit knowledge derived from sources other than systems theory? Again, will he be able to compensate for the fact that systems theory makes it possible to talk about an entire political society without ever mentioning the idea of justice, except in the distorting form of its contribution to "system maintenance"? Is he aware that if one can focus on the American political order as a *system*, he does not have to confront the unpleasant possibility of it as an *imperium* of unsurpassed power. If, in rebuttal, the political scientist claims that the sort of studies referred to above really do presuppose the knowledge which would make political sense out of formal methods, then it is necessary to reply that the contemporary political scientist threatens to chalk around himself a vicious circle: his methods of study presuppose a depth of political culture which his methods of education destroy.

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[63] *Op. cit.*, pp. 162–168.

[64] B. Berelson and G. Steiner, *Human Behavior* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), p. 13.

[65] Eulau, *op. cit.*, p. 7. See also G. Almond and B. Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 214; H. Alker, *Mathematics and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 6–8.

But what of the vocation by which political theories are created rather than transmitted? Testimony that such a vocation has existed is to be found in the ancient notion of the *bios theoretikos* as well as in the actual achievements of the long line of writers extending from Plato to Marx. How shall we understand this tradition as containing an idea of vocation which is relevant both to the challenge raised by the prestige of science and to the contemporary state of political life?

## V. NATURE AND ROLE OF EPIC POLITICAL THEORISTS

In what follows I shall develop the thesis that the traditional idea of political theory displays some features which resemble forms of scientific theory, but which, by virtue of their political bearing, are uniquely the properties of political theory. As a way of bringing out the distinctive nature of this vocation, I shall call it the vocation of "epic theorist," a characterization which probably seems pretentious or precious, but which has been selected in order to call attention both to the unusual "magnitudes" of this form of theorizing, and to its distinguishing purpose and style.

Perhaps the pretentiousness of the phrase may be lessened by briefly recalling a comparable conception of theory in Kuhn's work. He employs the phrase "extraordinary" science to describe the contributions of the great scientific innovators. Kuhn's main point is that these theories mark a break with previous ones; that is, they inaugurate a new way of looking at the world, which includes a new set of concepts, as well as new cognitive *and* normative standards. Taking this as a suggestion of how to think about great theories, the first feature shared by epic theorists has to do with magnitudes. By an act of thought, the theorist seeks to reassemble the whole political world. He aims to grasp present structures and interrelationships, and to re-present them in a new way. Like the extraordinary scientific theory, such efforts involve a new way of looking at the familiar world, a new way with its own cognitive and normative standards.[66]

The second aspect of epic theory can be brought out if we look upon a theory not only as a structure of formal features, but also as a *structure of intentions*. The structure of intentions refers to the controlling purposes of the theorist, the considerations which determine how the formal features of concept, fact, logic, and interconnection are to be deployed so as to heighten the effect of the whole. In using the word "purposes" I mean to acknowledge that the structures exhibit considerable variety, and yet I also mean to maintain that there has been a persistent feature in all of them, one which may perhaps seem naive to our age of unmasking where all emperors are naked. All of the major theories of the past were informed by "public concern," a quality which was not incidental to the activity, but fundamental to the very notion of being engaged in *political* theory. The cynical "realist," Machiavelli, professed, "I love my country more than my soul."[67] In his dialogue *Utopia* Thomas More wrote emphatically about the theorist's commitment: "If you cannot pluck up wrongheaded opinions by the root, if you cannot cure according to your heart's desire vices of long standing," he declares to the pure political philosopher, represented by Hythloday, "yet you must not on that account desert the commonwealth."[68] Hobbes, who was never one to romanticize men's motives, represented himself as "one whose just grief for the present calamities of his country" had driven him to theorize.[69] Similar sentiments abound in the writings of Plato, Augustine, Locke, Rousseau, Bentham, Tocqueville, and Marx, among others. This unanimity suggests that if a Plato or a Marx had said what the modern scientist says repeatedly, and some social scientists come perilously close to saying, namely, that they are not responsible for the political and social consequences of their inquiries, it would appear more foolish than blameworthy. Concern for *res publicae* and *res gestae* are as irreducible and natural to the vocation of theorist as a concern for health is to the physician. This quality of caring for public things contrasts sharply with the mental set which believes that "the formulation of the topic into a research problem is the first step in scientific inquiry and, as such, should be influenced primarily by the requirements of scientific procedure."[70]

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[66] Here it is only necessary to recall Plato's long discussion of cognition or Hobbes's effort to place political philosophy upon a new and more scientific basis.

Because history suggests that all political societies have both endured and employed violence, cruelty, injustice, and known the defeat of human aspirations, it is not surprising that the theorist's concern for *res publicae* and the commonweal has issued in theories which, for the most part, have been critical and, in the literal sense, radical. Why this is the case and the import of it for the contemporary vocation of theorist can be shown by referring once more to Kuhn. He has argued that scientific revolutions tend to occur when research begins to turn up persistent "anomalies," i.e., when phenomena are encountered that cannot be squared with the theory. To qualify as an anomaly the phenomena, should, in principle, be explicable by the theory; or, stated differently, the anomaly must be relevant to the kinds of problems for which the theory purports to furnish an explanation. It does not count as an anomaly if it raises a question which the theory cannot be said to recognize as important and hence be expected to answer.

The concept of anomaly suggests that a scientific crisis occurs because something is wrong "in" the theory. When nature does not conform to the scientist's expectations, he reacts by reexamining his techniques and theories. He assumes that the "mistake" lies with one or the other, not with nature. The bearing of this upon political science becomes clearer when we consider some frequent criticisms directed at traditional political theories by contemporary political scientists. It is charged that such theories are useless in explaining voting behavior, political apathy, the formation of politically relevant attitudes, and the precise degree of actual control exercised by the electorate. "If someone were to ask, 'How can I learn about what sorts of people participate most in politics, and why?', I would urge him to start with the most recent studies and work backwards. I seriously doubt whether he would get much help from Aristotle, Rousseau, or the *Federalist Papers*."[71] From such criticisms one would conclude that traditional political theories are valueless because they cannot explain why the political world is as it is. There is, in other words, something "wrong" in the theories. Whether this type of criticism will stand depends upon a prior understanding of the intentions of epical theorists: to what were their theories a response? As we have noted earlier, when it is believed that something is "wrong," scientists look for the error in the theory, not in the world. The same assumption is echoed by a contemporary behaviorist when he writes, "If there is a crisis, then, it is a crisis in the theory of representation and not in the institution of representation."[72] The assumption of the epic theorist has been of a different and contrasting kind. He has been preoccupied with a particular magnitude of problems created by actual events or states of affairs in the world rather than with problems related to deficiencies in theoretical knowledge. To be sure, problems-in-the-world and problems-in-a-theory are often interconnected, but the former has taken precedence among epic theorists and has been determinative of the latter. The shaping experience has been the recurrently problematic state of the political world, not the problematic state of theories about that world. What is problematic emerges when political life is experienced either as a threat or as a promise. Most of the important theories were a response to crisis; they have reflected a conviction either that political action might destroy certain civilized values and practices, or that it might be the means for deliverance from evils, such as injustice or oppression. These polarities can be illustrated by the contrasting responses of Burke and Paine to the French Revolution, or of Tocqueville and Marx to the events of 1848. The point is not that theories come in pairs, or that the "same" events can be viewed very differently and equally persuasively; but rather that epic theories issue not from crises in techniques of inquiry, but from crises in the world.

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[67] Letter to Vettori, April 16, 1527.

[68] *Utopia*, Bk. I, tr. E. Surtz (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 49.

[69] *De Cive*, Preface to the Reader, ed. S. P. Lamprecht (New York: Appleton, 1949), p. 18.

[70] Selltiz, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

[71] Dahl, *Political Analysis*, p. viii.

[72] Eulau in Pool (ed.), *Contemporary Political Science*, p. 55.

In the language of theory, crisis denotes derangement. One form of derangement is the result of forces or conditions beyond control, e.g., the plague which hit Athens during its struggle against Sparta and, according to Thucydides, weakened the vital conventions governing Athenian political life. Other kinds of derangement are closer to what Aristotle called contingent matters, that is, matters about which men can meaningfully deliberate and choose. These kinds of derangements are the result of certain types of "errors" or "mistakes": errors in *arrangements*, in *decisions*, and in *beliefs*. Obviously the three types are often interrelated and combined: mistaken beliefs may produce faulty arrangements and foolish decisions; an unwise decision, e.g., one which over-extends the resources of a society, may encourage mistaken beliefs, such as the illusion of omnipotence. Despite their obviousness, these three types may help in clarifying the defining, specific problems of traditional political theory. It is too vague to leave it that theorists are stimulated by problems-in-the-world, and it is misleading to say simply that they are drawn to a class of problems about which something can and should be done. What is all-important is that a problem be a truly theoretical one. A problem such as that presented by the inefficiency of postal services or the ineffectuality of legislative committees may be traceable to errors in arrangement (such as faulty delegations of administrative authority), or to mistaken beliefs (such as that seniority is the most expedient principle for determining committee chairmanships), or to a combination of erroneous arrangements and mistaken beliefs. Without denying the practical importance of these problems, they are not theoretical but technical in nature: they concern the most expeditious means of achieving goals which are, for the most part, agreed on beforehand. Likewise, the question of what decision is proper under particular circumstances is a matter for practical reason or judgment, not for theory.

There is one setting, however, in which specific arrangements, decisions, and beliefs become theoretically interesting. That is when they are "systematically mistaken": when arrangements or decisions appear not as random consequences of a system which otherwise works tolerably well or as the result of the personal foibles of a particular office-holder but as the necessary result of a more extensive set of evils which can confidently be expected to continue producing similar results. Such a system would be systematically deranged. An illustration of what is being argued here is provided by Plato's criticism of Athenian democracy. The main thrust of his criticism was not directed against certain politices which he opposed, or even against the democracy's condemnation of Socrates.[73] Rather, the main thrust was towards arguing that the bad policies and actions were bound to occur in one form or another, because the entire polity was systematically ordered in a mistaken way. Another example is provided by Marx. His case against capitalism did not rest on the charges that it chained the workers to a subsistence level, produced wastefully, and unfairly enriched those who owned the instruments of production. It was aimed, instead, at exposing the logic of capitalism which made injustice, alienation, and exploitation inevitabilities rather than contingencies.

This concept of the *systematically* mistaken explains why most political theories contain radical critiques. Their authors have tried to get at the basic principles (in the sense of starting-points) which produce mistaken arrangements and wrong actions. This same impulse determines why a political theory takes the form of a symbolic picture of an ordered whole. That it is a whole is dictated by its function, which is to be complementary to, or a substitute for, the systematically disordered whole which the theory seeks to displace. The possibility that the factual world is the outcome of a systematically disordered whole produces still another major difference between the epic political theorist and the scientific theorist. Although each attempts to change men's views of the world, only the former attempts to change the world itself. Although the scientist surely may claim for his theories the daring, beauty, and imaginativeness that are claimed for other forms of endeavor, he will concede that at some point his theory must submit to confirmation by the world. T. H. Huxley spoke sadly of "beautiful" theories tragically murdered by "an ugly little fact." Plato, in contrast, had asked defiantly, "Is our theory any the worse, if we cannot prove it possible that a state so organized should be actually founded?" Epic theory, if it has not strictly attempted to use theory to murder the ugly facts of the world, has taken a very different view of them, refusing to yield to facts the role of arbiter. Facts could never prove the validity of a true theory, because facts, in the form of practices or actions, were "less close to truth than [is] thought."[74] Thus for Plato the political facts of Athenian democracy were perfectly consistent with the theory of democracy, but the theory itself was systematically mistaken in its organizing principles, that is, deranged.

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[73] If the Seventh Letter is to be believed, Plato also condemned the government of the Thirty, which included some of his kinsmen, for their threats against Socrates (324 d-e).

When we turn our attention to political life in the modern states, its appearance seems more suitable to methodical inquiry and mechanical models or theories. Our political and social landscape is dominated by large structures whose premeditated design embodies many of the presuppositions and principles of methodism. They are deliberately fabricated, their processes are composed of defined "steps," and their work is accomplished by a division of specialized labor whose aggregate effect seems marvelously disproportionate to the modest talents which are combined. Not only do these organizations impart regularity and predictability to the major realms of our existence, thereby furnishing the conditions whereby methodical inquiry can pursue its goal of scientifically verifiable knowledge with reasonable hopes of success—for what could be more hopeful than to know that the political and social world is deliberately fashioned to produce regular and predictable behavior?—but also, since these organizations are uniquely the product of mind, rather than of mysterious historical forces, we are able to say with far greater confidence than Hobbes and Vico, who first announced the principle, "we can know it, because we made it."

Yet this is the state of affairs which the greatest modern philosopher of method, Max Weber, foresaw and despaired of, a world of bleak, forbidding, almost sterile reality, dominated by large and impersonal bureaucratic structures which nullified the strivings of those political heroes evoked in "Politics as a Vocation." "A polar night of icy darkness and hardness" was his description of the world to come.[75] In a fundamental sense, our world has become as perhaps no previous world has, the product of design, the product of theories about human structures deliberately created rather than historically articulated. But in another sense, the embodiment of theory in the world has resulted in a world impervious to theory. The giant, routinized structures defy fundamental alteration and, at the same time, display an unchallengeable legitimacy, for the rational, scientific, and technological principles on which they are based seem in perfect accord with an age committed to science, rationalism and technology. Above all, it is a world which appears to have rendered epic theory superfluous. Theory, as Hegel had foreseen, must take the form of "explanation." Truly it seems to be the age where Minerva's owl has taken flight.

It would seem, then, that the world affirms what the leaders of the behavioral revolution claim, the irrelevance of epic theory. The only trouble is that the world shows increasing signs of coming apart; our political systems are sputtering, our communication networks invaded by cacophony. American society has reached a point where its cities are uninhabitable, its youth disaffected, its races at war with each other, and its hope, its treasure, and the lives of its young men dribbled away in interminable foreign ventures. Our whole world threatens to become anomalous.

Yet amidst this chaos official political science exudes a complacency which almost beggars description. It is excusable that a decade ago a political scientist could contend that only a "fanatic" would want to "maximize" political equality and popular sovereignty at the expense of other values, such as leisure, privacy, consensus, stability, and status. But it is less excusable to find the following in a recent collection of papers delivered before the APSA and subsequently published under its imprimatur: "Our discipline is enjoying a new coherence, a pleasant sense of unity, and self-confident identity that fits its rapid growth and healthy mien."[76] Polanyi has remarked that "it is the normal practice of scientists to ignore evidence which appears incompatible with the accepted system of scientific knowledge, in the hope that it will prove false or irrelevant."[77] In this spirit

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[74] *Republic* 473 (Conford tr.)

[75] H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 128.

[76] Pool (ed.), *Contemporary Political Science*, p. vii. The essays by Eckstine and Dahl are excepted.

[77] *Personal Knowledge*, p. 138.

American political scientists continue to devote great energy to explaining how various agencies ingeniously work at the political socialization of our citizens and future citizens while mobs burn parts of our cities, students defy campus rules and authorities, and a new generation questions the whole range of civic obligations. And while American political scientists have laboriously erected "incrementalism" into a dogma and extolled its merits as a style of decision-making that is "realistic," it is apparent to all that the society suffers from maladies—the decay of the cities, the increasing cultural and economic gap between our minorities and our majority, crisis in the educational system, destruction of our natural environment—which call for the most precedent-shattering and radical measures.

Amidst all this, a political scientist approvingly quotes the following from a social scientist: "To argue that an existing order is 'imperfect' in comparison with an alternative order of affairs that turns out upon careful inspection to be unobtainable may not be different from saying that the existing order is 'perfect'."[78]

This assertion poses squarely the issue between political theory on the one side and the alliance between the methodist and the empirical theorist on the other. The issue is not between theories which are normative and those which are not; nor is it between those political scientists who are theoretical and those who are not. Rather it is between those who would restrict the "reach" of theory by dwelling on facts which are selected by what are assumed to be the functional requisites of the existing paradigm, and those who believe that because facts are richer than theories, it is the task of the theoretical imagination to restate new possibilities. In terms of theory, the basic thrust of contemporary political science is not antitheoretical so much as it is deflationary of theory. This is most frequently expressed in the anxiety of the behaviorist who discovers that the philosophy of democracy places excessive demands on the "real world" and hence it is the task of political science to suggest a more realistic version of democratic theory. Thus the authors of *The Civic Culture* admit that it would be possible to "explain" the low degree of political involvement on the part of citizens by "the malfunctioning of democracy." But, they caution, this kind of explanation rests on a belief "that the realities of political life should be molded to fit one's theories of politics." A "somewhat easier and probably more useful task," they contend, is suggested by "the view that theories of politics should be drawn from the realities of political life." Because "the standards have been set unreasonably high," the theory should be changed.[79]

Is it possible that in this genial, Panglossian twilight Minerva's owl is beginning to falter as it speeds over a real world that is increasingly discordant and is beginning to voice demands and hopes that are "unreasonably high"? Perhaps it is possible, especially if we remember that according to Greek statuary, Minerva's pet was a screech-owl, for a screech is the noise both of warning and of pain.

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[78] Cited by A. Wilkausky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), p. 178.

[79] *Civic Culture*, p. 475.

# CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLITICS: PARTIES AND ISSUES IN THE 1968 ELECTION*

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Without much question, the third-party movement of George C. Wallace constituted the most unusual feature of the 1968 presidential election. While this movement failed by a substantial margin in its audacious attempt to throw the presidential contest into the House of Representatives, in any other terms it was a striking success. It represented the first noteworthy intrusion on a two-party election in twenty years. The Wallace ticket drew a larger proportion of the popular vote than any third presidential slate since 1924, and a greater proportion of electoral votes than any such movement for more than a century, back to the curiously divided election of 1860. Indeed, the spectre of an electoral college stalemate loomed sufficiently large that serious efforts at reform have since taken root.

At the same time, the Wallace candidacy was but one more dramatic addition to an unusually crowded rostrum of contenders, who throughout the spring season of primary elections were entering and leaving the lists under circumstances that ranged from the comic through the astonishing to the starkly tragic. Six months before the nominating conventions, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon had been the expected 1968 protagonists, with some greater degree of uncertainty, as usual, within the ranks of the party out of power. The nominating process for the Republicans followed the most-probable script rather closely, with the only excitement being provided by the spectacle of Governors Romney and Rockefeller proceeding as through revolving doors in an ineffectual set of moves aimed at providing a Republican alternative to the Nixon candidacy. Where things were supposed to be most routine on the Democratic side, however, surprises were legion, including the early enthusiasm for Eugene McCarthy, President Johnson's shocking announcement that he would not run, the assassination of Robert Kennedy in the flush of his first electoral successes, and the dark turmoil in and around the Chicago nominating convention, with new figures like Senators George McGovern and Edward Kennedy coming into focus as challengers to the heir apparent, Vice President Hubert Humphrey.

No recent presidential election has had such a lengthy cast of central characters, nor one that was kept for so long in flux. And under such circumstances, there is an inevitable proliferation of "what ifs?" What if Lyndon Johnson had decided to run again? What if Robert Kennedy had not been shot? What if George Wallace had been dissuaded from running, or had remained simply a regional states-rights candidate? What if Eugene McCarthy had accepted party discipline and closed ranks with Humphrey at the Chicago convention? What if Hubert Humphrey had handled the interaction with Mayor Daley and the Chicago demonstrators differently?

Strictly speaking, of course, there is no sure answer to questions of this type. If the attempt on Kennedy's life had failed, for example, an enormous complex of parameters and event sequences would have been different over the course of the campaign. One can never be entirely confident about what would have happened without the opportunity to live that particular sequence out in all its complexity. Nonetheless, given sufficient information as to the state of mind of the electorate during the period in question, plausible reconstructions can be developed which do not even assume that all other things remained constant, but only that they remained *sufficiently* constant that other processes might stay within predictable bounds. And answers of this sort, if not sacrosanct, carry substantial satisfaction.

One of our purposes in this paper will be to address some of these questions, as illuminated by preliminary analyses from the sixth national presidential election survey, carried out by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan.[1] An effort to develop answers gives a vehicle for what is frankly descriptive coverage of the 1968 election as seen by the electorate. At the same time, we would hope not to miss along the way some of the more theoretical insights which the peculiar circumstances of the 1968 election help to reveal. In particular, we shall pay close attention to the Wallace campaign, and to the more generic lessons that may be drawn from this example of interplay between a pair of traditional parties, potent new issues, and a protest movement.

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[1] The 1968 national sample survey (N = 1559) was made possible by a grant from the Ford Foundation, whose support we gratefully acknowledge. A total of 1559 citizens of voting age were interviewed, most of them both before and after Election Day. The preliminary nature of this report is to be emphasized, since the data on which it is based had not been fully cleaned at the

## I. THE SETTING OF THE ELECTION

The simplest expectation for the 1968 election, and one held widely until March of that year, was that President Johnson would exercise his option to run for a second full term, and that with the advantages of incumbency and the support of the majority party in the land, he would stand a very good chance of winning, although with a margin visibly reduced from his landslide victory over Barry Goldwater in 1964.

We will probably never know what role public opinion may have actually played in his decision to retire. But there is ample evidence that the mood of the electorate had become increasingly surly toward his administration in the months preceding his announcement. When queried in September and October of 1968, barely 40% of the electorate thought that he had handled his job well, the rest adjudging the performance to have been fair to poor. A majority of Democratic and independent vo~~ters, asked if they would have favored President Johnson~~ as the Democratic nominee had he decided to run, said they would ~~not have~~. Affective ratings elicited just after the election for all the prominent political figures of the campaign showed Johnson trailing Robert Kennedy in average popularity by a wide margin, and lagging somewhat behind Humphrey and Muskie as well, among other Democrats (see Table 2). Given the normal head-start that a sitting president usually enjoys in such assays of opinion, Johnson completed his term amid a public bad humor matched only in recent elections by the cloud under which Harry Truman retired from the presidency in 1952. It is correspondingly dubious that Lyndon Johnson could have avoided the embarrassment of defeat had he set his sails for another term.

Indeed, the pattern of concerns exercising the voters and turnover in the players on the presidential stage combined to produce a shift in popular preferences between 1964 and 1968 which was truly massive. It is likely that the proportion of voters casting presidential ballots for the same party in these two successive elections was lower than at any time in recent American history. Among whites who voted in both elections, a full third switched their party. Almost one Goldwater voter out of every five turned either to ~~Humphrey or to Wallace~~ four years later (dividing almost 3 to 1 for Wallace over Humphrey); at the same time, three in every ten white ~~Johnson~~ voters switched to Nixon or Wallace, with Nixon the favorite by a 4-to-1 ratio. A full 40 percent of Nixon's votes came from citizens who had supported Lyndon Johnson in 1964! Much of this flood, of course, came from Republicans who were returning home after their desertions from Goldwater.

Nevertheless, Democrats and Independents who had voted for Johnson and then turned to Nixon four years later made up nearly half of *all* the remaining vote switches, more than matching the combined flow of Johnson and Goldwater voters who supported Wallace, and almost equalling the total Wallace vote. The Johnson-Nixon switchers easily outweighed the flow away from Goldwater to Humphrey and Wallace, and the Republican presidential vote rose from 39% to 43% in 1968 as a consequence. At the same time, the loss of more than a quarter of the total Johnson vote to Wallace and Nixon was scarcely offset by the trickle of votes from Goldwater to Humphrey, and the Democratic proportion of the vote across the land dropped a shattering 19 percentage points from more than 61 percent to less than 43 percent.

Such a massive drain from the Democratic ranks establishes a broader parallel with 1952, for in both cases an electorate professing to be of Democratic allegiance by a considerable majority, had arrived at a sufficient accumulation of grievances with a Democratic administration as to wish it out of office, thereby producing what we have labelled elsewhere a "deviating election."[2] Indeed, the frantic mo-

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time of writing. When the study is released through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, interested analysts may discover small discrepancies from the statistics reported here. Readers should also remember that all sample statistics are subject to varying amounts of sampling error in relation to the number of cases on which they are based.

[2] A deviating election is one in which the party commanding the identifications of a majority of the electorate is nonetheless voted out of power temporarily. See A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller, and D. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960), Chapter 19.

tion of the electorate in its presidential votes between 1964 and 1968 may be ironically juxtaposed against the serene stability of party identifications in the country, for the overall proportions of self-proclaimed Democrats, Independents and Republicans have scarcely changed over the past twenty years, much less in the past four. Of course this juxtaposition calls into question the predictive value of party identification, relative to other kinds of determinants of the vote, and we shall undertake a more intensive discussion of this matter presently. For now, however, let us simply point out that while the inert distribution of party loyalties cannot by definition explain the complex flows of the presidential vote between 1964 and 1968, it was handsomely reflected in the 1968 congressional elections, as it has been in virtually all of the biennial congressional contests of the current era. Despite widespread dissatisfaction with Democratic performance, the Republican proportion of seats in the House rose only a minute 1 percent, from 43 in 1966 to 44 percent on the strength of the Nixon victory. Even at more local levels, the continuing dominance of Democratic partisanship across the nation is documented by the results of thousands of races for state legislative seats. Prior to the election, Democrats controlled 57.7 percent of all legislative seats. After the election, which saw contests for some or all seats in 43 states, Democratic control had dropped from 4,269 seats (or 57.7%) to 4,250 seats (57.5%).[3]

In view of such continued stability of partisanship, it is clear we must turn elsewhere to account for the remarkable changes in voting at the presidential level between 1964 and 1968. The classic assumption is, of course, that such change must spring from some flux in "short-term forces"—the impact of the most salient current issues, and the way in which these issues interlock with the leadership options, or the cast of potential presidential figures in the specific year of 1968. These terms obviously best define the setting of the 1968 election.

When asked on the eve of the presidential election to identify the most important problem facing the government in Washington, over 40% of the electorate cited the war in Vietnam. The salience of this issue provided another striking parallel with 1952. In both presidential elections, widespread public discouragement with the progress of a "bleeding war" in the Far East, seen as initiated by a Democratic administration, was a major source of indignation.

But the Vietnam issue did not, of course, stand alone. Offering vivid testimony to another bitter current of controversy was a simple, though little-noted, pattern in the popular presidential vote itself: while some 97% of black voters in the nation cast their ballots for Hubert Humphrey, less than 35% of white voters did so. Thus the presidential vote must have been as sharply polarized along racial lines as at any time during American history.[4] One major irony surrounding this cleavage was the fact that it was the comfortable white majority that was agitating to overturn control of the White House, while the aggrieved black minority was casting its vote as one in an effort to preserve the partisan status quo.

Indeed, this irony is compounded when the role of the Vietnam issue is jointly taken into account. We have indicated above that the public was deeply impatient with the Johnson administration, in part because of the handling of the war. Blacks stood out as the major demographic grouping most exercised about the entanglement in Vietnam. They were more likely than whites to opine that the government should never have undertaken the military commitment there. They also were more likely to feel that American troops should be brought home immediately, a position not generally associated with the Johnson administration. Nonetheless, as Table 2 (below) will document, Negro enthusiasm not only for Hubert Humphrey but for Lyndon Johnson as well remained high to the very end. It seems quite evident that when black citizens were making decisions about their vote, Vietnam attitudes paled into relative insignificance by contrast with attitudes toward progress on civil rights within the country; and that where such progress was concerned, the Johnson-Humphrey administration was seen as much more friendly than the other 1968 alternatives.

Because of the near-unanimity of the black vote, many of our analyses below have been focussed on differences within the white vote taken alone.[5] At the same time, this treatment

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[3] *Congressional Quarterly*, November 22, 1968, p. 3177.

[4] The percentage difference of 62% in candidate preference between blacks and whites is substantially larger than class differentiation or other social cleavages and partisanship within the United States in recent history or for democracies of Western Europe.

[5] Such segregation is indicated simply because of the fact that within the black vote in 1968 there is next to no meaningful "variance" to be

TABLE 1. COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES ON CURRENT VIETNAM POLICY AND RACIAL DESEGREGATION, 1964 AND 1968, FOR WHITES ONLY

"Which of the following do you think we should do *now* in Vietnam?
1. Pull out of Vietnam entirely.
2. Keep our soldiers in Vietnam but try to end the fighting.
3. Take a stronger stand even if it means invading North Vietnam.

| | *Pull Out* | *Status Quo* | *Stronger Stand* | *Don't Know, Other* | *Total* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Northern Democrats* | | | |
| 1964 | 8% | 25 | 29 | 38 | 100% |
| 1968 | 20% | 39 | 35 | 6 | 100% |
| | | *Northern Republicans* | | | |
| 1964 | 8% | 19 | 38 | 35 | 100% |
| 1968 | 20% | 39 | 36 | 5 | 100% |
| | | *Southern Democrats* | | | |
| 1964 | 8% | 25 | 28 | 39 | 100% |
| 1968 | 17% | 36 | 38 | 9 | 100% |
| | | *Southern Republicans* | | | |
| 1964 | 10% | 18 | 42 | 30 | 100% |
| 1968 | 15% | 29 | 48 | 8 | 100% |

"What about you? Are you in favor of desegregation, strict segregation, or something in between?" (This was the fourth question in a series asking about others' attitudes toward racial desegregation.)

| | *Desegregation* | *Mixed Feelings* | *Strict Segregation* | *Other* | *Total* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Northern Democrats* | | | |
| 1964 | 31% | 50 | 17 | 2 | 100% |
| 1968 | 38% | 45 | 14 | 3 | 100% |
| | | *Northern Republicans* | | | |
| 1964 | 32% | 51 | 13 | 4 | 100% |
| 1968 | 35% | 50 | 10 | 5 | 100% |
| | | *Southern Democrats* | | | |
| 1964 | 12% | 35 | 52 | 1 | 100% |
| 1968 | 18% | 45 | 30 | 7 | 100% |
| | | *Southern Republicans* | | | |
| 1964 | 15% | 44 | 40 | 1 | 100% |
| 1968 | 15% | 60 | 20 | 5 | 100% |

must not be allowed to obscure in any way the deep imprint of racial cleavage on the election outcome. The additional "between-race" variance in the vote, concealed when data are presented only for whites, remains extreme, and is a faithful reflection of the crescendo to which civil rights tumult had risen over the four preceding years. It should be kept in mind.

To say that Vietnam and civil rights were dominant issues for the public in 1968 is not equivalent, however, to saying that voter positions on these issues can account for the large-scale voting change we have observed for whites between 1964 and 1968. As the comparisons provided by Table 1 suggest, changes in public thinking about strategic alternatives in Vietnam or civil rights outcomes over this period were rather limited. Where Vietnam was concerned, opinion was somewhat more crystallized in 1968 than in 1964 but there had been no sweeping shift of sentiment from hawk to dove in mass feeling. On civil rights, the drift of white opinion had been if anything toward a more liberal stance, and hence can hardly explain a vote which seemed to vibrate with "blacklash." Thus public positioning on these two central issues taken alone seems no more capable of illuminating vote change from 1964 to 1968 than the inert partisan identifications.

What *had* changed, of course, was the public view of the success of Administration performance in these areas. As we have discussed elsewhere, throughout the 1950's citizens who felt the Republicans were better at keeping the country out of war outnumbered those who had more confidence in Democrats by a consistently wide margin, much as the Democratic Party tended to be seen as better at keeping the country out of economic depression. In 1964, however, the pleas of Barry Goldwater for an escalation of the Vietnam War in order to produce a military victory served to frighten the public, and rapidly reversed the standing perception: by the time of the November election more people felt the Democrats were better able to avert a large war.[6] But this novel perception was transient. President Johnson himself saw fit to authorize an escalation of bombing in Vietnam almost immediately after the 1964 election. By the time of the 1966 congressional election, the balance in popular assessments had already shifted back to the point where a slight majority chose the Republicans as more adept in avoiding war. By 1968, exasperation at the handling of the war had increased sufficiently that among people who felt there was a difference in the capacity of the two parties to avoid a larger war, the Republicans were favored once again by a margin of two to one.

To the bungled war in Vietnam, the white majority could readily add a sense of frustration at a racial confrontation that had taken on

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"accounted for." When categories of "Nixon voters" and "Wallace voters" are presented, they are necessarily "lily-white" in composition. Therefore when "Humphrey voters" are contrasted with them, it is confusing if differences may be totally a function of the large admixtures of blacks in the Humphrey support, as opposed to differences which would stand up even with comparisons limited to whites.

[6] See "Voting and Foreign Policy," by Warren E. Miller, Chapter 7 in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1967).

increasingly ugly dimensions between 1964 and 1968. Although national opinion had evolved in a direction somewhat more favorable to desegregation, largely through the swelling proportions of college-educated young, some persistently grim facts had been underscored by the Kerner Commission report in the spring of the year: forbidding proportions of the white citizenry outside of the South as well as within it had little enthusiasm for the redress of Negro grievances to begin with. And even among whites with some genuine sympathy for the plight of blacks, the spectacle of city centers aflame had scarcely contributed to a sense of confidence in the Administration handling of the problem.

From Vietnam and the racial crisis a corollary discontent crystallized that might be treated as a third towering issue of the 1968 campaign, or as nothing more than a restatement of the other two issues. This was the cry for "law and order" and against "crime in the streets." While Goldwater had talked in these terms somewhat in 1964, events had conspired to raise their salience very considerably for the public by 1968. For some, these slogans may have had no connotations involving either the black race or Vietnam, signifying instead a concern over rising crime rates and the alleged "coddling" of criminal offenders by the courts. More commonly by 1968, however, the connection was very close: there were rallying cries for more severe police suppression of black rioting in the urban ghettos, and of public political dissent of the type represented by the Vietnam peace demonstrations at Chicago during the Democratic convention.

In view of these latter connotations, it is not surprising that people responsive to the "law and order" theme tended, like George Wallace, to be upset at the same time by civil rights gains and the lack of a more aggressive policy in Vietnam. Therefore it might seem redundant to treat "law and order" as a third major issue in its own right. Nevertheless, we have found it important to do so, even where the "order" being imposed is on black militants or peace demonstrators, for the simple reason that many members of the electorate reacted as though the control of dissent was quite an independent issue. This becomes very clear where support for blacks and opposition to the war are accompanied with a strong revulsion against street protest and other forms of active dissent. And this combination occurs more frequently than an academic audience may believe.

One would expect, for example, to find support for peace demonstrations among the set of people in the sample who said (a) that we made a mistake in getting involved in the Vietnam War; and (b) that the preferable course of action at the moment would be to "pull out" of that country entirely. Such expectations are clearly fulfilled among the numerous blacks matching these specifications. Among whites, however, the picture is different. First, a smaller proportion of whites—about one in six or seven—expressed this combination of feelings about Vietnam. Among those who expressed such feelings it remains true that there is relatively less disfavor vented about some of the active forms of peace dissent that had become customary by 1968. What is striking, however, is the absolute division of evaluative attitudes toward peace dissenters among those who were themselves relative "doves," and this is probably the more politically significant fact as well. Asked to rate "Vietnam war protestors" on the same kind of scale as used in Table 2, for example, a clear majority of these whites who themselves were opposed to the Administration's Vietnam policy located their reactions on the negative side of the scale, and nearly one-quarter (23%) placed them at the point of most extreme hostility.

Even more telling, perhaps, are the attitudes of these same whites toward the peace demonstrations surrounding the Democratic convention at Chicago, for in this case the protestors were given undeniably sympathetic coverage by the television networks. Keeping in mind that we are dealing here with only those whites who took clear "dove" positions on Vietnam policy, it is noteworthy indeed that almost 70% of those giving an opinion rejected the suggestion that "too much force" was used by Chicago police against the peace demonstrators, and the *modal* opinion (almost 40%) was that "not enough force" had been used to suppress the demonstration.[7]

It should be abundantly clear from this description that the white minority who by the autumn of 1968 felt our intervention in Vietnam was a mistake and was opting for a withdrawal of troops turns out to fit the campus

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[7] A separate analysis, carried out by a colleague in the Survey Research Center Political Behavior Program and using the same body of data from the SRC 1968 election study, suggests, moreover, that many voters who thought the police used too little force deserted Humphrey in the course of the campaign while the minority who objected that too much force was used voted more heavily for the Democratic nominee. See John P. Robinson, "Voter Reaction to Chicago 1968," Survey Research Center (1969), mimeo.

TABLE 2. AVERAGE RATINGS OF MAJOR 1968 POLITICAL FIGURES BY A NATIONAL SAMPLE, NOVEMBER–DECEMBER, 1968

| | | Non-South | | South | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | TOTAL SAMPLE | White (N's of 785–843) | Black (N's of 54–64) | White (N's of 315–340) | Black (N's of 55–66) |
| Robert Kennedy | 70.1 | 70.4 | 94.1 | 60.5 | 91.2 |
| Richard Nixon | 66.5 | 67.7 | 53.0 | 67.8 | 56.6 |
| Hubert Humphrey | 61.7 | 61.2 | 86.1 | 53.4 | 85.8 |
| Lyndon Johnson | 58.4 | 56.6 | 81.9 | 53.7 | 82.7 |
| Eugene McCarthy | 54.8 | 56.5 | 59.1 | 49.8 | 54.0 |
| Nelson Rockefeller | 53.8 | 54.4 | 61.6 | 50.7 | 53.5 |
| Ronald Reagan | 49.1 | 49.6 | 42.9 | 50.0 | 41.8 |
| George Romney | 49.0 | 50.4 | 48.3 | 45.6 | 50.2 |
| George Wallace | 31.4 | 27.7 | 9.4 | 48.2 | 13.2 |
| Edmund Muskie | 61.4 | 62.7 | 71.0 | 54.7 | 68.9 |
| Spiro Agnew | 50.4 | 50.9 | 37.7 | 52.9 | 42.4 |
| Cirtus LeMay | 35.2 | 33.6 | 21.1 | 43.9 | 22.9 |

image of peace sentiment rather poorly. Such a disjuncture between stereotypes developed from the mass media and cross-section survey data are not at all uncommon. However, as certain other aspects of the election may be quite unintelligible unless this fact has been absorbed by the reader, it is worth underscoring here. This is *not* to say that the more familiar Vietnam dissent cannot be detected in a national sample. Among whites resenting Vietnam and wishing to get out, for example, a unique and telltale bulge of 12% gave ratings of the most extreme sympathy to the stimulus "Vietnam war protestors." Now this fragment of the electorate shows all of the characteristics expected of McCarthy workers or the New Left: its members are very young, are disproportionately college-educated, Jewish, and metropolitan in background, and register extreme sympathy with civil rights and the Chicago convention demonstrations. The problem is that this group represents such a small component (one-eighth) of the 1968 dove sentiment on Vietnam being singled out here that its attitudes on other issues are very nearly obscured by rather different viewpoints held by the other 88% of the dove contingent. On the larger national scene, in turn, those who opposed Vietnam policy and were sympathetic to Vietnam war protestors make up less than 3% of the electorate—even if we add comparable blacks to the group—and law and order were not unpopular with the 97 percent.

In the broad American public, then, there was a widespread sense of breakdown in authority and discipline that fed as readily on militant political dissent as on race riots and more conventional crime. This disenchantment registered even among citizens who apparently were sympathetic to the goals of the dissent on pure policy grounds, and everywhere added to a sense of cumulative grievance with the party in possession of the White House. Thus the "law and order" phrase, ambiguous though it might be, had considerable resonance among the voters, and deserves to be catalogued along with Vietnam and the racial crisis among major issue influences on the election.

While the 1968 situation bore a number of resemblances to the basic ingredients and outcome of the 1952 election, the analogy is far from perfect. In 1952, the public turned out to vote in proportions that were quite unusual for the immediate period, a phenomenon generally taken to reflect the intensity of frustrations over the trends of government. It is easy to argue that aggravations were fully as intense in 1968 as they had been in 1952, and more intense than for any of the elections in between. Yet the proportion turning out to vote in 1968 fell off somewhat from its 1964 level.[8]

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[8] The decline was only on the order of 1½ percent nationally, but the overall figures are somewhat misleading. Enormous efforts devoted to voter registration projects among Southern blacks between 1964 and 1968 appear to have paid off by increasing voter participation in that sector from 44% to 51%. Perhaps in counterpoint, Southern whites increased their turnout by 2%, thereby inching ever closer to the national norm. Thus the decline in turnout was concentrated outside the South, and there approached the more substantial drop of 4%. Even this figure

Of course any equation between indignation and turning out to vote does presuppose the offering of satisfactory alternatives, and there was somewhat greater talk than usual in 1968 that the candidate options in November were inadequate. Certainly the array of potential candidates was lengthy, whatever the actual nominees, and our account of the short-term forces affecting the electorate would be quite incomplete without consideration of the emotions with which the public regarded the dramatis personae in 1968. Just after the election, respondents in our national sample were asked to locate each of twelve political figures on a "feeling thermometer" running from zero (cold) to 100° (warm), with a response of 50° representing the indifference point. Table 2 summarizes the mean values for the total sample, as well as those within relevant regional and racial partitions.

Numerous well-chronicled features of the campaign are raised into quantitative relief by this tabulation, including Wallace's sharply regional and racial appeal, Muskie's instant popularity and near upstaging of Humphrey, and the limited interest that McCarthy seemed to hold for Negroes compared to other Democratic candidates. At the same time, other less evident comparisons can be culled from these materials, although the reader is cautioned to keep in mind that these scores refer to the period just after the election, and not necessarily to the period of the spring primaries or the summer conventions.[9] This may be of particular importance in the case of the ratings of Eugene McCarthy. When respondents were asked before the election which candidate from the spring they had hoped would win nomination, over 20 percent of Democrats and Independents recalling some preference mentioned McCarthy. However, many of these citizens gave quite negative ratings to McCarthy by November, so it appears that some disenchantment set in between the primaries and the election.

The question of timing poses itself acutely as well where Robert Kennedy is concerned. Taken at face value, the data of Table 2 imply that aside from the tragedy at Los Angeles, Kennedy should have been given the Democratic nomination and would have won the presidential election rather handily. Yet how much of this massive popularity is due to some posthumous halo of martyrdom? It seems almost certain that at least some small increment is of this sort, and that the harsh realities of a tough campaign would have eroded the bright edges of Kennedy appeal. Nevertheless, both in contested primaries and poll data of the spring period,[10] as well as in the retrospective glances of our autumn respondents, one cannot fail to be impressed by the reverberations of Kennedy charisma even in the least likely quarters, such as among Southern whites or among Republicans elsewhere. And rank-and-file Democrats outside the South reported themselves to have favored Kennedy for

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is misleading, since whites outside the South showed a 3% loss in percentage points of turnout, while nonwhites declined by almost 11 percentage points! See *Current Population Reports*, "Voter Participation in November 1968," Series P-20, No. 177, December 27, 1968. Although such turnout figures, apart from the more general mobilizing of Southern blacks, are consistent with a proposition that whites were more eager to "throw the rascals out" than blacks, and that among whites, Southerners had the fiercest grievances of all, there is no hiding the fact of anemic turnout in most of the country in 1968. Interestingly enough, the decline from 1964 was uniformly distributed across the entire spectrum of party allegiances from loyal Democrats to strong Republicans.

[9] The reader should also keep in mind several other things about Table 2. The "South" here refers, as it will throughout this paper, to the Census Bureau definition of the region that includes 15 states and the District of Columbia. Hence such border states as Maryland or West Virginia are included along with the deeper southern states of the old confederacy. Presumably, for example, George Wallace's rating among whites of a more hard-core South would be correspondingly higher. Secondly, it should be remembered for some of the lesser candidates that respondents knowing so little about a candidate as to be indifferent to him would end up rating him "50°." Thus it would be questionable to conclude from Table 2 that LeMay was more popular than George Wallace, except in a very limited sense. Actually, three times as many respondents (nearly one-third) left LeMay at the indifference point as did so for Wallace. Thus lack of visibility helped to make him *less unpopular.* But among those who reacted to both men, LeMay was less popular than Wallace. Similarly, Wallace's low rating must be understood as a compound of an admiring minority and a hostile majority. The variance of Wallace ratings is much greater than those for other candidates, even in the South.

[10] Just after the decision of Robert Kennedy to run and before Lyndon Johnson's withdrawal, the Gallup poll showed Democrats favoring Kennedy as the party's nominee by a 44–41 margin.

the nomination over Humphrey by two-to-one margins, and over McCarthy by nearly three-to-one. Clearly a Kennedy candidacy could not have drawn a much greater proportion of the black vote than Humphrey received, although it might have encouraged higher turnout there. But there is evidence of enough edge elsewhere to suggest that Robert Kennedy might have won an election over Richard Nixon, and perhaps even with greater ease than he would have won his own party's nomination.

As it was, Humphrey received the mantle of party power from Lyndon Johnson and, with Robert Kennedy missing, captured the Democratic nomination without serious challenge. At that point he faced much the same dilemma as Adlai Stevenson had suffered in 1952: without gracelessly biting the hand that fed him, how could he dissociate himself from the unpopular record of the preceding administration? In 1952, Stevenson did not escape public disgust with the Truman administration, and was punished for its shortcomings. The 1968 data make clear in a similar manner that Humphrey was closely linked to Lyndon Johnson in the public eye through the period of the election. For example, the matrix of intercorrelations of the candidate ratings presented in Table 2 shows, as one would expect, rather high associations in attitudes toward presidential and vice presidential candidates on the same ticket. Thus the Humphrey-Muskie intercorrelation is .58, the Nixon-Agnew figure is .59, and the Wallace-LeMay figure is .69. But the highest intercorrelation in the whole matrix, a coefficient of .70, links public attitudes toward Lyndon Johnson and those toward Hubert Humphrey. Humphrey was highly assimilated to the Johnson image, and his support came largely from sectors of the population for which the administration had not "worn thin."

When we consider the relative strength of Kennedy enthusiasts as opposed to loyal Humphrey-Johnson supporters among identifiers with the Democratic Party within the mass public, the line of differentiation that most quickly strikes the eye is the noteworthy generation gap. As we have seen above, Kennedy supporters enjoy a marked overall plurality. However, this margin comes entirely from the young. For Democrats under thirty, only about one in five giving a pre-convention nomination preference picks Humphrey or Johnson, and Kennedy partisans outnumber them by nearly three to one. Among Democrats over fifty, however, Humphrey-Johnson supporters can claim a clear plurality.[11] The "wings" of the Democratic Party that emerged in the struggle for the nomination had an "old guard" and "young Turk" flavor, even as reflected in a cross-section sample of party sympathizers.[12]

This completes our summary of the setting in which the 1968 election took place. We have seen that despite great continuity in party loyalties and a surprising constancy in policy positions of the public, there was an unusual degree of change in partisan preference at the presidential level by comparison with 1964. This change occurred in part as a response to increased salience of some issues, such as the question of "law and order," and in part because of the way in which contending leadership cadres had come to be identified with certain policies or past performance. The Democratic party lost, as quickly as it had won, its perceived capacity to cope with international affairs and the exacerbating war in Vietnam. Hubert Humphrey, long a major figure in his own right, could not move swiftly enough to escape his links with a discredited regime.

Let us now pursue some of the more obvious analytic questions posed by the general discontent among voters in 1968, and by the Wallace movement in particular. We shall first consider influences on the actual partitioning of the vote on Election Day, and then examine some of the attitudinal and social bases underlying the outcome.

## II. HYPOTHETICAL VARIATIONS ON THE VOTE OUTCOME

*Impact of the Wallace Ticket.* There were signs of some concern in both the Nixon and Humphrey camps that the success of George Wallace in getting his name on the ballot might divert votes and lower their respective chances of success. Nixon was more alarmed by the

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[11] Interestingly enough, the same generational cleavages among Southern white Democrats occur at an earlier age than those elsewhere. In that region, Humphrey-Johnson preferences hold a plurality in all age cohorts over 30, despite the fact that Kennedy support has an edge of better than three to one among those under 30 (N of 34), perhaps because the latter group has less of a memory of the fury in the deep South at the Kennedy family prior to the assassination of President John Kennedy in Dallas in 1963.

[12] Although there is some slight tendency for pre-convention supporters of McCarthy to be relatively young, the distribution by age is more homogeneous than expected, and much more so than is the case for Kennedy. It is possible that young people supporting McCarthy as the only alternative to the Administration switched more heavily than the middle-aged to Kennedy when he announced his candidacy.

TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF THE WALLACE VOTE, BY TRADITIONAL PARTIES AND CANDIDATES

| Rating of Two Major Candidates | | PARTY IDENTIFICATION | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Democratic | Independent | Republican |
| | HUMPHREY over NIXON | 4%<br>(347) | 26%<br>(23) | 21%<br>(24) |
| | Tied | 24%<br>(79) | 9%<br>(11) | 6%<br>(17) |
| | NIXON over HUMPHREY | 26%<br>(132) | 15%<br>(53) | 7%<br>(314) |

The percentage figure indicates the proportion of all voters in the cell who reported casting a ballot for Wallace. The number of voters is indicated between parentheses.

prospective loss of the electoral votes in the Deep South that Goldwater had won in 1964, while Humphrey was alarmed in turn by intelligence that Wallace was making inroads outside the South among unionized labor that had been customarily Democratic since the New Deal. At the very least, the Wallace ticket was responsible for the injection of unusual uncertainty in a game already replete with unknowns. Now that the dust has settled, we can ask more systematically how the election might have been affected if Wallace had been dissuaded from running.

Numerous polls made clear at the time of the election that Wallace voters tended to be quite disproportionately nominal Democrats, and data from our sample are congruent with this conclusion, although the differences were more notable in the South than elsewhere. For the South, 68% of Wallace voters considered themselves Democrats, and 20% Republicans. Outside the South, proportions were 46% Democratic and 34% Republican. Yet these proportions taken alone do not address in any satisfying fashion what might have happened if Wallace had not run. In the first place, these partisan proportions among Wallace voters do not differ very markedly from those which characterize the regional electorates taken as a whole. Indeed, as we shall see, the overall association between partisanship and attitudes toward Wallace (the rating scale) shows Republicans slightly more favorable across the nation as a whole, although this fact is faintly reversed with blacks set aside, and the main lesson seems to be that the "true" correlation is of utterly trivial magnitude (.05 or less). More important still, however, is the obvious fact that Democrats voting for Wallace were repudiating the standard national ticket, as many as a third of them for the second time in a row. If Wallace had not run, we can have little confidence that they would have faithfully supported Humphrey and Muskie.

It is clear that the crucial datum involves the relative preferences of the Wallace voters for either Nixon or Humphrey, assuming that these preferences would have been the same without Wallace and that these citizens would have gone to the polls in any event. This information is available in the leader ratings used for Table 2. In Table 3 we have arrayed the total sample according to whether Humphrey or Nixon was given the higher rating, or the two were tied, as well as by the respondent's party identification. Within each cell so defined, we indicate the proportion of the vote won by Wallace, and the number of voters on which the proportion is based. The latter figures show familiar patterns. Of voters with both a party and a candidate preference, more than four-fifths prefer the nominee of their party. And while Democrats are in a majority, it is clear that the tides are running against them since they are suffering the bulk of defections.

It is interesting how the Wallace vote is drawn from across this surface. While the numbers of cases are too small to yield very reliable estimates in some of the internal cells, it is obvious that Wallace made least inroads among partisans satisfied with their party's nominee, and showed major strength where such partisans were sufficiently disgusted with their own party nominee actually to prefer that of the opposing party. Conceptually, it is significant that these protestors included Republicans unenthusiastic about Nixon as well as the more expected Democrats cool to Humphrey. Practically, however, Nixon Democrats so far outnumbered Humphrey Republicans that while Wallace drew at nearly equal rates from both groups, the majority of his votes were from Democrats who otherwise preferred Nixon rather than from Republicans who might have given their favors to Humphrey.

This is turn provides much of the answer to one of our primary questions. While the data underlying Table 3 can be manipulated in a variety of ways, all reasonable reconstructions of the popular vote as it might have stood without the Wallace candidacy leave Nixon either enjoying about the same proportion of the two-party vote that he actually won or a slightly greater share, depending on the region and the detailed assumptions made. In short, unless one makes some entirely extravagant assumptions about the mediating electoral college, it is very difficult to maintain any suspicion that the Wallace intrusion by itself changed the major outcome of the election.

*Impact of the McCarthy Movement.* If he was ever tempted at all, Eugene McCarthy decided against mounting a fourth-party campaign for the presidency. At the same time, he withheld anything resembling enthusiastic personal support for Hubert Humphrey. In view of his devoted following, some observers felt that McCarthy's refusal to close party ranks after Chicago cost the Democratic nominee precious votes, and conceivably even the presidency.

In order to understand the basis of McCarthy support at the time of the election, it is useful to trace what is known of the evolution of McCarthy strength from the time of the first primary in the spring. It will be recalled that McCarthy was the sole Democrat to challenge the Johnson administration in the New Hampshire primary. With the aid of many student volunteer campaign workers, he polled a surprising 42% of the vote among Democrats, as opposed to 48% drawn by an organized write-in campaign for President Johnson. Although he failed to upset the president in the vote, most observers saw his performance as remarkably strong, and a clear harbinger of discontent which could unseat Lyndon Johnson in the fall election. This reading was plainly shared by Robert Kennedy, who announced his own candidacy for the nomination four days later, and probably by Johnson himself, who withdrew from any contention less than three weeks later.

Sample survey data from New Hampshire at the time of the primary show some expected patterns underlying that first McCarthy vote, but also some rather unexpected ones as well. First, the vote among Democrats split toward Johnson or McCarthy in obvious ways according to expressions of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with Administration performance in general and its Vietnam policy in particular. The McCarthy vote in New Hampshire certainly reflected a groundswell of anger at the Johnson administration, and an expression of desire for a change which was simply reiterated in November. Surprisingly, however, in view of McCarthy's clear and dissenting "dove" position on Vietnam, the vote he drew in New Hampshire could scarcely be labelled a "peace vote," despite the fact that such a conclusion was frequently drawn. There was, of course, some hard-core peace sentiment among New Hampshire Democrats that was drawn quite naturally to McCarthy. Among his supporters in the primary, however, those who were unhappy with the Johnson administration for not pursuing a *harder* line against Hanoi outnumbered those advocating a withdrawal from Vietnam by nearly a three to two margin! Thus the McCarthy tide in New Hampshire was, to say the least, quite heterogeneous in its policy preferences: the only common denominator seems to have been a deep dissatisfaction with the Johnson administration.[13] McCarthy simply represented the only formal alternative available to registered Democrats. This desire for an alternative was underlined by the fact that most of the 10 percent of the Democratic vote that did not go to Johnson or McCarthy went to Nixon as a write-in candidate on the Democratic ballot.

The entry of Robert Kennedy into the race did provide another alternative and, as we have seen, a very popular one as well. He made major inroads into the potential McCarthy strength, and by the time our autumn sample was asked what candidate of the spring would have been preferred for the Democratic nomination, 46% of those Democrats with some preference cited Kennedy first while only 18% mentioned McCarthy. Nevertheless, even this 18% cannot be thought of as constituting hard-core McCarthy support at the time of the actual election, since almost two-thirds of this group had turned their attention elsewhere, giving at least one of the other presidential hopefuls a higher rating than they gave McCarthy in the responses underlying Table 2. The remainder who reported McCarthy as their preconvention favorite and awarded him their highest ratings just after the election, make up some 6% of Democrats having some clear candidate preference, or 3% of all Democrats. Along with a handful of Independents and Republicans showing the same reiterated McCarthy preference, these people can be considered the McCarthy "hard-core."

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[13] See also the account for New Hampshire by Louis Harris, "How Voters See the Issues," *Newsweek*, March 25, 1968, p. 26.

While it is this hard-core whose voting decisions interest us most, it is instructive to note where the other two-thirds of the pre-convention McCarthy support among Democrats went, over the course of the campaign. If these migrations are judged according to which presidential aspirant among the nine hopefuls of Table 2 was given the highest rating in November, one discovers that a slight plurality of these erstwhile McCarthy backers found George Wallace their preferred candidate in the fall. Slightly smaller groups favored Kennedy and Nixon, and a scatter picked other Republicans like Reagan and Rockefeller, despite their own Democratic partisanship. Very few of these McCarthy Democrats—about one in seven—migrated to a preference for Hubert Humphrey. Where the actual presidential vote was concerned, the choice was of course more constrained.

Since the McCarthy movement was commonly thought of as somewhat to the left of Humphrey and the administration, while Wallace was located rather markedly to the right, a major McCarthy-to-Wallace transfer of preferences may seem ideologically perplexing. Were McCarthy supporters so furious with the Humphrey nomination that pure spite overcame issue feelings and led to a protest vote for Wallace? Although there were rumors of such a reaction at the time, our data suggest a somewhat simpler interpretation. We have already noted the attitudinal heterogeneity of McCarthy voters in New Hampshire. Those in our autumn sample who recall a preconvention preference for McCarthy are similarly heterogeneous. Indeed, on some issues of social welfare and civil rights, preconvention McCarthy supporters are actually more conservative than backers of either Humphrey or Kennedy.

This heterogeneity declined markedly, however, as the size of the McCarthy group eroded over the summer to what we have defined as the hard-core. If we compare the attitudes of that hard-core on major issues with those of the professed early backers of McCarthy who subsequently supported Wallace, the differences are usually extreme. The McCarthy-Wallace group was against desegregation, in favor of an increased military effort in Vietnam, and was highly indignant with the situation in the nation where "law and order" was concerned (see Table 4). People supporting McCarthy to the bitter end took opposite positions on all of these major issues. Similarly, the winnowing down of the McCarthy support operated very sharply along demographic lines. Among non-Southern white Democrats who reported a pre-convention McCarthy preference, for example, the hard-core that remained enthusiastic about McCarthy through to the actual election were 60% of college background, whereas, of those whose ardor cooled, only 18% had had any connection with college.

In short, then, it is evident again that among Democrats particularly, McCarthy was an initial rallying point for voters of all policy persuasions who were thoroughly displeased with the Johnson administration. When the Wallace candidacy crystallized and his issue advocacies became more broadly known, that portion of the discontented to whom he spoke most directly flocked to him. Hence it seems very doubtful that Humphrey would have won many votes from this group even if McCarthy had lent the Vice President his personal support in a whole-hearted fashion. The main motivation of this group was to register its disgust with incumbent leaders concerning civil rights advances, timidity in Vietnam and outbreaks of social disorder. It may well be that by September, with the far more congenial candidacy of Wallace available, Senator McCarthy would already have become a relatively negative reference point for this two-thirds of his early support, especially if he had joined forces with Humphrey. Therefore if we are to search for votes withheld from Humphrey because of the kinds of discontent McCarthy helped to crystallize, they are much more likely to be found among the McCarthy hard-core.

We persist in looking for such withheld votes, not simply because of rumors they existed, but also because there are rather tangible signs in the data that they were present in 1968. Such votes could take any one of four major alternative forms: they could be located among citizens who went to the polls but did not vote for president; they could be reflected in votes for minor party candidates; they could involve staying at home on election day; or they could take the form of votes spitefully transferred to Humphrey's chief rival, Mr. Nixon. Easiest to establish as "withheld votes" are the first two categories. Although their incidence is naturally very limited, both types can be discerned in the sample and do occur in conjunction with strong enthusiasm for McCarthy. Projected back to the nation's electorate, perhaps as much as a half-million votes are represented here, lying primarily outside the South. This is only a faint trace when sprinkled across the political map of the nation, however, and taken alone would probably have made little or no

TABLE 4. ISSUE DIFFERENCES AMONG WHITES PREFERRING MCCARTHY AS THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINEE, ACCORDING TO NOVEMBER PREFERENCES FOR MCCARTHY OR WALLACE

| | | McCARTHY "HARD CORE"[a] | VOTED WALLACE[b] |
|---|---|---|---|
| "Are you in favor of desegregation, strict segregation, or something in between?" | DESEGREGATION | 79% | 7% |
| | IN BETWEEN | 21 | 50 |
| | SEGREGATION | 0 | 43 |
| | | 100%<br>(24) | 100%<br>(14) |
| "Do you think the (Chicago) police (at the Democratic Convention) used too much force, the right amount of force, or not enough force with the demonstrators?" | TOO MUCH FORCE | 91% | 0% |
| | RIGHT AMOUNT | 9 | 50 |
| | NOT ENOUGH | 0 | 50 |
| | | 100%<br>(23) | 100%<br>(12) |
| "Which of the following do you think we should do now in Vietnam: pull out of Vietnam entirely, keep our soldiers in Vietnam but try to end the fighting, or take a stronger stand even if it means invading North Vietnam?" | PULL OUT | 50% | 7% |
| | STATUS QUO | 50 | 7 |
| | STRONGER STAND | 9 | 86 |
| | | 100%<br>(24) | 100%<br>(13) |

[a] This column is limited to whites whose pre-convention favorite was Eugene McCarthy and who continued to give him their top rating after the November election.

[b] It is to be emphasized that this column includes *only* those Wallace voters who said that in the spring of 1968 they had hoped Eugene McCarthy would win the Democratic nomination. This fact explains the small case numbers. However, in view of the relative homogeneity of respondents in the table—all are whites who reported a pre-convention McCarthy preference and most happen in addition to be nominal identifiers of the Democratic Party—the disparities in issue position are the more impressive.

difference in the distribution of votes from the electoral college.

It is more difficult to say that specific instances of abstinence from any voting in 1968, or "defection" to Richard Nixon, reflect an abiding loyalty to McCarthy that Humphrey could not replace, and would not have occurred but for the McCarthy intrusion. There is a faint edge of non-voting that looks suspiciously of this sort, but it is again very limited: most ardent McCarthy fans were too politically involved to have thrown away a chance to vote at other levels of office. Far more numerous are the defections to Nixon on the part of voters of liberal and Democratic predispositions, who reported sympathy toward McCarthy. Here, however, it is difficult to be confident that McCarthy made any necessary contribution to the decision equation: the situation itself might have soured these people sufficiently, McCarthy or no. Nevertheless, when one begins to add together putative "withheld votes" from the preceding three categories one does not need to factor in any very large proportion of these defectors to arrive at a total large enough to have provided Humphrey with a tiny majority in the electoral college, without requiring any gross maldistribution of these new-found popular votes outside the South.

We should reiterate, of course, that any such hypothetical reconstructions must be taken with a grain of salt. If McCarthy had embraced Humphrey on the final night in Chicago, not all of his most fervent supporters would necessarily have followed suit, and Humphrey would have needed most of them for a victory. Or if Humphrey had catered more dramatically to the McCarthy wing in terms of Vietnam policy after the election, he might have suffered losses of much greater proportion to Wallace on his right, for there is simply no question but that Democrats sharing the circle of ideas espoused by Wallace outnumbered the Democrats attuned to McCarthy by a very wide margin—perhaps as great as ten to one. Moreover, it is appropriate to keep in mind our earlier suggestion that the Wallace intrusion hurt Nixon's vote more than Humphrey's: if we now remove Wallace as well as McCarthy from the scene, the net result might remain a Nixon victory.

However all this may be, it seems probable that the entire roster of prominent Democratic candidates—McCarthy, Wallace, Kennedy, McGovern—who were in their various ways opposing the administration, must have contributed cumulatively to Humphrey's problem of retaining the loyalty of fellow Democrats in the electorate. Certainly the failure of liberal Republican leaders to rally around the Goldwater candidacy in 1964, itself an unusual departure from tradition, had contributed to the Republican disaster of that year. 1968 provided something of a mirror image, and the result was an inordinate movement of the electorate between the two consultations.

## III. THE "RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE" OF 1968

In describing the current of discontent that swirled around the Democratic party and the White House in 1968, we indicated that disgruntled Democrats rather indiscriminately supported McCarthy in the earliest primaries, but soon began to sort themselves into those staying with McCarthy versus those shifting to Nixon or Wallace, according to their more precise policy grievances on the major issues of Vietnam, civil rights, and the problem of "law and order." By the time of the election, the sorting had become remarkably clean: in particular, differences in issue position between Wallace supporters and what we have called the McCarthy hard core are impressive in magnitude.

Even more generally, 1968 seems to be a prototypical case of the election that does not produce many changes of policy preferences but does permit electors to sort themselves and the candidates into groups of substantial homogeneity on matters of public policy. This trend over the course of the campaign calls to mind the posthumous contention of V.O. Key, in *The Responsible Electorate*, that the mass electorate is a good deal less irrational, ill-informed or sheep-like than it had become fashionable to suppose. He presented empirical materials to develop a counter-image of "an electorate moved by concern about central and relevant questions of public policy, of governmental performance, and of executive personality."[14] He argued that in a general way voters behaved rationally and responsibly, or at least as rationally and responsibly as could be expected in view of the pap they were frequently fed by contending politicians, while recognizing in the same breath that contentions of this unequivocal nature were necessarily overstatements.

To our point of view, Key's general thesis represented a welcome corrective on some earlier emphases, but his findings were hardly as discontinuous with earlier work as was often presumed, and the "corrective" nature of his argument has itself become badly exaggerated at numerous points. We cannot begin to examine here the many facets of his thesis that deserve comment. However, several features of the 1968 campaign seem to us to demonstrate admirably the importance of the Key corrective, while at the very same time illustrating vividly the perspective in which that corrective must be kept.

It is obvious, as Key himself recognized, that flat assertions about the electorate being rational or not are of scant value. In New Hampshire, as we have observed earlier, Democrats exasperated at Johnson's lack of success with the Vietnam war voted for Eugene McCarthy as an alternative. The relationship between this disapproval and the vote decision is exactly the type of empirical finding that Key musters in profusion from a sequence of seven presidential elections as his main proof of voter rationality and responsibility. In the New Hampshire case, however, we might probe the data a little farther to discover that more often than not, McCarthy voters were upset that Johnson had failed to scourge Vietnam a good deal more vigorously with American military might, which is to say they took a position diametrically opposed to that of their chosen candidate. This realization might shake our confidence somewhat in the preceding "proof" of voter rationality. But then we push our analysis still another step and find that many of the New Hampshire people fuming about Vietnam in a hawkish mood voted for McCarthy without having any idea of where he stood on the matter. Hence while they may have voted directly counter to their own policy preferences, they at least did not know this was what they were doing, so the charge of irrationality may be a bit ungenerous. In the most anemic sense of "rationality," one that merely implies people have perceived reasons for their behavior, these votes perhaps remain "rational."

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[14] V. O. Key, Jr., *The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936–1960* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1966), pp. 7–8.

However, when we reflect on the rather intensive coverage given by the national mass media to Eugene McCarthy's dissenting position on Vietnam for many months before the New Hampshire primary, and consider how difficult it must have been to avoid knowledge of the fact, particularly if one had more than the most casual interest in the Vietnam question, we might continue to wonder how lavishly we should praise the electorate as "responsible." Here, as at so many other points, pushing beyond the expression of narrow and superficial attitudes in the mass public to the cognitive texture which underlies the attitudes is a rather disillusioning experience. It is regrettable that none of the data presented in *The Responsible Electorate* can be probed in this fashion.

Key was interested in showing that the public reacted in a vital way to central policy concerns, at least as selected by the contending political factions, and was not driven mainly by dark Freudian urges, flock instinct, or worse still, the toss of a coin. With much of this we agree wholeheartedly. In addition, to put the discussion in a slightly different light, let us imagine, in a vein not unfamiliar from the literature of the 1950's, that voting decisions in the American electorate might be seen as a function of reactions to party, issue and candidate personality factors. Let us imagine furthermore that research suggests that these determinants typically have relative weights in our presidential elections of 60 for the party factor, and 40 divided between the issue and candidate determinants. The exact figures are, of course, quite fanciful but the rough magnitudes continue to be familiar. Since classical assumptions about voting behavior have attributed overweening weight to the issue factor, it is scarcely surprising that investigative attention shifts heavily away from that factor to the less expected party and candidate influences. If the issue factor draws comment at all, the finding of greatest interest is its surprisingly diluted role.

It is at this point that the Key volume exerts its most useful influence. Key points out that there *is*, after all, an issue factor, and he develops an analytic format which dramatizes the role that issue reactions do play. This dramatic heightening is achieved by focussing attention on voters who are shifting their vote from one party to the other over a pair of elections. If we set for ourselves the explanatory chore of understanding why the change which occurs moves in the direction it did, it is patently evident that the party factor—which merely explains the abiding finding that "standpatters" persistently outnumber "changers" by factors usually greater than four—is to be set aside as irrelevant. If this in turn leaves candidate and issue factors sharing the explanatory burden, our sense of the relative importance of the issue factor is, of course, radically increased, even though it is our question that has changed, rather than anything about the empirical lay of the land. Key was quite explicit in his desire to explain movement and change in the electorate, rather than voting behavior in a more general sense, and there is no gainsaying the fact that from many points of view it is indeed the change—marginal gains and losses—which forms the critical part of the story of elections.

In our analyses of such changes in the national vote over the course of presidential elections in the 1950's and 1960's we have been impressed with the magnitude of the effects introduced as new candidates focus on different issues of public policy, and as external events give particular candidate-issue intersections greater salience for the nation.[15] However, 1968 provides an opportunity to examine relative weights of party, candidate and issue factors under more varied circumstances than United States presidential elections usually proffer. We have talked above for illustrative purposes as though there were "standard" relative weights that would pertain for these three factors in some situation-free way. This is of course not the case: we can imagine many kinds of elections which would vastly shift the weights of such factors, if indeed they can be defined at all.

The Wallace movement is a good case in point. By Key's definition nobody who voted for Wallace could have been a "standpatter": all must be classed as "changers." Therefore party identification as a motivating factor accounting for attraction to Wallace is forced back to zero, and any variance to be understood must have its roots distributed between Wallace's attraction as a personality and the appeal of the issue positions that he advocated.[16]

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[15] Donald E. Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," this REVIEW, LX (March, 1966), 19–28.

[16] This is not to say that it would be inconceivable for identification with one of the two traditional parties to correlate with preference

In point of fact, the Wallace candidacy was reacted to by the public as an *issue* candidacy, a matter which our data make clear in several ways. For example, about half of the reasons volunteered by our respondents for favorable feelings toward Wallace had to do with positions he was taking on current issues; only a little more than a quarter of the reactions supporting either of the two conventional candidates were cast in this mode. Still more noteworthy is the relative purity of the issue feelings among the Wallace clientele where the major controversies of 1968 were concerned. Among the *whites* who voted for one of the two major candidates, only 10% favored continued segregation rather than desegregation or "something in between;" among Wallace voters, all of whom were white, almost 40% wanted segregation. Where the issue of "law and order" was concerned, a substantial portion of the voters felt that Mayor Daley's police had used about the right amount of force in quelling the Chicago demonstrations. However, among white voters for Nixon or Humphrey, the remainder of the opinion was fairly evenly split between criticizing the police for using too much force or too little, with a small majority (55%) favoring the latter "tough line." Among Wallace voters, the comparable ratio was 87–13 favoring a tougher policy. Or again, 36% of white voters for the conventional parties felt we should "take a stronger stand (in Vietnam) even if it means invading North Vietnam." Among Wallace voters, the figure was 67%. Much more generally speaking, it may be observed that all Wallace voters were exercised by strong discontents in at least one of these three primary domains, and most were angry about more than one. Wallace was a "backlash" candidate, and there is no question but that the positions communicated to the public and accounted for his electoral support in a very primary sense. The pattern of correlations between issue positions and the vote for these "changers" would support Key's thesis of a "rational" and "responsible" electorate even more impressively than most of the data he found for earlier elections.

Another way of organizing these preference materials helps to illuminate even more sharply the contrast between the bases of Wallace support and those of the conventional candidates. It will be recalled that all respondents were asked to give an affective evaluation of each of the three candidates taken separately, along with other aspirants. If we examine the pattern of correlations between issue positions and the ratings of Humphrey, Nixon and Wallace, we capture gradations of enthusiasm, indifference and hostility felt toward each man instead of the mere vote threshold, and we can explore the antecedents or correlates of the variations in sentiment toward the individual candidates.

Where the ratings of Wallace given by whites are concerned, patterns vary somewhat South and non-South, but substantial correlations with issue positions appear everywhere. In the South, the most generic question of civil rights policy shows a relation of .49 (gamma) with Wallace reactions; the most generic question on "law and order" shows a .39; and the central Vietnam policy question shows a relationship of .30. Party identification, however, shows a relation of only .04. Other ancillary questions probing more specific aspects of policy feelings in these areas vary around the most generic items somewhat, but tend to show fairly similar magnitudes of relationship. Outside the South, patterns are a little less sharp but remain unequivocal. Instead of the above correlations of .49, .39 and .30 in the main issue domains, the figures are .25 (civil rights), .27 (law and order), and .25 (Vietnam). The relationship of party identification to Wallace ratings among whites, however, is .01. Thus it is true in both regions that party identification is entirely dwarfed by any of several issue positions in predicting reactions to Wallace among whites, and in terms of "variance accounted for" the differences between issues and party would best be expressed in terms of *orders of magnitude.*

Differences that are almost as sharp turn up in the relationships surrounding the ratings of Nixon and Humphrey. Here, however, everything is exactly reversed: it is *party* that towers over all other predictors, and the central 1968 issues tend to give rather diminutive relationships. Thus comparable correlations (gammas) between partisanship and candidate ratings all

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for some third-party candidate. For example, it is possible that most of the voters for Henry Wallace's Progressive Party in 1948 were identified with the Democratic Party. However, it is clear that in such an instance "party loyalty" would have been a rather spurious name for the motivating factor. In the case of George Wallace, even this kind of spurious correlation is absent, except insofar as his Democratic origins and the invisibility of his American Independent Party label made it easy for Democrats to support him. Indeed, in the context of this argument it will be fascinating to discover whether Republicans and Democrats invoked different images of Wallace's party location in order to satisfy their need for consonance while voting for a man who reflects their own issue commitments.

TABLE 5. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ISSUE POSITIONS, PARTISANSHIP AND AFFECTIVE RATINGS OF THE MAJOR CANDIDATES

(Whites Only)[a]

| ISSUE DOMAIN: | NON-SOUTH | | | SOUTH | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Humphrey | Nixon | Wallace | Humphrey | Nixon | Wallace |
| A. Civil Rights (6 or 7 items)[b] | .17 | .09 | .27 | .24 | .08 | .41 |
| B. Law and Order (2 items) | .25 | .05 | .27 | .19 | .01 | .35 |
| C. Vietnam (2 items) | .05 | .03 | .23 | .14 | .02 | .26 |
| D. Cold War (4 items) | .12 | .11 | .15 | .16 | .05 | .28 |
| E. Social Welfare (2 or 3 items)[b] | .22 | .20 | .09 | .26 | .13 | .10 |
| F. Federal Gov't Too Powerful? (1 item) | .37 | .18 | .17 | .49 | .13 | .15 |
| SUM: 18 issue items | .19 | .10 | .20 | .22 | .07 | .31 |
| SUM: Three Major 1968 Issue Domains (A,B,C) | .16 | .07 | .26 | .22 | .07 | .37 |
| PARTISANSHIP: (3 items) | .47 | .47 | .04 | .39 | .36 | .03 |

[a] Cell entries are average absolute values of gamma ordinal correlations between items of the types listed in the rows and affective ratings of the candidates noted in the columns.

[b] An item having to do with the role of the federal government in aid to local education was considered a social welfare item outside the South, but a civil rights issue within that region.

run between .36 and .44, varying only slightly by region and man. Where Nixon is concerned, the average correlation values for issue items in the three main domains emphasized in the 1968 election never get as high as .10, and fall as low as .01, with the central tendency about .05. Where Humphrey is concerned, somewhat higher issue values are observed, varying between .05 and .25 according to the region and the domain. Moreover, there is another issue domain not hitherto cited in which average values over three items for Humphrey considerably outstrip the Wallace correlation in both North and South. Significantly, this is the domain of items concerning governmental social welfare activities that one might associate with the period running from the New Deal through the 1950's.[17] Nevertheless, averaging correlations across all of these issue domains (the obsolescing as well as the three most salient in 1968) suggests that party identification still accounts for three to five times as much variance in Humphrey ratings as does the average issue among the 18 issues posed in the study. These correlation patterns are summarized by region in Table 5.

Such dramatic comparisons between types of support for Wallace on one hand and the conventional candidates on the other may be perplexing to the casual reader who is keeping the thesis of V.O. Key in mind. After all, it is the pattern of Wallace support that shows the kind of strong issue orientation Key sought to demonstrate, whereas evaluations of both Humphrey and Nixon seem to show a strong factor of traditional party allegiance suffocating most issue concerns into relative obscurity. Yet the span of time Key's data covered limited him almost completely to observation of races of the routine Humphrey-Nixon type. Did these earlier two-party races look more like the Wallace patterns for some unknown reason?

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[17] Another domain of issues surrounding the "cold war" as it confronted the nation in the 1950's with controversies over foreign aid and trade with communist countries shows only modest correlations with the candidate rankings, and Nixon and Humphrey ratings show more of a parity with the Wallace correlations, although in an absolute sense the latter continue to outrun the former sharply in the South and mildly elsewhere. See Table 5.

The answer, of course, is very probably not. However, if we set the Wallace phenomenon in 1968 aside and limit our attention in the Key fashion to two contrasting groups of "changers" between the 1964 and 1968 election (Johnson to Nixon; Goldwater to Humphrey) we can show correlations with issue differences which look very much like those presented in cross-tabulations by Key for earlier elections: some strong, some weak, but nearly always "in the right direction." There are, to be sure, other problems of interpretation surrounding such correlations that one would need to thrash out before accepting the Key evidence fully.[18] But our principal point here is the simple one that even with Wallace analytically discarded from the 1968 scene, the rest of the 1968 data seem perfectly compatible with the data Key used. The only reason there may seem to be a discontinuity, then, is due to the different nature of the question being asked by Key which, by focussing on marginal change from election to election, effectively defines party loyalty out of the explanation and correspondingly opens the way for greater orienting weight for issues.

It is because the change in vote division from election to election is so critical that V.O. Key's contribution is a welcome corrective. On the other hand, the configurations of 1968 data we have summarized here help to put that contribution into perspective. The patterns of Wallace support show how empirical data *can* look when issues play a strongly orienting role. The contrasts between these patterns and those generated by routine two-party politics may help to suggest why investigators have tended to be more impressed by the feeble role of issues than by their strength.

The lessons to be drawn are several. One is a simple point of methodology. It has been suggested upon occasion in the past that relationships between issue positions and voting choice turn out to be as pallid as they usually are because investigators fail to ask the right questions or word them in confusing ways. We feel that improvement in these matters is always possible. However, we have seen that exactly the same issue items which continue to look pallid in accounting for assessments of Humphrey and Nixon blaze forth into rather robust correlations where Wallace is concerned. Hence we conclude that poor item choice scarcely accounts for past findings.

Another lesson is more substantive. Some past findings have been to our mind "overinterpreted" as implying that issues are poorly linked to voting preferences because of innate and hence incorrigible cognitive deficiencies suffered by the mass electorate in the United States.[19] Merely the Wallace data taken alone would suffice to show, exactly as Key argued, that the public can relate policy controversies to its own estimates of the world and vote accordingly. The fact that it does not display this propensity on any large scale very often invites more careful spelling out of the conditions under which it will or will not.

It seems clear from the 1968 data that one of the cardinal limiting conditions is the "drag" or inertia represented by habitual party loyalties: as soon as features of the situation limit or neutralize the relevance of such a factor, issue evaluations play a more vital role. Much research has shown that partisanship is fixed early in life and tends to endure. As the individual moves through the life cycle, old political controversies die away and new ones arise toward which at least some individuals crystallize opinions. While the parties try to lead this new opinion formation among their faithful, and probably succeed on a modest scale, there are many independent sources of such opinion for the citizen. The average citizen either does not know his party's position well enough to be influenced on many matters, or if he knows, frequently resists the influence. As a result, policy opinions are very loosely or anachronistically linked to party preference at any point in time. But in the moment of truth in the polling booth, party allegiance seems the most relevant cue for many voters *if conditions permit it to be used.*

Another type of condition which mediates the links between citizen position on issues and voting choice is the "objective" degree of difference between parties or candidates with respect to policy controversy, or the clarity with which any objective difference gets communicated to the populace. In every United States election there are accusations from one quarter or another that the two conventional parties provide no more than "tweedledee" and "tweedledum" candidates. However, these accusations as aired in the public media rose to something of a crescendo in 1968 from both the Wallace and the McCarthy perspectives. And even as measured a source as the *New York Times* noted wrily that it would take no more than the deletion of two or three codicils to make the official 1968 campaign platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties into utterly undistinguishable documents. If the main discriminable difference between Humphrey and Nixon began and ended with the party label then it would certainly not be surprising that the public sorted itself into voting camps by party allegiance and little more, save where Wallace was concerned. In this case, the public would be limited to exactly that "echo chamber" role which Key ascribed to it.

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[18] These include such considerations as that of the causal direction underlying the observed relationships; or known and systematic biases in recollection of a presidential vote four years later; or the superficiality of the issues that show such patterns, as opposed to issues thought basic by sophisticated observers; or blatant misinformation supporting the issue positions registered; or a tendency for the less informed to "shift" more quickly than the better informed, with position on any given issue held constant, etc.

[19] We much prefer an interpretation which hinges on a general inattention which is endemic because information costs are relatively high where little information is already in hand, and the stakes are rarely seen as being very large. While such a "condition" is likely to persist in mass electorates, there is nothing about it which is immutable given the proper convergence of circumstances.

As a matter of pure logic, nobody can deny that policy differentiation between parties is likely to be a precondition for meaningful relationships between policy feelings and partisan voting decisions. Our only problem here is to evaluate whether the party/issue data configurations surrounding Humphrey and Nixon are the obvious result of some lack of policy difference peculiar to 1968, or represent instead some more abiding feature of presidential voting in the United States. Unfortunately, there is no obvious way to arrive at an objective measurement of "degree of party difference." Perhaps the closest approximation is to ask the public how clear the differences appear to be. Nevertheless, since some people invariably feel party differences are big and others feel they are non-existent, even this approach leaves one without reference points as to "how big is big" where reports of this kind are concerned, except inasmuch as trends in such reports can be observed over periods of time. In this light, it can be said while reports of "important differences" between the Democrats and the Republicans were slightly fewer in 1968 than in 1964 (the year of Goldwater's "choice, not an echo"), they show a reasonable parity with such reports for 1952 and 1960. Hence in the public eye, at least, differences between what the major parties stand for were not lacking in unusual degree in 1968.

It may be useful to note that whereas we have labelled the Wallace effort in 1968 an "issue candidacy" from the point of view of the electorate, we have not said that it was an ideological candidacy from that same point of view. From other viewpoints of political analysis, it was of course just that: a movement of the "radical right." Moreover, with occasional exceptions, data on issue positions show Wallace voters to differ from Humphrey voters in the same "conservative" direction that Nixon voters do, only much more so. Therefore by customary definitions, not only the leadership of the radical right, but the rank-and-file espoused clearly "rightist" positions of a sort which were frequently extreme, on highly specific questions of public policy.[20]

Yet there was an element of ideological self-recognition present among Goldwater voters in 1964 that was simply lacking among Wallace voters in 1968. One measure of ideological location which we use involves the respondent in rating the terms "liberal" and "conservative." If the respondent gives the highest possible score to the stimulus "liberal" and the lowest possible score to "conservative," he is rated as the most extreme liberal, with a score of 100. In the reverse case, the extreme conservative receives a score of zero. At 50 are clustered individuals who either do not recognize these terms, or give the same affective rating to both.[21] In 1964 there was a rather considerable relationship between such a measure and response to Goldwater, in the expected direction. In 1968, the same scale showed only a very limited correlation with reactions toward Wallace (gammas of .13 and .09 among whites within the South and outside, respectively). Indeed, as Table 6 shows, in both political regions of the country Wallace voters were more favorable to the "liberal" label than Nixon voters! Thus while Wallace supporters were entirely distinctive in their "backlash" feelings on public policy, they were much less ideologically attuned to a left-right spectrum than their Goldwater predecessors.

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[20] This was not true across every issue domain. The most notable exception was in the area of social welfare issues such as medicare and full employment guarantees, on which issues Wallace voters were significantly more "liberal" than Nixon voters, and almost matched the liberalism of Humphrey voters. This admixture was of course familiar in Wallace's frequent appeals to the underdog and the working man, in the tradition of Southern populism.

[21] For reasons discussed elsewhere, a rather large proportion of the American electorate—nearly half—is found at this point of ideological neutrality.

Although Wallace supporters did not seem anywhere nearly as distinctive in terms of ideological measures as they did on specific issues, they did show some moderate trends in terms of other more generic political attitudes. In particular, various measures bearing on discontent with the responsiveness and probity of government show correlations with ratings given by whites to Wallace, and are related but with opposite signs to ratings of the "establishment" candidates, Humphrey and Nixon. Since Wallace was more of a mainstream candidate in the South than in the rest of the country, it might be thought that his appeal in that region might depend less strictly on this syndrome of political alienation than it would elsewhere. However, these relationships are stronger and more pervasive in the South, and seem only weakly mirrored in other parts of the nation. Within the South, white attitudes toward Wallace are quite sharply associated with our scales of political efficacy and cynicism about government. People drawn to Wallace tended to feel they had little capacity to influence government, and expressed distrust of the morality and efficiency of political leadership. These correlations reach a peak on items where the referent is most explicitly "the federal government in Washington," and it is plain that Southern voters felt more or less attracted to Wallace in the degree that they responded to his complaints that Washington bureaucrats had been persistently and unjustly bullying the South with particular respect to civil rights. Since there is no methodological need for it to be true, it is of particular interest that ratings of Humphrey show as substantial correlations in the opposing direction, in the South and other regions as well: people responding warmly to Humphrey had quite sanguine views of government.

All told, then, a sense of political alienation was a rather visible correlate of a sorting of the citizenry away from the conventional candidates toward Wallace, as was certainly to be expected and necessary if terms such as "backlash" are relevant. At the same time, it is worth keeping the apparent temporal sequences clear. The data suggest that Southern whites have become alienated with government because prior attitudes, particularly racial ones, have been contradictory to national policy for nearly twenty years. Thus there is a readiness to condemn government on a much broader front, and Wallace appealed in obvious ways to this readiness in the South. Outside the South Wallace also articulated the same array of specific grievances and received a clear response. However, the evidence suggests that any resonance he might have achieved in terms of a more generic condemnation of government, while present, was relatively limited.

TABLE 6. IDEOLOGICAL RESPONSES OF WHITE VOTERS FOR DIFFERENT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES IN 1964 AND 1968[a]

| | 1964 | | 1968 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Johnson | Goldwater | Humphrey | Nixon | Wallace |
| NON-SOUTH | 51.8 | 39.9 | 51.8 | 43.4 | 44.9 |
| SOUTH | 49.6 | 35.9 | 49.5 | 40.7 | 41.9 |

[a] The cell entry registers the mean value shown on the ideological scale described in the text for white voters for each of the candidates listed. A high value indicates that liberalism is held in relative favor; a low value means that conservatism is preferred.

## IV. THE SOCIAL BASES OF WALLACE SUPPORT

A variety of facts already cited about the Wallace movement of 1968 makes clear that while there was some modest overlap in support for Goldwater in 1964 and Wallace in 1968, it was at best a weak correlation and the Wallace clientele differed quite notably from Goldwater's. Thus, for example, almost exactly half of our 1968 Wallace voters who had participated in the 1964 election reported that they had voted for Johnson. Or again, we have seen that the majority of Wallace voters, like the electorate as a whole, was identified with the Democratic party, while it is obvious that most Goldwater voters were Republican identifiers. Similarly, we have just noted that the Wallace movement had a much less clear ideological focus among its sympathizers than marked Goldwater supporters in 1964.

This discrepancy in clientele may seem perplexing. After all, in the terms of conventional analysis in political sociology both candidates were "darlings of the radical right." Yet the limited degree of overlap between Goldwater and Wallace voters is confirmed in equally impressive fashion when one compares their social backgrounds or even their simplest demographic characteristics. Among Goldwater voters, for example, women both South and non-South showed the same slight majority they enjoy in the electorate; Wallace voters in the South showed a similar balance, but elsewhere were rather markedly (almost 60–40) male. The Goldwater vote had been much more urban, while the Wallace vote was relatively rural and small-town, particularly in the South. Outside the South, the age distribution of Wallace voters departed markedly from that shown by Goldwater in 1964, with the proportion under 35 being about twice as great and that over 65 only half as large.

The well-publicized appeal of Wallace to the unionized laboring man is clearly reflected in our data: outside the South, the proportion of white union members preferring Wallace over the other major candidates was more than three times as great as it was within households having no unionized members (19% to 6%); even in the South, where other appeals were present and the unionization of labor is more limited, the contrast between the preferences of union members and non-union households remains dramatic (52% to 28% giving top preference to Wallace over the conventional candidates). Indeed, in both regions the occupational center of gravity of Wallace popularity was clearly among white skilled workers. Nationwide, only about 10% of the Wallace vote was contributed by the professional and managerial strata, whereas persons of these occupations had given Goldwater almost half of his vote (46%). Needless to say, the proportion of unionized labor supporting Goldwater was very low. Along with these class differences, marked discrepancies in educational background can be taken for granted. In the South, one-third of Wallace's support came from whites with no more than grade school education, while the national figure for Goldwater was 13%. The proportion of voters of college experience backing Goldwater was about double that found voting for Wallace either in the South or elsewhere.

All of these comparisons help to underscore the major disparities in the social bases of support for Goldwater and Wallace, despite the apparent common policy ground of the relatively extreme right. While one should not lose track of the fact that there was a small and systematic overlap in clientele, it is abundantly clear that neither candidate exhausted the potential support for a severely conservative program in matters of civil rights, law and order or Vietnam. In a very real sense, it can be seen that Wallace was a poor man's Goldwater. As we suggested at the time, Goldwater pitched his campaign on an ideological plane which rather escaped some members of the electorate who might otherwise have found his positions congenial.[22] Wallace's perfectly direct appeal to citizens of this latter description, along with the undercurrent of populism alien to the Goldwater conservatism, apparently sufficed to put off some of the Arizona senator's more well-to-do supporters.[23] The Goldwater support was drawn from a relatively urbane and sophisticated conservatism; Wallace appealed to many similar instincts, but the style was folksy and tailored to the common man.

In a significant way, too, Wallace remained a regional candidate despite his discovery that he could win more than scattered votes in the North and his consequent presence on every state's ballot. Over half of his popular votes came from the states of the Confederacy. Everything, from his lack of political experience at a federal level to his marked Southern accent, suggested a parochial relevance that had rarely been salient where Goldwater was concerned. While electoral maps leave no doubt as to the regional nature of the response, sample survey data show that even these visible effects have been diluted by inter-regional migration. Thus, for example, while much has been written about the Wallace appeal in various European ethnic communities of northern cities, little has been said about the "American ethnic group" of southern white migrants, most of whom are blue-collar and frequently in a position to take special pleasure in the spectacle of a Southern compatriot coming north to give the Yankees what for. Our data indicate that Wallace drew over 14% of the vote from these migrants, and less than 7% otherwise outside the South. On the other hand, the significant stream of migration of Yankees into the South, the political implications of which we have described elsewhere,[24] provided something of a barrier to further Wallace successes. Heavily Republican in a non-Southern sense and now constituting better than one-seventh of white voters in the region, these migrants were even less interested in voting for Wallace than were Southern whites in the North, and gave the former Alabama governor only 10% of their vote while their native Southern white colleagues were casting almost one vote in every three for him.

Table 7 summarizes the affective ratings given Wallace by our respondents according to the region in which they grew up as well as their current region of residence. It is rather clear that the region of socialization is a more critical determinant of these assessments of

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[22] P. Converse, A. Clausen, and W. Miller, "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election" this REVIEW, 59 (June, 1965), 321–336.

[23] It is quite possible, however, that some of this support might have moved to Wallace had the Republican Party nominated anybody but Nixon or Reagan, among the main contenders.

[24] A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller, and D. Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: John Wiley, 1965), Chapter 12.

TABLE 7. REACTIONS OF WHITES TO WALLACE BY REGION OF SOCIALIZATION AND RESIDENCE

| | | RESPONDENT NOW RESIDES . . . | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Outside the South | Within the South | TOTAL |
| RESPONDENT | Outside the South: | 26.2[a]<br>(757) | 26.5<br>(51) | 26.2<br>(808) |
| GREW UP . . . | Within the South: | 34.7<br>(53) | 50.0<br>(281) | 48.5<br>(334) |
| | TOTAL: | 26.7<br>(810) | 46.3<br>(332) | |

[a] Cell entries are mean values of ratings on a scale from 0 (hostility) to 100 (sympathy) accorded to George Wallace by white respondents of the types indicated.

Wallace than is the region of current residence. Moreover, it is easy to show that regional differences in correlates of Wallace preference also follow lines of socialization rather than those of current residence. For example, we have noted that Wallace's appeal to women outside the South was rather limited. For white women of Southern background living outside the South, the response was much as it was in the South. Setting the migrants aside, the sex ratio among white Wallace enthusiasts outside the South is even more sharply masculine.

It is not our purpose here to do more than briefly summarize the social and demographic correlates of Wallace preferences, for numerous other essays are being prepared to treat the subject in detail. However, one correlate which has frequently surprised observers deserves more extended discussion, both because of its practical significance and because of its high relevance to some of the theoretical issues uniquely illuminated by the 1968 election. We speak of the relationship between the Wallace movement and the generational cleavages so evident at other points in data from the presidential campaign.

It would seem self-evident that Wallace's primary appeal to traditional and even obsolescing American values, as well as his caustic treatment of the rebels of the younger generation, would have brought him votes that were even more heavily clustered among the elderly than those drawn by Goldwater in 1964. We have already noted that Wallace took issue positions that were communicated with unusual clarity, and that these positions determined in unusual degree the nature of his clientele. On almost every issue of nearly a score surveyed, the position characteristic of Wallace voters in our sample is also the position associated with older citizens, where there is any age correlation at all. Hence it is somewhat surprising to discover that among white Southerners there is actually a faint *negative* correlation between age and a Wallace vote. And it is perplexing indeed to discover that outside the South voting for Wallace occurred very disproportionately among the young. For example, Wallace captured less than 3% of the vote among people over 70 outside the South, but 13% of those under 30, with a regular gradient connecting these two extremes. One of the major ironies of the election, then, was that Wallace made his appeal to the old but mainly received the vote of the young.

However, a whole cluster of empirical theory has grown up in recent years which, without any particular knowledge of the Wallace platform, would predict that such a third-party candidate would draw votes primarily from the young in just this way. It is established, for example, that repeated commitments of votes to a political party tend to increase the strength of psychological identification with that party, and it is an immediate corollary that voters of the older generation are more fixed in their party loyalties than are relatively new voters.[25] It follows with equal logic that when some new candidate or *ad hoc* party arises to challenge the conventional parties of a system, it should have relative difficulty making headway among the older generation, even though it might have natural appeals to such voters.

We have never had a chance to test this

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[25] Philip E. Converse, "Of Time and Partisan Stability," *Journal of Comparative Politics* (issue to be announced).

somewhat non-obvious expectation, although reconstructions of the fall of the Weimar Republic have always suggested that voters for the Nazi Party in its culminating surge were very disproportionately drawn from the youngest cohorts of the German electorate. Therefore the age distribution of Wallace support has been of uncommon interest to us. When issue appeals of a rather vital sort conflict with long-established party loyalties, as they must have in Wallace's case for many older voters, which factor is likely to exert most influence on the voting decision? The apparent difficulties older people had in voting for Wallace, particularly outside the South where he was a less "legitimate" Democrat and hence a less conventional candidate, seem to provide a rather clear answer.

However, if this interpretation is correct a variety of ancillary effects should be discernible in the 1968 data. For example, if prior party identification is truly the critical source of resistance to a Wallace vote simply because of the disloyalty implied, the prediction that the young would vote more heavily for him need not mean the young have any monopoly on admiration for him. Indeed, one could almost predict that the older generation should have shown more warmth of feeling toward Wallace per vote allotted him than would be true of the younger generation, simply because of the "artificial" inhibition on the vote represented by greater loyalty to a conventional party. Moreover, since strength of identification is measured explicitly in this study, it is of importance to show that it does indeed vary positively as in times past with age; that such identification with a conventional party is indeed negatively associated with voting for Wallace; and that the tendency of young persons to vote for Wallace did co-occur with weak conventional loyalties.

All of these empirical expectations are borne out, and usually in rather handsome fashion. First, while the young voted more heavily for Wallace, the correlation between age and affective rating of him as a political figure is nonexistent. Second, the old in 1968 were, as always, much more strongly identified with one of the two conventional parties than the young. Third, defection from a conventional party to vote for Wallace was indeed strongly related to degree of party identification, particularly outside the South:[26] the probability of a Wallace vote doubles there as one moves each step from strong through weak to "independent" or leaning identifiers. And finally, when strength of partisanship is controlled, the sharp inverse correlation between age and a Wallace vote outside the South is very nearly wiped out; within the South where it was a somewhat ragged relationship to begin with, it completely disappears or if anything, shows a slight reversal as though Wallace might in fact have had some extra drawing power for the older voter, aside from the complications posed by other allegiances.

This nest of relationships holds more than detached clinical interest in several directions. The reader concerned about the future of the Wallace movement as an electoral force on the American scene is likely to be interested in the fact that the clientele was young rather than aging. In one sense this is a pertinent datum and in another it is not. It is unquestionable that a Wallace candidacy in 1972 has a brighter future than it would have if its 1968 legions were dying out of the population. Nonetheless, the whole thrust of our argument above is that the Wallace movement is not in any special good fortune to have drawn young voters: this will be true of virtually any new party entering the lists in an old party system, and but for the habits which kept older voters with the conventional parties, the initial Wallace vote would probably have been significantly larger. Still more to the point, we would hazard that the future of the Wallace movement as a third party will be determined more by Wallace's personal plans and the organizational aspirations of his entourage on one hand, and by the evolution of events affecting national frustrations on the other, than by the age level of its 1968 voters.

Nevertheless, the youthful nature of Wallace's clientele provides a further irony to the backdrop of generational cleavage reflected in the 1968 campaign. For while such a cleavage was genuine and intense, as some of our earlier data have witnessed, one of the most important yet hidden lines of cleavage split the younger generation itself. Although privileged young college students angry at Vietnam and the shabby treatment of the Negro saw themselves as sallying forth to do battle against a corrupted and cynical older generation, a more head-on confrontation at the polls, if a less apparent one, was with their own age mates who had gone from high school off to the factory instead of college, and who were appalled by the collapse of patriotism and respect for the law that they saw about them. Outside of the election period, when verbal articulateness and leisure for political activism count most heavily, it was the college share of the younger generation—or at least its politicized vanguard—that was most prominent as a political force. At the polls, however, the game shifts to "one man, one vote," and this vanguard is numerically swamped even within its own generation.

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[26] The South shows somewhat diluted patterns here, compatible with the likelihood that for at least some Southern Democrats, a vote for Wallace was not conceived as a defection.

This lack of numerical strength is no intrinsic handicap: any cadre of opinion leadership is small in number. However, it must successfully appeal to some potential rank and file, and it certainly cannot risk becoming a negative reference point for large numbers of people if it expects to operate in a medium involving popular elections. In part because of collegiate naiveté concerning forms of dissent that maintain sympathy,[27] and in part because the public image of constructive efforts by the many can be so rapidly colored by a few whose needs are mainly to antagonize as much of society as possible, this vanguard became a negative reference point for most Americans. The result at the election thus had a different coloration from what went before: McCarthy did not run and Wallace captured a proportion of the vote which was historically amazing. Indeed, it was probably the political stodginess of the older generation so decried by campus activists which kept the vote of "people over 30" within the channels of the conventional parties and prevented the Wallace vote from rising still higher. Ce~~rtainly it is true that in~~ several major metropolises of the United States where party loyalty has been nullified in primary election settings in the spring of 1969, candidates of relative Wallace coloration have surprised observers with their mounting popularity.

There can be no question but that dramatic and persistent displays of dissent on the campuses between 1964 and 1968 helped to place question marks around "consensual" national policies which might otherwise have continued to be taken for granted by most of the citizenry. At the same time, disregard for the occasional junctures of electoral decision when the mass public has some say in the political process may mean that a battle was won but a war was lost. For some few, this *politique de pire* is quite intentional, being thought to help "radicalize" the electorate in ways that can be controlled and manipulated. For most student activists, however, success in raising questions is of little value if one is helping in the same stroke to elect "wrong people" to answer them. And quite apart from the nature of the leadership elected in 1968, it is obvious to any "rational" politician hoping to maximize votes in 1970 or 1972 that there are several times more votes to be gained by leaning toward Wallace than by leaning toward McCarthy.

If these facts were inevitable consequences of "raising the issues" from the campuses, the dilemma would be severe indeed. It is not clear to us, however, that any intrinsic dilemma is involved. Much of the backlash expressed in the 1968 voting received its impetus less from irreconcilable policy disagreement—although on civil rights there is more than a modicum of that—than from resentment at the frequency with which the message of dissent from the campuses was clothed to "bait" conventional opinion. In the degree that the feelings and opinion reflexes of the common man, including age peers of lower circumstances, were comprehended at all by campus activists, they tended to be a subject for derision or disdain. Strange to say, such hostile postures communicate with great speed even across social gulfs, and are reciprocated with uncommon reliability. Fully as often, of course, there was simply no comprehension of the dynamics of public opinion at all.

Whether one likes it or not, the United States does retain some occasional elements of participatory democracy. A young and well-educated elite-to-be that is too impatient to cope with this bit of reality by undertaking the tedium of positive persuasion may find its political efforts worse than wasted.

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[27] The American public seems to have a very low tolerance for unusual or "showy" forms of political dissent. Responses to an extended set of items in the 1968 study on the subject are appalling from a civil libertarian point of view. At the most acceptable end of the continuum of "ways for people to show their disapproval or disagreement with govermental policies and actions" we asked about "taking part in protest meetings or marches *that are permitted by the local authorities*" (italics not in original question). Less than 20% of all respondents, and scarcely more than 20% of those giving an opinion, would approve of such subversive behavior, and more than half would disapprove (the remainder accepted the alternative presented that their reaction "would depend on the circumstances"). In view of such assumptions, the overwhelmingly negative reaction to the Chicago demonstrations despite sympathetic media treatment (cited earlier) is hardly surprising.

# RATIONAL POLITICAL MAN: A SYNTHESIS OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES*

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## I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years the welter of data accumulated on American voting behavior has been continually reanalyzed by social scientists interested in building theories of electoral choice. Most of the original data-gathering enterprises were guided by general theoretical frameworks which, for the most part, were not developed to a point where the ensuing analyses addressed themselves unambiguously to the overall conceptions by which they were guided. As a result much of our knowledge about voting behavior is in the form of generalizations about what social and psychological variables account for voting choices while we lack conceptual frameworks which systematically interrelate these generalizations and provide comprehensive and parsimonious explanation.[1] If any one unifying conception has emerged from the original large scale studies it is that the average voter is irrational. This inference has been derived from a variety of empirical relationships coupled with varying conceptions of rationality.[2]

The more recent reanalyses of these data sets have been characterized by a theoretical sophistication that was lacking heretofore. One of these, a theory of the calculus of voting, has applied some formal rigor to the question of the rationality of the decision to vote, selected empirical equivalents of theoretical entities from survey data on national elections, and conducted a successful test of the theory.[3] Unlike traditional approaches to the rationality question which infer the degree of rationality from quantities of information possessed or from correlates of decisions (background, party affiliation, group memberships, etc.), this investigation conceived of rationality in terms of the kind of calculus employed by the individual in deciding among alternatives (in this case whether or not to vote).

The present investigation is an attempt to test a general theory of political behavior whose structure is designed to further illuminate the question of rationality. In this instance the theory is applied to voting intention data obtained with a view toward maximally facilitating the testing of the theory. The substantive focus of the theory is upon the rationality of electoral decisions. As has been suggested above, while most empirical investigations of voting behavior have implicitly or explicitly addressed themselves to the rationality question, the variety of conceptions of rationality along with the differing notions as to what constitutes the appropriate operational procedures with which to approach the question renders an assessment of the evidence on either side problematic at best. Here, as in the study discussed above, rationality will be considered in the context of the kind of calculus which can be ascribed to the decision-making behavior of the individual voter.

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[1] The major original voting studies are of course those of the Columbia and Michigan groups whose theories and data analyses are presented for the most part in Lazarsfeld and his associates' *The People's Choice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944) and *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954) and in Campbell *et al.*, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row Peterson, 1954), *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), and most recently *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966). Much has been said with respect to both the important contributions and theoretical shortcomings of these studies. What is perhaps the most significant commentary on the state of our knowledge about voting behavior is the structure of a recent book, Lester Milbrath's *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), which relies heavily on the findings of all but the most recent work cited above. Rather than presenting theories of participation, Milbrath is forced to offer a propositional inventory whose only unifying theme is a conceptual model of his own with which he attempts to bring together the various discrete propositions belonging to a variety of conceptions.

[2] Inferences with respect to the irrationality of the voter have been based upon the relative stability of partisan affiliation, the low information level with respect to national policy questions and the apparent influence of primary groups on partisan attitudes. A major attack on the irrationality hypothesis is presented in V. O. Key's *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1966), which is based upon an analysis of voters who switch parties from one election to the next, a switch which Key's analysis indicates to be issue oriented.

[3] William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," this REVIEW, 62 (March, 1968), 25–42.

Difficulties in making inferences about individual voter rationality extend beyond the problem of the variety of conceptions of rationality and the diversity of tests employed in their behalf. Many attempts at developing theoretical approaches to voter, or more generally, participant rationality have employed images of man which are more comprehensive than the actual models of man articulated for purposes of theory construction.[4] These images of man are generally responsive to preferences for particular forms of collective rationality. Behind the conceptions utilized to identify individuals often lurk real or envisioned political systems, the operating imperatives of which provide the criteria for assessing the rationality of the citizen participant. This becomes apparent when inquiries into the determinants of individual political behavior result in claims about political systems. A frequent pattern of inference in studies about the political behavior of individuals is that given what has been discovered about the behavior of individuals, this or that political system would appear to perform well. The circularity involved in such a procedure is obvious when explicated in this manner but is easily overlooked when, with consummate skill or cultivated inattention, theorists smuggle political systems into basic concepts about human nature, human potential, or human behavior.

Certain substantive theories of participation have been particularly prone to such circularity. A recent critique of consensus or civic culture approaches to political man, for example, has stressed the need for more individual oriented investigations which analyze, " . . . the structure of man's mind in relation to the surrounding social universe . . . " rather than juxtaposing, " . . . as the civic culture man does, individuals and institutions and tabulating the former's relations to the latter on a preconceived scale of integrative and disintegrative traits viewed through the eyes of the best available model of state organization . . . "[5] Indeed many of the inquiries into the nature of political man employ conceptions which embody preconceived political systems. Such studies have lacked a sensitivity to the images of individual-other relationships upon which their models of man are based and have thus predicated assertions about individual rationality on disguised commitments to models of collective rationality.

When a particular political system is presupposed in an investigation of political man, almost inevitably the conclusions reached permit questions about the worthiness of individuals rather than about the system. Because, for example, individuals do not exhibit consistent belief systems or ideological orientations with respect to public policies in the form in which they are articulated for and by national legislators, we cannot *ipso facto* assume that their voting choices are irrational, capricious, irresponsible, or even non-policy oriented.[6] Such an inference is predicated on presuppositions about the rationality of the political system which permit the definition of significant policy questions to be undertaken by political elites who aggregate issues with diverse implications into categories presented to non-elites for purposes of informing their electoral decisions. As Rogin has suggested, "An ideology usually reveals more about the preoccupations of elites than of masses."[7]

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[4] This distinction between images of man and models of man has been recently discussed by Donald D. Searing, "Models and Images of Man and Society in Leadership Theory," *Journal of Politics*, 31 (Feb., 1969), 3–31. Generally models of man can be thought of as tentative conceptual frameworks which are recognized as being empirically relevant while images are more unself-conscious, reality-filtering mechanisms.

[5] Otto Kircheimer, "Private Man and Society," *Political Science Quarterly*, 81 (March, 1966), 1–24. For a similar critique of consensus approaches which argues explicitly for rational choice conceptions to avoid biasing an analysis in favor of desired political structures, see John Harsanyi, "Rational-Choice Models vs. Functionalistic and Conformistic Models of Political Behavior," *World Politics*, 21 (July, 1969), 513–538.

[6] Defining a belief system in terms of the degree of constraint among idea elements, Converse found that with respect to national, domestic and foreign policy, the average voter demonstrated very little constraint. See Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David Apter (ed.) *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206–261. For a similar approach emerging with the finding that American attitudes on national policy lack a clear pattern, see Robert Axelrod, "The Structure of Public Opinion on Policy Issues," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 31 (Spring, 1967), 51–60.

[7] Michael P. Rogin, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The Radical Spector* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), p. 228.

In an attempt to avoid the conceptual difficulties considered above, this investigation of the rationality of voting intentions employs minimal presuppositions concerning the types of information that voters employ and the criteria they utilize in processing that information prior to their voting decisions. Rather than positing given stimuli to be generally relevant to the electorate with respect to a presidential campaign, an attempt has been made to utilize the information and voting criteria which the voter himself suggests as significant in his voting decision.[8]

## II. THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

The theoretical calculus to be utilized in this study is what has been characterized as a rational choice model. In applying such a model to the problem of voting behavior, implicit assumptions are made concerning the cognitive capabilities of the average citizen-voter. Despite the controversy which the ascription of rationality has provoked in the social sciences, as it is employed here, the assumption in the calculus is quite a modest one. The utility models, developed for the most part by economists, which characterize individuals as maximizing expected gains minus expected losses, are predicated on a limited aspect of rationality. Whereas in a broad sense rationality implies a grasp and employment of the rules of inductive and deductive inference, rational choice models assume only the latter kind.[9] The requirement for deductive rationality is simply that the individual choose those actions which he believes to be consistent with his desired goals.

The results of a now classic experiment are supportive of the basic utility formulation, and recently the application of such theories to a variety of social and political problems has been markedly successful.[10] The problem of inductive rationality, on the other hand, has been largely ignored in the utility formulations of economists. This aspect of individual choice behavior has been treated for the most part by social psychologists whose concern has been with the nature of beliefs, attitudes, and values and with the cognitive structures of which these components are a part.[11] A primary focus has been on beliefs or perceptions which are hypothesized to result from other aspects of an individual's attitude-value complex. It has been these models emphasizing the subjectivity of perceptions which have contributed much of the theoretical underpinning to voting behavior studies.[12]

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[8] The inspiration for this quasi open-ended interview technique was derived from the self-anchoring striving scale developed by Kilpatrick and Cantril. See F. P. Kilpatrick and Hadley Cantril, "Self-Anchoring Scaling: A Measure of Individuals' Unique Reality Worlds," *Journal of Individual Psychology*, 16 (November, 1960), 158–173. The scale's most notable application is in Hadley Cantril's *The Pattern of Human Concerns* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1965).

[9] The usefulness of distinguishing between deductive and inductive rationality has been discussed by Quentin Gibson, *The Logic of Social Inquiry* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), chapter XIV, "The Assumption of Rationality."

[10] The original experiment is reported in Frederick Mosteller and Philip Nogee, "An Experimental Measurement of Utility," *Journal of Political Economy*, 59 (1951), 371–404. In addition to the Riker-Ordeshook study cited above, applications of utility-type models include such diverse substantive concerns as foreign policy decision-making, e.g., Barry M. Blechman, "The Quantitative Evaluation of Foreign Policy Alternatives," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10 (December, 1966), 408–426, and child rearing practices, reported in O. G. Brim, *et al.*, *Personality and Decision Processes* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962).

[11] The concept of inductive rationality, as it is employed here, refers primarily to the various cognitive consistency models which hypothesize that information processing in attitude formation and choice behavior is partly responsive to motivations for maintaining consistent cognitions about objects and situations. Rosenberg and Abelson, for example, speak of the "induction of new relations," when an individual seeks to render new information compatible with other pre-existing impressions: see Milton J. Rosenberg and Robert P. Abelson, "An Analysis of Cognitive Balancing," in Milton J. Rosenberg *et al.* *Attitude Organization and Change* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960, pp. 112–163).

[12] Among the most significant theories of this type are Fritz Heider, "Attitudes and Cognitive Organization," *Journal of Psychology*, 21 (1946), 107–112, and *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958); Charles E. Osgood and Percy H. Tannenbaum, "The Principle of Congruity in the Prediction of Attitude Change," *Psychological Review*, 62 (1955), 42–55; Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957); Robert P. Abelson and Milton J. Rosenberg, "Symbolic Psychologic: A Model of Attitudinal Cognition," *Behavioral*

Despite the basic differences in emphasis of the economic and social-psychological models of man there are some critical convergences which should not be overlooked. Some of the cognitive consistency models of social psychologists possess essentially the same theoretical structures as the utility or rational choice models.[13] We can express the normal utility maximizing formulation as follows:

$$E(U)_1 = \sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i V_i$$

[Where $E\ (U)_1$ is the expected utility of choice number 1, $n$ is the number of possible outcomes, $V_i$ is the $i$th outcome affected by the choice, and $P_i$ is the probability that choice number 1 will result in the $i$th outcome (which may be positive or negative]. It can be seen that cognitive models such as that developed by Fishbein are essentially similar. Based on his behavior theory which combines both beliefs about objects and attitudes toward objects, Fishbein expresses his model algebraically as follows:

$$A_o = \sum_{i=1}^{N} B_i a_i$$

[Where $A_o$ is the attitude toward object $o$, $B_i$ is the strength of belief $i$ about $o$ (i.e. the probability that $o$ is related to some other concept $X_i$), $a_i$ is the evaluative aspect of $B_i$ or the evaluation of $X_i$ and $N$ is the number of beliefs about $o$]. The basic prediction as Fishbein expresses it is, "that an individual's attitude toward any object is a function of (1) the strength of his beliefs about the object . . . and (2) . . . the evaluative aspect of those beliefs."[14] Markedly similar cognitive theories have been formulated and tested by Rosenberg under the general conception of a consistency principle, and Zajonc in terms of a theoretical framework he refers to as the theory of "cognitive set."[15] Successful tests of the Fishbein, Bernstein, and, Zajonc theories along with those of other structurally similar social psychological models buttress, by implication, the basic utility conceptualization of economists.

Essentially, then, both the economic and social-psychological models of man emphasize two basic cognitive components, values and beliefs. The roles that values and beliefs are hypothesized to perform correspond roughly to the processes of prizing and appraising, or as many contemporary attitude theories express it, affect and cognition. The evaluative process which precedes the formation of an attitude or the making of a decision according to these two basic models consists of assessments as to the relative desirability of various outcomes (prizing) and of the objects, persons, or events that are likely to contribute to the outcomes (appraising).

It should be evident that from both the economic and social-psychological perspectives human decision-making is seen to result from the way in which these two basic cognitive components process information from the individuals environment to yield the criteria on the basis of which a decision is reached. The economic rational choice models, emphasizing theoretical rigor, are characterized by a minimum of assumptions and relatively parsimonious theoretical formulations while the social-psychological models tend to be less theoretically compact but more amenable to comprehensive description and explanation of human information processing.

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*Science*, 3 (1958), 1–13; and Muzafer Sherif and Carl I. Hovland, *Social Judgment* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961). A comprehensive review of the relevant literature can be found in William J. McGuire, "The Current Status of Cognitive Consistency Theories," in S. Feldman (ed.), *Cognitive Consistency: Motivational Antecedents and Behavioral Consequences* (New York: Academic Press, 1966). Insightful critiques of a number of these theories can be found in Roger Brown, *Social Psychology* (New York: Free Press, 1965), Chapter 11, and Chester A. Insko, *Theories of Attitude Change* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967). The most recent versions of the various consistency theories appear in Robert P. Abelson *et al.*, *Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Source Book* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968).

[13] This similarity has been noted explicitly in Norman T. Feather, "Subjective Probability and Decision Under Uncertainty," *Psychological Review*, 66 (1959), 150–164; and Ward Edwards, "Behavorial Decision Theory," *Annual Review of Psychology*, 12 (1961), 473–498. I am indebted to Rufus P. Browning for calling these references to my attention.

[14] Martin Fishbein, "A Behavior Theory Approach to the Relations Between Beliefs about an Object and the Attitude Toward the Object," in Martin Fishbein (ed.), *Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), p. 394.

[15] See Milton J. Rosenberg, "Cognitive Structure and Attitudinal Affect," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 53 (1956), 367–372, and R. B. Zajonc, "Structure of the Cognitive Field," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1954. Algebraic versions of both these theories are developed by Fishbein *op. cit.* pp. 394–395.



Block Diagram: Decision-Maker (from Irwin D. J. Bross *Design for Decision* (New York: The Free Press, 1953.)

FIG. 1. The rational choice perspective on decision-making.

From the point of view of the rational choice theorist, a sufficient characterization of an individual decision-maker is represented by models such as that depicted in Figure 1.[16] A belief system and value system are posited as independent information processing units which provide a basis for rational, deductive, utility maximizing, decisions.

Social-psychological models, on the other hand, manifest more concern with individual variation in the process of obtaining and interpreting information as well as with the way in which the information is formally structured to yield decision criteria. Emphasis is placed on various attributes of belief systems such as their degree of rigidity or the breadth of the categories. Similarly variations in value orientations, particularly in terms of breadth and flexibility, are a major consideration. In addition, many of these models focus on dynamic interrelations between cognitive components, dealing with propositions about such phenomena as the extent to which an individual's beliefs or perceptions are affected by intense value preferences.

These many additional concerns with the information processing aspect of cognitive structures is indicative of social psychologists' concern with inductive as opposed to deductive rationality.[17] Even those cognitive models which are structurally similar to utility formulations serve to interrelate hypotheses which focus on the ways in which information is fed into the cognitive structure as well as the way in which it is organized to yield attitude formation and behavior.

Because of their complementary concerns with the deductive and inductive aspects of rationality, it would appear that a synthesis of the economic and social-psychological approaches to decision-making might on the one hand provide a more comprehensive theoretical overview of individual choice behavior and on the other address itself more adequately to the questions of rationality such as that related to the rationality of voting decisions. The structural similarity between economic utility models and some social psychological models makes such a synthesis possible. With this in view, I have chosen a parsimonious rational choice formulation developed by economists and supplemented its usage with assumptions, operational definitions, and hypotheses which are compatible with the social psychologists' concern with the effects of cognitive structure on information processing in decisional contexts. What emerges is hopefully not only a calculus which is appropriate to the study of the rationality of voting decisions but also a general theory of individual decision-making which emphasizes the interrelationships between values and beliefs in both the assessment of decisional contexts and in the choice among alternative behaviors.

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[16] This diagram is taken from Irwin D. J. Bross, *Design for Decision* (New York: Free Press, 1958), p. 29.

[17] A theory which focuses explicitly on the way in which cognitive structures process information is presented along with some interesting empirical applications in Harold M. Schroder, Michael J. Driver and Siegfried Streufert, *Human Information Processing* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967).

## III. THE MODEL

The utility formulation chosen for this investigation of voting intentions is in the form of a quadratic loss function. The notation of Davis and Hinich (in linear algebra) is as follows:[18]

$$
\begin{aligned}
L_1 &= (X_i - \theta_i)' A_i (X_i - \theta_i) \\
L_2 &= (X_i - \theta_i)' A_i (X_i - \theta_i) \\
&\;\;\vdots \\
L_n &= (X_i - \theta_i)' A_i (X_i - \theta_i)
\end{aligned}
$$

where $L_1$ through $L_n$ represent an individual's loss functions as a result of the attributes (policies supported, personal characteristics, etc.) of candidates 1 through $n$; $X_i$ is a vector representing the $i$th individual's preferred attributes of candidates; $\theta_i$ is a vector of the perceived positions of the candidates with respect to the attributes preferred by the $i$th voter, and $A_i$ is an $n \times n$ positive semi-definite saliency matrix which weights each attribute on the basis of its salience for the $i$th voter.[19]

It should be apparent that this loss function model is an inverse of the standard utility formulation. Each $L$ represents the disutility of each candidate for a given voter, the prediction being that a given voter will choose the candidate for which the attribute loss is a minimum, i.e., the smallest $L$.

This model, as conceived by Davis and Hinich, was addressed primarily to the problem of candidate strategy. Thus while the model represents a decision-making calculus ascribed to the individual voter, its primary function, along with the formulae produced by extending the model at a strictly formal level, is as a theory of influence on a group of voters with certain collective characteristics. For purposes of analytic development, then, the assumptions upon which the model is predicated are more restrictive than those which would be considered desirable for a model which focuses primarily on individual choice behavior.

In their analysis, Davis and Hinich assume that all the voters in the population use the same indices to measure a given policy and that each voter has a preferred position for each issue of policy injected into the campaign. These assumptions are reflected in their conception of the $X_i$ vector of voter preferences. The number of elements in the vector is the same for all voters with each $X$ representing a campaign issue and each voter having a score (on a commonly perceived interval scale) on each $X$, which represents his policy preferences. In like manner the $\theta$ vector is assumed to be perceived similarly by all the voters such that a candidate's stand on each issue is identified in the same way by each voter.[20]

The quadratic form of the model is primarily significant for the analytic development it permits for a theory of candidate strategy. There are, however, properties of the quadratic form which are convenient for the individual choice behavior aspect of the model. The calculus involved with this form yields a loss of zero in instances where an $X_i$-$\theta_i$ (when the candidate attribute is equal to the preferred attribute) and a positive loss whenever $X_i \neq \theta_i$. In addition, a quadratic loss function incorporates the concept of an increasing marginal utility which in this case relates to preferred attributes as opposed to the traditional application to economic currency.

In order to employ the model in a manner that provides an overview of information processing as it relates to individual choice behavior and thus to assess voter rationality more comprehensively than is usually the case, several of the above assumptions have been relaxed. In keeping with the social-psychological emphasis on definitions of the situation and subjectivity of perceptions, it is not assumed that the $X$ vector is the same for all voters. Each voter is assumed to have his own criteria (preferred candidate attributes), and the number of criteria employed by the voters is assumed to vary. Similarly, the $\theta$ vectors are assumed to vary across the voting population with the actual position of each candidate on each attribute assumed to be ascribed by each individual voter. Of necessity, then, the A matrix will vary from voter to voter with each diagonal entry representing the relative importance of each of the corresponding candidate attributes adduced by the individual voter. The only unifying assumption for purposes of utilizing the model to explain the choice behavior of all the voters is that the same interval scales are used by the voters for rating candidates on attributes.

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[18] See Otto A. Davis and Melvin Hinich, "A Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society," in Joseph L. Bernd (ed.), *Mathematical Applications in Political Science II* (Dallas, Texas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1966), pp. 175–208, and an elaboration by the same authors, "Some Results Related to a Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society," in Joseph L. Bernd (ed.), *Mathematical Application in Political Science III* (Charlottesville, Va.: The University of Virginia Press, 1967), pp. 14–38. For another application and extension of the same theoretical calculus see Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of Electoral Behavior and Party Strategy," Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Rochester, 1968. I am indebted to Professor Ordeshook for bringing this theoretical formulation to my attention.

[19] The linear algebra notation is preserved in order to maintain continuity with other applications of the theory. In normal mathematical notation, the calculus could be rendered as $L_c = \sum_{i=1}^{n} d^2_i a_i$. (Where $L_c$ is the loss experienced by an individual voter with respect to candidate $c$, $d_i^2$ is the square of the distance between the individual's $i$th attribute preference and his perception of the candidates' position on that attribute, $n$ is the number of attributes that the voter deems to be relevant to his voting choice, and $a_i$ is the salience or importance of the $i$th attribute of the candidate with respect to his voting choice.)

[20] In Davis and Hinich's original version of the calculus, the A matrix was assumed to be constant for all voters. In their reformulation, they changed this assumption to allow for variation in the A matrix for the population of voters.

Thus while we have preserved the structure of the rational choice model which posits a given functional relationship between beliefs about candidate attributes and valuations of them, the standardizing assumptions have been revised to allow for the inclusion of assessments as to the actual substantive information which voters utilize to fill in such a formal calculus. With the revised assumptions the model is more compatible with social-psychological theories which hypothesize attitudes toward objects to be a function of a multiplicative relationship between objects or situations which are valued and beliefs about the instrumental relevance of the attitude object to those valued objects and states of affairs.

## IV. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

The substantive decisional setting utilized to test this theoretical model was the 1968 presidential campaign. The theory was employed to predict and explain voting intentions of the electorate from among the five candidates who were, at the time, actively campaigning for the Democratic and Republican Party nominations, Humphrey, Kennedy, McCarthy, Nixon, and Rockefeller. The sample of over 200 of the electorate was selected at random from the population of registered voters on the Island of Oahu.[21]

The interview schedule combined aspects of open-ended and forced-choice techniques. With the exception of party affiliation, each respondent was, within broad category designations, allowed to identify the criteria (major value referents) which he or she deemed important in voting decisions. The major categories for criteria (in addition to party affiliation) were personal qualities, issues, and interpersonal cues. For the party criterion, respondents were asked to identify their party affiliation on the typical seven point scale ranging from strong Democrat through independent to strong Republican. They were then asked to indicate both in general and specifically with respect to the forthcoming presidential election the importance of their party affiliation in their voting choice(s). The ascribed importance of party affiliation on a five point scale ranging from extremely important to totally irrelevant would serve as the weighting factor (in the $A$ matrix) for each individual with respect to the losses which would result from voting for each of the five candidates. The values in the $X$ and $\theta$ vectors for the party criterion were obtained by asking each respondent to rate each of the five candidates on the same party affiliation scale on which they had rated themselves. The party criterion thus appears as one value in each of the five loss functions for each individual with the loss with respect to each of the five candidates being a function of the distance between the individual's party affiliation and that ascribed to the candidate weighted by the importance which the individual ascribes to his party affiliation.

The number of values in the five loss functions for each individual resulting from the personal qualities, issue, and interpersonal influence criteria are variable. For these the respondent was asked to name the personal qualities, issues, and interpersonal cues which were of concern.[22] Then, as in the case of the party criterion, they were asked to indicate the general and specific (with respect to the forthcoming election) importance of each personal quality, issue or interpersonal cue in determining their voting decision. Respondents were then asked to rate each of the five candidates on a seven-point scale ranging from extremely close to extremely far in terms of the extent to which each candidate fulfills each named criterion. For practical purposes, the interview schedule provided for as many as eight criteria under each of the three categories.

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[21] The sample was drawn on a random probability basis from the list of registered voters on the Island of Oahu which contains approximately seventy-five percent of the voting population of the State of Hawaii.

[22] The questions asked to elicit voting criteria in the personal quality issue, and interpersonal cue categories are as follows: "In assessing the personal qualities of a presidential candidate, what things do you think about"; "What are the foreign and domestic policy questions with which you are, at present, most concerned"; "Can you think of any individuals or groups whose political opinions you pay attention to."

In order to test the overall predictive capacity of the model, a voting intention was obtained for each of the respondents. They were asked, "If the election were to occur tomorrow, which of the potential candidates would you vote for?" Those who were undecided were asked to indicate which of the candidates they were still deciding between or among.

### V. RESULTS

Before examining the extent to which the loss functions provide an explanation of the calculus of voting choices and, by implication, support for inferences about the deductive rationality of those choices, let us consider the nature and structure of the information which the voters themselves bring to such a calculus. Here we shall focus on the inductive aspect of decision rationality by considering the data from the perspective of social-psychological theories about cognitive determinants of information processing.

Looking first of all at the nature of the information selected by voters, the issues which the respondents deemed significant are presented in Table 1 for descriptive purposes. It is clear that the three most frequently mentioned issues are the Vietnam War, Civil Rights, and Civil Disturbances mentioned by 85, 50, and 30 percent of the respondents respectively.[23] The personal qualities mentioned ranged from moralistic attributes such as honesty, sincerity and integrity to skill attributes such as speaking ability, foreign affairs experience, and administrative experience. Interpersonal cues (respected opinions) included family, friends, coworkers, national commentators, all national and local politicians. The party criterion was, of course, standard for all respondents.

The data presented in Table 1 on issues along with responses on other voting criteria simply indicate, at a descriptive level, that voters mention party, issue, personal quality, and interpersonal cue criteria that purport to influence their voting choices. Although an overwhelming majority of our sample of voters cited the Vietnam War, for example, as a major voting criterion, one needs to know more about the way in which such a criterion affects information processing as it relates to candidate evaluation before inferences about inductive rationality are warranted.

TABLE 1. ISSUE CONCERNS OF OAHU ELECTORATE*

| Issue | N | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| Vietnam War | 183 | 85.0 |
| Civil Rights | 107 | 49.8 |
| Civil Unrest | 64 | 29.8 |
| Foreign Aid | 31 | 14.4 |
| Poverty | 24 | 11.2 |
| Balance of Payments | 24 | 11.2 |
| Taxes | 22 | 10.2 |
| Korean Ship Seizure | 20 | 9.3 |
| The Draft | 19 | 9.1 |
| Urban Development | 19 | 9.1 |
| Inflation | 11 | 5.1 |

* Includes only issues mentioned by more than 5% of the respondents.

Social psychologists have developed an explanation of perceptual processes which, when applied to the question of electoral choice, suggests that a voter's attitude toward candidates is not rational (in an inductive sense). If information processing by the electorate is to be ascribed as relatively objective, an image thesis would be implied whereby the attributes of candidates provide stimuli to which the electorate then responds. The conflicting explanation suggested by a number of social psychological models has been described as a perceptual balance thesis which suggests that evaluations of candidates are perceiver-determined. The later thesis would thus assert that the personal preferences such as partisan identifications provide a motivational basis for ascribing positions to candidates on other evaluative dimensions.[24]

Selective perception hypotheses belonging to the perceptual balance theory provided the major explanatory basis for one of the major

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[23] An analysis which attempts to differentiate policy orientations in terms of their complexity or sophistication can be found in John Kessel, "Cognitive Dimensions of Political Activity," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 29 (Fall, 1965), 377–389.

[24] An explication and empirical assessment of these two competing hypotheses is presented by Joseph E. McGrath and Marion F. McGrath, "Effects of Partisanship on Perceptions of Political Figures," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (Summer, 1962), 236–248.

TABLE 2. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTISANSHIP AND PERSONAL QUALITY, ISSUE, AND INTERPERSONAL CUE RATINGS

| Candidates | Personal Qualities | Issues | Interpersonal Cues |
|---|---|---|---|
| Partisan 1 (Humphrey) | .11 | .18* | .08 |
| Partisan 2 (McCarthy) | −.08 | .02 | .02 |
| Partisan 3 (Kennedy) | .03 | .08 | .07 |
| Partisan 4 (Nixon) | .23* | .17† | .15† |
| Partisan 5 (Rockefeller) | .16† | .02 | .02 |

* Significant at .01 level.
† Significant at .05 level.

studies of the electorate. Since that time a number of studies have been specifically addressed to the question of whether such attitudes as partisan preference affect perceptions of candidates. Nevertheless, the findings remain ambiguous.[25] In order to see which of the explanations, image or perceptual balance, applies to the data in this study and thereby to investigate the inductive rationality of our sample of the electorate, we will focus on an aspect of the perceptual balance thesis that is especially compatible with the nature of our data.

If perceptual balance mechanisms are operating in our respondents, we would expect that evaluations of candidates (ratings on their distances from the respondent's preferred attributes) would be systematically related to the partisanship of the respondents. To test this implication of the perceptual balance thesis, the correlations between the partisanship ratings of candidates and their ratings on personal quality, issue, and interpersonal cue attributes are presented in Table 2. It is evident that partisan identification is only slightly related to evaluation of candidates on other attribute dimensions in our sample of the electorate, for the correlations are generally quite low in magnitude and only five of the fifteen coefficients are statistically significant.

We can thus conclude that perceptual balance mechanisms have a very modest effect on information processing by the voters in our sample and infer with some confidence that this is true of the Oahu electorate. Nevertheless, the slight relationship discovered warrants further investigation in terms of another facet of the perceptual balance thesis. In some formulations of this theory of information processing it is hypothesized that individuals who are strongly committed to certain attitudes or stands or who are extremely ego involved with their positions are more likely to enforce consistency on information relevant to their positions than are individuals who are less committed or ego involved.[26]

We can translate the above hypothesis into terms relevant to our substantive focus on electoral choice and arrive at the expectation that for those respondents who are more strongly partisan (express a strong party affiliation), we are more likely to find a relationship between ratings of candidates on the party criterion and ratings of candidates on other attributes (personal qualities, issues, and interpersonal cues). To test this aspect of the perceptual balance thesis an index of the closeness of rating between party and other attributes was computed for each respondent by summing the differences between their party ratings and other attribute ratings across all five candidates. Thus each score on the perceptual balancing index for a given respondent is based on fifteen comparisons with a high score indicating a lack of relationship between party and other ratings and a low score indicating the existence of such a relationship.

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[25] The authors of *Voting* (see footnote 1) placed heavy emphasis on perceptual balance mechanisms in their explanation of voter decision-making. Since that time studies employing a variety of techniques have yielded contradictory results. Investigations which support the perceptual balance thesis include Lewis A. Froman, Jr. and James K. Skipper, Jr. "Factors Related to Misperceiving Party Stands on Issues," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (Summer, 1962), 265–272 and Roberta S. Sigel, "Effect on Partisanship on the Perception of Political Candidates," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 28 (Fall, 1964), 483–496. Investigations which support a stimulus or nonperceptual bias thesis include Lewis A. Froman, Jr. and James K. Skipper, Jr., "An Approach to the Learning of Party Identification," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27 (Fall, 1963), 473–480, and McGrath and McGrath *op. cit.*

[26] See, for example, Carolyn Sherif, Muzafer Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, *Attitude and Attitude Change: The Social Judgment-Involvement Approach* (Philadelphia: Saunders, 1965). They found that the degree of ego involvement of respondents (with respect to their partisanship) was systematically related to their perceptions of campaign appeals in the 1960 presidential election.

This index was then correlated with three different measures of the strength of partisanship of the respondents, their general rating of the importance of their party affiliation, their rating of its importance with respect to this election, and their strength of partisanship as indicated by their distance from the independent or neutral position on the seven point party affiliation scale. The correlations (shown in Table 3) indicate that a relationship does indeed obtain, particularly with respect to the most traditional measure of partisanship, the distance from the independent position. In general, then, a perceptual balancing mechanism is only slightly in evidence, and to the extent that it is operating, it is more in evidence among those with stronger partisan commitments.[27]

We have thus far considered the extent to which beliefs and values in the partisanship domain are related to other evaluative dimensions and have found that for the most part non-party assessments of candidates are independent of the respondent's party leanings. In order to consider the degree of relationship among all four evaluative domains (party, personal quality, issue, and interpersonal cue) one can obtain a correlation matrix for all the salience and distance ratings with respect to all four criteria. A factor analysis of this correlation matrix will then reveal the extent of interdependence of evaluation and will provide a comprehensive overview of the question of the effects of perceptual mechanisms on information gathering in electoral decisions.[28]

The factor matrix shown in Table 4 contains six of the seven factors retained for rotation to a simple structure solution. The highest loadings in each factor have been italicized to facilitate identification of the major sources of variation. The varimax rotation scheme employed is designed to provide maximal clarity in interpretation of the factors by maximizing variance in factors so that a few high and many very low loadings result. If, then, party, personal quality, issue, and interpersonal cue criteria represent separate evaluative domains for the voters, we would expect the evaluative ratings within each domain to appear on different uncorrelated factors.

TABLE 3. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN STRENGTH OF PARTISANSHIP AND DEGREE OF PERCEPTUAL BALANCE

| Partisanship Measures | Perceptual Balance |
|---|---|
| Party Importance (in general) | .16† |
| Party Importance (this election) | .12 |
| Strength of Affiliation | .25* |

* Significant at .01 level.
† Significant at .05 level.

A look at Table 4 indicates that this expectation is realized. Factor 1 is clearly an interpersonal cue factor with the only high loadings being the two salience ratings and the average distance ratings for the five candidates on interpersonal cues. Factor 2 is similarly unambiguous. All high loadings are represented by the salience and distance ratings in the personal quality domain. The other two criteria, party and issues, are also on separate factors, but in both cases their high loadings are on two different factors. The party domain is bifurcated in terms of salience and distance with Factor 3 being an unambiguous party distance factor (all high loadings are distance ratings for the five candidates) and Factor 5 being an equally clear party salience factor in which the three high loadings are the three party salience measures.

The bifurcation of the issue domain is of particular significance. Five out of seven of the issue ratings load highly on Factor 6. These loadings are for the two salience measures and the issue distance ratings on three of the candidates, Nixon, Rockefeller, and Humphrey. The distance ratings on issues for the two remaining candidates, McCarthy and Kennedy appear as the two highest loadings on Factor 4. This factor is not completely unambiguous, because there are two moderate loadings from the per-

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[27] Because it is often asserted that various kinds of irrationality in voting are more in evidence among voters of lower socio-economic status, we have correlated income level with the index of the degree of perceptual distortion. The correlation coefficient in this case is a non-significant .04.

[28] The factor analysis model employed is a principle components model. All factors with an eigen value greater than one were preserved for rotation. For a comprehensive discussion of various factor models and their implications see Harry H. Harmon *Modern Factor Analysis*, (2nd ed.; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967).

TABLE 4. ROTATED (ORTHOGONAL) FACTOR SOLUTION OF CORRELATION MATRIX OF SALIENCE AND DISTANCE RATINGS FOR FOUR VOTING CRITERIA†

| Variables* | Factors | | | | | | Communalities |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | |
| Party 1 | −06 | −06 | −08 | 18 | *82* | 02 | 72 |
| Party 2 | 02 | 04 | −06 | 05 | *83* | 07 | 71 |
| Party 3 | 15 | −06 | −07 | −06 | *65* | −04 | 46 |
| Party 4 | 04 | 04 | *−85* | 01 | 09 | 04 | 74 |
| Party 5 | 07 | −02 | *−73* | −05 | 29 | 14 | 65 |
| Party 6 | −05 | 15 | *89* | −07 | −13 | 05 | 85 |
| Party 7 | 01 | 06 | *79* | −05 | 20 | 13 | 69 |
| Party 8 | 05 | 06 | *86* | −03 | −03 | 15 | 77 |
| Personal Quality 1 | 05 | *−63* | −05 | 04 | 16 | −10 | 60 |
| Personal Quality 2 | 02 | *−70* | −03 | −04 | 16 | −13 | 69 |
| Personal Quality 3 | 07 | *−62* | −32 | 17 | −09 | −31 | 63 |
| Personal Quality 4 | 02 | *−65* | −16 | −14 | 06 | −13 | 50 |
| Personal Quality 5 | 02 | *−70* | 28 | 09 | −19 | −15 | 64 |
| Personal Quality 6 | −03 | *−62* | −12 | −45 | 04 | 11 | 63 |
| Personal Quality 7 | 05 | *−50* | 06 | −63 | 05 | 17 | 70 |
| Issue 1 | 00 | −07 | −04 | −19 | 20 | *−49* | 68 |
| Issue 2 | −05 | −18 | −06 | −19 | 18 | *−50* | 61 |
| Issue 3 | 09 | −17 | −23 | 07 | −02 | *−79* | 72 |
| Issue 4 | 01 | −05 | −06 | −32 | −01 | *−75* | 68 |
| Issue 5 | −06 | −27 | 30 | −11 | −20 | *−61* | 59 |
| Issue 6 | −03 | 03 | 01 | *−79* | −10 | −32 | 74 |
| Issue 7 | 02 | 00 | 11 | *−84* | −11 | −19 | 77 |
| Interpersonal Cue 1 | *78* | 05 | −11 | 16 | 21 | 00 | 71 |
| Interpersonal Cue 2 | *82* | 01 | −13 | 16 | 20 | −02 | 77 |
| Interpersonal Cue 3 | *87* | −07 | −14 | 00 | −06 | −03 | 80 |
| Interpersonal Cue 4 | *91* | −04 | −04 | −02 | 02 | −05 | 83 |
| Interpersonal Cue 5 | *84* | −11 | 18 | 03 | −13 | −04 | 77 |
| Interpersonal Cue 6 | *91* | 01 | 02 | −17 | −04 | 03 | 86 |
| Interpersonal Cue 7 | *88* | 03 | 13 | −21 | 00 | 02 | 84 |

* Party 1, 2, and 3 are the measures of party salience, the general importance of party, the importance of party in this election, and the strength of the respondents partisan position respectively. For personal qualities, issues, and interpersonal cues, numbers 1 and 2 correspond to the general importance and importance in this election of those attributes and numbers 3 through 7 correspond to the distance ratings of Nixon, Rockefeller, Humphrey, McCarthy, and Kennedy respectively on those attributes.

† Decimal points in coefficients have been omitted.

sonal quality domain, but again these are the ratings for McCarthy and Kennedy. Perhaps the most compelling inference that can be made with reference to the separate McCarthy-Kennedy issue factor relates to the Vietnam issue. At the time the data were collected, McCarthy and Kennedy were the only two major candidates with "anti" positions on the Vietnam War, and it should be recalled (see Table 1 above) that 85 percent of the respondents referred to the Vietnam War as an issue that would affect their voting decisions.

The results of the factor analysis provide further evidence of the inductive rationality of the electorate by indicating a general conceptual independence among the four voting criteria and thus a general lack of perceptual balance mechanisms operating, and by indicating that the two candidates with similar distinguishing policy stands are similarly located in the electorate's perceptual space.

We are now prepared to turn to a consideration of the deductive aspect of voter rationality by examining the extent to which our loss function equations presented above successfully predict the voting intentions expressed by the respondents. The sample of voters for this purpose is reduced from 215 to 201 by eliminating those respondents who either indicated no voting intention or an intention other than one of the five candidates for whom we have generated prediction equations. It was found that of these 201 respondents, the loss function equations correctly predicted the choices of 172. This represents an 85.5 percentage, indicating that a vast majority of our sample of the electorate exhibits a deductive (utility maximizing) rationality.[29]

The breakdown of the percentages correctly predicted for the different categories of party affiliation are shown in Table 5. While these partisan differences are not dramatic, the lowest predictability (and thus rationality) of the voters who identify themselves as independents should be expected. Systematic voting behavior studies over the past few decades have consistently indicated that the independent voter tends to be relatively uninformed and inattentive to political matters.[30]

TABLE 5. PREDICTION RESULTS FOR PARTISAN CATEGORIES

| Partisanship | N | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| Democrats | 94 | 88.3 |
| Independents | 56 | 81.5 |
| Republicans | 51 | 84.3 |
| Total | 201 | 85.5 |

We have found that generally the loss function equations perform well in predicting the voting intentions of the electorate. While the equations are relatively simple, they do represent a combination of elements which warrant individual assessment. In order to determine the contribution of the *A* matrix or saliency ratings to the overall result, the loss values of the respondents were recalculated using only the distances on the criteria they mentioned without weighting those distances in terms of the ascribed importance of each criterion. On the basis of these new values the number of voting intentions correctly predicted was diminished from 172 to 158 or from 85.5 to 77.5 percent, suggesting that the salience portion of the calculus contributes positively to the overall prediction.[31]

The remaining portion of the equations to be assessed are the candidate distances on the four categories of voting criteria. Because the factor analysis indicated that these distances are uncorreleted, it is possible to employ multiple regression equations and obtain unbiased assessments of the relative contributions of these four criteria in predicting voting intentions on the five candidates. The regression coefficient and partial correlation coefficients for the regression of the voting intentions on the four voting criteria are presented in Table 6. Considering the regression coefficients, first of all, we note that for all five candidates, the personal quality criterion accounts for as much or more variation in voting intentions than any of the other three criteria. Personal qualities is the leading criterion for three out of five candidates, the exceptions being Nixon, for whom the party criterion has an equal impact, and Kennedy, for whom the issue criterion has an equal impact. In the case of Nixon, this is to be expected on the basis of our findings on the relationship between partisanship ratings and assessments on other criteria reviewed in Table 2. The perceptual balance mechanism was most in evidence with respect to Nixon for whom all three correlations between partisan position and other categories were statistically significant.

The issue criterion is most significant in the case of Kennedy for whom it shares the lead with the personal quality criterion. Generally, the least important influence in the equations is the interpersonal cue criterion. The regression coefficients are especially helpful in giving us a basic profile of the appeal of each candidate.

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[29] The overall prediction of 85.5 percent is based upon two different kinds of voting intentions. 39 of the 201 respondents included in the prediction did not indicate a definite voting choice but rather named two or more candidates among whom they said they were deciding. They were considered correctly predicted if the loss function equations predicted one of those that they named. A separate analysis of only those with definitive choices, however, indicates that the 85.5 percentage is appropriate with or without the 39 respondents.

[30] The predictions in terms of the loss function equations were examined for different income groups and it was found that there is very little variation in percentage prediction on the basis of income level.

[31] It should be recognized that the sizes of the parameters in the loss function equations (a five point scale for salience and a seven point scale of attribute distances) are arbitrary. For this reason, several analyses of the overall predictions were conducted with the relative sizes of the saliences and distances varied. It was found that the scales as originally employed provided the optimum prediction.

TABLE 6. REGRESSION AND PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE REGRESSIONS OF VOTING INTENTIONS FOR THE FIVE CANDIDATES ON THE FOUR VOTING CRITERIA

| Candidate | Party | Personal Qualities | Issues | Interpersonal Cues |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Humphrey | | | | |
| regression | −.06 | −.09 | −.05 | −.01 |
| partial r | −.26* | −.31* | −.18* | −.05 |
| McCarthy | | | | |
| regression | −.03 | −.05 | −.03 | −.01 |
| partial r | −.15 | −.20* | −.15† | −.05 |
| Kennedy | | | | |
| regression | −.04 | −.05 | −.05 | −.03 |
| partial r | −.19* | −.19* | −.22* | −.16† |
| Nixon | | | | |
| regression | −.08 | −.08 | −.00 | .02 |
| partial r | −.38* | −.30* | −.01 | .11 |
| Rockefeller | | | | |
| regression | −.02 | −.06 | −.02 | −.03 |
| partial r | −.10 | −.19* | −.08 | −.14† |

* Significant at .01 level.
† Significant at .05 level.

A comparison of the coefficients in each row indicates the relative importance of each in relation to changes in voting intentions for each candidate. The partial correlation coefficients are indicators of strength of association and each coefficient in a given row is an index of the degree to which variation in a particular voting criterion is associated with variation in voting intentions for that candidate when we hold constant variation in the other three voting criteria.[32]

A general summary of the overall importance of each voting criterion in terms of the performance of the loss function equations is provided by considering the number of equations in which each criterion is significantly associated with voting intentions. If we employ the 95 percent confidence level, we find that again personal qualities lead, being significantly associated with the dependent variable in all five equations. Party is significantly associated with voting intentions in four out of five equations, issues in three out of five and interpersonal cues in only two out of five equations. The proportion of significant partial correlation coefficients can be employed as an indicator of the degree of redundancy in the loss function model in general. It can be noted that only six out of twenty of the partials are not statistically significant.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS

The evidence adduced above, in connection with the theoretical formulation of electoral decision-making employed, suggests that for our sample and with respect to our referent population of voters, voting choices are rational. This claim rests, of necessity, upon the conception of rationality that has been utilized in this investigation and, in addition, upon the relationship between findings on information processing or inductive rationality and those on the utility maximizing or deductive rationality.

Considering, first of all, the conceptual aspect of this study, we began with an approach to the rationality question which attempted to exploit the structural similarity and substantive complementarity of economic and social-psychological approaches to decision-making. By focusing upon both perceptual mechanisms in the obtaining of decision relevant information and the affectual and cognitive nexus as it relates to choices among perceived alternatives, we have attempted to develop a theoretical formulation that comprehends both the inductive and deductive aspects of rationality, the former concerning itself with the degree of bias in information processing and the latter with the extent to which choices are consistent with a utility calculus.

By conceiving of rationality in terms of the structure of a decisional calculus and the interrelationships between perceptions and experience we avoid presuppositions about the particular values and substantive information relevant to decisions. In the case of voting decisions, for example, it is exceedingly problematic to choose a set of value criteria which belong to voting decisions irrespective of the nature of the voters involved. Some voters derive gratification from knowing that a given type of individual is in office, some are more concerned with the policy choices that an office holder is likely to make, while others find fulfillment in making choices which they feel are congruent with the choices of others whom they admire or respect. The elevation of any particular criterion above others such that choices are considered rational to the extent to which they are designed to maximize it, usually involves the pre-selection of some notion of collective rationality. The relationship between individual and collective rationality is indeed an important one, but it should be explicitly formulated if theoretical approaches to it are to maintain some integrity. Unfortunately, many approaches to individual rationality attempt to smuggle in collective goals considered desirable so that individual choices not designed to fulfill them can bear the onus of being irrational.

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[32] For a discussion of the relative explanatory contributions of regression and correlation coefficients in multiple linear regression, see Mordecai Ezekiel and Karl A. Fox *Methods of Correlation and Regression Analysis* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959), section III.

Turning now to the results obtained with respect to our conception of rationality, it is important to note that the significance of the overall predictive capacity of the theoretical formulation (the loss function equations) is contingent upon the results of the hypothesis testing with respect to evidence of perceptual mechanisms affecting the information processing of voters. If there had been evidence indicating a substantial amount of perceptual balancing in the evaluating of candidates the predictive success of the loss function equations would not be particularly significant. The implication would have been that each respondent had simply given his preferred candidate a good rating on all attributes. This would suggest that the loss function equation was just a formalization of the hypothesis that voting intentions are indicated for the candidate whom the respondent likes. Because, however, ratings of candidates in the four categories, party, personal qualities, issues, and interpersonal cues, were shown to be independent, the loss function formulation appears to be a meaningful calculus which represents a reasonably complex decisional process.

In addition to their relevance to the rationality of voters, the results of this investigation (particularly the predictive success of the loss function equations) confer some respectability upon the decision-making theory derived from both economic and social-psychological perspectives on political man. In this application, the theory has been used to clarify the rationality question and explain voting choices. The theory is general in form, however, and might well be successfully applied to other decision-making contexts.

# PARTICIPANT CITIZENSHIP IN SIX DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

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In this paper I will endeavor to do the following: (1) test how far certain concepts dealing with individual orientations to politics, previously used in studies of relatively advanced European societies, are appropriate to populations in developing countries; (2) ascertain how far these separate dimensions of individual political orientation cohere as a syndrome, indicating the existence of a general underlying dimension of "participant citizenship;" (3) identify elements among common orientations to politics which cannot be incorporated in this general syndrome; and (4) assess the importance of certain social experiences or forces in inculcating the qualities of participant citizenship in individuals exposed to these influences.

These objectives will be better understood if they are seen in the context of the larger research program of which this report is a part, namely the Harvard Project on the Social and Cultural Aspects of Economic Development.[1] The project is an investigation of the forms and sources of modernization *in individuals.* Its focus is on the person rather than the society or the institution, and its emphasis is sociopsychological rather than purely sociological or structural. Six countries are represented: Argentina and Chile, East Pakistan and India, Nigeria and Israel. This report will not, however, emphasize national differences, but rather treat each sample as another replication of the basic design. We assume that if something holds true for six such different countries, it must be a powerful connection indeed.

The study is based on an extensive interview, of up to four hours duration, administered to a highly purposive sample including subgroups of cultivators, migrants to the city newly arrived, urban workers earning their living outside large-scale productive enterprises, and workers in industry. Industrial workers are the largest group in each country, some 600 to 700, whereas the other sub-groups were to be 100 each. The targets were not, however, always reached. The selection of cases was on the basis of the respondent's meeting certain common characteristics as to sex (all male), age (18–32), education (usually 0–8 years), religion, ethnicity, rural or urban origin, residence, and, of course, the occupational characteristics already mentioned.

Respondents were chosen within "sites," the most important being the factory. Up to 100 factories were included in each country. In practice virtually everyone meeting the sample criteria was selected from each factory, except the very largest. In those, up to 20 men were selected at random from among the pool of eligible subjects. Factories were selected on the basis of differentiation by size (5 categories), product (7 categories) and relative "modernity" (2 categories). Villages were chosen on the basis of being either the same as those from which the migrant industrial workers had come originally, or as being precisely equivalent in region, culture, crop, and the like. Urban non-industrials (UNI's) had to work outside large-scale production organizations in the same cities as the workers, and otherwise meet the general sampling criteria. Since we are not making generalizations to the national populations, we more emphasized keeping the subsamples like each other in all respects except occupation, rather than selecting them to be representative of any "parent" population. Nevertheless, our industrial samples prove to be very similar to their defined parent populations, although more so in some countries than others.

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[1] My chief collaborators from the early days of the project were Howard Schuman and Edward Ryan, who served respectively as field directors for Pakistan and Nigeria, and David H. Smith who was my assistant in Chile and later was assistant director of the project in Cambridge. The field work and later analysis were greatly facilitated by the work of our local collaborators in all six of the countries. We owe particular debt to Juan Cesar and Carlotta Garcia, Perla Gibaja, and Amar Singh who were field directors for Chile, Argentina, and India, respectively, and to Olatunde Oloko who was assistant field director in Nigeria. In its different aspects, stages, and settings the research has been supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the National Science Foundation, and the National Institutes of Mental Health. The Cultural Affairs Division of the Department of State provided local currencies to support our field work in India, Israel and Pakistan, and the Office of Scientific Research of the U. S. Air Force supported technical exploration in problems of translation and computer analysis undertaken in Cambridge. All of these organizations gave their support through the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University, which is the sponsor and institutional home of our project.

The main objective of the larger research program is to test a theory concerning psychosocial modernity. Individual modernity is here conceived of as a complex set of inter-related attitudes, values, and behaviors fitting a theoretically derived model of the modern man, at least as he may appear among the common men in developing countries.[2] Whether this syndrome actually exists in nature, and is the same from country to country, is one of the prime questions to which the project addresses itself. We already have an answer to this first question: the syndrome does indeed exist in nature. Furthermore, the psychological "structure" of individual modernity is basically very much the same in all six of the very different countries we studied.[3]

The second major objective of the Project is to assess the determinants of individual modernity. We are asking: What makes a man modern? Data bearing on this issue have not previously appeared in print. In this article an answer to that question is essayed with reference to one component of our model of the modern man, namely his role as a participant citizen.

### I. THE THEORY OF PARTICIPANT CITIZENSHIP

The Harvard program of research on the social and cultural aspects of economic development has been guided by two different, but not unrelated, models of the "modern" man. One, the "analytical" model, specifices a set of relatively abstract qualities, such as "openness to new experience," which we assumed to cohere as a syndrome defining a part,cular personality type. The second model, called the "topical," focused on substantive issues such as religion, family planning, and kinship obligations.[4] With regard to each of these separate topics, we were faced with the challenge of specifying what complex of attitudes, values, and behavior patterns we would consider a "modern" orientation in the given realm.

In the case of politics, the temptation was great to define as modern those qualities presumably characterizing the participants in a democratic polity. To do this, however, was to open ourselves to the charge of being culture-bound, a stigma which students of comparative systems wish to avoid at all costs. Moreover, the historical record gave little reason to assume any inevitable, or even highly probable, association of economic development and a democratic polity. Admittedly, Great Britain was the unchallenged forerunner in the industrial revolution, and the United States has these many years been its overwhelmingly outstanding exemplar, and both are well known for their long tradition of democratic politics. But Japan modernized in the reign of an Emperor who stood at the head of a state religion; Turkey made its great leap forward under a dictator who was rather like Russia's extraordinary modernizing Tsar Peter; the Soviet Union, and more recently China, undertook their modernization under the aegis of communist dictatorships; and Mexico, which many consider the outstanding example of development in Latin America, has made its progress under the tutelage of a one-party system even while maintaining the external forms of competitive democracy. Clearly each of these states must have demanded quite different qualities in its citizens, yet a number of them have rather impressive records of performance as distinctly modern societies.

In the face of these facts, we can hardly insist that the qualities which most characterize the democratic man are necessarily the best, certainly not those which exclusively suit one for life in the political structure of a modern society, at least not so long as we acknowledge the modernity of Russia, Japan, and Germany.[5] Nevertheless, we should not overlook the possibility that the political systems of

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[2] A brief description of this model appears in Alex Inkeles, "The Modernization of Man," in M. Weiner (ed.), *Modernization* (New York: Basic Books, 1966). A full account is contained in Alex Inkeles, "A Model of the Modern Man," in Wm. A. Faunce and H. Garfinkel (eds.), *Cross-Cultural Research in Developing Areas* (East Lansing, and New York: Social Science Research Bureau and Free Press, (forthcoming).

[3] A preliminary report of these findings may be found in David H. Smith and A. Inkeles "The OM Scale, A Comparative Socio-Psychological Measure of Individual Modernity," *Sociometry*, 29 (1966), 353–377

[4] See Inkeles, "A Model of the Modern Man," *loc. cit.*

[5] We do not mean to ignore the substantial body of writing in which it has been argued that Russia, Germany, and Japan, while important examples of a modernizing tendency, have indeed not yet attained a "true" condition of modernity. To engage in that particular dialogue would take us far afield from our main task here. For further discussion see Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (eds.), *Political Modernization in Turkey and Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); and Robert Bellah (ed.), *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia* (New York: Free Press, 1965).

England, the United States, Soviet Russia, Communist China, Japan, and Mexico might all make certain common demands on their citizens. If we could discover such common requirements to exist despite the enormous differences in the formal structure of these political systems, we surely would be entitled to speak of these qualities as truly appropriate to the *modern* (as opposed to the democratic) citizen.

What modern polities otherwise as diverse as the U.S., the U.S.S.R., England, and Japan have in common is most easily grasped if we contrast them with the societies of Europe before the rise of the national state, or with great but uncentralized culture areas such as India before and in the early stages of British colonial rule, or with much of tribal Africa today. The contrast can perhaps best be summed up in the word *citizenship.*[6] Before the advent of the modern centralized state, the individual is a *member* of a family or tribe and he *belongs* to a community, but his identity as a person does not include his being a *citizen* of a nation. When, in such societies, there is a higher and even quite powerful central authority, some king or emperor, the individual may know himself as subject to the sovereign's control but this subjugation is much like his bowing to the wind and waves. In such settings the common man does not believe that he can remotely influence the policy to which he is subjected, let alone make it.[7]

The modern nation-state, democratic or dictatorial, multi- or single-party, guaranteeing private property or exercising state control of wealth, requires and encourages its subjects to adopt a different relation to the government. First and foremost, it wants a man to know not merely his local community, his tribe and family, but to be aware of and to identify with that larger community which is the nation as a whole. It is, furthermore, expected that this new *awareness* will be linked to a shift in *allegiance,* from the local and peripheral to the national and central authority. A man must be prepared to follow not only his father and his tribal chief, but also, and even before these others, his country's prime minister or president.[8] The modern government does not value a passive citizen, but rather an active one. He is expected to participate in the process of running the country. Even in dictatorial and totalitarian systems, which drastically limit the citizen's ability to influence policy in actuality, the state nevertheless attempts to create the illusion that it expresses the common will, and urges almost everyone to take some part in political acts even though they may be fully staged and orchestrated by the supreme leader.

The modern state seeks to organize, and where necessary, to mobilize all its citizens to attain national goals of economic development, of civic improvement, of defense or expansion. This requires frequent communication between the government and the citizen, and he is expected to take an active *interest* in public affairs and to keep *informed* about important events and decisions. Yet neither interest nor information alone can guarantee effective performance of the citizen role. The complexity of modern political life requires of the citizen some understanding of the larger processes of a system in which bureaucratic rule and impersonal criteria of judgment replace treatment based mainly on special personal qualities, on family ties or friendship and connections.[9] The modern polity is suffused with that peculiar bureaucratic rationality which Weber identified as particularly outstanding in the economic behavior of modern man.

Thus, on theoretical grounds, we identify a set of related traits we may call "participant citizenship." The syndrome includes: freedom from traditional authority or, stated positively, identification with and allegiance to leaders and organizations transcending the parochial and primordial; interest in public affairs validated by keeping informed and expressed through participation in civic action; and an orientation toward political and governmental processes which recognizes and accepts the necessity and desirability of a rational structure of rules and regulations. This syndrome is one any modern man might be expected to manifest, just as any modern polity is likely to desire, perhaps even require, that he possess it.

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[6] See T. H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1964).

[7] In this description we have condensed, and blended, elements of what Almond and Verba term the "parochial" and "subject" political cultures: Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), ch. 1.

[8] Lucian Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), identifies this problem of developing identification with and allegiance to the national state as the highest priority task of the developing nations.

[9] We are not unaware that pull and influence, family connections and bribery, are common enough in modern states, including and perhaps even especially, in the more democratic ones. But we believe it correct to assert that *expectation,* and the formal system of *values,* in the modern polity run very much counter to such behavior. Whether or not corruption is in fact less common in modern polities, which we believe it to be, would be difficult to establish beyond peradventure.

Those familiar with *The Civic Culture* will recognize these traits as very similar to those delineated by Almond and Verba as defining the model of a democratic citizen. According to them the citizen of a democratic polity is expected to take an interest in politics, engage in political discussion, participate by voting and other actions, have knowledge of politics, and express a general sense of competence to influence the government; in sum, to stress "activity, involvement, rationality." I quite agree that these are the qualities appropriate to and expected in the citizen of a democracy. But I hold that exactly the same qualities are appropriate to, and expected of, the citizen of a one-party dictatorship such as that found in the Soviet Union! The difference in what is expected of a citizen of a democracy as against one in an extremist or totalitarian regime lies not in the qualities designated above, but along quite different dimensions. I have elsewhere delineated the non-democratic syndrome as including: "exaggerated faith in powerful leaders and insistence on absolute obedience to them; hatred of outsiders and deviates; excessive projection of guilt and hostility; suspicion and distrust of others; dogmatism and rigidity."[10] Any, indeed all, of these qualities which are common in the non-democratic personality can quite easily be combined with any or all of the qualities which Almond and Verba defined as the characteristics of the democratic citizen. It seems, therefore, that Almond and Verba have labeled as specifically "democratic" something which is a more general requirement placed upon the citizen of a modern polity, whether democratic or otherwise.

By stressing those qualities which a Soviet, an American, a Japanese or a British citizen should have in common, we inevitably gloss over differences which are enormously important if one is interested not so much in the forms of politics as in its content, not so much in action as in values. Voting is a political act equally encouraged in the Soviet Union and the United States, but we consider it to be a purely symbolic gesture in Russia whereas we consider it an action of substantial consequence in America. A man may take an interest in politics and keep well informed, but he may nevertheless judge his government's action inadequate or even evil. Someone who joins a mob screaming for the head of the prime minister engages in a political act no less than one who dutifully salutes as he marches past the minister's grandstand in the independence day parade. We must then recognize the *evaluative* and *judgmental* element of the individual's confrontation with the state as a potentially independent component of his total political role. To be interested is not to approve. To act is not to acquiesce. A man's judgment of his governmental system may be as negative as his understanding of it is complete. He may very much feel himself to be a good citizen, but be deeply offended by the behavior of others he considers either bad citizens or unworthy of citizenship altogether. We touch here on the familiar themes of radicalism or rejection of the political system, and of apathy and alienation, or withdrawal from politics.

Although we can perhaps get ready assent to the hypothesis that the elements of participant citizenship constitute a syndrome of intimately related political orientations, the case for an underlying common dimension is not so obvious when we enter the evaluative realm. Radical rejection of one's political system perhaps assumes hostility to those in power, but a man who joined a revolutionary party might feel quite benign toward most other groups working in the political arena. A person may feel that the particular politicians now in office are a bad lot who are not doing their job of serving the public interest, but he may nonetheless consider the governmental *system* under which he lives the very best there is requiring not the slightest change in *basic* structure.

To some this line of argument will seem specious. In common experience men who want revolutionary change in the structure of government also hate those identified with the system they want changed. Communists are generally hostile not only towards capitalists, but towards their competitor socialists as well. Those who suffer from profound anomie seem to express rather general hatred, and those who hate usually want basic changes. Experience is here supported by systematic research, at least in the United States, which shows that alienation is a general syndrome. Those tainted by it reflect this basic orientation in all aspects of their political life. Such alienation, furthermore, is apparently strongly correlated with the holding of extremist views about the structure of the political system.[11] Alienation, hostility, and radicalism might then also be a syndrome of intimately linked modes of relating to the political order, so that someone markedly characterized by one trait in the set would be so on the others as well.

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[10] See Alex Inkeles, "National Character and Modern Political Systems" in Francis L. K. Hsu (ed.), *Psychological Anthropology: Approaches to Culture and Personality* (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1961).

One may, indeed, take the even more extreme position of arguing that both participant citizenship and political benignity generally go together. A case can certainly be made for the idea that the complex functioning of a modern political system requires that citizens be not only active and interested, but that they show tolerance for the other participants and have reasonable respect for those who are trying to run the government. Quite apart from what the political system may "require," one can argue persuasively on purely psychological grounds that a person who is informed, active, interested, and rational about politics is more likely to also be tolerant of politicians, to harbor friendly rather than hostile feelings towards other major groups in the society, and perhaps even to take a more positive view of the political system at large.

Faced by these competing theoretical positions, we adopted the narrower definition of the modern political man as the more or less official standard for our project. We were, on the whole, convinced that the same forces which act to make a man modern in other ways should also influence his attitudes toward political life and the style of his political participation. Nevertheless, we were not prepared to argue that political modernity is all of a piece. It seemed highly likely that active citizenship is indeed a cohesive syndrome of related characteristics. We were, however, less certain that alienation, resentment of the inadequacy of the polity to produce what is expected of it, and hostility to other groups in society also forms a separate cohesive syndrome. Forced to decide, however, we predicted this subset of measures would also cohere as a common factor. Whether or not there is a separate "resentment syndrome,"[12] however, we were not prepared to say whether it or its components should or should not be systematically related to the active participation syndrome. To the extent that participant citizenship and political benignity empirically went together we would be encountering in nature the embodiment of that set of qualities Almond and Verba used to describe the citizen of the democratic polity, who, they say, has:

> a sense of identity . . . [in] a political community in which one trusts and can cooperate politically with one's fellow citizens, and in which one's attachment to the political system is deep and effective. (503)

These theoretical concerns, approached within the limits set by the nature of the larger study, helped to define the set of four tasks which we assigned ourselves in undertaking the empirical analysis of our data on citizenship attitudes and behavior.

### II. EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE THEORY

The first step in our analysis was to ascertain how far the concepts which had been used extensively to measure political orientations in more developed countries were meaningful in the study of our samples of the common man in six underdeveloped nations. In designing our questionnaire we conceived of the political realm broadly, and included questions to assess attitudes towards citizenship obligations, identification with the nation-state, and the degree and forms of the individual's participation in politics. We also included numerous questions to measure political information, to require people to evaluate the effectiveness of their government, to test the degree of their interest in politics, and to measure the amount of hostility they felt for other groups in the society. Altogether our core questionnaire included 33 items measuring attitudes and behavior relevant to politics, broadly conceived, which had been asked in more or less the same way in all six countries. Restricting ourselves to this set of core questions greatly facilitated cross-national comparisons.[13]

This core set of questions was grouped in what we conceived as a set of scale areas, topics or themes. The original design of the questionnaire suggested the broad outlines for this grouping,[14] but we later adapted the arrangement in consideration of the theoretical issues raised above. The list of questions, each in necessarily abbreviated form, is presented in Exhibit A (see below), grouped under the relevant scale headings. After the items were thus grouped on the basis of theory and "face validity," they were obliged to pass an empirical test of coherence. The resultant scales were as follows:[15]

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[11] H. McClosky and J. Schaar, "Psychological Dimensions of Anomie," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (1965), 14–39; H. McClosky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation," in J. N. Rosenau (ed.), *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

[12] We borrow here from the essay of Max Scheler, *Ressentiment* (New York: Free Press, 1961), in which he describes a psycho-political syndrome having the characteristics we have sketched above.

[13] The core set initially contained 39 questions, but local circumstances dictated the omission of certain items in some countries—3 in Pakistan, 2 in Argentina, and 1 in Israel. In Chile, Argentina, and Israel, in which time-pressure was less severe and the field directors felt greater freedom to touch on sensitive political issues, these 39 core questions were supplimented by others of local interest, up to a total of 54. Those additional questions are not considered in this report.

*Identification and allegiance:* to test the individual's identification of himself as a political personage, as a citizen rather than someone limited to primordial ties, and to probe how far he would go in following national or modern, rather than purely local or parochial, leadership in case he received competing advice.

*Interest in polictics:* to assess the extent of a man's interest in political rather than purely personal, familial, or parochial matters as judged by what he most follows in the news, is able to say about the problems facing his nation, and talks about with his wife.

*Political information:* to gauge the extent of a man's knowledge of international and national political figures and his ability to identify major world capitals. We hoped thereby to see how far expressed interest is translated into effective knowledge.

*Participation in civic affairs:* to measure whether a man actually joins civic organizations, contacts government officials or politicians, and is prepared to take active measures to oppose a government regulation he considers unfair.

*Political rationality:* to use the term rational here may assume too much, especially since we mean its opposite to be not necessarily irrational, but rather "particularistic," i.e., action outside the pattern of the formal rules usually pertaining in a modern bureaucracy or polity. In any event, we included here the belief that a government should sooner grant a petition to the man with the *right* to it by law rather than to a man more needy or influential; that education more qualifies a man to hold public office than do illustrious origins or charismatic personality; and that the country would benefit more from a good government plan or hard work by people than from prayer or good luck.

*Political anomie:* The concept of anomie has become one of the most widely used, and some would say abused, in contemporary political sociology. To add to the confusion it is often used interchangeably with the equally popular concept of alienation.[16] As originally used by Durkheim, anomie applied mainly to the social order, indicating a general condition of normlessness or failure of individuals to agree on and to follow the rules of society. It has since been widely used to designate a condition of the individual, either as himself not knowing or following the rules, or as *feeling* that others are not complying. We use it in the latter sense, and restrict its application to the individual's *perception* of the extent to which politicians and government officials pay attention to the common man, serve the public rather than their own careers, and keep their campaign promises after the election. Those individuals who see the politicians as failing in these obligations we define as having feelings of political anomie. Those who perceived politicans and government officials as fulfilling their obligations we score as non-anomic.

*Evaluation of government effectiveness:* we address ourselves here to judgments about how good a job the government is doing, what Almond and Verba would call the "output" side of government activity. We limited our study to judgments about the opportunities available to the common man, asking whether they were increasing or decreasing so far as concerned his chances to improve his economic condition, to get attention from the government, and to secure an education for his

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[14] Along with a number, all items in our questionnaire bore letters which were codes designating the content or topic of the question. Those coded ID dealt with national identification; AC with "action in politics"; CI with citizenship; PA with "particularism," and so on.

[15] The individual's score on each sub-scale ranged from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 2. This followed from the fact that each item was dichotomized as closely as possible to the median in each country, with a score of 2 assigned to the "modern" answer, 1 to the "traditional." Averaging by the number of items in the scale kept the range of the several scale scores uniform regardless of the number of items in the scale. To simplify reading the score results, we adopted the convention of treating scores of 1.00 as equal to 0 and 2.00 as equal to 100, enabling us to express individual scores on the common scale of 0–100.

[16] Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (1959), 783–791. For discussion of findings, see H. McClosky and J. Schaar, *op. cit.;* Arthur G. Neal and S. Rettig, "Dimensions of Alienation Among Manual and Non-Manual Workers," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (1963), 599–608.

**EXHIBIT A**

| Scale | Items Included | | Possible Responses | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Identity Primal* | *Identity Political* |
| Allegiance[1] | CI-7 | Whose advice would you more follow? | Church | Government |
| | CI-8 | Whose advice would you more follow? | Friend | Political party |
| | CI-9 | Whose advice would you more follow? | Father/Grandfather | Trade Union |
| | | | *Low Interest* | *High Interest* |
| Interest in Politics | MM-10, 11 | Which news interests you most? | Sports/Religion | World/National/Local |
| | GO-2 | What are your country's main problems? | Few problems | Many problems |
| | WR-4 | Do you discuss politics with your wife? | Never | Often |
| | | | *Uninformed* | *Informed* |
| Political Information | IN-1 | Who is Lyndon B. Johnson?[2] | Incorrect | Correct |
| | IN-2 | Who is Nehru? | Incorrect | Correct |
| | IN-3 | Who is . . . (national political figure)? | Incorrect | Correct |
| | IN-4 | Who is . . . (national political figure)? | Incorrect | Correct |
| | IN-6 | Where is Washington?[3] | Incorrect | Correct |
| | IN-7 | Where is Moscow? | Incorrect | Correct |
| | | | *Non-Participant* | *Participant* |
| Participation in Civic Affairs[4] | AC-3 | How many political organizations you belong to? | Few | Many |
| | AC-4 | Ever written to government about public issues? | Never | Many times |
| | AC-6 | Ever gotten concerned about a public issue? | Never | Many times |
| | CI-2 | What would you do about an anti-local proposal? | Nothing | Take political action |
| | | | *Traditional* | *Rule Oriented* |
| Political Rationality | CI-13 | What is important to occupy high public office? | Popularity/Family/ Tradition | Education |
| | CI-14 | Who should the government grant a petition to? | Friend/Needy person | Man with legal right |
| | EF-11 | What's most important for your country's future? | Help of God/Luck | Gov't plan/People's work |
| | | | *Anomic* | *Non-Anomic* |
| Political Anomie[5] | CI-10 | Do politicians pay attention to ordinary people? | No | Yes |
| | CI-11 | Who are politicians interested in serving? | Themselves | The public |
| | CI-12 | Do you trust politicians' speeches? | No | Yes |
| | | | *Allienated* | *Non-Alienated* |
| Evaluation of Government Effectiveness | CH-8 | Are opportunities for poor man to improve his economic condition | Decreasing | Remaining the same/ Increasing |
| | CH-9 | Are opportunities for young man to get educated | Decreasing | Increasing |
| | CH-12 | Is governmental consideration of the ordinary man's opinions[6] | Decreasing | Increasing |
| | | | *Hostile* | *Non-Hostile* |
| Group Hostility | CI-3 | Do factory owners[7] do . . . ? | Harm | Good |
| | CI-4 | Do unions[8] do . . . ? | Harm | Good |
| | CI-5 | Do foreign capitalists[9] do . . . ? | Harm | Good |

[1] For the National Identification and Allegiance scale, ID-2: "Would you sooner follow the advice of a local or national leader?" replaced CI-9 in Nigeria and CI-8 in India.

[2] In Pakistan and India, John F. Kennedy's name was substituted for Johnson's; in Nigeria, respondents were asked to identify Charles de Gaulle.

[3] In India, New York was used instead of Washington.

[4] In Argentina, AC-3 was omitted from the Participation scale.

[5] There is no Political Anomie scale for Pakistan.

[6] CH-12 for Argentina was slightly different: "Is political participation of the ordinary man decreasing or increasing?"

[7] Cultivators were asked if land owners did harm or good.

[8] In Pakistan and India, "businessmen" was substituted for "unions;" in Nigeria, the group used was "the Ibo people."

[9] In India and Pakistan, "government officers" was substituted for "foreign capitalists;" in Israel "extreme left parties" was used; and in Nigeria, the group used was the "Northern People's Congress."

children. Our emphasis thus accords with that of Lloyd Fallers, who argues that the politics characteristic of modern society tends toward egalitarianism.[17]

We scored as non-alienated those who manifested high expectation of vigorous government intervention to increase the opportunities for individual improvement. Insofar as our respondents saw little evidence of change toward increasing opportunity, we classified them as critical of the government's effectiveness (or "alienated").

*Group hostility:* In their analysis of the civic culture, Almond and Verba point to social trust, a sense of identity with one's fellow citizens and a feeling one can co-operate with them, as an essential ingredient for an effective democratic polity; and they note it may be

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[17] Lloyd Fallers, "Equality, Modernity, and Democracy in the New States," in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 204–205.

especially lacking in the new nations.[18] Class antagonisms, and ethnic or racial cleavages are, of course, not unknown in highly developed and stable societies. Nevertheless, we may argue that a high level of personal antagonism against other groups is likely to disrupt the political process, and render difficult or even impossible the complex cooperation between the different segments of society required by the modern polity. A substantial amount of trust in the probity and goodwill of other groups is essential for the common undertaking of running a political system of the modern type. In the absence of such trust, solutions will likely be sought outside the regular channels of politics, often in ways disruptive or even destructive of the political system itself.

To measure the propensity to hostility we identified target groups such as industrialists, traders, trade-unions, the military and various ethnic minorities, and asked our interviewees whether they considered these groups to be harmful, beneficial, or neither to the interests of our respondents. The tendency to see such groups as harmful we scored as indicating a high level of inter-group hostility. Such hostility might, in turn, be considered inimical to the effective performance of one's citizenship role in a modern polity.

On the whole, the questions we asked in the political realm seemed to be understood by our respondents as well as most others we asked, and created no special strain in the interview.[19] The eight scales we developed rest on well grounded theory. Examination of the items on which they are based (see Exhibit A) indicates they have substantial face validity; and they pass a reasonably strict test with regard to coherence as scales.[20] Within the limits indicated by these statistical tests, we can say that concepts which had been fashioned for the study of political orientations in more developed countries provide a meaningful basis for measurement of the political attitudes, values, and action of the common man in underdeveloped countries.

Insofar as the scales in our set have substantial theoretical face validity, and further meet a reasonable test of cohering empirically, they provide the means for answering our second major question: How far is it true that the set of attitudes and values which, on theoretical grounds, we identified as representing the model or ideal of the participant citizen, actually exists in nature as an empirically coherent syndrome? There were, of course, various methods we could have followed in seeking an answer to this question. We chose to approach it by considering the pattern of inter-relations among the scales. Guided by the theoretical considerations stated at the beginning of this article, we decided to test first the existence of the syndrome of active citizenship, excluding those scales which we considered to be judgmental or evaluative—i.e. the scales of anomie, governmental effectiveness, and hostility. Proceeding in this way did not foreclose the option of adding these evaluative scales to the first set, assuming that set itself met the test of coherence as a general measure of participant citizenship.

To ascertain the existence of a general syndrome of participant citizenship, we then explored the inter-relations, country by country, of five scales: those of allegiance, interest, information, civic participation, and rationality.[21] The relevant data are given in Table 1. There is no absolute basis for judging the coherence of a set of scales, but we interpret the facts as clear evidence that the five scale areas are indeed strongly related and indicate the existence of a general trait or syndrome of active citizenship. Certain of the scales do seem

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[18] Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, Ch. 15, esp. pp. 497–505.

[19] This refers only to the questions tapping general orientations towards political participation. Questions about which party they favored, or which candidate they supported, or what specific changes should be made in the government, were considered so delicate that we decided against even asking them in Pakistan. When they were asked in other countries, such questions did sometimes lead to refusal to answer and in other ways lessened rapport with the interviewee.

[20] Tastes and standards will, of course, vary, as to what strength of relationship between the items is required before one will accept a set of items as constituting a scale. We adopted as a rule of thumb that the average item-to-item correlations should be significant at least at the .05 level in at least four of the six countries. The most widely accepted standard of the quality of a scale is the measure of its reliability. Using the Spearman-Brown formula for the eight scales in six countries, we obtained a range of reliabilities from .600 to .906, with a mean of .707 and a median of .698.

[21] A second alternative would be to construct a summary scale based directly on the items making up the several sub-scales. This has been done, with results reported in footnote 25 below. A third alternative would be factor analysis of either the sub-scales or the original questions. This has not yet been done.

TABLE 1. INTERCORRELATIONS† OF THE 5 SUB-SCALES OF ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP: BY COUNTRY

ARGENTINA (N = 820)

| | | Allegiance | Interest | Information | Participation | Rationality | Active Citizenship |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CHILE (N = 930) | Allegiance | | .08* | .12** | .05 | .08* | .47** |
| | Interest | .10** | | .27** | .17** | .11** | .61** |
| | Information | .05 | .33** | | .23** | .24** | .70** |
| | Participation | .09** | .32** | .37** | | .03 | .52** |
| | Rationality | .10** | .13** | .33** | .14** | | .48** |
| | Active Citizenship | .47** | .62** | .70** | .59** | .56** | |

INDIA (N = 1300)

| | | Allegiance | Interest | Information | Participation | Rationality | Active Citizenship |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ISRAEL (N = 740) | Allegiance | | .21** | .24** | .18** | .24** | .60** |
| | Interest | .10* | | .37** | .27** | .21** | .62** |
| | Information | .13** | .27** | | .19** | .39** | .75** |
| | Participation | .15** | .28** | .25** | | .15** | .53** |
| | Rationality | .22** | .15** | .13** | .08* | | .63** |
| | Active Citizenship | .59** | .61** | .61** | .58** | .56** | |

NIGERIA (N = 720)

| | | Allegiance | Interest | Information | Participation | Rationality | Active Citizenship |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EAST PAKISTAN (N = 1000) | Allegiance | | .15** | .07* | .07* | .10** | .49** |
| | Interest | .22** | | .22** | .39** | .13** | .63** |
| | Information | .15** | .29** | | .27** | .27** | .64** |
| | Participation | .13** | .22** | .36** | | .11** | .60** |
| | Rationality | .20** | .08** | .12** | .05 | | .55** |
| | Active Citizenship | .60** | .64** | .66** | .58** | .46** | |

† Correlations followed by * are significant at the .05 level; those followed by ** at the .01 level or better.

rather weakly related to the others in some countries, for example the allegiance scale in Chile, Argentina, and Nigeria. On the whole, however, there is evidence here of a strong set of inter-relations.[22] In no case is the correlation sign negative, and this pattern is maintained in all six countries without even the approximation of an exception. The coherence of the entire set of scales is further attested to by their individually high correlations with a summary scale based on the individuals' score on each of the five sub-scales identified in Table 1 as Active Citizenship.[23]

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[22] The statistical tests of significance used in Table 1 and at later points in this paper assume a random sample. Ours are in fact cluster samples selected according to the dictates of our research design. Within those limits we sometimes have not so much a sample as the entire eligible population. In other cases we have taken our subjects as we found them, and in yet other instances drew them at random from a defined population. Given the nature of our "samples" we consider the test of significance based on the assumption of random sampling to be a conservative one, although this might be challenged in some instances. In any event, no single statistic presented here should be considered as having major or minor weight on the sole basis of the test of significance attached to it. We have used the tests of significance in order to have some general standard which could be applied as an aid in interpreting the statistics presented. The tests of significance given should not be interpreted too literally. They should rather be taken as a rough criterion which permits only a very proximate estimate of the confidence limits of the statistics presented. Most weight should be given

As theory indicated, there is clearly a general syndrome of individual psycho-political traits whose coherence can be established empirically. The man who is informed about politics is also more likely to identify with the national state in competition with local leaders, to take an interest in political affairs, to participate actively in civic matters, and to support the use of more rational rules impersonally applied as a basis for running governmental affairs. This set of attributes is not only theoretically consistent but now must be acknowledged to be empirically coherent as well. Such empirical coherence is generally expressed statistically by reference to a scale's "reliability." The reliability, country by country, of the summary scale based on the five sub-scales is quite respectable.[24] As an alternative we constructed the summary scale using the individual questions composing the five sub-scales as one undifferentiated pool of items. The resultant scale yielded even higher reliabilities.[25] All the evidence, therefore, supports the assertion that there definitely exists a general personal trait which may reasonably be called "active" or "participant citizenship."[26]

Having established the less problematic fact that participant citizenship is an internally consistent congeries of attitudes and values, we may turn to our second question, and inquire how far the *evaluative* and *judgmental* component of political orientations is consistently related to this activist syndrome. The evidence in Table 2 obliges us to give a negative answer. The participant citizen is not also consistently non-anomic, non-hostile, and satisfied with the performance of his government. Rather, we must say, "it depends" on the country—and no doubt on the segment of the population being studied, as well.

In India, for example, the citizenship scale is negatively correlated with that indicating a critical judgment of the government's effectiveness, but positively correlated with hostile views of other groups and bad opinions about politicians. In other countries a particular evaluative scale will be positively associated with some of the sub-scales, and negatively with others. Most serious, the pattern of association between the summary citizenship index and the evaluative scales is not the same in all the countries. Only in East Pakistan does the observed pattern support the unitary conception of the modern political man. There, those who are active citizens are also consistently more benevolent toward other groups and more satisfied with the government's performance. In India and Nigeria, on the other hand, those who score high on participant citizenship are more often anomic and hostile, and in Nigeria they are dissatisfied with the government's performance as well. In general, however, there is no consistent pattern of relationship between the evaluative scales and the measures of active citizenship.[27] The pat-

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to the pattern of results across a variety of measures and across the set of six countries.

[23] The individual's score on this summary scale was the mean of his score on each of the five sub-scales. From this it follows that in the summary scale each sub-scale carries the same weight, i.e., one-fifth, regardless of the number of questions on which the sub-scale is based. But the fact that only five units are included in computing the summary score also contributes to the high correlations shown in Table 1 between the citizenship and each of the sub-scales. Those correlations are each, in part, auto-correlations. The correlations of each sub-scale to the summary scale constructed to exclude the given sub-scale would be substantially lower.

[24] Using the Spearman-Brown formula, the summary scale yielded the following reliabilities: Argentina .690; Chile .722; India .746; Israel .724; Nigeria .721; Pakistan .724.

[25] The reliabilities thus obtained ranged from .760 to .794 when computed by the Spearman-Brown formula. Using the Kuder-Richardson formula the reliabilities ranged from .693 to .735. These reliabilities are in the same range as are those for scales of comparable length dealing with political attitudes in the United States. Thurstone's Patriotism Scale, for example, yielded reliabilities ranging from .69 to .83. Some others have done better, but generally only with college student populations who are more consistent than our less well educated respondents can be expected to be. See Marvin Shaw and Jack Wright, *Scales for the Measurement of Attitudes*, New York: McGraw-Hill, Co., 1967, esp. pp. 193–229, 301–329.

[26] As indicated above, the evidence from a factor analysis is not yet available. However, it seems reasonably apparent from the pattern of inter-correlations in Table 1 that a factor analysis would confirm the existence of the basic underlying syndrome of participant citizenship.

[27] This inconsistency is not maintained when we consider only the relation of the evaluative scales to one another. In all six countries the scales of anomie, alienation, and negativism toward government effectiveness correlate quite

TABLE 2. CORRELATIONS† OF 3 EVALUATION SCALES TO THE SCALE OF ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP AND ITS SUB-SCALES

ARGENTINA (N = 820)

| | Anomie | Government Effectiveness | Group Hostility |
|---|---|---|---|
| Allegiance | −.02 | .02 | −.03 |
| Interest | .01 | .05 | −.04 |
| Information | .05 | −.01 | −.05 |
| Participation | −.01 | −.06 | −.02 |
| Rationality | −.06 | −.04 | −.06 |
| Citizenship | −.01 | −.01 | −.08* |

CHILE (N = 930)

| | Anomie | Government Effectiveness | Group Hostility |
|---|---|---|---|
| Allegiance | −.17** | −.02 | .02 |
| Interest | −.08* | .00 | .04 |
| Information | .00 | −.02 | −.02 |
| Participation | −.06 | .03 | .05 |
| Rationality | −.05 | −.08* | −.07* |
| Citizenship | −.12** | −.03 | .00 |

INDIA (N = 1300)

| | Anomie | Government Effectiveness | Group Hostility |
|---|---|---|---|
| Allegiance | .07** | −.05 | .06* |
| Interest | .08** | −.10** | .05 |
| Information | .26** | −.05 | .19** |
| Participation | .03 | −.08** | .02 |
| Rationality | −.01 | −.14** | .00 |
| Citizenship | .15** | −.13** | .11** |

ISRAEL (N = 740)

| | Anomie | Government Effectiveness | Group Hostility |
|---|---|---|---|
| Allegiance | −.04 | .03 | −.04 |
| Interest | −.02 | −.03 | −.02 |
| Information | .01 | −.03 | .08* |
| Participation | −.07 | .04 | .04 |
| Rationality | .01 | −.06 | −.09* |
| Citizenship | −.04 | −.02 | −.02 |

NIGERIA (N = 720)

| | Anomie | Government Effectiveness | Group Hostility |
|---|---|---|---|
| Allegiance | −.04 | −.04 | −.03 |
| Interest | .02 | .06 | .03 |
| Information | .19** | .10** | −.01 |
| Participation | .08* | .08* | .07 |
| Rationality | .03 | −.03 | −.04 |
| Citizenship | .10** | .06 | .01 |

EAST PAKISTAN (N = 1000)

| | Anomie | Government Effectiveness | Group Hostility |
|---|---|---|---|
| Allegiance | Omitted | −.15** | −.03 |
| Interest | | −.09** | −.08* |
| Information | | −.07* | −.08** |
| Participation | | −.08* | −.07* |
| Rationality | | −.01 | −.07* |
| Citizenship | | −.14** | −.11** |

† Correlations followed by * are significant at the .05 level; those followed by ** at the .01 level or better.

tern is unclear and the associations weak. Only an analysis which took account of the special conditions in each country could do justice to this set of findings.

How one *judges* the political process clearly depends not only on one's psychological disposition to participant citizenship, but is much influenced by the actual situation and policies of one's government. This conclusion is certainly not startling, and most may consider it obvious. It is nevertheless important to put the presumably obvious to an empirical test.[28] We must recognize, furthermore, that these facts have by no means been obvious to everyone. In discussion of the politics of developing countries one often finds that strident demands, hostility toward the government, political strikes and other forms of unrest are cited as evidence of the lack of political "maturity" or the dearth of good citizenship in the new nations. These analyses run together what our study prove to be two quite distinct elements

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significantly, and appear to form a coherent "resentment" syndrome. The relation of this syndrome to the scale of participant citizenship is, however, again different in India and Nigeria from other countries, and throughout the relationship is weak.

[28] We will, later, see that some things which most everyone assumes to be obviously powerful causes of individual modernization nevertheless prove to be embarrassingly ineffective.

of the political orientation of those in developing countries. Good citizens are not necessarily happy, approving, or satisfied. In some countries the men who are informed, interested, and fully participant in the political process may also be alienated, anomic, and hostile. In some settings those manifesting such disgruntlement may be mainly expressing deep-seated personality tendencies, but in other lands they are making objective judgments perfectly consistent with their expectations as good citizens. Disgruntlement expressed in politics does not necessarily reflect a general personal tendency to anger and despair.

By contrast, it seems that the qualities of active citizenship are more general attributes, part of the individual personality, which will be manifested in much the same form regardless of the context of political action. Whether he disapproves or approves of what the government is doing, whether he feels friendly or hostile to other groups, the active citizen will keep informed, take an interest in public affairs, participate in public and civic organizations, and show preference for rational and orderly rules and regulations to govern political life. Participant citizenship is relatively "context-free," whereas the evaluative and judgmental orientations to politics cannot be understood outside of a specific setting. To understand them requires detailed contextual analysis, beyond the scope of this report.[29]

Since the five non-evaluative scales are so consistently related to each other, we will pursue the analysis of the sources of influence not separately for each element in the syndrome, but rather by using the summary scale. This composite, which we call the "active citizenship" index, has the virtue of being much broader in conception, and a more reliable measure than the individual scales. Its use greatly reduces the complexity of pursuing an analysis of five different scales through six different countries each of which is represented by several different occupational groups. Instead, each individual can be characterized by a single score, and he receives it on a measure which shows the widest possible variation from individual to individual within each national sample.[30]

## III. SOCIAL FACTORS FOSTERING ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP

In our larger study of modernization, we identified and measured almost 50 different social attributes of the individual, his social position, or his social setting which theory and/or earlier research had identified as likely to contribute to making a man more "modern." These ranged from characteristics acquired at birth, such as religion and ethnicity, through those developed in youth, such as education or village residence, to those relevant mainly to the adult, such as occupation or income. Since we thought of active citizenship as a component of the larger syndrome of individual modernity, there was every reason to relate the same set of independent variables used in studying the general syndrome to the scores individuals obtained on the index of participant citizenship.

The simplest way to test the relative strength of the different modernizing influences is through the correlations between the index of active citizenship and the independent variables. The data for a variety of such variables are given in Table 3. It is apparent that many factors have a substantial effect on the citizenship scale. Of our battery of independent variables, some 45 were applicable in at least 5 of the countries. Some half of these correlated with the citizenship index at the .01 level or above in four of the countries or more; sixteen had a perfect record, correlating at the .01 level or better in 5 of 5 or 6 of 6 tests. This is an impressive performance, both in general survey work and our experience with other scales in this study.[31] It clearly establishes the index of participant citizenship as a highly sensitive

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[29] In a separate set of reports on our research, we will explore these national differences in detail.

[30] Since, as noted above, the five sub-scales had each been scored from 0 to 100, the theoretical range on the summary scales was also 0 to 100. The range of the actual scores was as follows: Argentina 0–87; Chile 0–95; India 0–88; Israel 0–100; Nigeria 0–100; Pakistan 7–93. The scoring system for the sub-scales insured that each of them would produce a distribution very near the normal curve. In combining these five normal distributions, however, we could well have come out with a new distribution very far from the normal. In fact, the distribution of summary scores in each country was very close to normal. This could only have come about if the scores individuals received on any one sub-scale were in fact very similar to the scores they received on the other four scales, which further justifies our combining these five in one summary scale.

[31] We must acknowledge that not all these tests were truly independent. For example, the measures of total years in school, of performance on our literacy test, and the score on a vocabulary ("opposites") test were all highly inter-correlated and might be considered merely alternate, rather than independent, measures of intellectual capacity. Nevertheless, we feel our conclusion stands.

TABLE 3. CORRELATIONS[1] OF ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP SCALE WITH SELECTED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN SIX COUNTRIES

| Independent Variables: | Argentina | Chile | India | Israel | Nigeria | East Pakistan |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Education* | | | | | | |
| Formal Education | .46** | .42** | .69** | .37** | .42** | .42** |
| Opposites Test | .46** | .48** | .50** | .44** | .23** | .44** |
| *Mass Media* | | | | | | |
| Radio Listening | .15** | .25** | .30** | .12** | .25** | .25** |
| Mass Media Exposure | .36** | .44** | .51** | .38** | .36** | .31** |
| *Urbanism* | | | | | | |
| Years Urban Since 15 | .29** | .33** | .06** | n.d.[2] | .26** | .15** |
| Urbanity of Present Residence | .29** | .13** | .17** | n.d. | .19** | .05 |
| *Work Experience* | | | | | | |
| Occupational Sub-groups | .37** | .39** | .27** | .12** | n.d. | .27** |
| Total Time in Factory | .23** | .32** | .19** | .20** | .24** | .22** |
| Objective Skill (Coder Rated) | .23** | .25** | .29** | .20** | .13** | .17** |
| Number of Factories Worked in | .17** | .13** | .08* | .06 | .08* | .14** |
| *Factory Environment* | | | | | | |
| Factory Modernity | .07* | −.06 | n.d. | −.07 | .07 | .06 |
| Factory Size | .06 | −.07* | .17** | −.02 | .03 | −.06 |
| Factory Benefits | .08* | −.05 | .30** | .07 | .23** | .09* |
| *Standard of Living* | | | | | | |
| Consumer Goods Possessed | .30** | .30** | .38** | .19** | .35** | .29** |
| Income | .14** | .23** | .26** | .26** | .31** | .11** |
| *Personal Qualities* | | | | | | |
| Age | .08* | .17** | .05 | .12** | .19** | .09** |
| Perceived Modernity of Home-School | .05 | .14** | .18** | −.09* | −.04 | .05 |
| Perceived Modernity of Factory | .02 | .03 | −.16** | .03 | .09* | −.06 |
| Self-Rated Skill Level | .12** | .15** | n.d. | −.03 | .13** | .29** |
| Approximate Number of Cases[3] | 820 | 930 | 1300 | 740 | 720 | 1000 |

n.d. = no data.

[1] Correlations followed by * are significant at the .05 level; those followed by ** at the .01 level or better.

[2] Variable "Years Urban Since 15" for Israel is blank because the whole sample was of urban origin and our procedure was to code "Years Urban Since 15" only for respondents of rural origin.

[3] N's given are approximate. Some of the correlation coefficients are based on sub-samples due to disqualification of parts of the sample on certain questions, e.g. "Years Urban Since 15" is coded only for respondents of rural origin.

measure having substantial cross-national relevance.

Formal education is clearly the most consistently powerful influence represented in Table 3, never dropping below a coefficient of .37. Indeed, in India, in which there was the widest educational range of all the national samples, the correlation reaches the impressive level of .686. Other measures closely reflecting formal schooling, such as the opposites test, which serves as a kind of intelligence test, perform about as well as does the measure of education. Thus, our experience in these six developing countries is consistent with that of Almond and Verba, who noted in their five-nation study that "among the demographic variables usually investigated—sex, place of residence, occupation, income, age, and so on—

none compares with the educational variable in the extent to which it seems to determine political attitudes."[32]

In our case, however, we must temper the absoluteness of Almond and Verba's statement, since a number of other variables compete quite well with education in their apparent power to influence political attitudes.[33] The most vigorous competition is offered by the measure of mass media exposure. Contact with the mass media is much related to education, especially in the case of newspaper reading, but the measure used in Table 3 shows powerful connections for radio listening alone, which is not dependent on literacy. There is good reason to assume that extensive newspaper reading and radio listening would make a man better informed, more interested, and active in civic and political affairs. But in this case we have no way of demonstrating that the direction of influence is not the reverse, so that those with strong interest in civic affairs come to more often read newspapers and listen to the radio.

The argument of reverse influence cannot be applied so effectively, however, to urban experience, especially as measured by the years of city residence enjoyed by those who grew up in the country and came to the city after the age of 15. The greater intensity of political activity in urban areas, the increased accessibility of the individual to influence attempts, the heterogeneity of the groups represented in the cities and the obvious clash of their interest all should contribute to stimulate political interest and civic involvement. Note that the effect of urban experience seems very much less in Pakistan and India than in the other countries. In Argentina, Nigeria, and Chile, those who came from the countryside entered major urban and truly metropolitan centers of large size such as Santiago, Buenos Aires, and Lagos. In India, by contrast, the "urban" centers included in our study, such as Ranchi, were in fact quite modest provincial towns. In East Pakistan the migrants came to the capital, Dacca; but it too is, in fact, little more than a large provincial town as compared to a city like Calcutta. It would appear then, that the degree to which an urban center is truly cosmopolitan can play a role in the extent of the influence it exerts in making men modern.[34]

Of special theoretical interest to our project was the influence of occupational experience as a modernizing experience. We attached particular importance to the role of the factory as a kind of practical school in modern ways of thinking and arranging things. The correlation coefficients produced by the measure of occupational type—running from cultivator to highly experienced worker—and the more precise measure of total months of factory experience, prove to be among the largest in each country.

The other attributes of the factory, however, do not produce a large or consistent effect. The size of the factory, for example, has been discussed both by Kerr and Lipset as making for discontent and worker radicalism; but it does not seem to play an important or consistent role in inducing active citizenship.[35] Factory product (not shown) also failed to exert influence. The rated modernity of the factory, to which our project assigned substantial importance, appears to play only a very modest role and not a completely consistent one. This inconsistency is, however, less marked if we consider the worker's perception of it. Those factories which were reported by their workers to offer more benefits such as sick pay, lunch rooms, or family allowances were more consistently, and in Nigeria and India, quite noticeably, likely to produce workers with higher scores on the index of active citizenship. On the whole, then, we may assign to the qualities which make a factory modern some weight in citizenship training, while cautioning that this effect will not be manifested in all places. By contrast, the sheer amount of factory experience, of whatever kind, seems the more regular and powerful influence.

The findings in Table 3 we least anticipated are those which indicate that individuals with a high standard of living are more likely to be active citizens. Evidently those who earn more, possess more goods and live in better housing

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[32] *The Civic Culture*, p. 379.

[33] We realize, of course, that in itself a correlation coefficient is not proof of cause, but only of co-variation. Yet it also is evident that a man's current political attitudes could not have caused his educational level (except, of course, by affecting his recall of how much education he had had). The same case, although admittedly more vulnerable to challenge, may be made for other "objective" indices such as years of factory experience. It does not seem likely that most men enter and remain in factories because of their political attitudes.

[34] This theme is further pursued, with some surprising results, later in this paper.

[35] See Clark Kerr, *et al.*, *Industrialism and Industrial Man* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960); S. M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1960), esp. pp. 248–252.

(not shown) are decidedly more likely to keep informed and to participate more fully in civic affairs. It is often assumed that those most disadvantaged are likely to rush actively into the political arena seeking there to gain some advantage to offset that denied them in economic competition. Our data give no support to that theory.[36] On the contrary, they suggest that a man will not have the inclination or extra energy to take an interest in public life and participate in civic activity until he attains a reasonably decent standard of living.[37] Good citizenship is, then, a kind of luxury which can be "afforded" only by those who have secured a standard of living above the minimum required for mere survival. Of course, active citizens are no luxury, but rather a necessity for running a modern polity and the society which relies on it. The implication is clear. To leave men in a condition of poverty so extreme that they are outside politics, in effect non-citizens, is to create an apathetic mass which is not integrated in society and cannot be mobilized for the purposes of national growth and development. Furthermore, such individuals, to the extent that they feel themselves not sharing in the process of running their country and without rights or responsibilities, may constitute an unstable and even explosive force acting outside of, or against, the political system rather than within the framework established for the ordinary resolution of political differences.

To be completely candid we must weigh against this conclusion the fact that in the two countries in which we have a measure of political radicalism, namely Chile and Argentina, the feeling that the society and the economy need a "total and immediate change" is more common precisely among the groups who are good citizens and have experienced the most extensive contact with modernizing influences such as the school, the factory and the mass media.[38] The fact that the more modern men believe in basic changes, however, cannot be taken as evidence that they seek to effect these changes outside the framework of formal political action. After our study was completed, Chile had an extremely orderly election in which both the leading contenders campaigned on a platform calling for radical changes in the society. Although Argentina experienced substantial political instability after our study was completed, it was the military rather than the more advanced segments of the working class studied by us who made the revolution, overthrew the democratically elected government, and installed a junta to run the country.

The last set of variables in Table 3 which require our attention includes those which indicate the perceptual tendencies of the respondent—they reflect how he sees his world, and especially his place in it. These measures are important in enabling us to assess how far high scores on the citizenship index might be mainly a result of the tendency to take a rosy view of the world and the treatment one has received. Although there is evidence of some connection, it is not powerful, and is decidedly inconsistent. Since the citizenship scale requires passing an information test, it was unlikely that high scores could be obtained simply by "saying the right thing." Nevertheless, it is reassuring to find evidence that the active citizenship index apparently measures something more substantial than a mere "response propensity." Participant citizenship is not just talk.

## IV. THE FACTORY AND OTHER VARIABLES COMPARED

Many of the variables identified by the correlation coefficients as important in stimulating active citizenship are closely related to each other. This is true not only in obvious cases such as the two different measures of standard of living presented in Table 3. An individual's

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[36] Neither do numerous other studies, particularly those undertaken in the United States and Europe, which consistently show those less advantaged also to participate less in politics. See, for example, Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

[37] This point should be understood as applying to active citizenship as defined in this study, and not as necesarily applying to the evaluation of the government's performance, nor to the degree of individual commitment to the existing political system.

[38] The correlation of scores on the participant citizenship scale with radicalism was .269 in Argentina and .251 in Chile. The per cent scoring "high" on the radicalism scale in Argentina rose from 7 among those with 1–3 years of schooling to 39 for those with 8 years or more. In Chile among those with less than 6 months of factory experience only 29 per cent scored high on radicalism, whereas among those who had spent 10 years or more in factories the figure rose to 46 per cent. Expressed as correlations, the association of radicalism and exposure to modernizing institutions in Argentina was, for education .247, factory experience .167, mass media .187. In Chile the correlations were, respectively, .163, .113, .181. All were significant at the .01 level or beyond.

TABLE 4. PER CENT IN NIGERIA SCORING "HIGH"[1] ON PARTICIPANT CITIZENSHIP SCALE: BY EDUCATION, OCCUPATION, ORIGIN

| Occupation | Rural Origin Years Education | | Urban Origin Years Education | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1–7 | 8 | 1–7 | 8 | 8+ |
| Cultivator | 9*<br>(96) | 0<br>(4) | —<br>(0) | —<br>(0) | —<br>(0) |
| New Factory Worker[2] | 17<br>(30) | 50<br>(12) | 19<br>(27) | 39<br>(39) | —<br>(0) |
| Mid-Experienced Worker[2] | 18<br>(57) | 45<br>(49) | 25<br>(57) | 45<br>(103) | 82<br>(28) |
| High-Experienced Worker[2] | 67<br>(9) | 76<br>(21) | 36<br>(14) | 71<br>(5) | 82<br>(17) |

[1] Respondents falling in the upper third of the distribution of scores on the participant citizenship scale are considered "high;" their actual scores, out of a possible 100, were 56 or better.

[2] New workers had less than 7 months experience; mid-experienced had 2 to 8 years; high-experienced had been workers 8 years or more.

* The figures in parentheses show the number of cases on which the percentage is computed.

standard of living, in turn, is dependent in good part on his skill level, and both skill and earnings increase with time in the factory. Variables such as total time in the factory and urban experience are also highly correlated, because most factories are in the cities, and people had to leave their villages and come to the city to obtain industrial employment.

To disentangle these influences, one must turn to some form of multi-variate analysis, usually by applying "controls" to selected variables, while examining the effect of others. Table 4, taking Nigeria as representative, presents an array of such data with simultaneous controls for education, occupation, and rural origin. Education evidently maintains its influence, with one minor exception, within the occupational and origin groups. Factory experience also maintains its influence, but less systematically. The role of rural origin, however, becomes quite ambiguous when controls for education and factory experience are applied. By this tabular method, however, it is difficult to express the stability or instability of these influences through a simple composite metric. Furthermore, even when we control for as many as three variables, others in a battery as numerous as ours may be acting independently—but hidden from view—to give us a spurious impression of the power of any variable whose uncontaminated influence we wish to assess. One way to escalate the number of controls is by using "matched" groups of respondents. In each "match" one set of men is compared with another set chosen to be in all respects like the first set except for the match variable—on which they are chosen to be as different as possible. In the matches the critical variable is more precisely defined than is usual in the ordinary cross-tabulation procedure. More important, we gain because up to eight major variables were simultaneously controlled in the matching process.[39]

Table 5 presents the correlations which result when matched groups are considered in their relation to the active citizenship scale. In the first match the industrial workers are divided into those low and high in education. The next two matches test the effects of factory experience. The match between cultivators and experienced factory workers is, perhaps, the most appropriate to put in competition with the match on the extremes of education. The cultivator-worker match, however, could be influenced by selective recruitment, with politically more "modern" farmers dispro-

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[39] We also lose, however, because the matching process leaves us with very small numbers in the groups compared, and often selects a subset not truly representative of the larger group from which it is drawn. An alternative method would be multivariate regression analysis. This method, of course, presents still other peculiar difficulties. Nevertheless, we plan in a later publication to report the results of such an analysis.

TABLE 5. CORRELATIONS[1] OF SELECTED MATCHES WITH ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP SCALE: BY COUNTRY

| Line | Match Content[2] | Argentina | Chile | India | Israel | Nigeria | East Pakistan |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | Education:[3] Low vs. high | .57**<br>(10) | .40**<br>(21) | .56**<br>(52) | .39**<br>(35) | .57**<br>(20) | .35**<br>(50) |
| (2) | Cultivator vs. Experienced worker | .34**<br>(63) | .40**<br>(63) | .30**<br>(69) | n.d. | .48**<br>(21) | .28**<br>(176) |
| (3) | Factory experience: Few years vs. many | .23*<br>(44) | .27**<br>(71) | .19*<br>(80) | .16<br>(53) | .06<br>(62) | .16<br>(58) |
| (4) | Years urban: Few vs. many | −.11<br>(24) | −.15<br>(14) | .06<br>(40) | n.d. | .08<br>(24) | .02<br>(25) |
| (5) | Mass media: Low vs. high exposure | .19**<br>(143) | .24**<br>(147) | .20**<br>(94) | .19**<br>(97) | .19*<br>(90) | .13*<br>(124) |
| (6) | Cultivators vs. Urban non-industrials | n.d. | .49**<br>(24) | .11<br>(73) | −.18<br>(20) | .23*<br>(41) | .06<br>(96) |
| (7) | Urban non-industrials vs. Experienced workers | −.12<br>(33) | −.16*<br>(82) | .16<br>(29) | .08<br>(89) | .11<br>(36) | .11<br>(42) |
| (8) | Origin of workers: Rural vs. urban | n.d. | .15<br>(62) | n.d. | n.d. | .16<br>(53) | .29<br>(22) |

n.d. = no data.

[1] Correlations followed by * are significant at the .05 level; those followed by ** at the .01 level or better.

[2] The number of matched pairs on which each correlation coefficient is based is shown in the parentheses. For example, in Israel, the education match variable was created by giving 35 men with low education a score of 1 and assigning a score of 2 to 35 highly educated men of similar age, origin, skill and economic level and having the same amount of factory experience in factories of comparable size and modernity. This match variable was then correlated with the scores each man received on the participant citizenship scale. The resulting correlation coefficient, .392, is significant at the .01 level, indicating that active citizenship is in fact highly related to level of education.

[3] This match applies to factory workers only.

portionately drawn to city employment.[40] We, therefore, offer a third match in which both groups are already factory workers, and are divided by having been either few or many years in industry.

It is unambiguously the case that, with most everything else important under "control," education still has a powerful residual effect on active citizenship. The high zero-order correlations between education and citizenship which we earlier observed clearly did not result mainly from the incidental intercorrelation of education with other factors. In all six countries the education match produces resoundingly high correlations, which, despite the small sample size, are consistently significant at the .01 level or better.

Matches 2 and 3 show that even with education and other powerful variables controlled, factory experience also still has a substantial independent residual effect. Certainly, the relationship is neither so strong, nor so consistent, as that observed in the education matches. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that in itself the factory is, in significant degree, a school in citizenship, inculcating values of interest and active participation in the political process.

It is naturally tempting to take the difference in the size of the correlations for the education match as against the factory experience match as expressing the relative strength of the classroom versus the factory as "schools for politics." We must, however, urge extreme caution in comparing the relative size of these coefficients, since in a match the correlations are much affected by the size of the gap separating the high vs. low set.[41] To permit a less ambiguous comparison, we turn to another measure based on the matches but not relying on correlation coefficients. We may divide the *years* of experience in education or factory work separating high and low match groups by the number of *points* separating them on the scale of citizenship. The result indicates the number of points on the citizenship scale an individual gained on the average, for each year of additional schooling or factory work he experienced.[42]

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[40] This fear is, however, hypothetical rather than real. We have carefully matched cultivators with men of the same villages who had recently migrated but had not yet been much exposed to industrial life. The evidence is clear-cut that, at least in our six countries, the men who migrate are not self-selected on the basis of being more modern in attitude and spirit than those who remain behind.

[41] The education match might, for example, place in the "low" group men with 0–3 years and in the "high" group those with 8–10 years of schooling, resulting in a substantial gap of 5 years. Few of the high and low education group

In looking at the results, presented in Table 6, it should be kept in mind that the citizenship scale was scored so that individuals could get anything from 0 to 100. Evidently each year of additional schooling, on the average, enables a man to earn approximately 2½ more points towards a rating as a fully participant citizen. The impact of factory experience is much more modest, the gain being generally about 1¼ points per year. If the objective, therefore, is good citizenship, an investment in keeping people in school longer will apparently bring greater returns than an investment in keeping them employed in factories.

Nevertheless, it is striking that even with the effects of education and other variables rigorously controlled, the factory still has so definite, regular, and appreciable an effect. The factory evidently is a school for citizenship. It may work less efficiently, or more slowly, than does education, but it is effective in transforming attitudes, values, and behavior so as to make men more participant citizens. Since, in most cases, an adult's education is more or less terminal, the fact that factory work fosters the continued growth of citizenship values takes on added significance. It means that even in countries in which little formal education is attained by the average person, his schooling in citizenship can be continued informally through work in a factory. The marginal cost to society, furthermore, is nil. The entire gain in citizenship values, which would run 2½ per cent per year if we take 50 as a mean "starting point," is essentially a windfall profit.

TABLE 6. ANNUAL LOSS OR GAIN IN POINTS ON CITIZENSHIP SCALE: BY TYPE OF LIFE EXPERIENCE

| | Annual Point Gain Per Year of: | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Education[1] | Factory Work[2] | Urban Residence[3] |
| Argentina | 3.6 | 1.2 | −0.7 |
| Chile | 2.0 | 1.6 | −0.7 |
| India | 2.5 | 1.4 | 0.4 |
| Israel | 2.5 | 0.7 | n.d. |
| Nigeria | 3.5 | 1.5 | 0.6 |
| Pakistan | 2.2 | 1.2 | 0.1 |

n.d. = no data.

[1] Calculated on the basis of average gain in two matches: project match #35, comparing low vs. high educated factory workers, and match #34 comparing low vs. high educated cultivators.

[2] Calculated on the basis of the average gain in two matches: #4, comparing cultivators with experienced factory workers, and either match #63, 64 or 65 comparing different years of factory experience.

[3] Calculated on the basis of match #12 using UNI's and factory workers grouped as having "many" or "few" years urban experience.

There remains, however, the question raised earlier as to whether it is the factory or the town which is more truly the adult "school for citizenship." The matches permit us some resolution of the debate. First, how lasting are the effects of rural as against urban origin, at least for those who later leave the countryside and go on to industrial labor? We can answer the question for three countries. In each there is evidence of some long-term residual disability attached to rural origins, but in no case is the difference significant (line 8, Table 5). "Urban experience after 15" does not seem to be any more powerful in its influence on citizenship. When industrial workers and urban but nonindustrial workers (UNI's) are matched on all major variables except years of urban residence, the correlations with the citizenship scale are consistently low, and fail to attain significance in any country (line 4, Table 5). Furthermore, the two strongest associations are negative; that is, the score on the citizenship scale was ordinarily *less* for those with longer urban residence. The same impression is given by examining the points gained or lost on

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would then overlap in attitude, and a high correlation would result. If the factory work match succeeded in placing men in the "high" and "low" experience categories with only a two year gap, the overlap would be great and a lower correlation might be expected. Under such circumstances this lower correlation would not be correctly interpreted as showing that factory experience is a "weaker" variable than education.

[42] For example, in the educational match in Argentina the highly educated set had, on the average, six years more schooling than the low-educated. Their mean scores on the citizenship scale were 60 and 38, respectively. The mean difference of 22 points on the scale, divided by 7 for the year's difference in education, yields a point gain of 3.6 per year.

the scale per year of urban residence. The average change per year is very small where it is positive, and in Argentina and Chile the change is in the negative direction; that is, those longer in the city score lower on citizenship (Column 3, Table 6).

Under the circumstances, it is difficult to argue that it is the stimulation of urban life rather than his experience at work which makes the factory worker more fully a participant citizen. The seemingly substantial influence of urban experience which was earlier suggested by the zero-order correlations (in Table 3) evidently came about mainly because of the inter-relation of work experience and years of urban residence.[43] When matching controlled for the amount of factory work a man had, not much predictive power remained in the measure of years of urban experience.

The larger cosmopolitan centers, moreover, may be particularly counter-productive so far as concerns the inculcation of good citizenship. Thus, the match pitting the capital, Santiago, against the provincial city of Valdivia, produced a strong negative correlation of −.358, significant at above the .01 level. The mean score on the citizenship scale was 57 to 47 in favor of Valdivia. A comparable gap separated the Nigerian group in Lagos from those residing in Ibadan and other lesser cities and towns. Although Buenos Aires nosed out provincial Córdoba with mean scores of 45 to 41, respectively, the difference was not significant. Despite what we were tempted to conclude earlier, the city does *not* seem the place to learn participant citizenship, the *big* city least of all.[44]

If urbanism is not making the factory workers more active citizens, it presumably should not be having much impact on the urban non-industrials either. Since the UNI does not enjoy the experience of factory work as a school, he should have lower scores than the industrial worker of the same level of education. Cross-tabulations did not support this conclusion.[45] The matches permit a more precise check on this point.

Comparing lines 2 and 6 of Table 5 we see that factory work turns cultivators into good citizens more powerfully and more consistently than does work as a non-industrial. Nevertheless, we observe that non-industrial work does have the apparent capacity to change the cultivator into a more modern citizen. Indeed, in two of five countries the correlation reaches significant levels. When we pit the UNI's directly against the industrial workers, the latter do better in four of six countries, but not even at the .05 level of significance in any; and they do less well in Argentina and Chile, significantly so in the latter (line 7, Table 5).

To explain these facts in any depth would require a complex and detailed exposition, including an examination of the peculiarities of the urban non-industrial sample, which was unfortunately extremely variable from country to country. Such an exploration is not possible in this context. We therefore confine ourselves to acknowledging that in some countries, with some sets of urban non-industrials, either the peculiarities of their social or cultural origins or the conditions of their employment stimulate them to participant citizenship in degree equal to or greater than that of workers in industrial organizations. Of these factors, I believe it is mainly the UNI's extensive contact with the public, and their economic activity as petty entrepreneurs, which generates the heightened citizenship qualities of the taxi drivers, barbers, waiters, kiosk operators, and others who make up these sub-samples. Industry is a fine school for citizenship, but it is apparently not the only form of employment which may act in this way.

Although the matches knocked out urbanism as an independent determinant of participant citizenship, the mass media survive this severe test. Even with education, factory experience, and other powerful variables controlled, the mass media matches in *all* countries yield correlations with the citizenship scale significant at the .05 level and above (line 5, Table 5). The match does not, of course, resolve the ambiguity as to whether exposure to the mass media inculcates citizenship values, or whether those with an interest in politics look into the press and radio. No doubt the two tendencies act to reinforce each other.

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[43] For Argentina we have available a correlation of years of urban with years of factory experience for a sub-sample of factory workers only. The figure is very high: .78. Presumably the situation is much the same in the other countries.

[44] This conclusion is supported by an unpublished independent multi-variate analysis done by David Smith using the Overall Modernity Scale as dependent variable. He concludes: "The weakest of the six independent variable clusters we have been examining is urbanity. This is a very great surprise indeed. For all six countries the average regression weight of urbanity is .01; factory experience averages .05, objective skill level .07."

[45] For example, in Nigeria, among men of rural origin and low education, 18 per cent of both the UNI and the mid-experienced industrial workers scored "high" on citizenship. In Israel among the low educated, both occupational groups had about 21 per cent "high."

## V. SUMMARY

Our analysis of political orientations in the "common man" stratum of six developing countries yielded results which, on the whole, exceeded our expectations. There was reason to believe that purely local factors would loom so large as to make the pattern of attitudes in each country distinctive. We did, indeed, find that the evaluative component of political attitudes—as measured by our scales of anomie, group hostility, and alienation (or judgment of government effectiveness)—could not be fit to any pattern comparable for all six countries. We discovered, however, that another set of attitudes and behavioral tendencies, designated as the active or participant citizenship syndrome, cohered as a unified entity in much the same way in all the countries. This syndrome includes identification with or allegiance to supra-local and non-parochial public authority; interest in civic affairs; information about political figures; participation in public organizations; and adherence to rational organizational rules as a basis for running government affairs.

The syndrome is apparently inculcated as a result of certain life experiences. Of the early socialization influences, the amount of education a person enjoys seems the most powerful. Indeed, it emerges as one of the most important factors in stimulating active citizenship in competition with any other source of influence. From the distinctive point of view of our research project, however, it is notable that the experience of industrial work has considerable ability to inculcate the values and modes of behaving which go with active citizenship. Both of these determinants survived the very stringent test posed by our analysis with matched groups, although education comes through more powerfully and consistently than does factory experience. The results leave little doubt that these are both truly independent influences. Use of the mass media also qualifies as an independent force, although in this case it remains more ambiguous how far newspaper reading and radio listening are the "cause" and how far the "effect" of active citizenship. We also noted that a decent standard of living seems a necessary precondition to be met before a man will expend the extra energy required for full participation in civic life. Finally, it appears that certain personal qualities perhaps appropriately defined as personality traits, such as intelligence and a subjectively high estimate of one's skill and social standing, are also characteristic of those who manifest the syndrome of active citizenship. Unfortunately, using matches did not enable us to test how far either economic well-being or the tendency to see the world as benign are truly independent variables in their influence.

Education had previously been identified by many studies as a force making for fuller participation in the citizen role. That we confirm this finding in six developing countries, without exception, is gratifying but not startling. Our distinctive contribution, therefore, lies in establishing occupational experience, especially work in factories, as an independent source of influence. Since the general theory guiding our larger investigation into the sources of individual modernization gives special emphasis to the role of the factory as a "school for modernization,"[46] it is particularly gratifying to discover that industrial employment seems so effective in preparing men for more active participation in their role as citizens.

One might well have begun with the opposite prediction. The factory is organized hierarchically, and authority in it runs strictly along formal lines. Decisions are made not on the basis of consultation and vote, but on grounds of technical efficiency and position in the power hierarchy. Although the worker is expected to do his job as well as he can, it is a rare factory in which he is encouraged to feel a cooperative member of a larger community in whose affairs he takes an interest and in whose total efforts he is an active participant. The factory might, therefore, be seen as more likely to reinforce traditional habits and expectations in dealing with authority, rather than to stimulate a man to play a more modern citizenship role. But this conclusion assumes that the man entering the factory comes from an environment in which he already has experienced a good deal of centralized control, one in which the leader's power rests not merely on kinship or some related principle, but rather derives more formally by deputation from some higher, and presumably technically competent authority. This expectation will not be satisfied if the man comes from the typical village.

There may be a rough democracy in the traditional village, but it is also atomistically organized around more or less autonomous family units. This does not provide a focus for a sense of a community organized around a central authority. The factory might well, therefore, be an important way of schooling men in the acceptance of a central political authority not resting solely on the diffuse basis of kinship. The traditional small community has no general overarching goals, other than perhaps that of maintaining the peace which permits the family units to go about their own goals. The modern state, as a rule, has more definite collective goals and a national purpose. Here again the factory could well be a training ground in new values, since it has obvious goals of production, in the attainment of which every worker may see himself as a substantial contributor.

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[46] See Alex Inkeles, "The Modernization of Man," *op. cit.* Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 502, also believed that "the occupational changes that accompany industrialization . . . may increase the channels of (political) socialization." They did not, however, gather any evidence from their research to bear on the question.

To carry this line of reasoning a step further, we may see the factory as a school in rationality. A factory runs largely according to formal rules guided by impersonal technical norms. Its system of authority and rewards is intimately geared to a more or less objective and precisely graded hierarchy of technical skill which, in turn, rests on formal education. Such an environment might well, therefore, encourage men to carry over to the political realm the expectation that high position should rest on education and skill, and that people should be treated not according to their unique personal qualities or their intimate relation with authority, but rather by rule and according to their rights.

Beyond the influence of the factory we observed, but could not adequately explain, the fact that urban but non-industrial workers are also often surprisingly high on the citizenship scale. This might be thought to result from the effect of urban life. But our most striking finding is precisely that urbanism, despite its high zero-order correlation, fails to meet the test of being an independent school for citizenship. Neither urban origins, nor the number of years of urban experience after age 15, produce significant increases in active citizenship when other variables are controlled. This is confirmed by many special matches.[47] Indeed, it appears that the larger and more cosmopolitan the city, the less the frequency of active citizenship in the common-man stratum of society. These findings invite a host of speculations we cannot pursue in any detail here.[48] Urban centers in developing countries are very often poorly organized, and may be chaotic. The rate of population growth exceeds, often swamps, the capacity of the local authorities to provide essential services, let alone any of the amenities of urban living. Housing, in particular, is scarce, and shanty-towns arise everywhere with their odd structures arranged in a disorderly jumble expressing none of the rationality of urban planning. Social control often breaks down in communities of unrelated, often totally heterogeneous, populations drawn to the city from distant corners. These and related features of rapidly growing urban centers in developing countries put them at a marked disadvantage in competition with the factory as schools in modernization. Order, rationality, firm organization, effective technical competence, justice in the distribution of rewards and punishment, even intimate personal relatedness, are often much more common in the factory than in the urban milieu which houses it in developing countries.

Finally, we may note that when a number of the more effective determinants of active citizenship combine their influence, the result is a very sharp increase in the proportion who manifest that characteristic in "high" degree.[49] That is to say, impact of the determinants is apparently *cumulative*. In a group which is engaged in agriculture, has enjoyed few of the benefits of education, and is little exposed to the mass media, the proportion who score high on citizenship participation may be practically zero. In a more favored group, better educated, working in industry, and in regular contact with the mass media, the proportion showing a high level of active citizenship may rise to the point where it is the norm for the group.

In Chile, for example, only 3 per cent of the cultivators with low education scored high on active citizenship, but among the better educated, more experienced industrial workers the proportion rose to 72 per cent. In Nigeria the spread was from 9 per cent to 82 per cent, and in the other countries the results were strictly comparable. The implications of these findings for the political future of these developing nations are substantial. Many students of politics have expressed grave concern as to whether a modern polity can ever hope to function effectively in these countries, given their lack of a cultural tradition which can spontaneously inculcate in young people the qualities essential to active and effective citizenship in a modern polity. Our research indicates that what is lacking in the traditional culture may be provided by the institutions of a modern society—by the school, the factory, the newspaper and the radio. These sources of influence evidently have an independent power to effect political socialization, training men to know more about politics, stimulating them to take an interest in political events and to participate in civic affairs, and fostering a shift in allegiance from tribal and local leaders to those representing a wider community of interest.

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[47] Only some of which have been presented in this report.

[48] The issues will be dealt with in a detailed chapter on urbanism in the general report on our project by Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith to be titled *Becoming Modern* (in preparation).

[49] We scored individuals as "high" on the scale of active citizenship if they fell in the upper third of the distribution of scale scores in their country. It is thus a highly relative designation. In less relative terms, a man had to select an alternative at the modern end of the continuum in somewhat more than half of the questions in the battery in order to score in the upper third of the distribution.

A nation's political development will be balanced to the extent that the institution of modern political forms does not outrun the growth of schools, industry, mass communications, and other social forces which act to inculcate the necessary attributes of active citizenship in the population. The balance is, however, inherently delicate. The same forces which train men in active citizenship may act to increase the demands made on the government for effectiveness, efficiency, innovation, and change. The political system may then become overloaded, or for other reasons fail to meet expectations. Alienation, anomie, and radical and extremist forms of political action may result. Then follow those perennial stalemates, coups, revolts, riots, and repressions we have come to know as endemic in so many newly developing nations.

# CORRUPTION, MACHINE POLITICS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE*

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The study of political influence in the West has for the most part focused on the process by which interest groups affect the content of legislation; hence, the input process has occupied the center of attention.

Students of politics in the new states of Africa and Asia who have adopted this perspective, however, have been struck by the relative weakness both of interest structures to organize demands and of institutionalized channels through which such demands, once organized, might be communicated to decision-makers. The open clash of organized interests is often conspicuously absent during the formulation of legislation in these nations. To conclude from this, however, that the public has little or no effect on the eventual "output" of government would be completely unwarranted. Between the passage of legislation and its actual implementation lies an entirely different political arena that, in spite of its informality and particularism, has a great effect on the execution of policy.

Much of the expression of political interests in the new states has been disregarded because Western scholars, accustomed to their own politics, have been looking in the wrong place. A large portion of individual demands, and even group demands, in developing nations reach the political system, not before laws are passed, but rather at the enforcement stage. Influence before legislation is passed often takes the form of "pressure-group politics"; *influence at the enforcement stage often takes the form of "corruption" and has seldom been treated as the alternative means of interest articulation which in fact it is.*[1] The peasants who avoid their land taxes by making a smaller and illegal contribution to the disposable income of the Revenue Officer are as surely influencing the outcome of government policy as if they formed a peasant union and agitated for the reduction of land taxes. In a similar fashion, the businessmen who protect their black-market sales by buying protection from a well-placed politician are changing the outcome of policy as effectively as they might by working collectively through chambers of commerce for an end to government price controls.

Competing and complementary explanations for this prevalence of influence at the enforcement stage—usually offered as "causes of corruption"—abound in the expanding literature on this subject.[2] Among the most frequently cited factors contributing to widespread corruption in the new states are: the weak legitimacy of the formal political system compared to the persuasive ties of family or ethnicity, the relative importance of government as a source of employment and social mobility, the existence of wealthy elites denied access to direct, formal influence on policy and in the lack of strong commitments to the rule of general laws by either the elite or populace.

Implicit in each of these causes is the fundamental fact that the nature of most political

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[1] This process of influence, the groups which are likely to benefit from it most, and related issues are treated in much greater detail in my "The Analysis of Corruption Developing Nations. "*Comparative Studies in Society and History* (June, 1969). While not all corruption occurs at the enforcement stage and not all "influence at the enforcement stage" is corrupt, the empirical referents of the two terms overlap considerably. A striking exception, of course, is the legitimate arena of "regulatory politics" that largely involves contending interpretations of statutes governing private sector activity.

[2] Among others, see Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simkins, *Corruption in Developing Countries* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1963); M. McMullan, "A Theory of Corruption," *The Sociological Review* (Keele), 9 (July, 1961), 132–152; W. F. Wertheim, *East-west Parallels: Sociological Approaches to Modern Asia* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books 1965), pp. 103–131; J. S. Nye, "Corruption and Political Development," *This Review*, 61 (June, 1967), 417–427; J. David Greenstone, "Corruption and Self-interest in Kampala and Nairobi," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 7 (January, 1966), 199–210; Colin Leys, "What is the Problem About Corruption?," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 3 (1965), 215–230.

demands in transitional nations is such that they are simply not amenable to the legislative process. Family-centered demands—e.g., a family's desire to secure a civil service post for its eldest son—are generally not expressible in legislative terms. When demands are made on behalf of a wider grouping, they are likely to refer to ethnic, linguistic, or regional blocs and can seldom be given legislative form.[3] The problem thus lies less with the weakness of the interest structures at the legislative stage than with the very character of loyalties in a transitional nation and the demands fostered by such loyalty patterns. Couched as it is in universalistic language, legislation is not a suitable vehicle for the expression of particularistic interests.[4] Influence at the enforcement level—whether it meets the legal definition of corruption or not—is, on the other hand, almost exclusively particularistic. It is scarcely surprising, then, that many of the narrow, parochial demands characteristic of new nations should make their weight felt during the implementation of legislation rather than during its passage. Suitable though it may be for the few groups in the modern sector organized along occupational lines, the modern legislative machinery of new nations cannot effectively cope with the host of special pleadings coming from outside the modern sector.

There is one political form that, in spite of these formal obstacles, has not only been able to respond to particularistic interests but has thrived on them. I am, of course, referring to the urban *"machine,"* a form that flourished in the United States around the turn of the century. Although now virtually extinct, the machine once managed in immigrant-choked cities to fashion a cacaphony of concrete, parochial demands into a system of rule that was at once reasonably effective and legitimate. What follows is essentially an effort to outline the contours and dynamics of the "machine model" in comparative perspective, an attempt to show that the social context that fostered "machine politics" in the United States is more or less present in many of the new states. After 1) sketching the general character of "machine politics," the paper 2) suggests a developmental model to account for the machine, 3) indicates how the social context of the machine makes narrow self-interest the crucial bond of political organization, 4) examines the stabalizing or conservative effect of the machine, and 5) analyzes the reasons for the uneven development and instability of the machine in less developed nations.

### I. THE MACHINE

To abstract the basic characteristics of a political machine obviously does some violence to the great variety of entrepreneurial talent that was devoted to creating this form. Nevertheless, as all but a few beleaguered machines have succumbed to the forces of "reform," analysis has replaced accusation and the central features of most machines are reasonably clear.[5]

It will be recognized at the outset that the machine form can occur only in certain political settings. At a minimum, the setting of the machine requires:

1. the selection of political leaders through elections
2. mass (usually universal) adult suffrage
3. A relatively high degree of electoral competition over time—usually between parties, but occasionally within a dominant party

These conditions reflect the fact that since machine politics represents a distinctive way of mobilizing voters, it arises only in systems where getting out the vote is essential to gaining control of the government. While these conditions are necessary for machine style politics, they are by no means sufficient, as we shall see below.

Always applied to a political party in power, the term "machine" connotes the reliable and repetitive control it exercises within its jurisdiction. What is distinctive about the machine, however, is not so much its control as the nature of the organizational cement that makes such control feasible. The machine is not the disciplined, ideological party held together by class ties and common programs that arose in continental Europe. Neither is it typically a charismatic party, depending on a belief in the almost superhuman qualities of its leader to insure internal cohesion. The machine is rather a non-ideological organization interested less in political principle than in securing and holding office for its leaders and distributing income to those who run it and work for it.[6] It relies on what it accomplishes in a concrete way for its supporters, not on what it stands for. A machine may in fact be likened to a business in which all members are stockholders and dividends are paid in accordance with what has been invested.[7]

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[3] Malaysia, for example, is an instance where one ethnic group, the Malays, is given explicit, constitutional preference in access to certain bureaucratic posts. Similarly, the *harijan* castes in India are accorded preferential treatment with respect to education and government employment.

[4] "Pork-barrel" legislation catering to regional interests is an exception to this rule and is discussed at greater length below.

[5] Some of the more successful efforts at careful description and analysis include: V. O. Key, Jr., *The Techniques of Political Graft in the United States* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Libraries, 1936); Seymour J. Mandelbaum, *Boss Tweed's New York* (New York: Wiley, 1965); Edward C. Banfield and James A. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

"Patronage," "spoils," and "corruption" are inevitably associated with the urban machine as it evolved in the United States. As these terms indicate, the machine dealt almost exclusively in *particularistic, material rewards* to maintain and extend its control over its personnel. Although pork-barrel legislation provided inducements for ethnic groups as a whole, the machine did most of its favors for individuals and families. The very nature of these rewards and favors naturally meant that the machine became *specialized in organizing and allocating influence at the enforcement stage.* The corruption it fostered was not random greed but was finely organized and articulated to maximize its electoral support.

The machine is thus best characterized by the nature of the cement binding leaders and followers. Ties based on charisma, coercion, or ideology were occasionally minor chords of machine orchestration; the 'boss" might take on some heroic proportions, he might use hired toughs or the police now and again to discourage opposition, and a populist ideological aura might accompany his acts. Such bonds were, for the machine, definitely subsidiary to the concrete, particularistic rewards that represented its staple means of political coordination. It is the predominance of these reward networks—the special quality of the ties between leaders and followers—that distinguishes the machine party from the non-machine party.

The vaguely populist image of the machine party was based less on its pronouncements of general policy (which are rare) than on a myriad of acts that symbolized its accessibility, helpfulness, and desire to work for the "little man." For the rank and file, the machine boss represented a patron of those at the bottom of the social pyramid, and while the court system with its rational justice may have favored property interests, the boss typified for them an empirical justice "that works more consistently in the interests of the poor, for attention is focused upon their concrete needs and deprivations."[8] Hints of municipal corruption and graft were winked at, even applauded, by the machine clientele as the social banditry of an urban Robin Hood in spite of their long-run costs to the city. More than most types of political leaders, then, the boss' image was fashioned largely from concrete acts and only marginally from policy platforms or rhetoric.

Given its principal concern for retaining office, the machine was a responsive, informal context within which bargaining based on reciprocity relationships was facilitated. Leaders of the machine were rarely in a position to dictate because those who supported them did so on the basis of value received or anticipated. The machine for the most part accepted its electoral clients as they were and responded to their needs in a manner that would elicit their support. The pragmatic, opportunistic orientation of the machine made it a flexible institution that could accommodate new groups and leaders in highly dynamic situations.

The applicability of this basic political form to the parties of the new states has been noted by quite a few political analysts.[9] In his perceptive examination of the party states of West Africa, Aristide Zolberg emphasizes the limited authority of the dominant parties and explicitly suggests that they could be usefully described as political machines. "The party," he asserts,

> was initially a loose movement which naturally incorporated the characteristics of the society in which it grew; it was eventually transformed into a political machine but continued to reflect the state of complete integration of the territorial society.[10]

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[6] Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

[7] This analogy was made by former Liberal Party President, José Avelino of the Philippines in the *Manila Chronicle*, Jan. 18, 1949. Quoted in Virginia Baterina "A Study of Money in Elections in the Philippines." *Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review*, XX (March, 1955), 39–86.

[8] Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 118.

[9] See for example, Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 70–71; Henry L. Bretton, *The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah* (New York: Praeger, 1966)., Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962).

[10] Aristide R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), p. 123.

The particular "machine" qualities Zolberg has in mind include the flexible, bargaining character of the party that permits it to adjust to demands from a heterogeneous clientele on the basis of self-interest, its capacity to respond to social change through informal mechanisms, and finally its potential for stability and popularity in a context scarcely hospitable to either.

In the West African context, at least, some allowance must be made for the fact that American political machines were typically electoral machines, whereas the parties Zolberg analyzes have done their best to eliminate their dependence on winning votes. The absence of acute electoral pressures—plebiscites hardly impose equivalent pressures—considerably narrows the scope of the machine pattern; beyond a certain point the regime would then resemble an oligarchy based on coercion more than a machine relying on votes. Judging from Zolberg's analysis, that point was seldom approached in most party states of West Africa.

Describing the ruling parties in the states of India, Myron Weiner also has recourse to the machine model, not only to explain what occurs, but also to recommend the "machine" to Indian politicians as a form to emulate. Like Zolberg, Weiner focuses on the ability of the machine to reconcile competing ethnic and particularistic claims in a manner that, while corrupt, is "a small price to pay for acculturating immigrants into a democratic society."[11]

In India's state of Orissā, for example, the dominant Congress Party came more and more to resemble a machine party as it endeavored, amidst the deterioration of political bonds forged during the nationalist struggle, to win elections. F. G. Baily portrays Congress' local party leaders as machine brokers in a context where "workers and sometimes voters expect some tangible reward, not necessarily a bribe, but assistance of exactly the kind which brokers provide" (jobs, licenses, welfare payments, etc.).[12]

What all three authors have done, in effect, is to construct an analogy between the social context of political parties in Asia and Africa on the one hand, and late 19th-early 20th century urban America on the other. In the U.S., the rapid influx of new populations for whom family and ethnicity were the central identifications, when coupled with the award of important monopoly privileges (traction, electric power, and so forth) and the public payroll, provided the ideal soil for the emergence of party machines. Developing nations can be viewed as offering a social context with many of the same nutrients. New governments had in many cases only recently acquired control over the disposal of lucrative posts and privileges and they faced electorates that included many poor, newly urbanized peasants with particularistic loyalties who could be easily swayed by concrete, material incentives. The point each writer makes is not only that the machine is a suitable and relatively democratic political form that can manage such a complex environment, but that the social context typical of most new nations tends to encourage the growth of machine-like qualities in ruling parties. For America, Burnham has summarized the argument now being applied to less developed nations.

> If the social context in which a two-party system operates is extensively fragmented along regional, ethnic and other lines, its major components will tend to be overwhelmingly concerned with coalition building and internal conflict management. The need to unite for electoral [broad coalition building] purposes presupposes a corresponding need to generate consensus at whatever level consensus can be found.[13]

Given this sort of social context, so the reasoning goes, the price of effective political cooperation—at least in the short run—involves meeting narrow, particularistic demands, often through the patronage, favors, and corruption that are the hallmarks of machine politics. But why are other forms of association not feasible? What specific changes in the social context promote or undermine different styles of political collaboration? Unless the model is placed in a developmental perspective and considerably sharpened from its presently intriguing but impressionistic form, its explanatory value will remain limited.

## II. THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF POLITICAL TIES

The schema presented below focuses on changes over time in the nature of loyalty ties that form the basis of political parties. It is tailored to a bargaining—particularly, electoral—context and is less applicable where force or threats of force are the basis of cooperation. Nothing is intended to be rigidly deterministic about the movement from phase A to B to C. The phases are, however, largely based on the empirical experience of the U.S., England, and the new nations.

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[11] Weiner, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

[12] *Politics and Social Change: Orissā in 1959* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 138–140.

[13] Walter Dean Burnham, "Party Systems and the Political Process," pp. 277–307, in William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (eds.), *The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development* (New York: Oxford University Press. 1967), p. 287.

Although the phases in Table 1 have been separated for the purpose of conceptual clarity, they are likely to overlap considerably in the empirical experience of any nation. It is thus a question of which loyalty pattern is most common and which less common. Within new nations all three patterns typically co-exist; rural villagers may remain deferential to their traditional leaders, the recent urban migrants may behave more as free agents seeking jobs or cash for their votes, while a small group of professionals, trade union leaders and intellectuals may perhaps be preoccupied with ideological or class concerns. Even fully industrialized nations may contain recalcitrant, usually isolated, pockets where deference patterns have not yielded to more opportunistic modes of political expression.[17]

TABLE 1. DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY LOYALTY TIES

| | |
|---|---|
| Phase A[14] | Political ties are determined largely by traditional patterns of deference (vertical ties) to establish authorities. Material, particularistic inducements to cooperation play a minor role except among a limited number of local power-holders.[15] |
| Phase B | Deference patterns have weakened considerably in a period of rapid socio-economic change. Vertical ties can only be maintained through a relationship of greater reciprocity.[16] Competition among leaders for support, coupled with the predominance of narrow, parochial loyalties, will encourage the widespread use of concrete, short-run, material inducements to secure cooperation. The greater the competitive electoral pressures, the wider the distribution of inducements is likely to be. Influence at enforcement stage is common. |
| Phase C | New loyalties have emerged in the process of economic growth that increasingly stress horizontal, (functional) class or occupational ties. The nature of inducements for political support are accordingly likely to stress policy concerns or ideology. Influence at the legislative stage becomes more appropriate to the nature of the new political loyalties. |

Prior to fuller treatment below, a brief word is in order about the process of change implied by the model. Movement from Phase A to Phase B involves the shaking loose of traditional deference patterns which can occur in a variety of ways. For the United States, large-scale immigration by basically peasant populations was often the occasion for this change while, for less developed nations, the economic changes introduced by colonial regimes and rapid migration from village to city has provided the catalyst. The social disorganization that resulted was often exacerbated by ethnic, linguistic, or, even caste fragmentation, but similar patterns have arisen in Thailand and the Philippines, amidst comparatively homogeneous populations. Elections themselves have, of course, played a central role in this transformation in that they placed a new political resource of some significance at the disposal of even the most humble citizens.

Movement from Phase B to Phase C would appear to depend on the process of industrialization as new economic arrangements take hold and provide new foci of identification and loyalty. As the case of the United States illustrates, though, the presence of sharp ethnic and sectional cleavage—the latter reinforced by constitutional arrangements—may considerably dilute the strength of these new bonds.

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[14] The broad lines of this schema were suggested to me by an analysis of the use of money in elections contained in Arnold Heidenheimer, "Comparative Party Finance: Notes on Practices and Toward a Theory," pp. 790–811 in Richard Rose and Arnold Heidenheimer, eds., *Comparative Studies in Political Finance: A Symposium, Journal of Politics,* 25, 4 (November, 1963), especially pp. 808–809. Changes in the nature of political ties greatly influence the degree to which monetary incentives are successful in electoral campaigns, and I have thus borrowed from that analysis for the broader purpose of this paper.

[15] Traditional ties often allow some scope for bargaining and reciprocity; the ability of clients to flee to another jurisdiction and the economic and military need for a leader to attract and keep a sizable clientele provided subordinates with some leverage. The distinctions made here in the degree of reciprocity are relative, not absolute. See, for example, Herbert P. Phillips, *Thai Peasant Personality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p. 89 or George M. Foster, "The Dyadic Contract in Tzintzunzan, II: Patron Client Relationships," *American Anthropologist,* 65: pp. 1280–1294.

[16] What appears to happen in the transitional situation is that the client is less "locked-in" to a single patron and the need for political support forces patrons to compete with one another to create larger clienteles. For a brilliant analysis of this pattern in Philippine politics see Carl H. Landé, *Leaders Factions, and Parties—The Structure of Philippine Politics,* Monograph No. 6 (New Haven: Yale University—Southeast Asia Studies, 1965), *passim.*

[17] In this context, party labels are deceptive. The existence of parties proclaiming an ideology or class position are often found in rural areas where the labels have been appropriated in toto in a continuation of traditional feuds between powerful families and their respective clienteles. The key is the nature of loyalty patterns, not the name of the organization. See Carlo Levi, *Christ Stopped at Eboli* (New York: Pocket Books, 1965).

The duration of Phase B, when the social context is most hospitable to machine style politics, may vary widely. When the social disorganization accompanying urbanization and economic change is particularly severe and of long duration, when it is compounded by deep cultural differences, when competitive elections with a universal suffrage are introduced early, the pressures toward machine politics will be vastly greater than when demographic change is gradual and less severe, when it occurs with a minimum of cultural cleavage, and when the electorate is restricted. The historical circumstances of both the U.S. and most new nations have been, in this sense, quite conducive to the development of machine politics as opposed, say, to the Western European experience.

Political parties must generally offer inducements of one kind or another to potential supporters. The pressures to enlist adherents is obviously greatest when the party faces a competitive electoral struggle but, in the absence of battles for votes, merely the desire to establish a broad following among the populace may create analogous pressures.

The sort of incentives most likely to "move" people is contingent, as the phase model clearly implies, on the kinds of loyalty ties that are most salient to the potential client. In the short-run, at least, parties that need supporters are more apt to respond to the incentives which motivate their clientele then to transform the nature of those incentives. Elaborating on this relationship between loyalty bonds and party inducements, the table below suggests the actual empirical patterns likely to occur.

TABLE 2. INDUCEMENTS AND THE NATURE OF LOYALTY

| Nature of Loyalties | Inducement |
|---|---|
| 1. Ties of traditional deference or of charisma | Mostly symbolic, non-material inducements[18] |
| 2. Community or locality orientation (also ethnic concentration) | Indivisible rewards;<br>public works, schools "pork-barrel"<br>Communal Inducements |
| 3. Individual, family, or small group orientation | Material rewards; patronage, favors, cash payments "corruption"<br>Individual Inducements |
| 4. Occupational or class orientation | Policy commitments<br>tax law, subsidy programs, etc. "general legislation"<br>Sectoral Inducements[19] |

Parties in the real world commonly confront all four patterns of loyalty simultaneously and fashion a mix of inducements that corresponds to the mix of loyalties.[20] Inducements, moreover, are not unifunctional; public works usually carry with them a host of jobs and contracts that can be distributed along more particularistic lines while patronage can be wielded in such a way as to actually favor an entire community or ethnic group.

With these qualifications in mind, I am suggesting that, given pressure to gain support, a party will emphasize those inducements that are appropriate to the loyalty patterns among its clientele. Material inducements are as characteristic of occupational or class loyalties as they are of local or family loyalties; what is different is simply the scope and nature of the group being "bribed" by the party, not the fact of "bribery." In the case of occupational and class loyalties, the inducements can be offered as general legislation (and rationalized by ideology, too), whereas inducements at the individual or family level must often be supplied illegally ("corruptly") at the enforcement stage.[21] The classical machine faces a social context in which community and family orientations are most decisive. Responding to its environment, the machine is thus likely to become consumately skilled in both the political distribution of public works through pork-barrel legislation and in the dispensation of jobs and favors through more informal channels.

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[18] Charismatic ties naturally involve more symbolic inducements than do ties of traditional deference in which clients are generally assured a certain minimal level of material well-being (security) by their protector or patron in return for their loyalty.

[19] Term borrowed from Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 337.

[20] The importance of one or another pattern can, in addition, be amplified or diminished by structural characteristics of the political system; in the U. S., federalism and local candidate selection tend to amplify geographical ties. See Theodore J. Lowi, "Party, Policy, and Constitution in America," pp. 238–276 in Chambers and Nisbet, eds., *op. cit.*

[21] Political systems vary significantly in the extent to which favors and patronage can be carried out within the law. In the United States, for example, the traditional use of postmasterships, ambassadorial posts, and a number of state jobs exempt from normal civil service requirements provides a pool of party spoils denied most Indian, Malaysian, or Nigerian politicians.

Historically, the expansion of the suffrage together with the rupture of traditional economic and status arrangements have signalled the rise of particularistic, material inducements. In Robert Walcott's masterful portrait of electoral politics in 18th century England, this transition is vividly depicted in the contrast between the shire constituencies where traditional landholders still commanded the allegiance of a small electorate and the larger urban constituencies where elections

> were notoriously venal and turbulent. Wealthy beer-barons with hireling armies of draymen battled for the representation of Southwark: while the mass of Westminster electors were marshalled out, with considerable efficiency, to vote for candidates set up by the court.[22]

Southwark and Westminster, at the time Walcott describes them, were the exception rather than the rule, and English parliamentary politics revolved around coalitions of clique leaders, each of whom was generally accepted as the "natural" representative of his constituency. The transition, however, was underway.

A similar shift from patterns of deference to patterns of short-run material inducements is evident in contemporary Philippine politics. Like the English landed proprietor in the 18th century, the Filipino *haciendero* could, until recently, rely on his tenant laborers and peasants indebted to him to vote as he directed. Increasingly though, the economic arrangements and traditional patron-client ties that undergird this deference are eroding and the peasant now often requires cash or other special inducements.[23] Pork-barrel legislation is still of great electoral significance, but family and individual inducements (to the exclusion of broader sectoral demands) are the real currency of electoral struggles. As Landé describes them,

> Political parties in the Philippines, on the whole, find it unnecessary to make categorical choices between programs favoring . . . one or another social class. There are two reasons for this, the first being that Filipino voters allow their rulers to satisfy their needs particularistically . . . The second reason . . . is that most Filipino voters are not much disturbed by measures that go against the collective interests of their class or category for they have learned to expect that, as individuals, they may escape the effects of these laws.[24]

Furthermore,

> The ordinary voter also learns that what he does can have a direct effect upon certain substantive "outputs" of government. He knows that, rather than sell his vote for cash, he can trade it for the promise of a public works job, free medical care in a government hospital, protection against harassment by a local policeman, or exemption from the payment of taxes.[25]

As elsewhere, the decline of deference in the Philippines has encouraged the growth of machine style politics in which a mixture of public works and, above all, more particularistic rewards provide the fuel. The necessary incentives, as the description indicates, are generally arranged by influence at the enforcement stage—reflected in the widespread corruption for which the Philippines is noted. Philippine experience, in this regard, is reminiscent of changes in the conduct of American politics which reached decisive proportions by the mid-19th century. Till then, more oligarchic patterns prevailed which "depended on habits of deference or subordination on the part of voters toward established notables in local communities, who were recognized as natural leaders."[26] Only after such "habits of deference" had receded in the face of economic change and immigration could the machine style of particularistic, material rewards begin to thrive on a large scale.

Changes in modal patterns of loyalty help account for not only the development of machine politics but for its decline as well. In addition to other factors (which are discussed below), the growth of political ties in which family bonds were less important than before and in which occupational and/or class considerations played a more prominent role undercut the very foundation of the machines.[27] The specific inducements which the machine was organized to supply worked their "magic" on a smaller and smaller proportion of party workers and supporters. Instead, as businessmen and laborers each came to appreciate their broader, longer run interest as a sector of society, they increasingly required general legislation that met their interests in return for political support. Here and there a social context tailored to the machine style remained, but the machine either reconciled itself to the new loyalties—becoming less and less a machine in the process—or was the electoral victim of social change. Parties still continued to offer palpable inducements to voters but the new inducements were more typically embodied in general legislation, where previously they had been particularistic and often outside the law. As Banfield and Wilson summarize the transition,

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[22] Robert Walcott, Jr., *English Politics in the Early Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 13. The coincidence between the patterns Walcott describes and contemporary Philippine politics is discussed by Carl Landé, *op.cit.*, pp. 101–107.

[23] David Wurfel, "The Philippines," pp. 757–773 in Rose and Heidenheimer (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 771

[24] Landé, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

[26] William Nisbet Chambers, "Party Development and the American Mainstream," pp. 3–32, in Chambers and Burnham (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 5.

[27] Family loyalties are always of significance but in the typical machine case narrow family ties become a central factor in the evaluation of

> If in the old days specific material inducements were illegally given as bribes to favored individuals, now much bigger ones are legally given to a different class of favored individuals, and, in addition, general inducements are proferred in packages to every large group in the electorate and to tiny but intensely moved minorities as well.[28]

## III. THE ECOLOGY OF MACHINE COORDINATION

Historically the distinctive style of political coordination embodied in the machine has occurred in settings where, in addition to rapid social change and a competitive electoral system, a) political power was fragmented, b) ethnic cleavage and/or social disorganization were widespread, and c) most of the population was poor. Drawn mostly from studies of urban machines in the United States, these features of the environment seem applicable to a large degree to the many underdeveloped nations in which political parties have resembled machines.

a) *The Fragmentation of Power*: In accounting for corruption and machine politics in Chicago, Merriam lays particular stress on the multiplicity of urban authorities and jurisdictions that existed within the city. The eight main "governments," each with different powers, that he describes, created so many jealously guarded centers of power that a mayor faced a host of potential veto groups, any one of which could paralyze him.[29] He could secure cooperation with these authorities only by striking informal bargains—often involving patronage, contracts, franchises—and thus putting together the necessary power piece by piece.

Power was fragmented in yet another sense. Party candidates did not face one electorate but several; each ethnic group had its own special interests and demands and a successful campaign depended on assembling a temporary coalition on the basis of inducements suited to each group. The decentralization of power created by such a heterogeneous environment, meant that the "boss' " control was forever tenuous. His temporary authority rested on his continuing capacity to keep rewards flowing at the acceptable rate.

New York in the era of Boss Tweed strikingly resembles Merriam's picture of Chicago. Inspite of the prodigious manipulations attributed to him, Tweed was not especially powerful and had little control over party branches that could nominate their own candidates for many posts. What he did manage to do, however, was to create, for a time, a centralized, finely articulated coalition. Carefully assessing the nature of Tweed's feat, Seymour Mandelbaum declares:

> There was only one way New York could be "bossed" in the 1960's. The lines of communication were too narrow, the patterns of deference too weak to support freely acknowledged and stable leadership. Only a universal payment of benefits—a giant pay-off—could pull the city together in a common effort. The only treasury big enough to support coordination was the public till.[30]

Many leaders of developing nations might well sympathize with Tweed's difficulties. They also face a highly differentiated populace—divided not only along ethnic, religious, linguistic, or regional lines but also representing varying stages of incorporation into the modern sector

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government action. Occupational, much less broad civic, sentiments play a marginal or even negligible role. Most immigrants to the U.S., for example, at first "took for granted that the political life of the individual would arise out of family needs. . . ": Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), p. 9.

[28] Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

[29] Charles E. Merriam, *Chicago: A More Intimate View of Urban Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1929), pp. 68, 90. Merriam's analysis is especially valuable as he was simultaneously political scientist and politician throughout the period he describes.

[30] Seymour J. Mandelbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 58. See also, Edward J. Flynn, *You're the Boss* (New York: Viking Press, 1947), p. 21, for a 20th century account of New York City politics in which a similar argument is made.

and varying degrees of loyalty or hostility in the nation state. Except in those instances where physical coercion is preferred and sufficient to the task, rulers in the new states must reach some accommodation with enough of these interests to govern. Electoral struggles may vastly increase the pressure to reach an accommodation—for competitive elections enhance the value of popular support—but such pressures are in a sense endemic where state authority is weak. More often than not, the price of rule involves paying off each of a variety of interests in their own (usually particularistic) coin. The system of coordination thus comes to resemble machine politics.

b) *Social Fragmentation and Disorganization*: The immigrants who constituted the bulk of the clientele of the American urban machine came largely from the European peasantry. As such, they "required the most extensive acculturation simply to come to terms with urban-industrial existence as such, much less to enter the party system as relatively independent actors."[31] If the fragmentation of power made it advantageous for the politician to offer special inducements for support, the situation of the immigrant made him eager to respond to blandishments that corresponded with his most immediate needs. Machine inducements are thus particularly compelling among disoriented new arrivals who value greatly the quick helping hand extended to them by the party.

The dependence of machine parties on a clientele that is both unfamiliar with the contours of the political system and economically on the defensive, is underscored by the character of the small pockets where vestiges of once powerful machines still exist. One such example is the Dawson machine (really a sub-machine) in Chicago. This machine rests squarely on favors and patronage among the Negro population, most of which has come to Chicago from the rural south within the last generation. Deprived of even this steadily diminishing social base, the machine has elsewhere withered as the populations it assisted became acculturated and could afford the luxury of wider loyalties and longer range political goals.

It is no coincidence then, that machines florished during the period of most rapid urban growth in the U.S., when the sense of community was especially weak, and when social fragmentation made particularistic ties virtually the only feasible means of cooperation. The machine bound its clientele to it by virtue of the employment, legal services, economic relief, and so forth it supplied for them.

> For the lower strata, in return for their votes, it provided a considerable measure of primitive welfare functions, personalized help for individuals caught up in the toils of the law, and political socialization.[32]

With few qualifications, the social context that nourished machines in America matches the conditions in new nations. Rapid urban migration of rural peasantries, especially since W.W. II, when coupled with ethnic fragmentation, economic insecurity and a basic unfamiliarity with the Western governmental forms adopted by most new states, have conspired to create an analogous social context. As in the U.S. at the turn of the century, a large clientele is available that will respond enthusiastically to short-run material incentives and to the party that provides them.

c) *Poverty*: Perhaps the most fundamental quality shared by the mass clientele of machines is poverty. Machines characteristically rely on suffrage of the poor and, naturally, prosper best when the poor are many and the middle-class few. In America, Banfield and Wilson emphasized that

> Almost without exception, the lower the average income and the fewer the average years of schooling in a ward, the more dependable the ward's allegiance to the machine.[33]

Poverty shortens a man's time horizon and maximizes the effectiveness of short-run material inducements. Quite rationally he is willing to accept a job, cash, or simply the promise of assistance when he needs it, in return for his vote and that of his family. Attachments to policy goals or to an ideology imply something of a future orientation as well as wide loyalties, while poverty discounts future gains and focuses unavoidably on the here and now.

The attitudes associated with poverty that facilitate machine style politics are not just confined to a few urban centers in less developed nations, but typify portions of the rural population as well.[34] In such circumstances, the jobs, money, and other favors at the disposal of the government represent compelling inducements. Deployed to best advantage, these incentives are formidable weapons in building coalitions and/or electioneering. The ease with which votes are bought—individually in many urban areas, and in blocs where village or ethnic cohesion is sufficient to secure collaboration—during elections in the new nations is a measure of the power of narrow material rewards in the social context of poverty.[35]

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[31] Burnham, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

[32] *Ibid.* Merriam calls the precinct worker "something of a social worker not recognized by the profession," *op. cit.*, p. 173.

[33] Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

[34] For a more extended discussion of these attitudes and their origin, see my *Political Ideology in Malaysia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), Chapter 6.

### IV. SELF-INTEREST AS POLITICAL CEMENT: THE PATRONAGE

A popular regime is likely to reflect more of the social context in which it arises than a regime that rests primarily on coercion. The quest for broad popular support—whether because of electoral competition or, say, because of the desire to build a following wide enough to forestall potential coups—usually entails being responsive to the kinds of political demands coming from the society. Forging a wide coalition of interests in social contexts that resemble the features of the U.S. at the turn of the century or most new nations today, inevitably means developing a capacity to distribute short-run material incentives among potential clienteles. Few, if any, durable political bonds except that of material self-interest are available to build a large political party among poor, heterogeneous, transitional populations. Self-interest thus provides the necessary political cement when neither a traditional governing elite nor a ruling group based on ideological or class interest is available.

Small wonder, then, that, faced with the environment we have outlined, and with a steady deterioration of the symbolic bonds fashioned during the struggle for independence, parties in the new states have frequently taken on many machine-like traits. An overwhelming concern with the particularistic distribution of rewards to supporters so as to maintain the patchwork of interests uneasily contained within the ruling party and the decline of broader policy goals are the hallmarks of this transformation. The metamorphosis has been most striking in those cases where electoral anxieties have been most intense; e.g., the Philippines,[36] Ceylon, and, increasingly, India. In nations where a single party faces little competition but has not totally dismantled electoral procedures, machine features are often in evidence, too.[37] Only where the military has taken command has the distributive process been confined to such narrow proportions as to resemble more an oligarchy, or occasionally a dictatorship, than a machine.

Among the specific instruments of coordination available to the machine, the power of patronage is perhaps the most celebrated. The practice of patronage is by no means, however, confined to machine parties—nor is political graft on franchises, contracts, or licenses, for that matter. The court in 18th century England based its ability to create a viable parliamentary coalition on the distribution of public offices to the right people at the right time.[38] Nevertheless, the necessity of generating broad support on a continuing basis has typically meant that machine parties wield the patronage on a scale that is distinctive.

By exploiting the public purse to provide posts that may be dealt out according to political criteria, the machine party gains a staple means of maintaining internal discipline and cohesion. The diverse groups and individuals comprising the party are linked together by such material rewards as patronage, while these posts supply the party with a cadre of political workers who are constantly available to the organization and who will be responsive to commands from the leadership. It is precisely the diversity of groups within the party that renders this pool of available jobs an indispensible basis of organization. The effectiveness of patronage as a means of coordination hinges, of course, on the kind of clientele I have described—a clinetele for whom jobs are of central importance.

The political distribution of patronage was perfected to the point of fine art by the American urban machine. In the heyday of machines the number of posts dispensed by patronage reached prodigious levels. Around the turn of the century, according to Lincoln Steffens, the Martin machine in Philadelphia had placed 15,000 people in office and "each of these 15,000 persons was selected for office because he could deliver votes, either by organizations, by parties, or by familes."[39] In New York City in the 1930's, the total annual pay for posts exempt from civil service regulations—that is, political jobs—exceeded seven million dollars even after some reforms had been enacted.[40]

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[35] Wurfel, for example, claims that 10–20% of Filippino voters *regularly* sell their votes. *Op. cit.*, p. 763. The differences between urban- and rural-based machines in the U.S. and less developed nations is an important subject that I hope to treat in a later article.

[36] Filippino parties resembled machines well before independence due to the powers they exercised within the colonial system and a pattern of early electoral competition.

[37] For single party states, the significance of material incentives has appeared to grow as the leader of the independence movement passed from the scene or as the charisma generated in that period diminished. What had been movements *par excellence* gradually became machine parties. Communist states in underdeveloped areas are, of course, exceptions.

[38] Walcott, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

While the bastion of patronage in the U.S. has remained at the state and local levels, federal jobs have historically served to knit together national parties as well. The most striking example of this may well be Lincoln's victorious Republican Party of 1860—a hodgepodge of ethnic groups, old Whigs, old Democrats, rural and urban interests, family-based factions, and so forth. As Carman and Luthin describe it, the Republicans

> had come together in the recent campaign like Highland clans to battle the common foe, the leaders of these various factions were still jealous of one another and often openly hostile. Lincoln realized that public jobs wisely distributed were the cement he must use to hold the Republican party together.[41]

The need for coordination by patronage resulted in "the most sweeping removal of federal office holders up to that time in American history,"[42] Occupants of roughly twelve hundred of the fifteen hundred posts covered were replaced with the party faithful. As it developed, the distribution of federal jobs not only cemented the party but served to cement a part of the republic itself by keeping some states within the fold during the Civil War. Carman and Luthin conclude that the liberal use of the patronage was largely responsible for containing secessionist pressures in Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware. Later, during the campaign of 1864, Lincoln also skillfully used the patronage in each state to help ensure his renomination and election. The fact that the distribution of jobs proved such a powerful political factor is due as much to the importance of federal employment in the minds of party workers as to Lincoln's talent for deploying it.

Given the heterogeneous composition of parties in new nations, the nature of their clientele, the scarcity value of government employment in poor nations, the patronage is, if anything, an even more significant adhesive agent than it was in the U.S. The "bandwagon" effect experienced by many ruling parties after independence was partly due to a popular recognition that the party would control the disposal of tangible rewards for some time to come and, conversely, the "negative bandwagon" effect whereby parties that failed to capture at least a local power base often disintegrated, was related to the absence of material rewards to bind their initial following.

Wielding the patronage in the new nations, however, occurs in a markedly different legal context than it did in much of urban America. Saddled with the "very latest" in terms of civil service regulations, politicians in the new nations must regularly resort to practices that are either highly questionable or transparently illegal to find jobs for some of the party workers. In India, the political career of Partap Singh Kairon, Chief Minister of the Punjab, was cut short by a public inquiry that cited him for relatively minor financial peculations and for using his influence to persuade the state Public Service Commission to exclude a few posts from normal civil service requirements.[43] Deprived of open access to the spoils that built strong parties in America or 19th century England, Kairon was indicted for behavior that would scarcely have appeared unseemly in Boss Tweed's day. Congress Party politicians, despite the occasional risks, have increasingly made use of the available patronage (not to mention licenses, contracts, franchises) to maintain their electoral strength, secure party cohesion, and even to help contain mounting secessionist pressures.[44] Especially at the state level, the Congress Party has come to resemble a classical political machine.

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[39] Lincoln Steffens, *The Shame of the Cities*. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1963), p. 147. This was the case despite the fact that the Philadelphia machine made use of outright elector fraud as well.

[40] J. K. Pollock, "The Cost of the Patronage System," *The Annals*, 189 (1937, p. 29, quoted in V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York: Crowell, 1966), p. 353.

[41] Harry J. Carman and Reinhard H. Luthin, *Lincoln and the Patronage* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), p. 10. For an account of patronage in the first few decades after independence, see Sidney H. Aronson, *Status and Kinship in the Higher Civil Service: Standards of Selection in the Administrations of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Andrew Jackson* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 331.

[43] *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Matter of Pratap Singh Kairon* (Das Commission) (New Delhi: Government Printer, June 11, 1964), pp. 222, 224, 235.

[44] See, for example, the introduction to the "Santhanam Report," *Report of the Committee*

A wide variety of economic measures in new nations merit close analysis for their patronage functions. In this respect, programs of nationalization, while they may answer economic and patriotic needs too, are frequently tailored to maximize the number of patronage posts available to the ruling party. Indonesia prior to 1957 provides a striking example of these mixed motives. When a measure permitting only Indonesian firms to handle sea cargo was implemented, each of the major parties then in the cabinet established their own warehousing firms and simply assumed control of the existing facilities and business.[45] These favored enterprises—although formally within the private sector—supplied a source of both income and employment for the ruling parties.[46] Discussing the economic policy of the three cabinets from 1953–57 Herbert Feith concludes,

> On the whole, their measures of Indonesianization failed to bring about any increase in the *power* of Indonesian nationals within the economy, a fact which suggests that the patronage function of these measures may have been more important than their policy aspect.[47]

Analogous cases from other new nations could be cited at some length, but the Indonesian example is sufficiently illustrative of the general pattern. Patronage pressures are present in military regimes in new nations too,[48] but in party dominated regimes these tendencies arise not only from kinship ties and the desire for informal employment fees, but from the need to reward party workers and to maintain or broaden support.[49] The military clique need only secure the acquiescence of a relatively few powerful groups; the party characteristically faces patronage demands of greater scope since it must cultivate a large popular following.

The party's need to put together a broad coalition is often reflected in the structure and operation of development programs as well. Even in Italy, where the ruling Christian Democratic Party depends on votes from the rural south, LaPalombara has written that the Fund for the Development of the South "has become a gigantic *patronage organization* which employs people and awards developmental contracts strictly on the basis of political considerations."[50] Quite apart from its contribution to economic growth in the south, then, the Fund is managed so as to enhance Christian Democratic electoral strength in the "underdeveloped" south.

Rural development programs in many new nations are designed with this duality of function in mind. To mention only one other instance, the activities of Malaysia's Ministry of Rural Development are keyed closely to the electoral requirements of the ruling Alliance Party. The employment, "pork-barrel" funds, and contracts engendered by its programs are carefully distributed among rural Malays who are deemed assets to the party, and the few areas of solid opposition strength naturally receive little or nothing.[51] If anything, the political component of these programs has contributed to their economic success.

The Malaysian and Italian cases each exemplify the effects of machine pressures on development schemes. In fact, where parties in the new nations must build wide support (generally for elections) one would expect to

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*on Prevention of Corruption* (New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1964); Ronald Segal, *The Crisis of India* (London: Johnathan Cape, 1965), Ch. 6; and Surendranath Dwivedy and G. S. Bhargava, *Political Corruption in India* (Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1967).

[45] Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 478–479. See also pp. 366–384 for a more general discussion.

[46] The multi-party setting of Indonesia at this time resembles less a strong machine party in power than a situation where two or more potential machine parties are vying for power. While a solid machine often looks to its long run interest and limits patronage and graft to moderate levels, the situation where potential machines vie for power is inevitably more hectic and less restrained. In Indonesia, the smaller parties, having few long-term concerns, were the most ravenous.

[47] Herbert Feith, *op. cit.*, p. 557, emphasis in original.

[48] See, for example, Fred W. Riggs, Thailand, *The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), pp. 270–271.

[49] The narrower scope of patronage distribution in military regimes does not preclude its overall volume being greater. If military leaders need not generate broad support in order to rule, neither need they be as concerned about the public reaction at the polls to inordinate official misconduct.

[50] Joseph LaPalombara, *Interest Groups in Italian Politics* (Princeton: University Press, 1964), p. 344, emphasis mine.

[51] For an example of how the most traditional areas are able to resist machine blandishments, see Manning Nash, "Tradition and Tension in Kelantan," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, I (June, 1966), 310–314.

find greater emphasis placed on broad rural development programs—programs with a capacity to distribute incentives throughout much of the population—than where wide support is of only marginal concern. To some extent, these programs are the functional equivalent of the services American urban machines performed for first generation voters in the cities.

Patronage is but one of the many material incentives that parties aspiring to gain wide support among a "transitional" population must resort to. Graft for party funds, help with the law, and selective non-enforcement are, like patronage, part of the bundle of short-run inducements involving "corrupt" influence at the enforcement stage that serve as the organizational cement for the typical machine party. Where machine pressures are evident in new nations, the development programs pursued are often more amenable to the kind of political analysis indicated here than to an analysis that focuses merely on the economic or nationalistic requirements customarily used to justify such ventures. The choice among development projects and the manner of their execution may depend, for the ruling party, less on criteria of growth or productivity than on the level and quality of inducements they place at the party's disposal. If economic success and political payoffs coincide, so much the better, but a project judged a failure by economic planners may nonetheless have achieved precisely the political effects expected of it.[52]

## V. THE MACHINE AS A CONSERVATIVE RESPONSE TO CHANGE

Thriving in periods of rapid social change, machine politics nevertheless represents a conservative response to its dynamic environment.[53] Machine politics is conservative in at least these four respects: a) it represents an alternative to violence in managing conflict, b) it increases the legitimacy of the regime for transitional populations, c) it emphasizes short-run gains at the expense of encouraging long-run transformations, d) it avoids class issues and fosters inter-class collaboration.

It is crucial to specify here that these effects, while they may flow in part from corrupt practices, are attributable to machine politics and not to corruption *per se*.[54] The central fact about a political "machine" is that it aims at the "political consolidation of the beneficiaries" of the patronage and graft system.[55] Whereas non-machine corruption often has a random and sporadic character or aims only at the consolidation of narrow elites who control wealth or armed force, the machine must remain popular to survive and must consequently meet the demands of a broad stratum. Not all corruption is machine politics and not all machine politics is corrupt.

*Avoiding Violence:* The social setting of the machine is ordinarily one where ties to the community as a whole are weak and where the potential for violence is great. The capacity of the machine to organize and provide material inducements (often corruptly) operates as a means of solving, for the time being at least, conflicts of interest that might otherwise generate violence. In order to remain popular, the machine must continually make a place for new, ambitious leaders who could potentially threaten its control. By coopting new leaders the machine can be responsive to new demands while simultaneously protecting its own future.[56]

The 1946 presidential election in the Philippines is a striking example of the use of machine inducements to defuse temporarily an economic situation highly charged with a potential for violence. Faced with a "rising tide of peasant labor discontent," the main sugar, banking, and commercial interests contributed enormous funds to the Liberals, whose electoral campaign virtually smothered the revolutionary fires beneath a soft carpet of green.[57]

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[52] Road-building in Malaysia illustrates this pattern. The present road system is adequate for some time to come and planners have urged a lower priority for this activity. The almost unique capacity of a large road construction program to reach many rural areas with pork-barrel and patronage benefits, however, has led the ruling party to continue to pave its way throughout rural Malaysia at much the same rate as in the past. Similar calculations lie behind road programs in other new nations—and in portions of the U.S. as well.

[53] Some readers may object to the use of the term "conservative" to cover the effects described. If so, each of the separate effects may be considered separately as the term itself is not central to the argument.

[54] Both Joseph Nye, *op. cit.*, and David H. Bayley, "The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation," *Western Political Quarterly*, XIX (December, 1966), 719–732 appear occasionally to treat much corruption as if it were "machine corruption" without specifying the distinction.

[55] Key, *The Techniques of Political Graft in the United States*, *op. cit.* p. 394.

[56] For an imaginative effort to deal quantitatively with the Congress Party's cooptation of former opponents in Orissā as its majority was threatened, see Baily, *op. cit.*, Ch. 9. The process of cooptation of conservative leaders changed the social base of the party and forced abandonment of much of its original legislative program.

The Philippine case illustrates the limits of machine conciliation as well. Depending as they do on particularistic, material incentives, machines are only as effective as their inducements. For either the modern sector where broader loyalties and civic sentiments have taken root, or the traditional sector where deference and symbolic goals are common, machine blandishments are likely to fall on barren soil. Machines can, thus, manage conflict best among "transitional" populations and may be unable to alleviate strife—or may actually exacerbate it—in other social contexts.

*Creating Legitimacy:* Urban American machines have long been credited with wedding the immigrant to the political system by protecting him, meeting his immediate needs, and offering *personal* (particularistic) service. If the new arrival was to be tied to the political system at all, it would have to be by personal, material inducements, and the machine responded since each immigrant represented a vote which it needed. The effectiveness of machine inducements during the Boss Tweed era in New York was underscored by what happened in the short reform period that followed his rule. Within one year, Mandelbaum states, reform mayor Havemeyer "did not have the support of a single mass based political organization."[58] Reform governments, determined to avoid the corrupt practices of the machine, soon discovered that the cost of "clean" government was a marked loss of support.

In India, where ethnic groups are geographically concentrated and thus compound the problem of alienation with that of secession, Weiner claims that only machine style bargaining and benefits can hold the state together.[59] The Congress Party has, in fact, increasingly distributed both particularistic rewards and pork-barrel projects whenever calls for regional autonomy reached threatening proportions, but the success of such efforts has been spotty. Ironically, the desire for regional autonomy was, in part, prompted by a recognition that more civil service posts, more scholarships, and so forth would be available to the local party if regional autonomy were granted than if it were not.

The latent function of building legitimacy served by machine politics is subject to the same qualification that was made for its capacity to settle conflict peacefully. Machine practices may engender support among those for whom material incentives are effective, but may, on the other hand, increase the alienation of the new middle class, military officers, students, and the very traditional. Once again, the *impact of the inducement hinges on the social context.* The support generated by machine rewards is, moreover, based rather tenuously on the continuing distributive capacity of the regime. Lacking either ideological or charismatic foundations, the regime may find its support has evaporated once it can no longer deliver the concrete inducements that serve as the party's social adhesive.

*Short-run Goals:* The machine must, in a sense, buy its popularity. To the extent that it faces competition, the cost of popularity is raised and the public till may not be sufficient to the demands it must meet. The effect of this "squeeze" in urban America has often forced the machine party not only to raise the city's debt[60] but also to rely increasingly on assistance from businesses with interests in the city. This latter strategy was not without its penalty as licenses and franchises were given to traction and power interests for negligible amounts, as the city accepted sub-standard equipment and materials, and so forth. *Frequently, a three-cornered relationship developed in which the machine politician could be viewed as a broker who, in return for financial assistance from wealthy elites, promoted their policy interests when in office, while passing along a portion of the gain to a particularistic electorate from whom he "rented" his authority.* The substantial long-run costs to the community as a whole were seldom appreciated since the machine controlled an electorate with little sense of community interests and a preference for immediate, personal inducements.

Machines in the new nations have often been impelled to follow a similar course. Although the private sector was occasionally a less significant resource base than in urban America, the machine frequently developed close and occasionally secretive ties with wealthy elites—especially in Southeast Asia and East Africa where minority groups dominate the private sector. Meeting reciprocal obligations to these groups and distributing material incentives for popular support has made the pursuit of longer-run development objectives more difficult.[61] Elsewhere, a dangerous running down of foreign exchange reserves or steeply inflationary deficits have provided fuel for the machine[62]—characteristically followed by a military government presiding over an austerity program.

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[57] Virginia F. Baterina, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

[58] Seymour Mandelbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

[59] Myron Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–72.

[60] Boss Tweed, in four years, raised New York City's indebtedness by a multiple of three while leaving both the tax rate and assessments untouched. Mandelbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

d) *Non-class Focus:* The fact that the machine stresses family and parochial loyalties to the virtual exclusion of ideology and class politics requires little elaboration, as it is embedded in the definition of a machine.

> So long as the public's interest continues to be centered on the scramble for particular benefits for individuals, overt rivalry will tend to be intraclass rather then interclass.[63]

While older elites have typically looked askance at the possibilities for personal mobility provided to those of humble origins by the machine, class issues of the collective nature beyond vague populism have been rare. Machines, by the nature of rewards they offer and personal ties they build into their organization, may well impede the growth of the class and occupational bonds implied by economic change and thus prolong the period during which family and/or ethnic ties are decisive.

## VI. THE FAILURE OF THE MACHINE IN NEW NATIONS

Looking at politics in the new nations a scant five years ago, the machine model would have seemed an increasingly practical tool of analysis. The symbolic ties of the nationalist struggle were steadily losing their strength and yet electoral procedures were still enough in evidence to reinforce the efforts of ruling parties to remain genuinely popular. Politicization of the colonial bureaucracy was often underway and many parties were becoming adept at building support by distributing patronage and pork-barrel projects. In spite of these harbingers of machine development, relatively few machine parties actually materialized and those that did were generally short-lived.[64] The task, therefore, is to explain why machines failed to develop as they did in urban America. The simplest answer is, of course, that embryonic machines in new nations were generally thrown out by military coups. Beyond this truth, however, there are additional reasons why machines failed to flourish that are based on the social context of new nations and the dynamics of machine politics itself.

The decline of machine politics in America is of only limited use in accounting for what happened to rudimentary machines in the new states. How, after all, does one compare the demise of two machines, one of which (U.S.) appears to die a more or less "natural" death with a machine that is struck down by military force?

Samuel Hays ascribes the atrophy and disappearance of the American urban machine to

> certain rather obvious but momentous changes in American life. In the first place, a continually increasing majority of the active American electorate has moved above the poverty line. Most of this electorate is no longer bound to party through the time-honored links of patronage and the machine. Indeed, for a large number of people, politics appears to have the character of an item of luxury consumption. . . .[65]

The services that tied the client to the machine were either no longer necessary or were performed by other agencies than the machine. In a full-employment economy with rising wages, patronage was insufficient cement with which to organize and control a party. With aid to dependent children and old age assistance becoming the formal responsibility of government agencies, "the precinct captain's hod of coal was a joke."[66] The protective and defensive function of the machine had simply ceased to be important political incentives.

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[61] Where business secures freedom from restrictions via its ties with the machine, economic growth may be speeded but it appears, in most cases, that businesses seek favored, or monopolistic positions free from competitive rigors. See, for example, the *Santhanam Report*, *op. cit.*, *passim.*

[62] Non-machine rulers often make use of similar income-producing tactics (e.g., Thailand) but, in the case of the machine, its needs are typically greater and its resources are usually destined for wider distribution as well as personal gain of office holders.

[63] Landé, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

[64] Among those new nations where ruling parties possess notable machine characteristics, one might include India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Ivory Coast, Liberia, and especially Lebanon. In the Ivory Coast and India the ruling parties still retain some of the "mass movement" ideological features that marked their earlier history.

[65] In William Nisbet Chambers, *op. cit.*, p. 305. To my knowledge, no actual empirical tests of hypotheses advanced for the rise or decline of machine politics have been attempted. It would be instructive, for example, to plot the increases and decreases of machine style politics over time in a number of American cities against possible explanatory variables such as rates of in-migration, changes in per-capita income, changes in income distribution, changes in welfare measures, rates of education, and so forth. I am grateful to Garry Brewer for suggesting this general line of inquiry.

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 121.

Viewed from another angle, the machine simply destroyed its own social base. It had flourished among those who were, for one reason or another, "civic incompetents"; so when immigration slackened, when the new citizens gained a secure economic foothold, and when they developed wider loyalties, the central prop of machine politics was destroyed. Here and there, individual politicians managed to adapt to the new style and incentives, but the machine itself disappeared along with its social context.

The failure of machines in the new nations not only differed from the American pattern, but varied somewhat from case to case due to the special circumstances of each nation. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern a number of important factors that appear to have been significant in the demise of many such embryonic machines.

In the first place, the full development of a machine depends on its evolving capacity to create and maintain a large popular following with particularistic inducements. Typically, this capacity has developed best in the context of electoral pressures. Elections in American cities were virtually guaranteed by the fact that the city was a unit in a larger political system which sanctioned elections; machines perfected their techniques in the knowledge that they would always face periodic electoral opposition. Ruling parties in new nations, however, often began with a considerable store of popularity generated in the nationalist period. As this support deteriorated, the dominant party did not necessarily have to fall back on material incentives to retain its wide support; it could alternatively abrogate elections and escape the usual machine pressures. A good many nationalist leaders—having goals of transformation in mind—were increasingly discouraged at the growth of particularistic demands from all quarters that liberal democratic forms seemed to foist on them. Not having the heart for mediating between a host of what they considered short-sighted parochial demands made of machine bosses, many concluded that liberal democracy stood in the way of long-run national goals. Both Nkrumah and Sukarno spoke feelingly in this regard, and both consciously chose to eschew machine politics for more grandiose, symbolic goals.[67]

Another factor that basically altered the character of machines in some cases was the predominant position of a single ethnic group. In urban America it was virtually never possible for a machine to rule without being obliged to knit together a broad ethnic coalition. Where machines could be based on one dominant ethnic group in new nations—e.g. pre-Ne Win Burma and, to a smaller extent, Nigeria—the excluded ethnic groups, which were often geographically concentrated, demanded at the very least more regional autonomy and launched secessionist revolts in some areas.[68] The resulting threat to the territorial integrity of the state was commonly the occasion for military takeovers.

Looking at those nations in which machines have developed with some vigor, the importance of elections and ethnic balance (or homogeneity) is manifest. Lebanon, Malaysia, and India, for example, are balanced ethnically so as to require some form of collaborative rule while the Philippines is relatively homogeneous ethnically; all four have retained electoral forms. Beyond these two factors, however, are two broad obstacles to machine politics relating to the nature of a machine's clientele and its resource base.

Machines in American cities tended to live beyond their means and the evidence suggests that machines in new nations behave similarly.[69] As a form of rule machines are particularly subject to what Zolberg terms "an inflationary process of demand-formation"[70] and naturally thrive best in a buoyant economy that provides them with a continually expanding store of material incentives to distribute. It is perhaps no coincidence that the high-water mark of machine politics in the new nations occurred in the mid-1950's when Korean War boom prices for primary exports underwrote high rates of growth. In addition, there were a large number of "one-time-only" rewards available to ruling parties after independence. Foreign businesses could be nationalized, new franchises and licenses could be let, older civil servants could be replaced by loyal party workers, but the supply of such material incentives was soon exhausted in the absence of economic expansion. Of the later cabinets before martial law was imposed in Indonesia, Feith claims,

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[67] In an otherwise perceptive article, Edward Feit characterizes, I think mistakenly, Nkrumah's CPP before the military coup as a political machine. He distinguishes between a political party which "aggregates demands and converts them into legislative policy" and a political machine which "exists almost exclusively to stay in power." The problem, of course, is that many regimes are motivated almost solely to stay in power—e.g., the Thai military, Haiti's Duvalier—but the term machine should be reserved for civilian regimes which rest on a popular base. The CPP, until about 1960, might profitably be seen as a machine party, but thereafter coercion and symbolic goals dominated. "Military Coups and Political Development: Some Lessons from Ghana and Nigeria," *World Politics*, XX (January, 1968), 179–193.

[68] For an excellent discussion of ethnic configurations and their political implications, see Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States* (New York: Free Press, 1963).

[69] This fact may indicate that machine politics is not a stable form of rule.

[70] Aristide R. Zolberg, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

> . . . perhaps most fundamentally, the weakness of these later cabinets stemmed from their shortage of disposable rewards . . . Moreover, the number of material rewards and prestige roles which government was expected to provide did not decrease . . . In sum, then, those cabinets were almost as poorly equipped to reward as to punish.[71]

It is reasonable to suppose that the Indonesian case is not unique. The material rewards were, finally, not sufficient to the task and, amidst the ruling party's loss of support, the military—which, if it could not reward, could at least restrain and punish—stepped in.

The line of reasoning developed above suggests that perhaps the machine flourishes best at the sub-national level where it was confined in the U.S. That is, *the durability of this political form is maximized where there is an external guarantor of the electoral process, where the machine is a part of a larger growing economy that can afford its expensive habits, and where its bosses do not have a monopoly of coercive authority*. A large measure of the instability of machines in developing nations may derive from their national rather than local character.[72]

Finally, in those nations where demand-inflation was not the key factor, there was some question of how well suited the social context was to machine politics. On the one hand, the machine faced opposition from a small but strategically-placed middle class of civil servants, professionals, students, and, above all, army officers, which was less amenable to material incentives and was, like its American counterparts, profoundly alienated by machine corruption and patronage. On the other hand, the machines, particularly in Africa, faced large numbers of quite traditional folk for whom religious and cultural issues were still important[73] and whose leaders realized that the machine threatened the ascriptive basis of their power. These populations by and large remained outside the scope of the machine and represented, at a minimum, a latent challenge to the machine's authority. Bastions of tradition were often found in areas of "indirect rule" where social and political change had been less severe, while the machine won support especially among urban migrants and in areas (often "directly" ruled) where folk ways had been decisively uprooted by colonialism. The *transitional* population on which the machine relied was, in these cases, simply not large enough to sustain this form of government when it was menaced by widespread traditional recalcitrance and a powerful middle class with military allies. Macines require not only an economy that performs tolerably well but a social context that corresponds to the inducements it can give; only where both conditions have been satisfied have machines managed to survive and grow.

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[71] Herbert Feith, *op. cit.*, p. 572.

[72] I am indebted to Professor Henry Hart for suggesting this.

[73] To stretch a point, one might link them with the forces in American politics that felt strongest about Sunday laws, prohibition, and so forth.

# SOME ECONOMETRICS OF THE HUK REBELLION*

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Shortly after World War II a Communist guerrilla army, the Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan (HMB), or People's Liberation Army, became a serious threat to the new Philippine Republic. The Huks, as they are commonly known, controlled large parts of the sugar cane and rice growing areas of Central Luzon and carried out military and political operations in other parts of the islands. Like their Communist counterparts in Vietnam and Malaya, the Huks began as an anti-Japanese guerrilla army. In fact, Huk originally referred to Hukbalahap, a contraction of a phrase meaning People's Army Against the Japanese. As the military arm of the Communist Party, however, their ambitions always exceeded mere anti-Japanese activities.

After the Japanese defeat, successive Philippine governments wrestled with the problem of eliminating the Huks. Policies of coercion failed because the Philippine Army and Constabulary were not up to the task. Policies of conciliation failed because the demands of the Huks were regarded as unreasonable. By 1949 it became clear that the issues dividing the Huks and the government would have to be settled by force. Following the allegedly fraudulent election of President Quirino in 1949 the Huks gained steadily. By 1950 large unit raids were common and a full-scale attack on Manila was envisioned for 1951. Before that time arrived, however, the tide had begun to turn. Under the new Defense Secretary, Ramon Magsaysay, the Constabulary and Army were reorganized, and by the early 1950s the Huks were on the run, one of the most dramatic events being the surrender of former Huk Supremo Luis Taruc in May 1954.[1]

Despite the decimation of Huk units in Northern and Southern Luzon, Panay, and other regions, the movement survived and persists to this day especially in the part of Central Luzon known as Huklandia—the provinces of Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Tarlac. Although this region comprises only a small part of the Philippines (see Fig. 1), its size understates its importance. With close proximity to Manila and a leading position in rice production, it has always played a key role in Philippine history.

Huklandia is the only region in which the Huks flourished.[2] During the period 1948–1953 Huk expansionary forces had moved up and down the Sierra Madre cordillera, north to the Cagayan valley and the Ilocos region, south from Laguna to the Bikol provinces, and across the sea to Negros and Panay. The striking feature of this expansion, however, was its failure. Huk outposts were readily smashed, usually with the aid of defectors and informants from the local population.[3] A resurgence of the Huks over the past six or seven years has also been accompanied by the growth of a significant following outside Huklandia, especially in Southern Luzon. But again it does not appear that the Huks have been able to gain the kind of effective domination achieved in Central Luzon.

Figure 2, based upon data obtained from the Constabulary, shows the location of Central Luzon barrios[4] supporting the HMB in 1968. What are the peculiar features of these dissident barrios? Why should the Huks succeed there but not elsewhere? An operational theory of the Huk rebellion should be able to tell what special characteristics are to be found. For example, some have argued that the desire for land by the peasantry is a prime motivating force in the rebellion. We should expect to find, then, that barrios in which few farmers own their own land tend, other things being equal, to support the Huks. To carry out tests of this

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* This article was written while the author was at the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, and the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton. The views presented are his own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions with which he has been affiliated.

[1] A brief history of the Huk movement is contained in the first few chapters of A. Scaff, *Philippine Answer to Communism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955).

[2] N. Valeriano and C. Bohannan, *Counter-guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 33.

[3] W. J. Pomeroy, *The Forest* (New York: International Publishers, 1963), esp. pp. 38–43, 156, 166–168; Valeriano and Bohannan, *op. cit.*, p. 32. See also V. Lieberman, "Why the Hukbalahap Movement Failed," *Solidarity* (October–December 1966), pp. 22–30.

[4] A barrio usually contains 1000–2000 people; a municipality is generally composed of 15–40 barrios.


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LA UNION
ISABELA
NUEVA VIZCAYA
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ZAMBALES
BATAAN
MANILA
RIZAL
CAVITE
LAGUNA
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BATANGAS
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CAMARINES SUR
CATANDUANES
ALBAY
SORSOGON
MASBATE
ROMBLON
SIBUYAN SEA
SAMAR
LEYTE
VISAYAN SEA
CAPIZ
AKLAN
ANTIQUE
ILOILO
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BOHOL
BOHOL SEA
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SURIGAO
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BUKIDNON
ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE
ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR
LANAO DEL NORTE
LANAO DEL SUR
DAVAO
COTABATO
PALAWAN
SULU PROV
Scarborough Shoal
CHINA SEA
SULU SEA
PACIFIC OCEAN
CELEBES SEA
BORNEO
Huklandia
0
50
100
150
Statute Miles

FIG. 1. Map of the Philippines.

and other theories requires an explicit framework or model. Application of the econometric approach will show that the successes and failures of the Huk movement can be explained well by a few cultural, economic, and geographical variables.


HUK-controlled
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Province boundaries
Poblacion
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STATUTE MILES
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PAMPANGA
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SIERRA MADRE
CARRANGLAN
LUPAO
PANTABANGAN
SAN JOSE
CUYAPO
SAN
MUNOZ
RIZAL
BONGABON
MONCADA
ANAO
NAMPICUAN
SAN CLEMENTE
CAMILING
PANIQUI
RAMOS
GUIMBA
SANTO DOMINGO
TALAVERA
PURA
SANTA IGNACIA
GERONA
VICTORIA
LICAB
QUEZON
LAUR
MAYANTOC
ALIAGA
CABANATUAN
TARLAC
HACIENDA LUISITA
LA PAZ
ZARAGOZA
SANTA ROSA
PENARANDA
JAEN
SAN LEONARDO
PAPAYA
CONCEPCION
SAN ANTONIO
CAPAS
SAN ISIDRO
GAPAN
BAMBAN
MAGALANG
CABIAO
MT ARAYAT
MABALACAT
ARAYAT
SAN MIGUEL
ANGELES
CANDABA
SANTA ANA
MEXICO
PORAC
CANDABA SWAMP
SAN ILDEFONSO
SAN FERNANDO
BACOLOR
SAN LUIS
SANTA RITA
SAN SIMON
SAN RAFAEL
ANGAT
FLORIDABLANCA
GUAGUA
MINALIN
APALIT
BALIUAG
BUSTOS
NORZAGARAY
LUBAO
MACABEBE
PULILAN
CALUMPIT
PLARIDEL
SEXMOAN
BIGAA
GUIGUINTO
SAN JOSE DEL MONTE
MASANTOL
MALOLOS
SANTA MARIA
PAOMBONG
HAGONOY
BOCAUE
BULACAN
MARILAO
MEYCAUAYAN
OBANDO
POLO

Fig. 2. Huklandia.

### I. A MODEL OF REBELLION

For some time economists have represented the economic system by a set of equations—behavioral, institutional, technological, and definitional. The variables in these equations are those in which the economist is interested—prices, wages, employment—plus those noneconomic variables that must be taken into account—family size, weather, technological conditions. A representative equation in an economic system would be the demand equation, relating the quantity of a good purchased to its price, the prices of other goods, income, family size, age, and so forth. Each decision made by "economic man" can be represented by a behavioral equation. The equation enables us to determine what an individual or group will choose to do, given the objective costs and benefits associated with the various choices and given the tastes or attitudes of those making the choices. In the demand equation the price of the good is an objective cost; the age of the consumer is a variable characterizing the consumer himself and therefore his likely tastes and attitudes.

There is no reason why the political system cannot be thought of in the same way. Whether a village is government- or rebel-controlled is a consequence of decisions made by people, individually or collectively, in that village. Their decision will be a function of the objective costs and benefits attached to alternative choices, and of the basic attitudes of these people toward the rebels and toward the existing order. There is, then, an equation relating the degree of government or rebel control in an area to the "prices" of various actions in the area, and to those characteristics that determine the basic attitudes of the population.

The characteristics of the population might be represented in the equation by variables such as language, religion, occupation, and literacy. Determined over long periods of history they are usually not affected by the events of the rebellion (with the significant exception of its outcome). They may be regarded therefore as determined for the most part outside the rebellion model. On the other hand, the costs and benefits associated with different peasant actions are very much under the influence of government and rebel policy. It is obviously desirable for each side to attach high rewards and severe penalties to favorable and hostile acts. But the business of setting these prices is itself costly. Possessing limited resources, neither side can afford to reward good behavior and punish misbehavior each time they occur. Instead a strategy must be worked out by which resources flow to those places that yield the greatest returns for a given cost.

The cost of influencing peasant behavior in a community seems to depend heavily on the friendliness or hostility of the surrounding area. To determine one's allies and enemies requires communication with the village. To reward allies and punish enemies requires access by military and political personnel. The movement of messages and men is obviously more expensive when they must pass through enemy areas. The rational allocation of resources thus compels each side to concentrate on contiguous areas.

As a consequence, the pattern of incentives in any community depends upon the control situation of its neighbors. There are, of course, additional factors. Guerrillas are thought to be relatively more efficient in areas of low mobility such as mountains and swamps. Thus, villages located near mountains may face exceptional pressure from the rebel side. But this topographical factor is exogenous and may simply be added to the list of exogenous variables. The principal endogenous influence on incentive patterns is contiguity. We may therefore replace the prices in the control equation with an index of Huk control in neighboring areas. The control equation may then be written formally:[5]

$$HC_j = F(HCN_j; X_{1j}, X_{2j}, \cdots, X_{nj}; e_j), \qquad j = 1, 2, \cdots, J. \quad (1)$$

HC is a variable measuring the degree of Huk control (or rebel support). The subscript j indicates the municipality; in all there are J. HCN is an index of Huk control in neighboring municipalities. $X_1$ through $X_n$ are n exogenous variables; e is a random error representing ignored minor variables.

For simplicity, HCN is assumed to be an ordinary weighted average of Huk control in bordering municipalities:

$$HCN_j = \sum_{m=1}^{J} a_{jm} HC_m, \quad (2)$$

$$\sum_{m=1}^{J} a_{jm} \leq 1, \qquad j = 1, 2, \cdots, J. \quad (2a)$$

In the statistical work that follows the weights were chosen in proportion to the length of the border between the municipality and each neighboring municipality.[6] If the total border of municipality A is 20 miles and municipalities A and B share a border of two miles, the $a_{AB}=.10$. (Note that in general $a_{AB}\neq a_{BA}$). Alternative weighting principles, such as distance from the center of one municipality to the center of another, would cause negligible changes in the index.

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[5] The pattern of incentives obviously depends upon the control situation within the community itself. In other words, $HC_j$ appears on the right hand side of the equation as well as the left. Equation (1) must therefore be regarded as derived from an original equation, the $HC_j$ on the right hand side having been "solved out." The parameters of equation (1) will as a consequence be somewhat larger than those of the original equation.

[6] Since this study is confined to a particular geographical area, municipalities on the edges of that area will have borders with external municipalities that are not represented in the summation of (2a); hence, the inequality. This is a reasonable way of handling the weights since external municipalities have no critical barrios for primarily exogenous reasons and therefore make no contribution to HCN. The alternative would be to force the weights to add to one by scaling them up, resulting in a somewhat lower estimate of k.

If the general function F in equation (1) can be approximated by a linear function,

$$HC_j = k\left(\sum_{m=1}^{J} a_{jm}HC_m\right) + \sum_{i=1}^{n} b_iX_{ij} + e_j, \qquad j = 1, 2, \cdots, J. \quad (3)$$

If all the variables on the right hand side of equation (3) were exogenous, the parameters (k and the b's) could be estimated by running a simple multiple regression. But obviously HCN is not exogenous. It is a linear combination of HCs and these values are determined within the model, that is they are endogenous. According to equation (3), to know Huk control in one municipality we must know Huk control in neighboring municipalities. But if A is a neighbor of B, B is a neighbor of A. Thus, to know control in A we must know control in B, and to know control in B we must know control in A. Control in all municipalities must therefore be determined simultaneously by the J equations, one for each municipality.

There is considerable econometric literature on the estimation of parameters in simultaneous equation systems.[7] One of the elementary points is that ordinary least squares or multiple regression generally leads to biased and inconsistent estimates when there are two or more endogenous variables in an equation.[8] However, the sophisticated methods devised to yield consistent estimates are not applicable (without modification) to this special case. As it turns out, consistent estimates can be obtained by a very simple procedure.

(For those whose mathematical background does not include matrix algebra, a crude prose translation of the remainder of this section will be given. The objective of these manipulations is to transform equations (3) into a new set of equations that do not include HCN, but only HC and the X's. Equations (3) read: Huk control in a given municipality depends upon Huk control in neighboring municipalities and the environmental conditions (the X's) within the given municipality. This is transformed to: Huk control in a given municipality depends upon the environmental conditions in the given municipality and upon the environmental conditions in the neighboring municipalities. Thus, "environmental conditions in the neighboring municipalities" is substituted for "Huk control in the neighboring municipalities." Needless to say, the mathematical counterpart of this is at once more precise and more complex. In the new equation Huk control depends only on factors that are exogenous, that is, they affect Huk control, but are in turn unaffected by it. Using the new equation estimates of the parameters of equations (3) can be obtained that are far more accurate than direct use of equations (3). In particular, application of multiple regression directly to equations (3) would result in overestimation of the importance of coercion or contiguity, and more important, severe underestimation of the role of other variables.)

Consider the J equations (3) in matrix notation:

$$HC = kAHC + Xb + e, \qquad (4)$$

where $HC$ is a $J\times 1$ vector of observations on Huk control; A is a $J\times J$ matrix of weights, a typical element being $a_{jm}$; X is a $J\times n$ matrix of J observations on n exogenous variables; and $e$ is a vector of random errors.

Manipulating (4) we have:

$$HC - kAHC = Xb + e,$$
$$HC = (I - kA)^{-1}Xb + (I - kA)^{-1}e.$$

Letting $u = (I-kA)^{-1}e$

$$HC = (I - kA)^{-1}Xb + u. \qquad (5)$$

In this equation system, $HC$ is expressed entirely as a function of exogenous variables. Consistent estimates of the parameters can be obtained by applying least squares or the equivalent method of maximum likelihood. Unfortunately, this does not lead to a straightforward linear multiple regression because the equations are not linear in the parameters. To minimize the sum of squares of the residuals, or equivalently to maximize the likelihood function under normality, we choose a wide range of values of k, substitute them into $(I-kA)^{-1}$, and run multiple regressions of HC on the transformed Xs. The value of k that minimizes the sum of squares is the least squares and maximum likelihood estimate. The regression coefficients for this value of k then give the estimate of $b$.

A better understanding of the equation system (5) can be gained by expanding the matrix $(I-kA)^{-1}$. Under appropriate conditions, $k<1$ and the inequalities (2a) being sufficient,

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[7] The best textbook reference is E. Malinvaud, *Statistical Methods of Econometrics*, North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1966.

[8] An estimate is unbiased if its expected value equals the true value of the parameter. An estimate is consistent if, as the sample size becomes large, the estimate tends in a stochastic sense to the value of the parameter. See M. G. Kendall and A. Stuart, *The Advanced Theory of Statistics*, Griffin, London, 1961, Vol. 2, Ch. 17.

$$(I - kA)^{-1} = I + kA + k^2A^2 + \cdots.$$

Ignoring the error term,

$$HC = Xb + kAXb + k^2A^2Xb + \cdots. \qquad (6)$$

The first term in this series represents the influence of the characteristics of a municipality on Huk control within that municipality. If k were zero this is the only influence that would exist. With k greater than zero neighboring municipalities begin to play a role. In the second term the expression AX represents weighted averages of the characteristics of bordering municipalities. These weighted neighborhood characteristics operate on Huk control in the same manner as the characteristics of the original municipality, except that they are deflated by k. If k is large the characteristics of the neighbors will be important; if k is small they will not.

The third term represents the effects of characteristics in municipalities bordering on the neighbors of the original municipality. In the expression $A^2X$ the characteristics of these second-order municipalities are weighted according to their indirect influence through the first-order municipalities. Since $A^2$ is smaller than A and $k^2$ is less than k these second-order effects will be less than the first-order.[9]

Pursuing the higher order terms it is clear that every municipality will affect every other municipality, but that the impact will lessen with the distance between them.[10]

It should be stressed that the value of k depends not only on the validity of the allocation theory, but also on the extent to which coercion is used. In the absence of coercion k must be zero. On the other hand, with great and efficient exercise of threat and intimidation it can reach one, in which case the theory implies almost complete control by one side or the other. The estimate of k obtained at any point in time refers of course only to the use of coercive resources at that point. With changing capabilities either side can effect large shifts in the level of control and accompanying changes in the value of k.

## II. THE HUK EQUATION

Some barrios of Huklandia are so dominated by the Huks that they are classified as critical by the Philippine Constabulary. The specific criteria are: first, the Huks must exercise considerable authority over local officials; and second, the residents must actively support the Huks through monthly contributions and other assistance. No distinction is made whether this support is obtained voluntarily or by force, and in practice this would probably be impossible to ascertain. As the model suggests, Huk support will generally depend on both popularity and pressure.

The variable HC (Huk Control) is defined to be the percentage of critical barrios in a municipality in 1967. All references to Huk "control," "support," or like terms refer to this measure. Statistics recently released by the Constabulary indicate Huk activities outside Central Luzon, principally in Southern Luzon. At the time my data were collected (1967–1968) I was assured that there were no critical barrios in that region. The new data appear to contradict this assurance. On the other hand, the very small number of Constabulary assigned to the area seems to belie the new data. Unfortunately, I have no firsthand acquaintance with them. If there are in fact critical barrios in Southern Luzon, a separate econometric analysis for that region should be conducted. Simple extrapolation of the Central Luzon results would be inappropriate.

The exogenous variables were constructed from data in the 1939 and 1960 Philippine Censuses of Population and Agriculture. These included economic variables (tenancy, average farm size, gross peasant farm income, value of farm output, type of agriculture, farm population); cultural variables (language, religion, education, literacy); demographic variables (population growth, population density); and geographical variables (mountains, swamps). For two reasons it was felt that the 1939 data would be most appropriate. First, to be truly exogenous some of these, particularly the economic variables, should antedate the formation of the Huks in 1942. Second, some potentially important variables can be constructed only from the more comprehensive 1939 Censuses. As it turns out the 1939 variables actually have larger coefficients and greater statistical significance than their counterparts from 1960. (The reason for this will be discussed later in this section.)

To study the influence of changes in the environment between 1939 and 1960 rate of change variables were constructed where feasible. In fact, most exogenous variables changed little during this period, the notable exceptions being population and type of agriculture, and, to a lesser extent, tenancy, farm population, and farm size. No change variables were found to be statistically significant.

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[9] Smaller in the sense that the average element of $A^2$ is smaller than the average element of A. For particular elements this need not be true.

[10] The analogy of this discussion to input-output systems should be obvious to economists. The matrix A is an input-output matrix with the special condition that each industry must sell to the same industries from which it buys.

In all, 57 Central Luzon municipalities have been included in the study. These range from Malolos in the south to Paniqui in the north. The only reason for limiting the analysis to this area is to reduce the computational work. The 57 municipalities cover all the Huk area, plus the surrounding areas in every direction. There is nothing to be gained from extending the boundaries. As it turns out, the equation arrived at predicts Huk control outside of the sample with great accuracy and inclusion of additional municipalities would only confirm what was already well established.

Estimating the parameters of the model from the reduced form we arrive at the first equation (A) of Table 1. This equation includes only those variables that possess statistical significance by standard statistical criteria. (The data from which this equation is derived are given in Table 2.) Three principal conclusions may be drawn. First, k is large and hence our theory of coercion is well supported. Second, the presence of Pampangos, an ethnic and linguistic minority, is a crucial condition for Huk success. Third, Huk control will be greater where most men are farmers and most farmers are tenants.

To appreciate the importance of k being as large as .8, consider the case of a municipality surrounded by thoroughly Huk-controlled territory (that is, $HCN=100$). Let us suppose that this surrounded municipality possesses none of the characteristics favorable to Huk success. There are no Pampangos, few tenant farmers, and so on. According to equation (A), this unreceptive place would find 80 percent of its barrios critical.[11]

Examples as extreme as this do not occur in the data, but there are some illustrative cases. San Rafael in Bulacan has few Pampangos and on the basis of its cultural and economic features should be relatively Huk-free. Yet one in every six barrios is critical. Figure 2 shows that San Rafael is bordered on the west by a solidly Huk region around the Candaba swamp. To the east the Sierra Madre offers excellent refuge to Huk regulars. To the north and south neighbors San Ildefonso and Baliuag are in similar positions. Thus, for apparently geographical reasons an otherwise peaceful spot finds itself with a serious Huk problem.[12]

To return to a point made earlier, there is nothing inherently stable about the parameter k. Its value as computed in the cross-sectional analysis reflects the importance of the hypothesized coercion mechanism at a specific point in time. With more effective use of coercion by the Huks k would rise, indicating an expansion of Huk control outside of the shaded areas of Figure 2. A decline in k would, of course, result in a contraction of area under control. The Huk expansion of the immediate post-war period and the contraction of the 1950's should be thought of primarily in these terms. The reorganization and revitalization of an ineffective Constabulary by Magsaysay into a formidable anti-guerrilla force drastically reduced the importance of coercion in the Huk campaign. Accordingly, a reduction of k to a very small magnitude results, when plugged into equation (A), in a predicted number of barrios under Huk control that is but a meager fraction of the actual 1968 figures. Although detailed statistics are not available to the author this prediction would probably not correspond too badly to actual conditions in the late 1950s.

Among exogenous variables the proportion of Pampangos in the population dominates. In the absence of Pampangos the impact of other exogenous variables is nil. Apparently the Huks can control non-Pampango areas only through external pressure. In this sense the presence of Pampangos is a necessary but not sufficient condition for Huk success. Outside of Pampanga and the Pampangan-speaking areas of Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, and Bulacan, the equation predicts accurately the absence of any critical barrios.

The predominance of the Pampango variable is due to the particular way that P enters into equation (A). Suppose instead we assumed that the presence of Pampangos is not a necessary condition, but just one among sev-

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[11] It should be mentioned that there are factors other than coercion that would be contained in the contiguity effect. For example, the strong kinship tie among Filipinos would imply sympathy for the cause of relatives in neighboring areas. But the quantitative importance of this and similar qualifications is likely to be small.

[12] The use of coercion does not imply a high level of violence. An efficient coercive organization does not have to carry out its threats if they are truly credible. An occasional penalty swiftly administered may be all that is necessary. The correlation between effective coercion and observed incidents of violence is probably quite weak.

TABLE 1. HUK CONTROL EQUATIONS

(57 Municipalities)

| Equation | | $\bar{R}^2$ (Reduced Form) | F (Reduced Form) |
|---|---|---|---|
| (A) | $HC = \underset{(.76)^{a}}{-1.53} + .8\ HCN + P\left[\underset{(.46)}{2.28\ FMP} - \underset{(.26)}{1.69\ OWN} + \underset{(.09)}{.33\ SGR} + \underset{(3.5)}{23.0\ MNT} + \underset{(4.2)}{11.6\ SWP}\right]$ | .86 | 60.5 |
| (B)<br>[k=0] | $HC = \underset{(2.60)}{.94} + P\left[\underset{(.86)}{4.47\ FMP} - \underset{(.47)}{2.10\ OWN} + \underset{(.16)}{.42\ SGR} + \underset{(6.7)}{40.3\ MNT} + \underset{(8.6)}{16.0\ SWP}\right]$ | .73 | 27.8 |
| (C)<br>[P linear] | $HC = \underset{(1.19)}{3.00} + .9\ HCN - \underset{(.03)}{.03\ P} + \underset{(2.15)}{2.15\ FMP} - \underset{(.19)}{.89\ OWN} + \underset{(.10)}{.30\ SGR} + \underset{(3.2)}{14.5\ MNT} + \underset{(4.4)}{16.5\ SWP}$ | .68 | 17.3 |
| (D)<br>[k=0, P linear] | $HC = \underset{(9.70)}{-6.13} + \underset{(.09)}{.19\ P} + \underset{(.54)}{.88\ FMP} - \underset{(.29)}{.65\ OWN} + \underset{(.18)}{.44\ SGR} + \underset{(5.4)}{20.9\ MNT} + \underset{(10.7)}{18.5\ SWP}$ | .50 | 8.3 |

*Definitions:*

HC = the percentage of barrios in a municipality under Huk control (1967–1968).[b]
P = the proportion of the population that speak the Kapampangan dialect (1939).[c]
FMP = farmers as a percentage of the population (1939).[c]
OWN = owners as a percentage of all farmers (1939).[c]
SGR = the percentage of cultivated land planted to sugar cane (1939).[c]
MNT = 1 if mountains are in or immediately adjacent to the municipality; 0 if not.
SWP = 1 if a swamp is in or immediately adjacent to the municipality; 0 if not.
HCN = a weighted average of HCs in bordering municipalities.

*Notes:*

[a] The figures in parentheses are standard errors.

[b] The percentage of variation in HC explained by equation (A) or (C) *given HCN* is substantially higher than the $\bar{R}^2$ for the reduced form. This latter figure is based only on the explanatory power of the exogenous variables.

[c] All 1939 data were obtained from the 1939 Census of Population or the 1939 Census of Agriculture.

eral exogenous factors. What would happen if P entered the equation additively rather than multiplicatively? The answer is given by equation (C). Taken as a whole, this is much poorer than equation (A). Furthermore, the coefficient of P is not even statistically significant! The explanation is that Huk control is confined for the most part to the Pampangan-speaking area; but not all of this area is Huk-controlled. Within the area, and only within the area, the remaining exogenous factors operate.

Strictly speaking, this is the way we must interpret equation (A). Having limited ourselves to only the simplest models, however, the supposed "necessity" of Pampangos is an exaggeration. More complex functional forms would almost certainly show that factors such as tenancy operate among non-Pampangos, but to a much smaller degree. We should expect to find many non-Pampangos freely embracing the HMB, and we do. This does not detract, of course, from the strong general tendency that the equation reveals.[13]

Two questions arise in any attempt to ascertain the behavioral interpretation of the Pampangan effect: Why would a serious insurgency be most likely to develop among Pampangos? And, why would other ethnic groups shun a Pampangan movement? The latter question is the easier and will be handled first. Based upon the history of rebellions in Central and Southern Luzon there does appear to be a strong element of mistrust between Pampangos and their neighbors, the Tagalogs and Ilokanos. During the first phase of the Philippine Revolution against Spain (1882–1896), the militantly nationalist Katipunan movement was overwhelmingly Tagalog and received little support from the Pampangans.[14] Even after hostilities broke out between the Tagalogs and the Spaniards (August 1896) Pampangans for the most part remained loyal to Spain and many served faithfully on the Spanish side. It was not until the defeat of the Spanish at Manila Bay by the Americans (May 1898) that the Pampangans began to favor the revolution. After joining the Republic in August 1898, Pampanga, although one of the wealthiest provinces, ranked a poor fifteenth in financial contributions.[15]

A similar lack of Pampangan enthusiasm for a predominantly Tagalog cause was displayed during the Sakdalista episode of the 1930s. The Sakdalista party was a radical agrarian movement in Central and Southern Luzon and ran successful candidates for public office. During the 1934 elections they received a significant percentage of the vote in every province of the region—except Pampanga.[16]

Thus, the forsaken Pampangos of the past two decades have been undergoing an experience familiar to the Tagalogs. In historical perspective, the Huk phenomenon is seen as a simple turnabout of the usual situation, but with this exception: the success of a Tagalog cause is little affected by Pampangan support or the absence of it. Tagalogs outnumber Pampangos by more than 6 to 1. Given the Huk performance with the potential backing of little more than 5 percent of the Philippine population, the Tagalog abandonment must rate as a decisive factor of the rebellion.[17]

To the north, especially in northern Tarlac, the principal neighbors of the Pampangos are Ilokanos. Here the historical evidence is more limited. However, the impression one obtains is that the cleavage between Ilokano and Pampango is more thorough than between Tagalog and Pampango. The Ilokano is noted for his clannishness and, although willing to follow his own leaders, he is suspicious of strangers. To the Huks' misfortune, he is one of the more extreme examples of Filipino sectionalism.[18]

We must now consider why this particular

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[13] Since there are virtually no Pampangos in Southern Luzon success of the movement there would imply that either the language barrier has been hurdled, considerable coercion has been employed, or the movement there has a different basis.

[14] Pampangans are residents of Pampanga province; Pampangos are people who speak the Kapampangan dialect. Almost all Pampangans are Pampangos, but the reverse is not quite true. In this historical discussion the distinction, although necessary for literal accuracy, is of no great consequence.

[15] J. A. Larkin, *The Evolution of Pampangan Society: A Case Study of Social and Economic Change in the Rural Philippines* (Doctoral Dissertation in History, New York University, 1966). There are a number of Filipino historians who dispute the importance of sectionalism in the Revolution. See for example, T. Kalow, *The Philippine Revolution* (Manila, 1925). Among American writers it is often referred to as the Tagalog Rebellion.

[16] Carl H. Landé, *Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

[17] From private conversations with Luis Taruc I gather that the Huk leadership was unaware of this, although in recent years Taruc has reflected on its importance.

[18] Marcelo Tangco, "The Christian Peoples of the Philippines," *Natural and Applied Science Bulletin*, XI, 9–114.

TABLE 2. DATA ON HUK CONTROL, LANGUAGE, TOPOGRAPHY, AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
(57 Philippine municipalities)

| Municipality | Province | Percentage of Barrios Huk Controlled 1968 (HC) | Proportion of Population Able to Speak Pampangan Dialect (P) | Farms as Percentage of Population 1939 (FMP) | Percentage of Farms Operated by Owners 1939 (OWN) | Area Planted to Sugarcane as a Percent of all Cultivated Land 1939 (SGR) | Dummy Variable-Contiguous to Mountains (MNT) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Angeles | Pampanga | 46.7 | .88 | 2.6 | 14.6 | 53.9 | 1 |
| Apalit | Pampanga | 7.4 | .99 | 6.7 | 9.4 | 11.4 | 0 |
| Arayat | Pampanga | 68.4 | .98 | 8.2 | 12.4 | 22.8 | 1 |
| Bacolor | Pampanga | 29.4 | .99 | 6.2 | 12.5 | 33.3 | 0 |
| Candaba | Pampanga | 48.1 | .92 | 11.3 | 4.6 | 2.5 | 0 |
| Floridablanca | Pampanga | 0.0 | .91 | 7.5 | 21.0 | 65.3 | 0 |
| Guagua | Pampanga | 0.0 | .98 | 3.0 | 18.8 | 23.4 | 0 |
| Lubao | Pampanga | 2.5 | .99 | 8.4 | 17.9 | 35.8 | 0 |
| Mabalacat | Pampanga | 73.7 | .96 | 4.9 | 10.3 | 58.5 | 1 |
| Macabebe | Pampanga | 0.0 | .99 | 4.3 | 14.0 | 6.6 | 0 |
| Magalang | Pampanga | 80.0 | .97 | 7.8 | 9.5 | 49.0 | 1 |
| Masantol | Pampanga | 0.0 | 1.00 | 6.3 | 8.0 | 1.0 | 0 |
| Mexico | Pampanga | 25.0 | .93 | 9.8 | 8.1 | 36.9 | 0 |
| Minalin | Pampanga | 0.0 | .99 | 5.5 | 4.6 | 0.9 | 0 |
| Porac | Pampanga | 43.5 | .95 | 7.9 | 8.4 | 61.6 | 1 |
| San Fernanco | Pampanga | 11.8 | .95 | 3.4 | 12.2 | 46.4 | 0 |
| San Luis | Pampanga | 43.8 | .96 | 6.5 | 11.3 | 4.8 | 0 |
| San Simon | Pampanga | 35.7 | .97 | 10.5 | 18.5 | 7.1 | 0 |
| Santa Ana | Pampanga | 50.0 | .99 | 8.2 | 11.5 | 21.8 | 0 |
| Santa Rita | Pampanga | 0.0 | 1.00 | 5.7 | 16.9 | 35.2 | 0 |
| Sexmoan | Pampanga | 0.0 | .96 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0 |
| Bamban | Tarlac | 88.9 | .92 | 6.1 | 7.1 | 35.8 | 1 |
| Capas | Tarlac | 62.5 | .93 | 9.4 | 15.4 | 19.0 | 1 |
| Concepcion | Tarlac | 78.6 | .94 | 9.1 | 6.7 | 39.1 | 0 |
| Gerona | Tarlac | 0.0 | .26 | 12.7 | 33.3 | 30.5 | 0 |
| La Paz | Tarlac | 9.5 | .54 | 13.4 | 10.0 | 20.6 | 0 |
| Paniqui | Tarlac | 0.0 | .44 | 12.1 | 30.8 | 14.6 | 0 |
| Pura | Tarlac | 0.0 | .54 | 12.0 | 34.3 | 31.7 | 0 |
| Ramos | Tarlac | 0.0 | .57 | 13.2 | 17.0 | 27.5 | 0 |
| Santa Ignacia | Tarlac | 0.0 | .47 | 15.0 | 40.5 | 4.0 | 0 |
| Tarlac | Tarlac | 0.0 | .81 | 6.7 | 23.7 | 25.3 | 1 |
| Victoria | Tarlac | 0.0 | .28 | 14.3 | 31.3 | 17.6 | 0 |
| Aliaga | Nueva Ecija | 0.0 | .03 | 23.4 | 15.6 | 0.2 | 0 |
| Cabanatuan | Nueva Ecija | 0.0 | .03 | 13.0 | 19.0 | 0.5 | 1 |
| Cabiao | Nueva Ecija | 21.4 | .65 | 11.8 | 14.3 | 0.1 | 0 |
| Gapan | Nueva Ecija | 0.0 | .23 | 10.3 | 11.5 | 0.1 | 1 |
| Jaen | Nueva Ecija | 0.0 | .05 | 26.3 | 11.7 | 0.5 | 0 |
| Licab | Nueva Ecija | 0.0 | .10 | 21.3 | 19.8 | 0.7 | 0 |
| Peñaranda | Nueva Ecija | 0.0 | .00 | 21.5 | 40.5 | 0.2 | 1 |
| Quezon | Nueva Ecija | 0.0 | .02 | 21.2 | 23.2 | 0.3 | 0 |
| San Antonio | Nueva Ecija | 20.0 | .12 | 19.8 | 20.4 | 0.6 | 0 |
| San Isidro | Nueva Ecija | 0.0 | .02 | 17.3 | 18.5 | 0.3 | 0 |
| San Leonardo | Nueva Ecija | 0.0 | .16 | 20.3 | 17.7 | 0.8 | 0 |
| Santa Rosa | Nueva Ecija | 0.0 | .02 | 19.3 | 17.8 | 0.3 | 1 |
| Zaragoza | Nueva Ecija | 0.0 | .04 | 25.7 | 24.8 | 0.5 | 0 |
| Angat | Bulacan | 0.0 | .00 | 18.2 | 43.1 | 1.2 | 1 |
| Baliuag | Bulacan | 16.7 | .03 | 7.7 | 9.3 | 0.3 | 0 |
| Bustos | Bulacan | 0.0 | .00 | 16.8 | 16.1 | 0.7 | 0 |

TABLE 2—(*Continued*)

| Municipality | Province | Percentage of Barrios Huk Controlled 1968 (HC) | Proportion of Population Able to Speak Pampangan Dialect (P) | Farms as Percentage of Population 1939 (FMP) | Percentage of Farms Operated by Owners 1939 (OWN) | Area Planted to Sugarcane as a Percent of all Cultivated Land 1939 (SGR) | Dummy Variable-Contiguous to Mount (MNT) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Calumpit | Bulacan | 0.0 | .23 | 9.0 | 16.9 | 20.6 | 0 |
| Haganoy | Bulacan | 0.0 | .03 | 3.4 | 9.0 | 7.7 | 0 |
| Malolos | Bulacan | 0.0 | .01 | 4.8 | 15.6 | 0.2 | 0 |
| Paombong | Bulacan | 0.0 | .00 | 4.4 | 7.4 | 10.5 | 0 |
| Plaridel | Bulacan | 0.0 | .00 | 11.0 | 14.3 | 0.4 | 0 |
| Pulilan | Bulacan | 0.0 | .05 | 12.7 | 22.7 | 2.2 | 0 |
| San Ildefonso | Bulacan | 9.7 | .02 | 14.9 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 1 |
| San Miguel | Bulacan | 5.0 | .08 | 11.3 | 11.8 | 0.2 | 1 |
| San Rafael | Bulacan | 16.7 | .01 | 14.9 | 42.8 | 0.3 | 1 |

*Note:* The SWP variable has a value of 1 for the municipalities of Apalit, Candaba, San Luis, and San Simon; for all other municipalities it is 0.

Communist movement began among Pampangos in the first place. One answer, and there is no one that can be held with any certainty, involves the general environment of Pampanga and the immediately surrounding parts of Central Luzon. This area has been at the forefront of the general drift toward tenancy and away from peasant ownership that has characterized the Philippines most of this century. As a consequence it became the focus of the radical agrarian politics of the 1930's, with the Socialist and Communist parties centering their activities around the capital city of San Fernando. Feeding on peasant discontent over land distribution and tenure conditions these movements took hold and there ensued peasant strikes, sabotage of crops, and violent clashes between socialist unions and landlord-backed organizations. The important point is that the Communist movement and the subsequent Hukbalahap became predominantly Pampangan movements. Although they faced similar agrarian conditions in their attempts at expansion outside the Pampangan speaking zone, they did not face other Pampangans. The rebellion could be exported therefore only by a heavy emphasis on coercion. As a result the most fragile part of the rebellion has been that outside the relatively reliable home base in Pampanga.

On this interpretation we arrive at the paradoxical conclusion that the rebellion arose out of a dissatisfaction with land tenure conditions, but could not expand to other localities where conditions were as bad or worse.[19] This interrelationship between land tenure and language is demonstrated by the manner in which the tenancy variable enters into equation (A). If P is one, land tenure exerts a strong influence on control. If P is zero, its effect is nil.

At first glance the positive contribution of tenancy to Huk success does not appear to be a remarkable finding. The literature on agrarian radical movements in Southeast Asia,[20] and on the Philippines in particular,[21] stresses the role of unequal land distribution and the resulting frustration of peasant aspirations. Yet certain aspects of this result are interesting. First of all, it is in sharp contrast to the author's research on the Vietnamese war, where it was found that high tenancy rates and several other measures of inequality contributed positively to the government, not the rebel, cause.[22] Without attempting a thorough explanation here, we can distinguish between the effects of tenancy and inequality on peasant aspirations, and their effects on economic, social and political organization of the village. Even if peasant frustrations are greatest in areas of inequality, and it is not clear that they are,[23] there exist offsetting elements in the way that unequal communities are organized. It can be argued that an external threat to the community in the form of a disciplined guerrilla force can best be handled when the structure of authority is simple. Landlords, with clear interests in defending the village, may be able to efficiently organize their tenants and debtors into a resistance. A more democratic community of small independent farmers may prove indecisive and incapable of organizing a defense. Thus we find in Vietnam relatively larger and presumably more effective local militia and paramilitary forces in areas of strong landlord influence. (Incidentally, if this thesis is correct we would probably have to characterize the Huk rebellion as the more spontaneous, rising out of peasant aspirations, and the Vietnamese as more induced, depending on the use of coercion by external organizations. Emphasizing that this distinction is one of degree and not of kind, the inference does not seem implausible.)

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[19] Note that Pampanga as a province has the highest overall rate of tenancy, but that there are many municipalities outside of Pampanga that have higher rates than specific Huk-dominated municipalities within Pampanga.

[20] E. Jacoby, *Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia* (Bombay: Asia Publishing Co., 1961).

[21] F. L. Starner, *Magsaysay and the Philippine Peasantry* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961).

[22] Edward J. Mitchell, "Inequality and Insurgency: A Statistical Study of South Vietnam," *World Politics*, xx (April 1968), "The Significance of Land Tenure in the Vietnamese Insurgency," *Asian Survey*, August 1967.

It is also interesting that land tenure should play so large a role where it varies so little. In the great bulk of the Pampangan-speaking municipalities owners represent only 5 to 18 percent of all farmers. Thus, tenancy (including part-ownership) varies from a high 82 percent to a very high 95 percent. Yet the coefficient of the OWN variable is so large (−1.7) that this represents a difference of 22 percentage points in Huk control. One would have thought that by the time tenants and part-owners reached 75 to 80 percent their influence would be so great as to yield diminishing returns to further increments in their number. Apparently not. This suggests that at moderate rates (25–75 percent) tenancy is not a crucial factor contributing to rebellion and becomes so only upon reaching the highest levels. It further suggests that owner-farmers, whose variability is much greater relative to their average numbers, may play a conservative role for exceeding in importance their proportion of the population.

Unlike tenancy rates, occupational composition does vary widely, both within Pampanga and without. In 1939 there were but 7 small farms in Sexmoan, Pampanga, a municipality of more than 10,000 people; whereas in Jaen, Nueva Ecija, there was one farm for every four persons. Assuming a family size of at least four, the farm population varied practically from 0 to 100 percent. The coefficient of the FMP variable indicates that Huk support among non-farmers (fishermen, merchants, laborers) was weak. Examples are found in Sexmoan, a fishing community, with no critical barrios, and San Fernando, location of the provincial capital, with but 11.8 percent. Candaba, on the other hand, with a farm population of over 50 percent, has 13 of its 27 barrios on the critical list.

To see how tenancy and farm population fail to operate as powerful forces outside the Pampangan-speaking area consider one extreme case. (There are many less dramatic examples.) Nampicuan in Nueva Ecija had 1451 farms in 1939. Four of these were operated by owners. By 1960 the figure had soared to 12. Over these 1451 farms were spread 5023 people, or about 3.5 persons per farm. Surely there were few individuals engaged in anything but agriculture. By 1960 the farm population had declined to 78 percent, still very high. The FMP and OWN variables possess values here more favorable to the Huks than in any municipality included in Table 2. Yet, because only 74 residents spoke Pampangan, and, interestingly enough, almost all the remainder were Ilokanos, there were no critical barrios.

The presence of nearby mountains raises Huk control by about 23 percentage points. This is easily explained by the comparative advantage possessed by guerrillas in poor terrain. In the same way, nearby swamps raise Huk control by 11 points. These results strongly reinforce the position that coercion plays a dominant role.

Turning to the sugar cane variable we must be a bit more speculative. Two interpretations may be advanced. First, there is usually a high proportion of farm laborers and migrant workers on sugar cane estates, and these groups may well be the most radical. (Unfortunately, no explicit variable measuring laborers or migrant workers is available on a municipality basis.) Second, the sugar cane landlord is probably more a profit-oriented and businesslike and hence less paternalistic than the traditional Philippine landowner. His tenants would then be regarded as employees with no claims on his time and resources other than their share of the cash value of the crop. Since the traditional acceptance of the landlord's high status is predicted on a far more extensive set of roles than mere owner of the land, tenants may have little respect for their landlord's rights and the institutions that preserve them.

Thus far we've been satisfied with explaining a large part of the variation in Huk control across municipalities in terms of a few systematic factors. It is often rewarding, however, to try to explain some of the deviant cases where actual Huk control differs substantially from that predicted by the equation. In two cases this seems worthwhile.

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[23] See Mitchell, *op. cit.*; and *Land Tenure and Rebellion*, The RAND Corporation, RM-5181 (Abridged) (Santa Monica, June 1967).

The municipality of Tarlac has no critical barrios according to the Constabulary. Yet it possesses some ideal attributes from the Huk point of view. Over 80 percent of the population are Pampangos, a fair amount of sugar cane is grown, the Zambales Mountains are nearby, and its neighbors to the south are under great Huk influence. The equation in fact predicts over 21 percent of the barrios as critical. A glance at Figure 2 gives some indication of how this deviation might be accounted for. The Hacienda Luisita appears to act as a blocking force against Huk expansion northward.[24] The Huks are very strong right up to the borders of the Hacienda but control no barrios beyond that. The Hacienda, a 15,000 acre sugar plantation, has had its own private army for many years and apparently has been able to control the local situation. It is interesting to discover that the new owners of the plantation, both of whom are Filipino politicians, have begun a more conciliatory approach to the Huks and have permitted them to organize peasants on the estate. The Constabulary believes that some of the plantation barrios may soon be on the critical list.

To the east of Tarlac in La Paz the Hacienda seems to serve the same function. From the equation one would predict about 20 percent Huk control compared with an actual 9.5 percent, an error of almost 11 percent. The map shows clearly that the only critical barrios in La Paz are in the southeast not far from some of the Huk barrios of Concepcion. In the west the Hacienda appears to halt the Huk thrust and all territory to the north of it is fairly secure.

The FMP, OWN, and SGR variables were calculated from 1960 as well as 1939 data. (The MNT and SWP variables have no time dimension, while P could be measured only for 1939.) Besides the *a priori* grounds for preferring 1939, these variables also turned out to have much larger and more significant coefficients. The 1939 OWN variable had more than twice as large a coefficient and much greater variance than its 1960 counterpart. The 1960 SGR coefficient was not even statistically significant. When 1960 data are used the burden of explanation is transferred to the MTN and SWP variables as well as to the 1960 FMP variable, which in a relative sense seems not to have changed much. Consistent with these findings is the result that a variable measuring changes in tenancy from 1939 to 1960 makes no significant contribution to equation (A).

The relative importance of pre-war conditions may be the consequence of a common political phenomenon. It often happens that during periods of great crisis, such as the Japanese invasion and the initiation of guerrilla activities, attitudes are formed that become hardened over time and inherited by succeeding generations. This view would also account for the persistent location of the movement in Central Luzon, especially Pampanga, despite a changing environment and twenty-six years of ups and downs in Huk fortunes. An almost identical explanation would seem appropriate in South Vietnam, where recent Viet Cong strongholds correlate highly with old Viet Minh areas.

A further cause of geographical stability in insurgent support is the relatively slow pace at which the important cultural and economic forces change. Some variables, such as farm incomes, tend to be unstable, but there is no indication that these variables play an important function in determining support. The regional patterns of the crucial factors—language, land tenure, occupation and terrain—are relatively constant over periods as long as a generation or more. Thus, we find the locations of highest tenancy in the Philippines (and in Vietnam) remaining roughly the same over the last thirty or forty years.

For this reason it is doubtful whether studies focusing on socioeconomic variables can explain short-run dynamic aspects of the rebellion. Since the War the Huk movement has risen to a threatening position, fallen to near insignificance, and risen again as a serious force. There does not seem to be any broad environmental factor whose path corresponds to this cycle.

The dynamic aspects of the rebellion would seem to be better studied from the point of view of competing organizations. I would suggest that it is the changing objectives, strategies, and resources of the Huks and the several Philippine governments that largely account for temporal shifts in the level of influence. (The reorganization of defense forces by Magsaysay has already been cited.) Given the relatively "soft" kind of data available for such a study, it is better handled as a speculative enterprise, and suited to a more conventional political analysis.

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[24] The configuration representing the Hacienda in Fig. 2 is a gross approximation. For our purposes it is only necessary that its general location be correct.

# ENVIRONMENT, PROCESS AND POLICY: A RECONSIDERATION*

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In recent years a growing body of research has used multivariate statistical techniques to examine the relationship between aggregate environmental characteristics and the public policies of state and local governments. This research has been concerned primarily with isolating or demonstrating the social, economic, and political correlates of either public policies (e.g., expenditures, revenues and referenda issues) or governmental structures (viz., form of government, size of election districts and type of ballot).[1]

One advantage of the aggregate approach, beyond the relative accessibility of data, is that it permits a systematic, comparative study of states or cities. On the local level this comparative approach provides a convenient supplement to the earlier case study approach which was concerned with the political processes and issues of particular cities.

A number of hypotheses have been suggested by studies employing either the case study or aggregate approaches. In those observations dealing with government structure, attention is usually directed to the council-manager plan as an example of progressive government. That is, city governments which are reform-oriented are likely to be found in more affluent, better educated, homogeneous, middle-class cities. The notion is that the middle class prefers a more efficient, professional city administration. Conversely, the mayor-council plan is usually associated with older, machine-type politics which allegedly reflects the preferences of the less affluent, less-educated, working class and ethnic minorities who are most concerned about political representation.[2]

The question of how to categorize commission government has presented a problem. Despite the fact that it was one of the earliest manifestations of the reform movement, its popularity has declined steadily, and it is rapidly fading into obscurity throughout most of the country.[3] Curiously enough, in spite of its decline in the last four decades and its rather marked politicization in those cities in which it does remain, scholars continue to consider both commission and council-manager governments analytically as reform governments. Indications of the weaknesses in such a combination are apparent in some of the anomalous relationships revealed and recognized in a recent study by Lineberry and Fowler.[4]

## I. GENERAL STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Two ideas emerge from the case and aggregate studies of public policies in cities. The results of the case studies suggest that political variables are important determinants of public policy. More specifically, political decision-making and interaction processes appear to be the key variables which must be studied in order to understand policy outcomes.[5] Conversely, the results of aggregate comparative studies on the state and local levels indicate

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[1] A good discussion of this literature can be found in Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure, and Power: An Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics," *Journal of Politics*, 30 (May, 1968), 510-538.

[2] Perhaps the best known statement of this view is found in Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press and Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1963); and their article, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," this REVIEW, 58 (December, 1964), 876-887.

[3] Charles R. Adrian, *Governing Urban America* (2nd ed., New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961), pp. 214, 217-218.

[4] For example, they found that commission governments did not fulfill the objectives of institutional reform, i.e., this form of government seems to reflect rather than reduce the impact of social cleavages. Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," this REVIEW, 61 (September, 1967), 701-716.

[5] See, for example, Robert J. Mowitz and Deil S. Wright, *Profile of a Metropolis* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962); and Robert Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

that policy outcomes are more closely associated with the social and economic characteristics of the units of analysis. These studies suggest that environmental rather than political variables appear to be much more important as policy determinants.[6]

There are several possible explanations for these somewhat contradictory conclusions. First, it may be that some variables are ignored in either approach, thus exaggerating the importance of those variables which are considered. For example, most case studies ignore or at least do not treat systematically the social and economic variables employed in the aggregate approach. The opposite emphasis is present in the aggregate studies, i.e., decision-making or process variables tend to be ignored. Second, and this applies mainly to the aggregate studies, it may be that the indicators which are used to measure process variables are simply too crude or insensitive to reflect the dimensions being considered. Attempts to quantify what are essentially behavioral variables frequently encounter this problem. Third, comparative studies of cities have been unable to control adequately for differences in local policies which may reflect state and Federal restrictions rather than local prerogatives. Thus state laws limiting the discretion of city governments can only confound attempts to explain the policies of these governments if this factor is not considered. Closely related to this problem is the fact that controls for time are rarely employed. Particularly in studies of reformism, cities are often classified as reformist or not regardless of when or how the particular charter was adopted. It is unlikely that events such as these, many of which occurred around the turn of the century, can be considered the same as events occurring at mid-century.[7] Finally, it may be that environmental factors are important determinants of policies, such as revenue and expenditure policies, which are substantially dependent on the economic potential of communities. But are these same environmental variables equally important in influencing policies which reflect more closely the manifest political values of a community (e.g., elections for public office and certain referenda decisions)?

Lineberry and Fowler, in their study of reformism in American cities, suggest that:

> The implicit, or at times explicit, causal model in much of the research on municipal reformism has been a simple one: socio-economic cleavages cause the adoption of particular political forms. A more sophisticated model would include political institutions as one of the factors which produce a given output structure in city politics. We hypothesize that a causal model would include four classes of variables: socio-economic cleavages, political variables (including party registration, structure of party systems, patterns of aggregation, strength of interest groups, voter turnout, etc.), political institutions (form of government, type of elections and types of constituencies), and political output.[8]

This study represents an effort to examine, with one modification, such a model of reformism. That modification is that the single policy output, or dependent variable, in this study involves change or innovation in a political institution form of government.

## II. SETTING

Forty-three third-class cities in Pennsylvania have been selected for study. In 1957, the Optional Third-Class City Charter Law was signed providing all third-class cities with the option to adopt new municipal charters—either a mayor-council or council-manager plan.[9] If the local electorate chose to keep its existing commission form of government, which until 1957 had been required by state law, it could do so.[10] Under these conditions, the state laws of Pennsylvania provide a common legal framework for these cities. That is, in 1957, all forty-three cities were governed by commission governments, and all were provided with the same opportunity to adopt new charters under the law. This, perhaps more than anything else, directs attention to the characteristics of individual communities in seeking some explanation for their action or inaction on the charter question.[11]

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[6] See, for example, Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables and Welfare Politics in the American States," *Journal of Politics*, 25 (May, 1963), 265–298; Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," this REVIEW 60 (March, 1966), 73–82; and Thomas R. Dye, "Governmental Structure, Urban Environment, and Educational Policy," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 11 (August, 1967), 353–380. For an exception to this general finding, see Ira Sharkansky, "Economic and Political Correlates of State Government Expenditures: General Tendencies and Deviant Cases," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 11 (May, 1967), 173–192. See also the discussion of this question in Jacob and Lipsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 511–517.

[7] On this point, see, Jacob and Lipsky, *op. cit.*, p. 518.

[8] Lineberry and Fowler, *op. cit.*, p. 714.

[9] Hereafter referred to as the Optional Charter Law.

[10] Under the law, a city could place a proposal to elect a charter study commission before the voters either by ordinance or petition. If a commission were elected by popular vote, it could, after a study period, recommend either a mayor-council or council-manager charter, or it could

The time period considered is the years from 1957, when the Optional Charter Law was adopted, through 1966. During this period, nine cities voted to adopt new charters. Six cities adopted the mayor-council plan. Three adopted the council-manager plan. Twelve other cities attempted unsuccessfully to adopt new charters.[12] There was no new charter activity in the remaining twenty-two cities.

Broadly defined, the dependent variable to be examined is municipal reform or change. As indicated earlier, the usual and inappropriate distinction between reform and non-reform government is not used. Thus, both the new options, council-manager or mayor council, are considered innovative or representative of political change, while the commission plan only represents the status quo.

The setting of this study approaches a quasi-experimental situation. All forty-three cities function within the constraints imposed by Pennsylvania law. Each city was provided with the same option, at the same time, to consider new charters. Furthermore, the controlled time period during which the cities were examined minimizes the effects of demographic or other environmental fluctuations. Control of these factors permits a more accurate assessment of the environmental and political influences on local public policy.

### III. RESEARCH DESIGN

The purpose of this study is to examine those variables which are related to the consideration and adoption of new political forms. In a broader perspective, the analysis deals with the correlates of political change on the local level. The general hypothesis is that variations in the social, economic and political characteristics of communities are associated with the decision to alter or retain existing forms of government. The forty-three cities selected for the study are treated as a statistical population of third-class cities in Pennsylvania.[13]

The study attempts to answer two questions: (1) What are the correlates of charter-reform activity in the forty-three cities? (2) Among those cities which were active, what variables are associated with the outcomes of this activity? Twelve independent variables were selected for analysis because of their prominence in the local and state policy literature (see Table 1).[14] Aside from the familiar variables (1–8), variables 9–11 require some further clarification below:

TABLE 1.—INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

1. Population, 1960 ($10^3$).
2. Median gross rentals, 1960.
3. Real estate values, 1960 (per capita).
4. Median income, 1960 ($10^2$).
5. Median school years completed by the adult population, 1960.
6. Percentage white collar, 1960.
7. Percentage nonwhite, 1960.
8. Percentage of the native population of foreign or mixed parentage, 1960.
9. Metropolitan classification (1960).
10. Employment-residence ratios (1960).
11. Percentage absentee-owned industry (1965).
12. Local interparty competition (1955–1966).

*Metropolitan Classification.* The cities are classified as central, independent, or suburban cities. A central city is the largest city of 50,000 or more, located within a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA). Suburbs are cities above 10,000 located within SMSA's. Independent cities are cities above 10,000 located outside SMSA's.[15] This classification is treated as a dichotomous variable

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recommend retention of the existing commission plan. A recommendation for a new charter was then placed before the people in a referendum.

[11] Other structural variables usually considered in studies such as this were not relevant. Pennsylvania law requires partisan, at-large elections in all third-class cities.

[12] One of these cities, at the time of this writing had not had the opportunity to vote. It was coded as an "active" rather than a new charter city.

[13] The 1960 census populations of these cities range from 10,667 to 138,440. Five cities were excluded from the study because they have dropped below the legal population minimum of 10,000 required for third-class cities.

[14] Variables 1 through 10 were taken from *The Municipal Yearbook 1963* (Chicago: The International City Manager's Association, 1963) and *The County and City Data Book 1962* (Washington: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 1962). All data are taken from the 1960 census.

[15] *The Municipal Yearbook 1963*, p. 97.

comparing central and independent cities to suburbs.

*Employment-Residence Ratios.* This is the ratio of total employment to resident employment. It measures the extent to which a city is dependent upon a nonresident labor force.[16]

*Percentage Absentee-Owned Industry.* The degree of absentee-owned industry is measured by the percentage of the total local work force employed by absentee-owned firms. The location of the firm's home office was used to determine whether the firm is absentee or locally owned, i.e., if the home office is located outside the city, it is considered to be an absentee-owned firm.[17]

*Local Interparty Competition.* This variable is defined as the relative percentage of city elective offices held over the twelve year time period by the minority party. This was determined by counsulting *The Pennsylvania Manual* for the years included in the study and recording for each two year period the number of offices held by both parties.[18] These numbers were then totaled for the twelve year period and the percentage of local offices held by the minority party was calculated for each city. The index ranges from 0 (least competitive) to 50 percent (most competitive) where control was equally divided between the parties.

The dependent variable—charter reform activity—is treated as a dichotomous variable, i.e., reform activity is dichotomized on the basis of its presence or absence in each city. The minimal condition required for a city to be classified as "active" was that it had, either by petition or ordinance, placed the question of whether or not to elect a charter study commission before the local electorate.[19]

Two methods were used to explore the second question. First, results were classified in terms of success, i.e., either adoption or rejection of the charter proposals, and operationalized as a dichotomous variable.[20] Second, the percentage of the popular vote approving the proposal was used as the dependent variable in the twenty-two cases where the public did have an opportunity to vote on the issue.[21]

Four political process variables—type of proposal, city hall response, fear of the higher costs of reform government and voter turnout—were included in the analysis. These variables are commonly considered in the case study literature on municipal reform and metropolitan reorganization,[22] but they are not often included systematically in comparative studies. They are treated in this analysis as dichotomous variables.[23]

As stated above, the twenty-two charter referenda occurred over the years from 1957 to 1966. Because of this extended time period, newspaper accounts seemed to offer the most reliable and comprehensive information concerning the campaigns. Local newspapers, in each of the cities in which the referenda occurred, were examined for the time period beginning with the ordinance or petition leading to the election of a charter study commission through to the date the referendum was held.[24]

The four process variables were defined as follows:

1. *Type of proposal.* This was defined and

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[16] *Ibid.*, p. 92.

[17] The employment information and home office location were taken from the *Pennsylvania Industrial Directory 1965* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Department of Internal Affairs, 1965).

[18] "Lists of Public Officials" (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Department of Property and Supplies), Vols. 92–97.

[19] Twenty-one of the forty-three cities were defined as active.

[20] Rejection was defined to include, in addition to electoral defeat, the failure of a charter study commission either to submit a recommendation or to recommend retention of the commission plan. One of these conditions was met in twenty-five cases involving twenty cities. Five cities experienced two campaigns. In the analysis, the second effort in these five cities was treated as a separate event.

[21] The twenty-two referenda occurred in nineteen cities. Again, the second referendum in three of the cities was treated as a separate event with conditional changes treated as new information.

[22] For example, see David A. Booth, *Metropolitics: The Nashville Consolidation* (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University, Institute for Community Development, 1963), pp. 37–56; and Brett Hawkins, "Public Opinion and Metropolitan Reorganization in Nashville," *Journal of Politics*, 28 (May, 1966), 408–418.

[23] The risks involved in dichotomizing such complex variables are recognized and accepted in view of the new information which may be revealed about the interrelationship of these variables and the standard environmental indicators in determining policy outcomes.

[24] The duration of reform activity usually ranged from a year to eighteen months. Additional information on some campaigns was found in published and unpublished documents made available by the Bureau of Research and Information of the Pennsylvania Department of Community Affairs, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

coded simply as either a mayor-council (1) or council-manager (0) plan.

2. *City hall response.* This variable was dichotomized as opposition (0) or lack of opposition (1) to the proposal. Opposition was defined subjectively as any number of councilmen or city employees who, actively and overtly, opposed the charter reform proposal to a degree, sufficient in itself, to keep the issue consistently before the public. In those cities where city hall was divided on the issue, the dominant response, in terms of publicity, was coded.
3. *Cost issue.* This variable was defined as either the presence (0) or absence (1) of a fear of higher costs under a reform government, as reflected in newspaper accounts and political advertisements.
4. *Voter turnout.* This variable was included in the analysis in a more conventional manner.[25] Voter turnout was defined as the percentage of the total registered voters in each community who voted on the local charter referendum.

Simple, partial and multiple correlations are used to describe the relationships. In addition, cumulative coefficients of determination are reported to indicate the relative variation explained by each independent variable.

### IV. REFORM AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS: SOME PROPOSITIONS

There is a substantial body of literature which discusses the environmental correlates of municipal reform.[26] No attempt will be made here to discuss that literature. Rather, only the major conclusions will be summarized in the form of propositions:[27]

1. *Population size.* Larger cities are more likely to consider and adopt new charters than smaller cities (Alford and Scoble; Kessel).
2. *Social Class.* Cities with larger middle-class populations—as measured by occupation, education and income—are more likely to consider and adopt new charters (Banfield and Wilson; Schnore; Alford and Scoble; Kessel).
3. *Social Heterogeneity.* Cities with larger non-white and ethnic populations are less likely to consider and adopt new charters (Banfield and Wilson; Kessel; Schnore and Alford; and Alford and Scoble).
4. *Economic Potential.* Cities with greater economic potential—as measured by per capita market value of real estate, median gross rentals and larger employment residence ratios—are more likely to consider and adopt new charters (Williams and Adrian; Sherbenou).
5. *Absentee-owned industries.* Cities with greater proportions of the work force employed

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[25] For an analysis of the correlates of voter turnout, see, Robert R. Alford and Eugene C. Lee, "Voting Turnout in American Cities," this Review, 62 (September, 1968), 796–813.

[26] Examples of such studies are: Edgar L. Sherbenou, "Class Participation, and the Council-Manager Plan," *Public Administration Review,* 21 (Summer, 1961), 131–135; John H. Kessel, "Government Structure and Environment: A Statistical Note about American Cities," this Review, 56 (September, 1962), 615–620; Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, *Four Cities: A Study in Comparative Policy Making* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), pp. 287–288; Leo F. Schnore, *The Urban Scene: Human Ecology and Demography* (New York: The Free Press, 1965) pp. 184–199; Robert R. Alford and Harry M. Scoble, "Political and Socio-economic Characteristics of American Cities," *The Municipal Yearbook 1965* (Chicago: The International City Manager's Association), pp. 82–97; Charles S. Liebman, "Functional Differentiation and Political Characteristics of Suburbs," *Americal Journal of Sociology,* 66 (March 1961), 485–490; Raymond E. Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," this Review 60 (June, 1966), 306–326; Thomas R. Dye, "Urban Political Integration: Conditions Associated with Annexation in American Cities," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 8 (November, 1964), 430–446; Thomas R. Dye, Charles S. Liebman, Oliver P. Williams and Harold Herman, "Differentiation and Cooperation in a Metropolitan Area," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 7 (May, 1963), 145–155; and Amos H. Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," *American Journal of Sociology,* 68 (January, 1963) 422–431; and Leo F. Schnore and Robert R. Alford, "Forms of Government and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Suburbs," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* 8 (June, 1963), 1–17.

[27] The propositions listed are logically derived from the studies indicated in footnote 26, *supra.* These propositions are not empirically derived because most of this literature deals specifically with government structure rather than political change. Thus, the results of the examination of these propositions do not bear directly on the findings from which they were derived.

in absentee-owned firms are less likely to consider and adopt new charters[28] (Williams and Adrian, Kessel).

6. *Metropolitan classification.* Central and independent cities are more likely to consider and adopt new charters than suburban cities. This proposition is drawn from Schnore's finding that the commission plan is more common in "older, less modernized" suburbs where many problems are not recognized or acknowledged.[29] Third-class suburban cities in Pennsylvania tend to fit this description. It may be also that the status quo or "caretaker" orientation of some suburbs is a result of the suburban dependence on central city resources and services.[30]
7. *Interparty competition.* Cities with more competitive party structures are more likely to engage in reform activity but less likely to adopt new charters. There is a scarcity of research on local party competition from which to draw hypotheses. Proposition 7 is based on the suspicion that challenges to the controlling party, such as structural changes, are more likely in competitive cities because of the minority party's efforts to exploit any opportunity to weaken the control of the majority party. At the same time, it is doubtful that a weak minority party could mobilize sufficient support to carry a proposal which was opposed by the majority.

## V. REFORM ACTIVITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS: SOME FINDINGS

A step-wise correlation program was used to analyze these data.[31] In Table 2, the independent variables are ranked in terms of the relative variance produced in the dependent variable—reform *activity.* It is clear that metropolitan class and population size are the most important environmental correlates of reform activity. The remaining ten variables, in combination, contribute only an additional 22 percent to the explained variance in the dependent variable. It appears that the effects of social class and heterogeneity, economic potential, and absentee ownership are marginal in determining the presence or absence of charter reform activity.

TABLE 2.—CUMULATIVE MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES AND REFORM ACTIVITY IN FORTY-THREE PENNSYLVANIA CITIES

| Environmental Variables | Activity Index | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Multiple R | Multiple $R^2$ | Increase in $R^2$ |
| Metropolitan Class | .48 | .23 | .23 |
| Population Size | .58 | .33 | .10 |
| All Variables* | .74 | .55 | .22 |

Note: In this program, variables are ranked in terms of their overall explanatory power (i.e., the variance produced in the dependent variable). If a variable is unrelated to the dependent variable, it is excluded from the equation. When a number of independent variables are not truly independent, i.e., when they are highly intercorrelated, the importance of one or more of these variables may be minimized. For example, if variables A, B, and C are highly intercorrelated and their effects on variable D are being analyzed, the computer may rank variable A highly and as a result, deemphasize the importance of variables B and C. This would result because B and C did not contribute a sufficient additional increment to the variance explained by A. For a more detailed explanation, see Hubert M. Blalock, *Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 346–351.

* Variables which independently account for less than a 7 percent increase in $R^2$.

Although the total variation explained by the environment is not high (55 percent), metropolitan classification and population size

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[28] See also, Ernst A. Barth, "Community Influence Systems: Structure and Change," *Social Forces*, 40 (October, 1961), "Absentee-Owned Corporations and Community Power Structure," *American Journal of Sociology*, 61 (March, 1956), 413–419; Robert O. Schulze, "The Role of Economic Dominants in Community Power Structure," *American Sociology Review*, 23 (February, 1958), 3–9.

[29] Schnore, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

[30] See for example, Amos Hawley, "Metropolitan Populations and Municipal Expenditures in Central Cities," *Journal of Social Issues*, 7 (1951), 100–108. The reference to "caretaker" government is taken from the Williams and Adrian typology, *loc. cit.*

[31] For a brief explanation, see Note, Table 2. A complete description of the program is available in W. J. Dixon (ed.), *Biomedical Computer Programs* (Los Angeles: Health Sciences Computing Facility, Department of Preventive Medicine and Public Health, School of Medicine, University of California, 1964), pp. 49–59.

TABLE 3.—CUMULATIVE MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES AND REFORM OUTCOMES IN TWENTY-FIVE ATTEMPTS*

| Environmental Variables | Outcomes (Passage-Defeat) | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Multiple R | Multiple $R^2$ | Increase in $R^2$ |
| Rentals | .47 | .22 | .22 |
| Metropolitan class | .63 | .40 | .18 |
| Absentee-Ownership | .73 | .53 | .13 |
| Real estate values | .78 | .60 | .07 |
| All Variables** | .86 | .74 | .14 |

* See footnote 20.

** Variables which independently account for less than a 7 percent increase in $R^2$.

together account for 33 percent of the total variation. This finding provides some support for Propositions 1 and 6, which, when combined, might be termed a stress-dependence hypothesis. That is, larger cities may generate greater demands for services which are not easily handled in the rather decentralized administrative structure inherent in commission governments. The resulting stress may provide at least the inclination to consider structural changes. Further, as indicated above, the dependence of suburban cities on central city resources may result in a reduction in demands placed on suburban governments and a corresponding status quo orientation.[32]

## VI. ENVIRONMENT INDICATORS AND REFORM OUTCOMES: SOME FINDINGS

Attention is now directed to this question: once political change is formally considered, as reflected in the activity index, what are the environmental correlates of the results of this consideration (i.e., the variables associated with passage or defeat)? The results reported in Table 3 reveal that the relationship between outcomes and metropolitan class is consistent with the earlier findings, but the explanatory importance of population size has diminished. A possible explanation is that this is a consequence of the fact that larger cities tended to be active while smaller cities remained inactive (i.e., larger cities were more likely to attempt to exercise their new charter options than smaller cities). In this measure, where only active cities are considered, the variation in population size is not as great.

The effects of absentee-ownership require some explanation. The relationship is negative.[33] It appears that there is a tendency to reject new charter proposals in cities where a larger proportion of the local economy is controlled by absentee-owned firms.[34] This finding is consistent with Proposition 5. Further, there is evidence of support for Proposition 4. Economic potential, as reflected in rentals and real estate values, appears to be a factor of some importance. New charter proposals tend to have a higher probability of success in cities with greater economic potential.

The most important conclusion which can be drawn at this point is that central and independent cities with greater economic potential and lower levels of absentee-ownership are more likely to adopt new charters. It is interesting to note that neither the social indicators nor interparty competition (Propositions 2, 3 and 7) is associated with reformism as it is measured in two separate indices.

## VII. ENVIRONMENTAL AND POLITICAL INDICATORS AND REFERENDA OUTCOMES: SOME PROPOSITIONS AND FINDINGS

Thus far, interparty competition was the only explicitly political variable included in the analysis.[35] Now the four additional political process variables are introduced in the analysis of twenty-two charter referenda: (1) type of proposal, (2) city hall response, (3) fear of excessive costs, and (4) voter turnout.[36] The dependent variable in this case is the percentage of the popular vote approving the new charter proposal.

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[32] A further justification for this explanation is that population size is not strongly associated with any other environmental variable, and is only marginally associated with metropolitan classification ($r=.33$). It is possible that ethnicity ($r=-.49$) and race (percentage nonwhite, $r=-.33$) are exerting an indirect influence through metropolitan classification. These correlations indicate that there is a tendency for the suburban cities to have larger ethnic and nonwhite populations. But, the correlations between both these variables and the activity index are low, although directionally consistent ($r_e=.29$) ($r_{nw}=.25$), and they proved to be rather inconsequential in the step-wise analysis.

[33] The partial correlation coefficient between absentee-ownership and activity outcomes is $-.45$.

[34] Recall that rejection here does not necessarily mean electoral defeat, but any of the means of rejection indicated earlier, *supra*, footnote 20.

[35] Incomplete newspaper coverage is the reason other political variables were not included. Newspaper coverage improved greatly after it was established that a referendum would be held.

The textbook literature on urban politics provides an abundant supply of insights into the politics of municipal reform.[37] In brief, it is suggested that council-manager proposals are usually opposed by incumbent city administrations and local politicians. This opposition often has its basis in the understandable reluctance to sacrifice or relinquish political influence (e.g., patronage) to a professional manager. Perhaps the most common criticism of the manager plan is that it costs too much. Opponents of manager proposals often exploit the public's fear of excessive costs during reform campaigns. If this fear becomes a salient issue for the electorate, it is probable that it will be reflected in a higher voter turnout comprised of a disproportionately large number of negative voters.[38]

The following propositions are drawn from this literature:

8. City hall opposition is associated with council-manager proposals.
9. The fear of higher costs of reform government is associated with council-manager proposals and city hall opposition.
10. Higher voter turnouts are associated with council-manager proposals, city hall opposition, and the fear of higher costs.
11. Referendum defeat is associated with council-manager proposals, city hall opposition, fear of excessive costs and larger voter turnouts.

Beyond examining these specific propositions, the overriding question raised here involves the relative importance of political process variables when they are evaluated simultaneously with the environmental set.

TABLE 4.—SIMPLE CORRELATIONS AMONG POLITICAL VARIABLES IN TWENTY-TWO CAMPAIGNS

| | City Hall Response | Type of Proposal | Cost Issue | Percent Voter Turnout |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| City Hall Response (1 = support, 0 = opposition) | — | .72 | .83 | −.53 |
| Type of Proposal (1 = mayor, 0 = manager) | | — | .76 | −.56 |
| Cost Issue (1 = No, 0 = Yes) | | | | −.57 |

Propositions 8, 9 and 10 are examined in Table 4. The substantial association between these variables tends to confirm the hypothesized relationships, if one agrees with a logical sequence of events. That is, when council-manager proposals were offered, in most cases city hall responded negatively. Usually this opposition was mobilized in counter-campaigns to dramatize the alleged excessive costs of council-manager government. Alerted to the alleged financial burden council-manager government would create, taxpayers expressed their fears by turning out in larger numbers to vote against the proposal. It appears that if local public officials oppose a charter proposal and subsequently provide a nucleus for resistance, opposition in the community at large is more likely to develop.[39]

With reference to Proposition 10, larger voter turnouts are clearly associated with council-manager proposals, city hall opposition and the fear of excessive costs of reform government. Conversely, smaller voter turnouts are associated with mayor-council proposals, city hall support, or at least lack of opposition, and the absence of the cost issue.

Proposition 11 is considered in the final phase of the analysis, when both environmental and political variables are combined to assess their relative importance as correlates of referenda outcomes. The results reported in Table 5 provide evidence of the rather striking relative im-

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[36] Recall again that "reform outcomes" (passage defeat) refer to the twenty-five cases in which decisions were made either by the charter commission, (e.g., recommendation to retain the commission plan) or in a referendum. At this point, *only* referenda decisions (defined as the percentage of the vote for the proposal) are considered.

[37] See, for example, Adrian, *op. cit.*, ch. 8; and Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics*, *op. cit.*, ch. 13.

[38] A study of fluoridation referenda indicates that higher voter turnout is associated with the defeat of these referenda. See Maurice Pinard, "Structural Attachments and Political Support in Urban Politics: The Case of Fluoridation Referendums," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (March, 1963), 513–526.

[39] This is consistent with the findings that the position of the mayor is closely associated with the outcomes of fluoridation referenda. See David B. Rosenthal and Robert L. Crain, "Executive Leadership and Community Innovation: The Fluoridation Experience," *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 1 (March, 1966), 39–57.

TABLE 5.—CUMULATIVE MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL AND POLITICAL VARIABLES AND THE PERCENTAGE POSITIVE VOTE IN TWENTY-TWO REFERENDA

| Environmental and Political Variables | Percentage Positive Vote | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Multiple R | Multiple $R^2$ | Increase in $R^2$ |
| Cost Issue | .69 | .47 | .47 |
| Population Size | .76 | .57 | .10 |
| Type of Proposal | .82 | .68 | .11* |
| Voter Turnout | .87 | .75 | .08 |
| All Variables** | .98 | .96 | .21 |

* The apparent non-sequential ordering is due to rounding. The difference in $R^2$ between the second and third variables is .0033.

** Variables which independently account for less than a 7 percent increase in $R^2$.

TABLE 6.—SIMPLE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL AND POLITICAL VARIABLES IN TWENTY-TWO REFERENDA

| Environment | Type of Proposal | City Hall Response | Cost Issue | Voter Turnout |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rentals | .27 | .42 | .41 | −.53 |
| Income | .31 | .20 | .18 | −.52 |
| Real estate values | .35 | .14 | .33 | −.43 |
| Employment/residence *ratios* | .07 | .33 | .49 | −.39 |
| Nonwhite | .48 | .43 | .29 | −.32 |
| Party competition | −.03 | −.19 | −.20 | .20 |
| Metro class | .17 | .18 | .22 | .17 |
| Absentee-ownership | .19 | −.11 | −.14 | −.16 |
| Education | −.13 | .06 | .11 | −.13 |
| Ethnicity | −.17 | −.25 | −.02 | .07 |
| White collar | −.28 | .00 | −.03 | −.07 |
| Population | .29 | −.01 | .11 | −.03 |

portance of political process variables. Four of the sixteen variables included in the analysis, three political process variables and population size, account for 75 percent of the variation in the percentage positive vote, i.e., the percentage of votes cast *for* the adoption of new charters.

Several conclusions can be drawn from these results. Of greatest significance, is the relative strength of the political process variables. With the exception of population size (a positive relationship), the explanatory capacity of the environmental set of variables appears to be quite limited. Again, the weakness of association between the dependent variable and indicators of social class, social heterogeneity and interparty competition is noteworthy in view of the importance accorded these variables in the literature. Beyond this, it appears safe to conclude that there is some empirical support for Proposition 11.

With reference to Proposition 11, perhaps some further clarification is due. A larger positive vote on the charter question is associated with mayor-council proposals, absence of the cost issue, and lower voter turnout.[40] The reduced importance of city hall response as an independent variable is a function of the statistical fact that this variable is highly correlated with two of the other process variables, viz., type of proposal and the cost issue (see Table 4). In the case of three such variables in a multiple correlation equation, the explanatory overlap is considerable (see Note, Table 2).

## VIII. ENVIRONMENTAL AND POLITICAL VARIABLES: A RELATIVE ASSESSMENT

Thus far, an attempt has been made to determine the correlates of variously defined dependent variables which measure different dimensions of structural change or reformism. The analysis has shown that, in general, the relative importance of environmental variables declined when political process variables were considered simultaneously in the analysis of referenda outcomes. Population size was the single exception.

At the conclusion of their study, Lineberry and Fowler suggest that ". . . political institutions 'filter' the process of converting [socio-economic] inputs into [political] outputs."[41] They hypothesize that political variables perform a similar "filter" or linkage function. If the Lineberry-Fowler model is valid, one would expect to find a convincing relationship between the environmental set and the political process variables. Table 6 shows that there is such a relationship between a subset of the environmental set and the political variables. More specifically, indicators of economic potential (rentals, income, real estate values, and employment-residence ratios) and race (percentage nonwhite) are most closely associated with the political variables. Cities with greater economic potential and larger nonwhite populations are more likely to receive and vote on mayor-council proposals. Consequently, city officials are less likely to oppose these proposals and the cost issue remains dormant. This combination of events results in lower voter turnouts and greater acceptance potentials for reform proposals.

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[40] The simple correlation between voter turnout and the percentage positive vote is negative, $r = -.53$.

[41] *Op. cit.*, p. 715.

There is some evidence, reported earlier, that reform activity is less likely to occur in more racially diverse cities, viz., suburbs.[42] However, this evidence must now be qualified by adding that when reform activity does occur, the size of the nonwhite minority is positively associated with mayor-council proposals which have a greater probability of acceptance. It may be that economically viable and racially diverse cities find mayor-council government more compatible with a need to provide an arena for the arbitration of potentially conflicting interests.

Population size and metropolitan class, which were shown earlier to have some determinant effect on reform activity and outcomes (See Tables 2, 3 and 5), are not related in any meaningful way to the political variables. A plausible interpretation of this, noted earlier, is that population size and metropolitan class exert an independent influence on reformism.[43] Larger central and independent cities are more likely to consider and adopt reform policies simply as a result of a sheer physical need for administrative innovation. In short, their size, relative proximity to parasitic suburbs, or as is the case with independent cities, their relative geographical isolation may provide sufficient pressures for structural change or administrative innovation regardless of other social, economic, and political variables. The remaining environmental indicators appear to be only tenuously related to the political variables.

## IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

An important feature of this study is its quasi-experimental design. Both the time sequence and legal constraints are uniform for each city included in the analysis. Thus, any distortion, which is quite probable when these factors are not controlled, has been eliminated.

The findings reported are generally consistent with the linkage model hypothesized by Lineberry and Fowler.[44] The analysis has shown that some of the political variables recognized in the Lineberry and Fowler model —viz., structure of party systems (interparty competition), patterns of aggregation (type of proposal and cost issue), strength of interest groups (city hall response) and voter turnout—were, with the exception of interparty competition, important determinants of referenda outcomes. Beyond this, the relative importance of environmental variables declined when these political variables were considered simultaneously in the analysis. There is some evidence that these political variables function as intervening variables linking a subset of the environmental indicators to referenda outcomes. Finally, some standard social indicators, viz., education, ethnicity, and occupation, were shown to be conspicuously weak in their association with reformism throughout the analysis.

These findings suggest the importance of political process variables in comparative urban research. On the surface, it may seem that this finding is contrary to those of a number of studies which have indicated the limited influence of political variables on policy outputs at both the state and local levels.[45] A possible explanation for these somewhat divergent findings is that previous policy output research has been limited almost exclusively to analyses of revenue and expenditure policies which, quite plausibly, would be associated with variables reflecting the economic potential or the tax base of states and localities. However, the relationships which exist between these socio-economic variables and policies which represent explicitly political values (e.g., candidate preferences or essentially noneconomic issues such as fluoridation and municipal reform) may not be as direct or important as they are in those policies which must be made within the parameters set by the economic potential of the state. It is probable, and certainly worthy of further research, that the explanatory importance of socio-economic and political process variables will vary with the type of policy being considered. When noneconomic policies are considered, a stronger association is revealed between political process variables and, in this case, referenda outcomes. These process variables reflect the attitudinal and behavioral dimensions of city politics to a greater degree than the socio-economic variables.

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[42] See footnote 32, *supra*.

[43] *Supra*, p. 1177–78.

[44] *Loc. cit.*

[45] See, for example, Herbert Jacob, "The Consequence of Malapportionment: A Note of Caution," *Social Forces*, 43 (December, 1964), 256–261; Thomas R. Dye, "Malapportionment and Public Policy in the States," *Journal of Politics*, 27 (August, 1965), 586–601 and *Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," this REVIEW, 60 (March, 1966), 73–82; and Jacob and Lipsky, *op. cit.*, 511–517.

Another explanation for these differences is that perhaps too much consideration is being given to the relative availability of political data rather than the theoretical relevance of these data to the problem being examined. The result is that political variables are usually defined operationally in structural rather than behavioral or interactional terms. To this extent, the behavioral dimension of politics is being ignored, not assessed, in the policy output studies and the results may be simply a product of the methodology.

What this analysis has demonstrated is not that environmental variables are unimportant, but rather that their importance must be assessed in combination with relevant and meaningful political variables; that is, political process variables which are often recognized but rarely included in comparative urban research. Despite the reservations one may have about the validity of dichotomous variables in defining complex political phenomena, the costs of excluding such variables may far exceed the satisfaction which may be derived from more rigorously defined, more readily accessible but inconsequential indicators. In short, an effort must be made to include those variables, which have been shown in the case study literature to have theoretical and political relevance, into aggregate comparative studies. The theoretical limitations of case study analysis are well-known. More attention should now be directed to the explanatory limitations of simple input-output analysis in which no attempt is made to determine the independent and intervening effects of political process variables.

# "ECOLOGICAL" INFERENCE: THE USE OF AGGREGATE DATA TO STUDY INDIVIDUALS*

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Because they are inexpensive and easy to obtain, because they may be available under circumstances in which survey data are unavailable, and because they eliminate many of the measurement problems of survey research, data on geographic units such as counties or census tracts are often used by political scientists to measure individual behavior. This has involved us in the long-standing problem of inferring individual-level relationships from aggregate data, which was first raised by W. S. Robinson in the early nineteen fifties.[1]

In this paper, I shall first discuss the problem raised by Robinson. I shall then review three partial solutions to the problem—the Duncan-Davis method of setting limits, Blalock's version of ecological regression, and Goodman's version of ecological regression.[2] Finally, I shall propose some ways in which Goodman's method may be used so as to reduce the problem of bias in its estimates, and make it a more reasonable tool for reserch.

## I. THE PROBLEM OF ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE

Our difficulty, as Robinson showed, is that we cannot necessarily infer the correlation between variables, taking people as the unit of analysis, on the basis of correlations between the same variables based on groups of people as units. For example, the "ecological" correlation between per cent black and per cent illiterate is +0.946, whereas the correlation between color and illiteracy among individuals is only +0.203. Similarly, the "ecological" correlation between per cent of the population foreign-born and per cent illiterate is −0.618, although the individual-level correlation between these variables is +0.118!

As several writers pointed out in response to Robinson, not all correlations between variables measured at the community level are intended to lead to inferences about individuals.[3] Often communities themselves are the units which we wish to study; and when this is the case, we will wish to find relationships between community-level variables. Many recent studies using data measured at the aggregate level have dealt with true community-level variables, but problematic "ecological" correlations continue to be used.[4]

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[1] W. S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review*, 15 (June, 1950), 351–357.

[2] O. Dudley Duncan and Beverly Davis, "An Alternative to Ecological Correlation," *American Sociological Review*, 18 (December, 1953), 665–666; Hubert M. Blalock, *Causal Inference in Non-Experimental Research* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), ch. 4; Leo A. Goodman, "Some Alternatives to Ecological Correlation," *American Journal of Sociology*, 64 (May, 1959), 610–625. See also Duncan, Cozzart, and Duncan, *Statistical Georgaphy* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 60–80; Gudmund R. Iversen, *Estimation of Cell Entries in Contingency Tables When Only Margins Are Observed* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Statistics, Harvard University, 1969), and Donald E. Stokes, "Ecological Regression as a Game With Nature" (unpublished ms.).

[3] Among others, Herbert Menzel, "Comment on Robinson's 'Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals,'" *American Sociological Review*, 15 (October, 1950), 674–675, and Austin Ranney, "The Utility and Limitations of Aggregate Data in the Study of Electoral Behavior," in Austin Ranney (ed.), *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 91–102.

[4] Studies using community-level variables, but not requiring ecological inferences, are too numerous to list. Two examples are Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, *Negroes and the New Southern Politics*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1966), pp. 101–175; and Robert L. Crain and Donald B. Rosenthal, "Community Status as a Dimension of Local Decision-Making," *American Sociological Review*, 32 (December, 1967), 970–984. Some recent studies which use aggregate correlations to infer individual-level relationships are Duncan MacRae, Jr., and James A. Meldrum, "Critical Elections in Illinois: 1888-1958," this REVIEW, 54 (September,

Before we discuss the use of aggregate data to get at individual-level variables, we should clarify just how we know that a variable is an "individual" one or a "community" one. The percentage of votes for the Democrats in a county may be an individual-level variable measured at the aggregate level, if we relate it to percentage of manual workers in order to find out how manual workers vote Democratic. But it may also be a community-level variable, if we relate the percentage of the vote Democratic in districts to Congressmen's voting records in the house. The distinction lies in our intent in using the variable. In the first example we wish to use "per cent Democratic" to get at a characteristic of individuals; in the second, we wish to use it to get at a characteristic of the district.

I stress this point only because there has been some confusion as to whether, and under what circumstances, voting data (the most frequently used "ecological" variable) are a community variable or an individual one. Austin Ranney, in his discussion of the utility of aggregate voting statistics, suggests that it is valid to correlate voting results of counties, states, and so on, if we do not consider ourselves to be studying individual voting patterns, but rather the behavior of electorates.[5] We can study such phenomena as critical elections, voting change, and the social basis of the vote by treating the number of votes for a party or the number of working-class as community-level variables.

> Accordingly, if aggregate data studies carefully and thoroughly identify and describe recurring patterns of preference and turnout characteristic of particular electorates over time and, by ecological correlations, relate those patterns to other traits of the electorates and their environments, they can be valuable allies to the sample surveys in the investigation of electoral behavior.[6]

It seems to me that this approach begs the question. The county or ward "electorate" is not a meaningful entity whose characteristics we normally wish to study. It is an accidental aggregation of voters whose boundaries are of no theoretical interest to us in studies such as Ranney describes. A student of presidential or state elections can use county or ward data interchangeably. In fact, it would not affect the basis of his work if the aggregations, instead of wards or counties, consisted of all adults in the county whose last name began with Aba . . . , Abe . . . , Abo . . . , and so on through the alphabet. He could still take these aggregations of people with similar names and correlate the proportion of working class in the group with the proportion of Democratic voters in the group, or do any of the usual "ecological" correlations for which voting data are frequently used. If it were truly the ward "electorates" that he wanted to study, he could not use the other kinds of data at all.

I am not arguing here that voting data can never be a true community-level variable; I used it above as an example of one. But unless the theory with which we are working conceives of the aggregations we are using as real entities, *for which no other type of aggregation can readily be substituted*, we mislead ourselves if we use ecological correlations.

This brings us back to the original problem: How can we study relationships at the individual level when the data available to us are based on aggregations of individuals?

### II. ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE: THE DUNCAN-DAVIS TECHNIQUE

Duncan and Davis point out that if we calculate the maximum strength of a relationship at the individual level which would be consistent with the aggregate marginals, and also calculate the minimum strength, then we have limits within which the true relationship must lie. Without making any assumptions about individuals in the aggregation, we set unimpeachable limits around the true value of the individual-level relationship.

The method works in the following way. Suppose we wish to find the relationship between religion and social class (both dichotomized) in a city. In ward A, we find that the population includes 10,000 working-class and 1,000 middle-class; 8,000 Catholics and 3,000 non-Catholics. Since there are only 1,000 middle-class in the ward, at least 7,000 of the Catholics must be working-class. Thus a minimum of 7,000 and a maximum of 8,000 Catholics are working-class. Similarly, a minimum of 2,000 non-Catholics, and a maximum of 3,000, are working-class.

Repeating this analysis for each ward in the

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1960), 669–684; James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," this REVIEW, 58 (December, 1964), 876–888; Gerald Pomper, "Classification of Presidential Elections," *Journal of Politics*, 29 (August, 1967), 535–567; and Karl O'Lessker, "Who Voted For Hitler?", *American Journal of Sociology*, 74 (July, 1968), 63–69.

[5] Ranney, *op. cit.*, 99–101. Pomper, for example, uses this argument to help justify his use of ecological correlations. Pomper, *op cit.*, 556.

[6] Ranney, *op. cit.*, 100.

city, we can then add all the minima together, and all the maxima. The results might read like this:

| | *minimum* | *maximum* |
|---|---|---|
| Catholic working-class | 110,000 | 140,000 |
| Catholic middle-class | 20,000 | 50,000 |
| Non-Catholic working-class | 70,000 | 100,000 |
| Non-Catholic middle-class | 110,000 | 140,000 |
| | 310 | 430 |

This means the relationship lies somewhere between those shown in A and B:

A. (Minimum relationship)

when least distant

| | *Catholic* | *Non-Catholic* |
|---|---|---|
| Working-class | 110,000 | 100,000 |
| Middle-class | 50,000 | 110,000 |

B. (Maximum relationship)

most distant

| | *Catholic* | *Non-Catholic* |
|---|---|---|
| Working-class | 140,000 | 70,000 |
| Middle-class | 20,000 | 140,000 |

These are absolute limits, not estimates; it is impossible for the individual-level relationship to be higher or lower than these limits.

The great advantage of the Duncan-Davis method is that it requires no assumption about the distribution of individuals in aggregations. The main difficulty with it is that frequently the limits which it can specify are so far apart that we are not much better off than we were before we began the analysis.

We achieve the narrowest limits when the variables we examine are irregularly distributed among the aggregate units. If in the example above the proportion of Catholics does not vary considerably among the wards, we cannot delimit the individual relationship greatly. To take the two extremes, where all wards have the same proportion of Catholics and of working-class, looking at the wards does not give us narrower limits than those we would get by looking at the whole city as a unit. But if all wards are either entirely Catholic or entirely non-Catholic (that is, proportion Catholic is at its maximum variablity) the Duncan-Davis method will in fact give us a single value, which is the true relationship; in this situation the limits simply close together. Many variables of interest to social scientists, such as sex and age, tend to be rather evenly distributed geographically. Others, such as race, tend to be sharply clustered, and will be more amenable to the Duncan-Davis method.

A few examples illustrate the promise, and limitations, of the method. Using census tracts in Chicago, Duncan and Davis are able to show (a) that the correlation among females between race and being a domestic servant falls between +0.165 and +0.317, (b) that the correlation between race and not owning one's home falls between +0.058 and +0.138, and (c) that the correlation between age of buildings and the number of occupants per room in the building is between −0.246 and +0.111. An example used by Goodman illustrates how wide the bounds may be. Taking Robinson's example of the relationship between race and illiteracy, Goodman calculates the bounds of the individual-level correlation as −0.07 and +0.58. These are too wide to be very useful.

The value of the Duncan-Davis method lies in the fact that it does not require any assumptions about internal relationships; but precisely because we do not bring any assumptions to bear, the method is rather inefficient.

## III. ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE: REGRESSION TECHNIQUES

Hubert M. Blalock and Leo A. Goodman[8] have in rather similar ways proposed the use of ecological regression coefficients, rather than ecological correlations, as a solution to Robinson's problem. Their methods are more efficient than the Duncan-Davis method of setting limits, but at the same time, they require some difficult assumptions.

Since the assumptions of the two methods are related to the way in which individuals are grouped into aggregates, I shall first discuss in general terms the process of aggregating individuals.

We can regard aggregate units as samples of individuals drawn from the total population in one way or another. The aggregate samplings with which we normally work are not random, but are drawn on the basis of geographic proximity. They could just as well, however, be drawn on some other basis. (I used the example above of aggregations drawn on the basis of individuals' last names).

What is important to ecological regression is the relationship between an individual's scores on $X$ and $Y$ and the probability that he will fall into a given aggregation. There are three ways by which individuals can be grouped ("sampled") into aggregations:

(1) They can be grouped in some way which is unrelated to their values on $X$ and $Y$. In this case, knowledge of an individual's score on $X$ or $Y$ would not help us predict the aggregation in which he will be found.

(2) They can be grouped more or less according to their scores on $X$, independently of their scores on $Y$, such that knowledge of an individual's $X$-score would help us predict which aggregation he will be in.

(3) They can be grouped more or less according to their scores on $Y$, independently of

their scores on $X$, such that knowledge of an individual's $Y$-score would help us predict his aggregation.

Grouping by geographic proximity, or by any other means, will approximate situation 1, situation 2, situation 3, or a combination of situations 2 and 3. Which of these situations has occurred constitutes the major assumption required by ecological regression.

Blalock's and Goodman's versions are presented in rather different ways, but we shall see that Blalock discusses the use of ecological regression when variables are measured intervally at the individual level, whereas Goodman mainly discusses the situation in which variables are measured nominally or ordinally at the individual level. The two forms of ecological regression, as we might expect, will require similar assumptions.

*Blalock's Ecological Regression.*

Blalock shows that for two "ecological" variables, $X$ and $Y$, if we use as our measure of relationship the slope of the regression line rather than the correlation coefficient (which measures the spread of the data around the regression line), then we need make fewer assumptions to infer the individual-level relationship from the aggregate-level relationship.

He shows that $b_A$ (the regression coefficient for $\bar{X}$ and $\bar{Y}$ among the aggregates) tends to equal $b_I$ (the regression coefficient for $X$ and $Y$ among individuals), when the individuals are "grouped" into aggregates in a way which is related to their scores on $X$, that is, when they are grouped by the independent variable. This might be the case, for example, if we were using income as an independent variable. People with high income would tend to live in the same ward as other high income people, people with low incomes would tend to live together, etc. But if the individuals have been grouped by the *dependent* variable, $b_A$ will tend not to equal $b_I$.

Thus we must meet a single general assumption if we are to infer individual-level relationships from aggregated data through ecological regression. This assumption is that *individuals have been grouped in such a way that their scores on the dependent variable are unrelated to the aggregation in which they fall, except indirectly through their scores in the independent variable.* That is, any relationship between an individual's score on the dependent variable and the aggregation into which he is placed must be indirect—a spurious relationship caused by grouping on the independent variable, and by the individual-level relationship between the independent and dependent variables.

This is simply to say that we cannot validly use the "ecological" regression coefficient $b_{YX}$ if $\bar{Y}$ causes $\bar{X}$. This makes sense, since the regression coefficient is an asymmetric measure of relationship, with no clear interpretation if the dependent variable causes the independent variable.

To give a concrete example, suppose we wanted to find out how strongly a person's education affects his income from data on the mean educational level and mean income of wards in a city. To use $b_A$ as an estimate of the (individual-level) relationship, we would have to assume that a person's income (the dependent variable) is unrelated to the ward he lives in, when controlling for his level of education (the independent variable). In this case, the assumption would pretty clearly be unjustifiable, and we would be unable to use ecological regression to get what we are looking for.

*Goodman's Ecological Regression.*

Although Blalock does not discuss the level of measurement of the variables at the individual level, it is clear that his method is appropriate only when the variables are of interval measurement. There is no such thing as a slope or regression coefficient between ordinal or nominal variables, except in the case of dichotomies, so to show that $b_A$ will tend to equal $b_I$ is not useful when the variables are not measured intervally.[7]

Many of the variables with which social scientists are concerned in studying individuals—religion, social class, vote, and so on—are of nominal or ordinal measurement. When we deal with them, we shall have to use something other than the method Blalock suggests.

Leo A. Goodman presents a form of ecological regression which is appropriate for variables which are measured nominally or ordinally.[8] His articles appeared a few years after Robinson's, as an attempt to define those circumstances in which one could surmount the difficulty which Robinson had posed.

Briefly, his method is as follows: Let us assume that we have two dichotomized variables, such as "vote in election I" and "vote in election II," which we wish to relate at the individual level. The data we have in hand, by county, are % Democratic in election I, % Republican in election I, % Democratic in election II, and % Republican in election II.[9]

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[7] The examples which Blalock uses in his chapter on aggregation are all of interval measure for the units which he groups together.

[8] Goodman, *op. cit.*

[9] For the sake of simplicity, I shall present Goodman's method as applied to two dichoto-

Then for each county we could construct the following matrix, where $X_1$, $X_2$, $Y_1$, and $Y_2$ are the data we have for the county, and $P$ (per cent of election I Democrats voting Democratic in election II), $Q$ (per cent of election I Democrats voting Republican in election II), $R$ (per cent of election I Republicans voting Democratic in election II), and $S$ (per cent of election I Republicans voting Republican in election II) are the data about the individuals which we wish to learn.

| Election II | Election I: Democratic | Election I: Republican | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Democratic | $P \cdot X_1$ | $R \cdot X_2$ | $Y_1$ |
| Republican | $Q \cdot X_1$ | $S \cdot X_2$ | $Y_2$ |
| | $X_1$ | $X_2$ | |

$P+Q=100\%$ $\quad X_1+X_2=100\%$
$R+S=100\%$ $\quad Y_1+Y_2=100\%$

If we could assume that $P$, $Q$, $R$, and $S$ had exactly the same value in each county, we could easily solve for them by a regression equation derived as follows.

We know that $Y_1 = P \cdot X_1 + R \cdot X_2$. (Per cent of the vote Democratic in election II equals per cent of the vote Democratic in election I times the per cent of election I Democrats voting Democratic in election II, plus per cent of the vote Republican in election I times the per cent of election I Republicans who switch to the Democrats in Election II.)

Since $Y_1 = P \cdot X_1 + R \cdot X_2$, it follows that

$$Y_1 = P \cdot X_1 + R(1 - X_1), \text{ since } X_1 + X_2 = 1.0$$
$$= P \cdot X_1 + R - R \cdot X_1$$

Hence, $Y_1 = R + (P - R)X_1$. Thus we end up with an equation equivalent to that for the linear regression of $Y_1$ on $X_1$, $Y_1 = a_{YX} + b_{YX}X_1$. If we perform this regression on the county data for $Y_1$ and $X_1$, we solve for $a_{YX}$, which equals $R$, and $b_{YX}$, which equals $P-R$.[10]

The technique proposed by Goodman, then, is as follows. Pick one of the categories of the independent individual-level variable, and one of the categories of the dependent individual-level variable. From the aggregate data, plot the slope and the intercept for the relationship between per cent of the aggregate's population which is of the independent category (in our example, percentage of the vote Democratic in election I) and the per cent which is of the dependent category (percentage of the vote Democratic in election II.) The intercept for this relationship equals the percentage of individuals who are in the independent category which we leave out of the regression analysis, but who are in the dependent category we use in the analysis. That is, the intercept of the relationship between per cent Democratic in election I and election II equals $R$, the percentage of Republicans who switched to the Democrats in the second election. The slope equals the percentage of Democrats who stayed with the Democrats, minus the percentage of Republicans who switched. By calculating the slope and intercept of the relationship between per cent Democratic in election I and per cent Democratic in election II in this way, we can fill in the individual-level table relating vote in election I to vote in election II. $R$ will equal $a_{YX}$, $S$ will equal $1-R$, $P$ will equal $a_{YX}+b_{YX}$, and $Q$ will equal $1-P$.

This might seem like too much hocus-pocus and be suspect for that reason. But it makes sense when we look at what the slope and intercept in a regression equation mean. The intercept is the expected value of the dependent variable, when the value of the independent variable is set at zero. The slope measures the amount of increase in the dependent variable which results from an increase of one unit in the independent variable.

Looking back at the example, it makes sense that the intercept of the regression line should equal the proportion of election I Republicans who voted Democratic in election II. Where per cent Democratic in election I equals zero, all the voters in the district in election I will have been Republican. The percentage of the vote Democratic in such districts in election II will equal the percentage of Republicans switching to the Democrats.

Starting from this intercept, the slope measures the increase in percentage Democratic in election II which will result from adding a given percentage Democratic in election I to the district. If the make-up of the district is

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mous variables. Since dichotomies can be treated as interval variables, Blalock's methods could also be used for two such variables, though the results would not be as simple conceptually as those from Goodman's method. But Goodman can be easily extended to non-dichotomous variables, which is not true of Blalock. To avoid creating the impression that there is a mysterious difference between Goodman's and Blalock's forms of ecological regression, I should point out that Goodman's version is equivalent to using Blalock's version with dummy variables, then transforming the resulting slopes back into proportions.

[10] Goodman, *op. cit.*, 612.

switched from 0% Democratic in election I to 10% Democratic in election I, how much is per cent Democratic in election II likely to change? When per cent Democratic in election I increases by 10%, per cent Republican in election I will decrease by the same amount. Thus, the change in per cent Democratic in election II should equal 10% times the proportion of election I Democrats who vote Democratic in election II, minus 10% times the proportion of election I Republicans who switched to the Democrats in election II. In other words, the slope $b_{YX} = P - R$, as Goodman says.

So far, we have assumed that the internal values were constant for all our counties. If $P$, $Q$, $R$, and $S$ were constant among the counties, the regression equation would give an exact solution for each of them. But they will rarely be constant. Therefore Goodman shows that if the *expected* values of $P$, $Q$, $R$, and $S$ are constant at all values of $X_1$ then $b_{YX}$ will be an unbiased estimate of $P - R$.[11] That is, if for all different values of $X_1$, the *average* value of $P$ and $R$ (for $Q$ and $S$ are determined by the other two) is constant, Goodman's form of ecological regression is valid. This is consistent with common sense. If the expected value of $R$ is the same at all values of $X_1$, then $a_{YX}$ (the expected value of $R$ when $X_1 = 0.0$) is a satisfactory estimate of $R$ in general. But if the expected value of $R$ is different at different values of $X_1$, $a_{YX}$ will not be typical of $R$ in general, and will be a biased estimate of $R$.

Goodman did not specify under what conditions this assumption is met, but we shall see that they are exactly the conditions in which the use of Blalock's method is valid. If individuals are placed into aggregate units randomly, or on the basis of their value on $X$, the assumption is met; if they are aggregated according to their $Y$-score, the assumption is not met and Goodman's method produces biased estimates.

In drawing up aggregations according to individual's scores on $X$, what we do in effect is set arbitrary marginal frequencies of $X$ for the aggregate units. Given a dichotomous variable $X$, the effect of drawing people into aggregations according to whether they are + or − on $X$ will be to determine the number of aggregations having a given percentage of their members + on $X$. We might set aggregations at either all + or all − on $X$. Or we might use a system whereby we draw fifty +'s and then draw individuals randomly, until we have a hundred individuals. Whatever we choose, we arbitrarily regulate the marginal $X_1$ values of the aggregations. In the first case, we set the value of $X_1$ at either 0% or 100% with no districts having any other value. In the second, we guarantee that the value of $X_1$ will be at least 50% in each district.

It is my contention that when we group by $X$ in this way, the assumption of Goodman's method (that the expected values of $P$ and $R$ are constant at all values of $X$) is met. When we group by $Y$, the assumption is violated.

We wish to estimate $P$, the proportion of $X_1$'s that are $Y_1$'s. But there is an inverse proportion, $P^1$ (the proportion of $Y_1$'s that are $X_1$'s), which must be taken into account. If one of these proportions is held constant from aggregate to aggregate, but the marginals $Y_1$ and $X_1$ are varied, then the value of the other proportion (the inverse of the proportion which is held constant) must vary with the changes in the marginals.

Consider the two counties below:

County A

| | $X_1$ | $X_2$ | |
|---|---|---|---|
| $Y_1$ | [illegible] | [illegible] | 150 |
| $Y_2$ | 6 | | 250 |
| | 100 | 300 | |

County B

| | $X_1$ | $X_2$ | |
|---|---|---|---|
| $Y_1$ | 50 | | 250 |
| $Y_2$ | | | 150 |
| | 300 | 100 | |

If $P$ is the same in the two counties then $P'$ cannot have the same value in both. For example, if $P = .5$, the two counties will look like this:

County A

| | $X_1$ | $X_2$ | |
|---|---|---|---|
| $Y_1$ | 50 | 100 | 150 |
| $Y_2$ | 50 | 200 | 250 |
| | 100 | 300 | |

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[11] *Ibid.*, 612.

County B

| | X₁ | X₂ | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Y₁ | 150 | 100 | 250 |
| Y₂ | 150 | 0 | 150 |
| | 300 | 100 | |

In this case, $P'$ for County A is .333 and $P'$ for County B is .600. Similarly, if $P'$ had the same value for both counties, $P$ would vary systematically with changes in the marginal values of $X_1$ and $Y_1$.

When we form aggregations by grouping along one ~~of the two variables, what we do~~ is hold the proportion based on that variable roughly constant (subject only to random error), while we vary the marginals. This forces the inverse of the proportion to vary systematically with the marginals. For example, if we group by $Y$, we draw a certain number of $Y_1$'s from the total population, and then a certain number of $Y_2$'s. Since we have drawn the $Y_1$'s randomly from all the $Y_1$'s in the population, we can expect that in all the aggregates we build this way, about the same percentage of $Y_1$'s will be $X_1$'s. In other words, $P'$ is held roughly constant. At the same time, the marginals are varied. Thus $P$ must vary systematically with the marginals, and anal~~ysis of the marginals by ecological regression will give us a biased estimate of $P$.~~

~~As an example of this, consider sim~~ulated data which are grouped, first by $X$ and then by $Y$. Given a population whose individuals are distributed as shown in Table 1:

TABLE 1. THE POPULATION

| | X₁ | X₂ | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Y₁ | P 20,000 | R 60,000 | 80,000 |
| Y₂ | Q 80,000 | S 40,000 | 120,000 |
| Total | 100,000 | 100,000 | |

read

These individuals are grouped into 100 aggregations of 1,000 individuals each. We know the per cent of each aggregation that are $X_1$, the ~~per cent $X_2$, the per cent $Y_1$, and the per cent~~ $Y_2$. What we do not know, but wish to learn through analysis of the aggregate data, are the values of $P$, $Q$, $R$, and $S$ in the percentage table. If the assumption required by Goodman's

| | X₁ | X₂ |
|---|---|---|
| Y₁ | P·X₁ | R·X₂ |
| Y₂ | Q·X₁ | S·X₂ |

P = %-age X₁'s that are Y₁
Q = %-age X₁'s that are Y₂
R = %-age X₂'s that are Y₁
S = %-age X₂'s that are Y₂

method is met, we can estimate the table from the aggregate data. How ~~well is the assumption~~ (that the expected values of $P$ and $R$ are constant at all values of $X_1$) met when we group by $X$? When we group by $Y$?

As I pointed out above, placing individuals into aggregations ~~on the basis of their $X$ value~~ is equivalent ~~to arbitrarily setting the frequencies of $X_1$ and $X_2$ for the areas.~~[12] In this example, individuals are drawn to form aggregations in such a way that the per cent $X_1$ in each district must be either 20%, 40%, or 60%. In the first type of aggregation there are 200 $X_1$'s, in the second, 400 $X_1$'s, and in the third, 600 $X_1$'s. What are the expected values of $P$, $Q$, $R$, and $S$ at these different values of $X_1$

We see from Table 1 that the probability of an $X_1$ being a $Y_1$ is 20,000/100,000 = 0.20; the probability of an $X_1$ being a $Y_1$ 2 is 0.80; the probability of an $X_2$ being $Y_1$ is 0.60; and the probability of an $X_2$ being $Y_2$ is 0.40. If we draw 800 $X_2$'s, for example, the expected number of $Y_1$'s is 0.60 × 800 or 480.

In this way we can calculate the expected number of $X_1Y_1$-individuals, $X_1Y_2$-individuals, $X_2Y_1$-individuals, and $X_2Y_2$-individuals for each type of aggregation. These expected values are shown in Table 2.

In grouping by $X$, the expected values of $P$, $Q$, $R$, and $S$ remain constant at all values of $X$.

The results of grouping in a similar way by $Y$ are different. Returning to Table 1, we see that the probability that a $Y_1$ will be an $X_1$ is 20,000/80,000, or 0.25, the probability that a $Y_1$ will be an $X_2$ is 0.75, the probability that a $Y_2$ will be an $X_1$ is 0.667, and the probability that a $Y_2$ will be $X_2$ is 0.333. The results of this grouping are shown in Table 3. Note that the expected value of $P$ varies systematically with the value of the marginals.

Finally (though this is not illustrated), when we group in a way that is unrelated to either $X$ or $Y$ the expected values of $P$ and $Q$ are constant for all values of $X$. In this case, we in

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[12] Under a probabilistic grouping of individuals, the district frequencies would not be fixed precisely, but their average, or expected, frequencies would be. The example I present uses precise fixing of frequencies for convenience.

TABLE 2. EFFECTS OF GROUPING BY X

$X_1 = 20\%$

| | $X_1$ | $X_2$ | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| $Y_1$ | 40 | 480 | 520 |
| $Y_2$ | 160 | 320 | 480 |
| Total | 200 | 800 | |

$E(P) = 40/200 = 0.20$

$X_1 = 40\%$

| | $X_1$ | $X_2$ | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| $Y_1$ | 80 | 360 | 440 |
| $Y_2$ | 320 | 240 | 560 |
| Total | 400 | 600 | |

$E(P) = 80/400 = 0.20$

$X_1 = 60\%$

| | $X_1$ | $X_2$ | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| $Y_1$ | 120 | 240 | 360 |
| $Y_2$ | 480 | 160 | 640 |
| Total | 600 | 400 | |

$E(P) = 120/600 = 0.20$

TABLE 3. EFFECTS OF GROUPING BY Y

$Y_1 = 20\%$

| | $X_1$ | $X_2$ | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| $Y_1$ | 50 | 150 | 200 |
| $Y_2$ | 530 | 270 | 800 |
| Total | 580 | 420 | |

$E(P) = 50/580 = 0.09$

$Y_1 = 40\%$

| | $X_1$ | $X_2$ | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| $Y_1$ | 100 | 300 | 400 |
| $Y_2$ | 400 | 200 | 600 |
| Total | 500 | 500 | |

$E(P) = 100/500 = 0.20$

$Y_1 = 60\%$

| | $X_1$ | $X_2$ | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| $Y_1$ | 150 | 450 | 600 |
| $Y_2$ | 270 | 130 | 400 |
| Total | 420 | 580 | |

$E(P) = 150/420 = 0.36$

effect draw individuals into the aggregations randomly. Again using the data in our example, the probability of drawing an individual who is $X_1$ and $Y_1$ is $20{,}000/200{,}000 = 0.1$; the probability of an $X_1Y_2$ is $80{,}000/200{,}000 = 0.4$. There will tend to be four times as many $X_1Y_2$'s as there are $X_1Y_1$'s in each aggregation, one-fifth of the $X_1$'s in each aggregation will tend to be $Y_1$, and thus the expected value of $P$ is constant for all values of $X_1$.

## IV. REDUCING BIAS IN GOODMAN'S REGRESSION[13]

We have seen that Goodman's analysis requires exactly the same assumption as Blalock's. This limits its applicability more than had previously been realized. Actually, the difficulty of using Goodman's regression has been recognized in practice. In the decade since his method was presented, it has remained virtually unused in published research. This has probably been due to its propensity to produce badly biased estimates when its basic assumption is violated. These are particularly demoralizing since they often appear as percentages which are greater than one hundred or less than zero[14]

[13] In this section I shall deal only with ways to reduce bias in Goodman's ecological regression. The suggestions I make should apply equally to Blalock's version, but I have not developed them along those lines here, since we only rarely use aggregate data to get at interval individual-level variables.

[14] The problem of estimates which are higher than one hundred per cent or less than zero per cent has been dealt with elsewhere by Telser: L. G. Telser, "Least-Squares Estimation of Transition Probabilities," in C. F. Christ, *et. al.*, *Measurement in Economics* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963.) He is concerned with the problem when it is due to predictable

In the preceding section, I have specified the assumption which must be met if we want unbiased estimation. This might be expected to make Goodman's method more usable. But if this is to be the case, we must be able to tell when we are safe in making the assumption. As it happens, we are often unable to tell whether or not $Y$ causes $X$ (which is another way of saying that data are grouped by the dependent variable.) It is not enough to know that $Y$ does not cause $X$ at the individual level. Even if this is so, the grouping process may in some way be based on individuals' $Y$-scores. In this case, $\%$-$Y$ will be a cause of $\%$-$X$.

For example, we might want to relate education to occupation by calculating the slope of $\%$-manual workers on $\%$-high school graduates. The direction of causality at the individual level is clear enough: a person's education causes his occupation, but (except in a very weak way) occupation does not cause education. But individuals are very likely grouped into geographic aggregations largely on the basis of their occupations, so that $\%$-manual workers would help to determine the $\%$-high school graduates in the district.

Even when, as in this example, we can hazard a good guess that a given variable is grouped geographically, it is often difficult to tell the extent to which this is due to the other variable in the analysis, or to independent grouping on the variable. Thus it is often difficult to decide *a priori* whether we are justified in making the assumption that the data are not grouped along the dependent variable other than indirectly, through the impact of the independent variable.

But if we cannot be sure that the assumption is valid, there are two precautions we can take which will help to reduce the bias below what we would get using Goodman's regression in the ordinary manner. These may help reduce the bias to magnitudes we are willing to live with.

(1) *A Condition in Which Bias Is Low.*

First of all, the strength of the relationship at the individual level determines how much bias is caused by violations of the assumption. *When the variables with which we are concerned are strongly related at the individual level, grouping by the dependent variable does not cause as great bias in the ecological estimate as when they are weakly related.* This fact may allow us to use ecological regression with relative confidence, even when we are unsure of the assumption about grouping. If we have good reason to assume that the individual-level relationship is one which will generally be rather strong, then we will not be so concerned with the assumption about grouping.

When there is a strong relationship between the variables $X$ and $Y$, this means that only a few $X_1$'s fall into one of the categories of $Y$, while the vast majority fall into the other. As a result, changing the frequency of $Y_1$ cannot greatly change the incidence of $X_1Y_1$-types relative to that of $X_1Y_2$-types, though it will affect the incidence of $X_1$'s as a whole very greatly. If there are practically no $X_1Y_1$'s in the population, then an increase in the number of $Y_1$'s in an aggregate unit does not add many $X_1Y_1$'s. In the extreme case of a perfect relationship between $X$ and $Y$ at the individual level, in which all $X_1$'s are $Y_2$'s, there would be no variation at all in P, regardless of the aggregate units' $Y_1$ frequencies; each of the units would have zero $X_1Y_1$'s, and $P$ would always equal zero

To illustrate this, let us simulate further populations like that shown in Table 1. Keeping the total numbers of $X_1$, $X_2$, $Y_1$, and $Y_2$ constant, we shall adjust the number of $X_1Y_1$'s, $X_1Y_2$'s etc., so that the strength of the true individual-level relationship varies, and then calculate the expected frequencies of $P$ as $X$ varies, for aggregations formed by grouping along $Y$. In other words, we shall perform the same analysis as was done above in Table 3, but for populations which involve varying individual-level relationships between $X$ and $Y$. Table 4 shows the results of such an analysis for four different populations, having the marginals given in Table 1, but varying in their internal distributions. Population B has the same internal distribution as that given in Table 1; population $A$ has a distribution in which $X$ and $Y$ are more weakly related than in Table 1; populations C and D have distributions in which $X$ and $Y$ are more strongly related than

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estimation error in estimating parameters which fall near the extremes. His solution is to change the estimation procedure so that it cannot produce results of greater than one hundred or less than zero. This strikes me as a rather trivial problem, since an error of ten percentage points in estimating a parameter is just as harmful if it stays within the "respectable" 0–100 bounds as it is if it happens to make the researcher look silly by straying outside those bounds. I suspect, however, that the frequency with which one encounters these unnatural results in using Goodman's technique is due to a more serious problem than that of estimation error—violation of the assumption that data have not been grouped by the dependent variable.

which of course [illegible]

TABLE 4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN %-$X_1$ AND E(P) IN VARYING POPULATIONS

| Population | True $\phi^2$ | E(P), $X_1=45\%$ | E(P), $X_1=55\%$ | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | .042 | .540 | .107 | .433 |
| B | .167 | .298 | .130 | .168 |
| C | .375 | .142 | .078 | .064 |
| D | .602 | .028 | .013 | .015 |

The stronger the relationship X·Y the smaller the diff

in Table 1. The point in Table 4 is that the expected value of $P$ for aggregate units varies more strongly with ~~the units', $X_1$ frequencies~~ when the units are drawn out of a population in which $X$ and $Y$ have a relatively weak relationship. Since the bias involved in grouping along $Y$ is due to the fact that such grouping causes $E(P)$ to vary with the value of $X_1$, this bias will be less serious when $X$ and $Y$ are strongly related in the population from which the aggregations are drawn

If we are willing to assume that the individual-level relationship is relatively strong, then we may use ecological regression with less fear of bias. In one sense, this is a strange kind of assumption to make. The analysis is intended to measure the individual-level relationship, yet we are asked to start by assuming the strength of that relationship! Still, we often have good reason to assume that a relationship will be in a certain vague range, although we want to know where it falls within that range.

Electoral stability and change studies are an example of the sort of situation in which we might use this characteristic of ecological regression to avoid analyses which are particularly prone to bias. In such a study of two British elections, for instance, we might be interested in estimating the percentages to complete the following table:

| 1959 | 1955 Conservative | 1955 Labour | 1955 Liberal | 1955 Non-voter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative | . . . % | . . . % | . . . % | . . . % |
| Labour | . . . % | . . . % | . . . % | . . . % |
| Liberal | . . . % | . . . % | . . . % | . . . % |
| Non-voter | . . . % | . . . % | . . . % | . . . % |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |

The assumption that the dependent variable is unrelated to the aggregate units, except indirectly through the independent variable, must be met for each pair of independent and dependent variables needed to fill out the cells of the table. But it is unlikely that all of the 1959 variables are unrelated to geographic districts, so we cannot confidently make the basic assumption.

However, we should be able to assume that 1955-Conservative and 1959-Conservative are strongly related at the individual level, and likewise that the variable pairs 1955-Labour, 1959-Labour; 1955-Liberal, 1959-Liberal; and 1955-Non-voter, 1959-Non-voter are strongly related. For these analyses the problem of bias should be less serious, ~~though of course it is not~~ eliminated. On the other hand, for the rest of the analyses needed to complete the table (1955-Conservative, 1959-Liberal for instance) it is likely that the individual-level relationship is rather weak.

One possible strategy in this situation would be to limit our study to the four "stability" percentages which we can estimate with relatively little bias, and forget about measuring specific crossovers.

(2) *A Technique for Reducing Bias.*

A second way to reduce bias in ecological regression is based on the fact (for which a proof is offered in Appendix I) that whenever data are grouped by $Y$, if $b_{YX}$ is positive, the bias in estimating $P$ is positive. That is, the estimate of $P$ based on $b_{YX}$ and $a_{YX}$ is greater than the true $P$ in the population. At the same time, when $b_{YX}$ is positive, $b_{XY}$ is also positive, and $P'$ (the proportion of $Y_1$'s that are $X_1$) can be estimated from $b_{XY}$ and $a_{XY}$ with no bias or (if the data have been grouped by $X$ as well as by $Y$) with a positive bias. Similarly, if $b_{YX}$ is negative, then $P$ is underestimated by $b_{YX}$ and $a_{YX}$, and $P'$ is either unbiased or underestimated by $b_{XY}$ and $a_{XY}$.

This may allow us to reduce materially the amount of bias in estimating $P$. We can estimate $P$ from two different regression equations, *and we can choose the estimate which probably incorporates less bias* (or, we hope, no bias at all). We have the estimate of $P$ derived from $b_{YX}$ and $a_{YX}$; to the extent that data are grouped by $Y$, this estimate of $P$ is biased. Secondly, we can use the estimate of $P'$ (biased to the extent that the data are grouped by $X$) to estimate $P$, by the equation:[15]

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[15] $P'$ times the total number of $Y_1$ individuals in the population tells us how many individuals in the population are $X_1$ and $Y_1$. If we divide this figure by the total number of $X_1$ individuals in the population, we have the proportion of $X_1$'s that are $Y_1$

the most interesting phenomena

$$P = \frac{P' \cdot \text{Total number of } Y_1 \text{ individuals in the population}}{\text{Total number of } X_1 \text{ individuals in the population}}.$$

If $b_{YX}$ and $b_{XY}$ are positive, ~~then to the extent~~ that the data are grouped by $Y$ the direct estimate of $P$ has a positive bias. And to the extent that the data are grouped by $X$, the indirect estimate of $P$ has a positive bias (since the estimate of $P'$ has a positive bias). Thus we have two separate estimates of $P$, for both of which any bias which exists is positive. In order to pick the one which involves less bias, we choose the lower of the two. If $b_{YX}$ and $b_{XY}$ are negative, ~~by the same argument~~ we pick the higher estimate of $P$, since any bias in estimates from a negative slope is negative.[16] In this way we can choose that estimate of $P$ which is based on the regression coefficient which involves less grouping on the dependent variable.

There is another, perhaps more important, advantage to this obliging characteristic of ecological regression. In addition to reducing bias in the estimates, we can also specify the direction of whatever bias there is.

If $b_{YX}$ and $b_{XY}$ are positive, then, since any bias that remains after we have picked the lower estimate is positive, we know that the true value of $P$ assuredly does not lie *above* our estimate (subject, of course, to sampling error). In this way we can estimate an upper, or lower, limit for the value of $P$.

We might choose to combine such an unbiased upper or lower limit with one of the Duncan-Davis limits, in order to produce a narrower range of possible values. Combined limits of this sort would involve one absolute limit (from the Duncan-Davis analysis), and one unbiased, estimated limit (the Goodman estimate).

*An Example.*

An example may illustrate the usefulness of this technique for reducing the bias in Goodman's estimates. In an ecological analysis of race and home-ownership, using 1960 census ~~tract data from Mecklenburg~~ County, North Carolina, the true individual-level relationship between the variables, ascertained from statistics for the county as a whole, is relatively weak, $\phi_2 \approx .116$. Thus the first condition for avoiding bias is not met. But the second technique, using both possible estimates of $P$, gives us considerably better estimation than we would get using normal procedures.

Letting $H$ represent ~~%-homeowner, and~~ $W$ %-white, the relevant regression equations are:

Gwh

$$W = .275 + .835\,H$$

and

$$H = .227 + .491\,W$$

Mecklenburg County has 44,755 homeowners, and 60,403 white families.

From $b_{WH}$ and $a_{WH}$, we estimate that 111.0% of homeowners are white. But estimating indirectly from $b_{HW}$ and $a_{HW}$, we get a figure of 96.9%. Since the slopes are positive, we know that any bias in the estimates is positive. Therefore we choose the lower of the two. The true value, from census data, is 90.1%.

Similarly, estimating the percentage of whites that are homeowners, we get figures of 71.8% by direct estimation, and 82.2% by indirect estimation. Again we choose the lower figure, since the slopes are positive. The true value is 67.0%.

*A Computational Aid.*

Instead of actually calculating both the direct and indirect estimates of $P$, one may decide on the basis of the variances and means of the variables which estimate will involve less bias. As is shown in Appendix II, when:

$$\frac{\text{Var}_{Y_1}}{\overline{Y}_1\overline{Y}_2} > \frac{\text{Var}_{X_1}}{\overline{X}_1\overline{X}_2}$$

the direct estimate, $b_{YX}+a_{YX}$ is the more biased of the two estimates. But when this condition does not hold, either $b_{YX}+a_{YX}$ is the less biased of the two estimates, or there is no difference in bias.

Aside from easing our calculations, this condition gives us a good operational definition of the verbalizations "grouping by $Y$" and "grouping by $X$." $\overline{Y}_1\overline{Y}_2$, or $\overline{Y}_1\ (1-\overline{Y}_1)$, is the maximum value that the variance of $Y_1$ can reach, and $\overline{X}_1\overline{X}_2$, or $\overline{X}_1\ (1-\overline{X}_1)$, is the maximum possible value of the variance of $X_1$. The condition above can be verbalized as "the dispersion of $Y_1$ scores, relative to the amount of dispersion possible given the value of $\overline{Y}_1$, is greater ~~than the disperion of $X_1$ scores~~, relative to the amount of dispersion possible given the value of $\overline{X}_1$." Or, "grouping by $Y$ is greater than grouping by $X$."

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[16] Note that the direct and indirect estimates of $P$ may differ as a result of sampling error, as well as because of differing magnitudes of bias. This is why I stated above that by comparing the two estimates we can pick the one which *probably* incorporates less bias. In fact, if there were no bias in either estimate of $P$, and we consistently chose the lower of the two, we would ourselves cause a slight downward bias in the estimation procedure. Accordingly, if there are only slight differences between the estimates, it may be better to take the average of the two estimates, rather than pick the one which (presumably) incorporates less bias.

## V. CONCLUSION

It has been more than a decade since Robinson pointed out the flaws in ecological correlation, and since ecological regression and the Duncan-Davis limits were proposed as alternatives. The latter techniques require less restrictive assumptions than ecological correlation; yet neither has been adopted by researchers, while ecological correlations are frequently used.

In the case of the Duncan-Davis limits, this is probably due to the fact that researchers prefer a single point-estimate to a range of possible values, and to the fact that the limits are rather wide. The lack of interest in ecological regression is probably due to the fact that errors in estimation are likely to turn up either as negative percentages or as percentages which are greater than one hundred. This is disheartening to the researcher, and is difficult to present to his colleagues. Ecological correlations, on the other hand, are comfortably bounded by $-1.0$ and $+1.0$ no matter how incorrect the ecological inference is.

I hope that by specifying conditions in which the assumptions required by ecological regression are less critical, by suggesting a rough technique through which bias caused by errors in the assumptions can be reduced, and finally by its review of the Duncan-Davis, Blalock, and Goodman techniques, this paper will encourage greater use of alternatives to ecological correlation.

## APPENDIX I

### PROOF THAT WHEN THE SLOPES ARE POSITIVE ANY BIAS IN ESTIMATING $P$ IS POSITIVE, AND THAT WHEN THE SLOPES ARE NEGATIVE ANY BIAS IN ESTIMATING $P$ IS NEGATIVE[17]

Given a population of individuals measured on two dichotomous variables, $x$ (consisting of attributes $x_1$ and $x_2$), and $y$ (consisting of attributes $y_1$ and $y_2$):

Let $P_t$ = the proportion of $x_1$-individuals who also have attribute $y_1$. The individuals in the population are grouped into aggregations. For each of these aggregations, let:

$X_1$ = the proportion of individuals having attribute $x_1$
$X_2$ = the proportion of individuals having attribute $x_2$
$Y_1$ = the proportion of individuals having attribute $y_1$
$Y_2$ = the proportion of individuals having attribute $y_2$
$P$ = the proportion of $x_1$-individuals who also have attribute $y_1$
$R$ = the proportion of $x_2$-individuals who also have attribute $y_1$

In estimating $P_t$ by the ecological regression of $Y_1$ on $X_1$, there are four possible situations with different implications for bias in the estimate:

### A. DATA ARE NOT GROUPED BY $y$.

In this case, as was shown in the main body of the paper, the estimate of $P_t$ is unbiased.

### B. DATA ARE GROUPED BY $y$, AND $b_{Y_1X_1}$ IS POSITIVE

If this is the case,

1) *$X_1$ and $P$ are positively related*

Since $b_{Y_1X_1}$ is positive, as $Y_1$ increases $X_1$ increases. But as $Y_1$ increases, $Y_2$ of course decreases, since for each aggregation $Y_1+Y_2=1.0$. This means that $P$ will increase as $Y_1$ increases, since the number of individuals having attributes $x_1$ and $y_1$ will increase in the aggregations as $Y_1$ increases, but the number of individuals having attributes $x_1$ and $y_2$ will decrease as $Y_2$ decreases. Thus the number of $x_1$ individuals having attribute $y_1$ will increase relative to the total number of $x_1$ individuals. Therefore, $Y_1$ and $P$ are positively related. Since both $P$ and $X_1$ are positively related to $Y_1$, $X_1$ and $P$ are positively related.

2) *Since $X_1$ and $P$ are positively related, $(a_{Y_1X}+b_{Y_1X_1})>P_t$.*

Proof

a) Since $X_1$ and $P$ are positively related, $E(P)$ will be at its maximum when $X_1$ is at its maximum, which is 1.0. (It is at this point that the assumption of a monotonic relationship enters; see the Note at the end of this Appendix.)

b) Therefore, when $X_1=1.0$, the expected value of $P$ is greater than $P_t$, unless the value of $X_1$ equals 1.0 in every aggregation, in which case regression analysis is impossible anyway.

c) When $X_1=1.0$, $E(Y_1)=E(P)$, since when

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[17] Assuming that any relationship between $X_1$ and $P$ is monotonic. See the Note at the end of this Appendix.

$X_1=1.0$, $X_2=0.0$, and $Y_1=P\cdot X_1+R\cdot X_2=P\cdot 1.0+R\cdot 0.0=P$

d) When $X_1=1.0$, $E(Y_1)=a_{Y_1X_1}+b_{Y_1X_1}\cdot 1.0 =a_{Y_1X_1}+b_{Y_1X_1}$

e) Therefore (from steps c and d), $a_{Y_1X_1}+b_{Y_1X_1}=E(P|X_1=1.0)$, the expected value of $P$ given that $X_1=1.0$.

f) Since $E(P|X=1.0)>P_t$ (from step *b*), $a_{Y_1X_1}+b_{Y_1X_1}>P_t$.

3) *But* $a_{Y_1X_1}+b_{Y_1X_1}$ *is the estimate of* $P_t$ *in ecological regression. Therefore, in this case, this estimate has a positive bias*

## C. DATA ARE GROUPED BY $y$, AND $b_{Y_1X_1}$ IS NEGATIVE

This case differs from case B only in that now an increase in $Y_1$ coincides with a decrease in $X_1$. But an increase in $Y_1$ still brings an increase in $P$, since as above, an increase in $Y_1$ increases the number of individuals with attributes $y_1$ and $x_1$, and is accompanied by a decrease in $Y_2$ which causes a decrease in the number of individuals having attributes $x_1$ and $y_2$. In this situation $X_1$ and $P$ will be negatively related.

This means, as in the similar proof above, that when $E(P)$ is at its minimum, and therefore is less than or equal to $P_t$, it is equal to $a_{Y_1X_1}+b_{Y_1X_1}$, which is thus a negatively biased estimate of $P_t$.

## D. DATA ARE GROUPED BY $y$, AND $b_{Y_1X_1}=0.0$

Here, even though the data are grouped by $y$, $P$ will be unrelated to $X_1$. Therefore, $a_{Y_1X_1}+b_{Y_1X_1}$ is an unbiased estimate of $P_t$. This makes sense if we realize that the only circumstances under which the data could be grouped by $y$, and $X_1$ still be unrelated to $Y_1$, is that for the individuals out of which the aggregate units are drawn, attribute $x_1$ is unrelated to attribute $y_1$.

*NOTE:*

The above proof assumes that there is a monotonic relationship between $P$ and $X_1$. If this is not so, it is not necessarily true that $P$ reaches its maximum (or minimum) value when $X_1$ and $E(Y_1)$ are at their maximum, and thus that $E(P|X_1=1.0)\geq P_t$ (or $E(P|X_1=1.0)\leq P_t$)

If there is interaction between individuals' $x$-scores and $y$-scores in the grouping process, then the $P$, $X_1$ relationship can be non-monotonic. Such interaction occurs if the expected proportion of $y_1$'s who are $x_1y_1$ varies with the value of $Y_1$ in grouping by $y$, or if the expected proportion of $x_1$'s who are $x_1y_1$ varies with the value of $X_1$ in grouping by $x$. In the simulated example of grouping by $y$ presented earlier in this paper, for instance, there was no such interaction; the probability that an individual had attribute $x_1$, given that he had attribute $y_1$, was assumed to be the same in all the aggregations, with differing values of $Y_1$.

It would take a very specific kind of interaction, however, to produce both a non-monotonic $P$, $X_1$ relationship and a linear $X_1$, $Y_1$ relationship. Such a process of interaction grouping would have to be:

(1) *A process which produces a non-monotonic* $P$, $X_1$ *relationship.* Many interaction-based groupings would not do so. For example, it might be that as the values of $X_1$ and $Y_1$ increase, the value of $P$ increases at an accelerating rate. The $P$, $X_1$ relationship would be nonlinear, but still monotonic.

(2) *A process, furthermore, in which the non-monotonic* $P$, $X_1$ *relationship is mirrored by an* $R$, $X_2$ *relationship in such a way that the* $X_1Y_1$ *relationship is linear.* If at some point in the value of $X_1$ there is an unusual shift in the proportion of $x_1$ individuals who are $y_1$, there must be a compensating shift in the proportion of $x_2$ individuals who are $y_1$, if the predicted value of $Y_1$ is to fall on the same line as the predicted values of $Y_1$ at other values of $X_1$.

Finally, even if there is a non-monotonic relationship between $P$ and $X_1$, it may still be true, even though it is no longer necessarily true, that $E(P|X_1=1.0)\geq P_t$ for positive $b_{YX}$ or $E(P|X_1=1.0)\leq P_t$ for negative $b_{YX}$. Whether it is true or not depends on the distribution of $X_1$ values. If most of the observations have $X_1$ values such that they share a region of increase (or decrease) with the region approaching $X_1=1.0$, then it will still be true that $E(P|X_1=1.0$ will be greater (or less) than $P_t$, even though there are some values of $X_1$ at which the expected value of $P$ is greater (or less) than $E(P|X_1=1.0)$.

Since it must be highly unlikely for all of these conditions to be met, it seems to me that if we are confident of the (testable) assumption that $X_1$ and $Y_1$ have a linear relationship, we can normally assume that no interaction-based grouping of the type described above has occurred, unless there is some *a priori* reason to expect that it has.

## APPENDIX II

## PROOF THAT EXAMINATION OF THE MEANS AND VARIANCES OF THE VARIABLES WILL SHOW WHICH ESTIMATE IS MORE BIASED.

If $b_{YX}=0$, then as was shown in Appendix I, neither the direct estimate nor the indirect estimate of $P$ incorporates any bias. Therefore I will work here only with the situation in which $b_{YX}$ is non-zero.

We must prove:

If $b_{YX} \neq 0$, a necessary and sufficient condition that the direct estimate of $P$ be the more biased estimate is:

$$\frac{\mathrm{Var}_Y}{\overline{Y}(1-\overline{Y})} > \frac{\mathrm{Var}_X}{\overline{X}(1-\overline{X})}$$

Let us call the direct estimate $P_D$, and the indirect estimate $P_I$. Observe that:

$$\begin{aligned} P_D &= a_{YX} + b_{YX} = (\overline{Y} - b_{YX}\overline{X}) + b_{YX} \\ &= \overline{Y} - b_{YX}\overline{X} + b_{YX} \\ P_I &= \frac{\overline{Y}}{\overline{X}}\cdot(a_{XY} + b_{XY}) = \frac{\overline{Y}}{\overline{X}}\left[(\overline{X} - b_{XY}\overline{Y}) + b_{XY}\right] \\ &= \overline{Y} - b_{XY}\frac{\overline{Y}^2}{\overline{X}} + b_{XY}\frac{\overline{Y}}{\overline{X}} \end{aligned}$$

Since

$$b_{XY} = b_{YX}\cdot\frac{\mathrm{Var}_X}{\mathrm{Var}_Y},$$

Denoted

$$b_{YX}\cdot\frac{V_X}{V_Y},$$

$$\begin{aligned} P_D - P_I &= (\overline{Y} - b_{YX}\overline{X} + b_{YX}) \\ &\quad - \left(\overline{Y} - b_{YX}\frac{V_X}{V_Y}\frac{\overline{Y}^2}{\overline{X}} + \frac{V_X}{V_Y}b_{YX}\frac{\overline{Y}}{\overline{X}}\right) \end{aligned}$$

$$P_D - P_I = b_{YX}\cdot\frac{1}{X V_Y}(V_Y\overline{X} - V_Y\overline{X}^2 - V_X\overline{Y} + V_X\overline{Y}^2)$$

$$P_D - P_I = b_{YX}\cdot\frac{1}{\overline{X}V_Y}\left[V_Y(\overline{X} - \overline{X}^2) - V_X(\overline{Y} - \overline{Y}^2)\right]$$

$$\begin{aligned} P_D - P_I &= b_{YX}\cdot\frac{1}{\overline{X}V_Y}\cdot(\overline{X} - \overline{X}^2)(\overline{Y} - \overline{Y}^2) \\ &\quad \cdot\left[\frac{V_Y}{(\overline{Y} - \overline{Y}^2)} - \frac{V_X}{(\overline{X} - \overline{X}^2)}\right] \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} P_D - P_I &= b_{YX}\cdot\frac{1}{\overline{X}V_Y}\cdot(\overline{X} - \overline{X}^2)(\overline{Y} - \overline{Y}^2) \\ &\quad \cdot\left[\frac{V_Y}{\overline{Y}(1 - \overline{Y})} - \frac{V_X}{\overline{X}(1 - \overline{X})}\right] \end{aligned}$$

You will recall that when $P_D > P_I$, and $b_{YX}$ is positive, or when $P_D < P_I$, and $b_{YX}$ is negative, $P_D$ is the more biased estimate. That is to say, when $P_D - P_I$ has the same sign as $b_{YX}$, $P_D$ is the more biased estimate. In the final equation above, note that $\overline{X}$, $V_Y$, $(\overline{X} - \overline{X}^2)$, and $(\overline{Y} - \overline{Y}^2) \geq 0$. Therefore, unless one of them equals zero (in which case ecological regression would be useless anyway, since this would mean that there was no variation in one of the variables), the sign of $P_D - P_I$ is determined by the signs of $b_{YX}$ and the sign of the term in the brackets. If and only if the term in the brackets is positive, $P_D - P_I$ and $b_{YX}$ have the same sign, and thus the direct estimate is the more biased. If and only if the term in the brackets equals zero, $P_D - P_I$ equals zero, and neither estimate is more biased. If and only if the term in the brackets is negative, $P_D - P_I$ and $b_{YX}$ have different signs, and thus the indirect estimate is the more biased.

In order to give an interpretation for the terms

$$\frac{V_Y}{\overline{Y}(1-\overline{Y})} \text{ and } \frac{V_X}{\overline{X}(1-\overline{X})},$$

note that $\overline{Y}$ $(1\text{-}\overline{Y})$ is the maximum possible value of $V_Y$.

A common computational formula is:

$$V_Y = \frac{\Sigma Y^2}{N} - \overline{Y}^2$$

Since $0 \leq Y \leq 1$, $V_Y$ reaches its maximum value when $Y$ equals either zero or one for each aggregate unit. But when this is true, $\overline{Y}$ will be the proportion of units for which $Y = 1$, and therefore

$$\Sigma Y^2 = \overline{Y}N\cdot 1^2 + (1 - \overline{Y})N\cdot 0^2 = \overline{Y}N$$

Then

$$V_Y = \frac{\Sigma Y^2}{N} - \overline{Y}^2 = \frac{\overline{Y}N}{N} - \overline{Y}^2 = \overline{Y}(1 - \overline{Y})$$

Therefore when $V_Y$ is at its maximum, it equals $\overline{Y}$ $(1\text{-}\overline{Y})$; similarly $\overline{X}$ $(1\text{-}\overline{X})$ is the maximum possible value of $V_X$. Accordingly, the term

$$\frac{V_Y}{\overline{Y}(1 - \overline{Y})}$$

is interpreted as the magnitude of the variance of $Y$, relative to its greatest possible magnitude.

# VOTING ON THE PROPOSITIONS: BALLOT PATTERNS AND HISTORICAL TRENDS IN CALIFORNIA*

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Entering the polling booth on Tuesday, November 3, 1964, the typical California voter found himself confronted with an immense sheet of finely-printed green paper, a dirty black rubber stamp, a tiny ink pad, and thirty decisions to render. A few minutes later (the legal maximum is 10) he emerged and numbly surrendered to a clerk his ballot, now slightly embellished, like the fingers of his decision hand, with black ink stains.

Most of his decisions were made on a lengthy array of propositions. In these, questions on an assortment of issues were posed, each couched in language tedious and obscure—as only minds trained in the finest law schools could devise.

This study seeks to gain some knowledge about factors which influence the vote on these propositions. It employs a somewhat unorthodox method: an analysis of the voting patterns on actual ballots. The ballots furnish attractive data because they are, after all, completely accurate records of the results of those minutes of decision-rendering in the artificial privacy of that cramped polling booth.

It would be impossible by this method to generate a comprehensive theory about proposition voting behavior—too much information about the individual voter is forever lost by the secrecy incorporated in the balloting procedure. Nevertheless a contribution can be made in several areas of relevant concern, areas currently dominated more by folklore and mythology than fact or theory.

## I. DATA

The data come from some 1600 ballots voted in Los Angeles county, most of them in the presidential election of 1964. First, by peering over the shoulders of the ballot counters on election night in 1964—and well into the next morning—it was possible to obtain an accurate record of the ballot patterns of the 209 voters in a reasonably typical middle income precinct. Second, through the cooperation of the county clerk, a modified random sample comprising 1085 of the 94,058 absentee ballots voted in the county in the election was obtained and the ballot patterns noted.[1] Finally, some limited ballot data were gathered for three municipal elections in the spring of 1965.[2]

## II. 1964 IN CONTEXT: SOME HISTORICAL COMMENTS ON "MOOD" AND ABSTENTION

Before examining the ballot data directly it may be helpful to put the 1964 election in somewhat broader historical perspective. The method to be employed in this investigation of historical patterns in proposition voting will be multiple regression analysis. Those repelled either by history or regression analysis may wish to skip this section after being informed of two relevant findings: *when looked at in the light of the experience of proposition voting at general elections in California in this century, it is found, first, that the electorate was in a favorable "mood" in 1964 and, second, that abstention rates on the propositions were very low.*

Regression analysis permits one to estimate the independent impact of each of a number of variables as they interact simultaneously in association with a "dependent variable."[3] For the discussion of "mood," the variable to be explained, the dependent variable, will be the average "yes" vote for the "noncontroversial" propositions in each election, while the dependent variable in the abstention discussion

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[1] The absentees represented 3.3 percent of the total county vote.

[2] It might be noted here that the secrecy of the ballot applies to the voting procedure itself. The ballots are secret in the sense that it is impossible to link a particular ballot with an individual voter. After the ballot box has been opened anyone, even social scientists, can by law view the ballots as they are counted.

[3] For a discussion, see Mordecai Ezekiel and Karl A. Fox, *Methods of Correlation and Regression Analysis* (New York: Wiley, 1959); E. Malinvaud, *Statistical Methods of Econometrics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); N. R. Draper and H. Smith, *Applied Regression Analysis* (New York: Wiley, 1966).

will be the average abstention garnered by these propositions.

"Noncontroversial" propositions are the residue when one excludes from consideration all bond, initiative, and referendum measures. All of the noncontroversial propositions have been placed on the ballot by the state legislature—and by extraordinary majorities, a fact which helps to guarantee their noncontroversial nature. They tend to cover matters which seem legalistic, involved, trivial, or irrelevant to the average voter and, with very few exceptions, they generate little or no campaign debate. These measures, then, should be the most affected by whatever general mood happens to prevail at the time and the least influenced by peculiarities of special information and campaign activity.[4]

The period from 1918 to 1968 is covered in the regression analysis. The years previous have been excluded either because there were too few measures on the ballot or because the Republican party was in utter disarray due to Progressive or Bullmoose inroads, thus making it difficult to assess electoral partisanship in the election. Between 5 and 22 noncontroversial propositions appeared on the ballot in each of the elections considered.

*Electoral mood.* It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there exists an underlying mood of favorableness or unfavorableness toward the propositions which forms a background from which specific propositions, due to reasonable or capricious circumstances, may deviate. Besides 1964, the years of 1960, 1952, and 1928 have seen a large measure of success for ballot measures while years like 1958, 1936, and 1918 have seen much failure. The average favorable vote on the noncontroversial propositions for the period has varied widely and erratically from a high of 65 percent to a low of 40 percent. At the same time, however, the standard deviation for the vote on these measures for each year has remained quite stable—at one point, in fact, it was constant for four straight elections. Thus it appears that *there are good years and bad years for noncontroversial propositions. The average success varies from election to election but the dispersion of propositions around that average remains quite steady.*

If there is such a thing as voter mood on the propositions, it would be of interest and importance to discover what determines the mood. Several variables which seemed on *a priori* grounds likely to be associated with the average favorable vote on the noncontroversial propositions were tested with the results as displayed in Table 1.[5]

Only one of the variables, a measure of the partisan nature of the election, proved to be a truly strong predictor. A number of measures of partisanship were experimented with and the one which proved to give the best fit was the percentage of total registration gained by the Republican candidate for Governor or President.[6] This correlates .70 with the average favorable vote on the noncontroversial propositions and proves to be by far the most powerful independent predictor even when a substantial number of other variables are thrown into the regression calculation. An increase of 3 percentage points in the Republican share of the registered vote is associated with an increase of over 2 percentage points in the average favorable vote on the noncontroversial proposition.

Thus it is found that *what is good for the Republicans is good for the noncontroversial propositions and vice versa.* When political, economic, and social forces have worked to the Republicans' benefit in California, they also seem to have encouraged a favorable mood toward the noncontroversial propositions. It

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[4] For more content-oriented surveys of historical trends, see Sheldon Radabaugh, "Tendencies in California Direct Legislation," 42 *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly* 66–78 (June 1961); and Winston W. Crouch, *The Initiative and Referendum in California* (Los Angeles: Haynes Foundation, 1950).

[5] The regression equations are displayed vertically in the table. Standard errors are given in parentheses below each partial regression coefficient; to be regarded as statistically significant, a regression coefficient should be, conventionally, at least twice its standard error. The equations as a whole were significant (F test) at the .01 level. The Durbin-Watson statistic for serial correlation was also calculated. It fell in the inconclusive area for each equation.

[6] When the total vote cast is used as the percentage base, the Republicans tend to do "too well" for a proper fit in gubernatorial elections—particularly in the Warren era. This may suggest that Republican candidates for governor have done somewhat better than one would "normally" expect them to—a phenomenon perhaps attributable to the historically weak party structure in the state as well as to the party's ability to field candidates of bipartisan appeal. One way of overcoming this peculiarity was to take the total registration as a base thus smoothing out these disruptions in the lower turnout off-year elections. In 1946 the race for governor was won in the primary and thus the Republican vote for lieutenant governor has been used.

TABLE 1. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF MOOD AND ABSTENTION, 1918–1968

| Dependent variable | *Mood*<br>Average favorable vote on the noncontroversial propositions, in percent (mean = 54.4; s.d. = 6.6) | *Abstention*<br>Average abstention on the noncontroversial propositions, in percent (mean = 29.9; s.d. = 7.9) |
|---|---|---|
| Intercept | 16.34 | 650.93 |
| Independent variables | | |
| Percent of the total registration gained by Republican candidate for President or Governor | 0.71<br>(0.18) | −0.42<br>(0.12) |
| Turnout, in percent of registered vote | 0.01<br>(0.13) | 0.04<br>(0.11) |
| Average abstention on the non-controversial propositions, in percent | −0.10<br>(0.23) | |
| Number of propositions on the ballot | −0.24<br>(0.25) | 0.02<br>(0.19) |
| Favorable vote on the most controversial proposition, in percent | 0.12<br>(0.07) | |
| Trend; the year of the election | 0.01<br>(0.13) | −0.32<br>(0.08) |
| Abstention on the most controversial proposi- in percent | | 0.63<br>(0.19) |
| $R^2$ | .60 | .81 |
| Standard error of estimate | 4.8 | 3.9 |

does not necessarily follow, however, that Republican voters are inordinately favorable to noncontroversial propositions. Indeed, as will be seen below, the ballot data from 1964 suggest the opposite—although it should be borne in mind that the 1964 election was one in which the relationship between Republican and proposition success did not hold up and also that there is something of a middle class bias in the ballots examined.

It is somewhat surprising that none of the other independent variables showed much strength. For example turnout is positively associated with the average favorable vote on the noncontroversial propositions (r = .25) for the period and it could be argued that citizens who vote only in presidential elections are disproportionately people who tend rather passively to acquiesce on the legislative ballot proposals—although this conflicts with the notion of the proponents of alienation that high turnout would be associated with referendum defeat.[7] However, as can be seen from Table 1, the independent influence of the variable in the regression equation is nil.

Similarly the variable denoting the average abstention on the noncontroversial propositions by itself correlates −.45 with the dependent variable—suggesting at that level that abstainers, if prodded into rendering an opinion on these proposals, may support them. It too was found to have little independent effect in the regression equation. There was a somewhat stronger tendency for the length of the ballot to be negatively associated with the average favorable vote, but the relationship was not significant.

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[7] See John E. Horton and Wayne E. Thompson, "Powerlessness and Political Negativism: A Study of Defeated Local Referendums," 67 *American Journal of Sociology* 487–88 (March 1962) and James S. Coleman, *Community Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1957). Since only general elections are being considered in this analysis, turnout tends to be rather high in all cases. The election with the lowest turnout was 1942 with 59 percent of the registered vote, the highest, 1964 with 88 percent. Local elections frequently generate much lower turnout rates.

The vote on the most controversial proposition[8] might be expected to set the "mood" for the election. This variable does seem related to the average favorable vote on the legislative propositions but the relationship, while approaching statistical significance, is weak: the vote in favor of the most controversial proposition must rise over 8 percentage points to be associated with an increase of one percentage point in the dependent variable.

*Abstention.* It can be seen from Table 1 that, while there seems to have been no trend in electoral mood, *there has been a strong downward trend in abstention on ballot measures in California during this century.* The regression equation suggests a decline in average abstention of about one percentage point every three years. The low abstention rates found in the 1964 election simply place it as a late entry in this process.

A large drop in abstention occurred between the 1910 and 1912 elections (before the period covered by the regression analysis). The change was probably caused by increased interest in the ballot measures encouraged by the adoption in 1911 of initiative and referendum procedures, by the practice which began in 1912 of mailing out voters booklets, by the establishment in office in 1910 of the Progressive party in California with its enthusiastic—perhaps frenetic—preoccupation with "good government," and by the beginning of women's suffrage in 1912 with the disproportionate participation in early elections of those women who were the most intensely interested in politics.[9] After this period there was a general decline in abstention, then something of a leveling off during the twenties and thirties, a major drop in the middle forties, with a continued, but slower, decline since then.

The reasons for this trend are not particularly obvious. Californians may be somewhat more election conscious than they used to be, for turnout (based on registration figures) has slowly increased over the years.[10] However, the cause is not in a changed attitude toward abstention in general or simply in the postwar influx of new residents from the east (who might conceivably be expected to have different attitudes toward abstention) for abstention on the judicial races has remained fairly constant in the last thirty years. Voter knowledge about the judicial races has always been very low and nothing has ever been done to bring these contests to the attention of the voter; thus abstention remains constant (and large).[11] On the propositions, however, voter attention and knowledge may have been increasing in recent years leading to higher participation on these ballot items. Causes for this may be more education, greater and better coverage by the mass media, more effective campaigning on the propositions, and simply higher literacy rates.[12]

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[8] This is assumed to be the proposition with lowest abstention. Propositions which have generated controversy seem invariably to have low abstention rates. It seems then that, as the debate is more loudly and clearly drawn on a proposition and as the voter is made aware of the arguments of both sides and of the issues at stake, he is far more likely to reach a decision than he is to come to a psychological or ideological impasse due to a discovered value conflict or to cross-pressures. In only one of the elections was the proposition with lowest abstention itself "noncontroversial" by the definitions used here.

[9] For a discussion of some of these points, see also V. O. Key, Jr. and Winston W. Crouch, *The Initiative and Referendum in California* (Berkeley: University of California, 1939), pp. 531–532. Incidentally, the correlation between trend and abstention does not affect the interpretation of the "mood" equation: neither variable is significant even when the other is excluded.

[10] For a contrary argument, see Eugene C. Lee, *California Votes 1928–1960* (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, 1963), Chapter 1. The correlation of turnout with the year in California in general elections for the 1912–1968 period is .48. The regression coefficient suggests an average increase of turnout of about one percentage point every four years. Regression analysis using the year as an independent variable as well as a dummy variable for on- or off-year elections generates a highly significant equation and a multiple $R^2$ of .66:

$$\text{TURNOUT} = -408.72 + \underset{(0.06)}{0.25}(\text{YEAR}) + \underset{(1.96)}{11.35}(\text{ON-OFF})$$

[11] The abstention rate on the vote for state supreme court justices did drop noticeably in 1966 as a result of an unprecedented (and unsuccessful) campaign against the justices for their declaration that 1964's propostion 14 was unconstitutional.

[12] These data are generally consonant with James Rosenau's argument that the size of the

Whatever the reason for the decline in abstention, the trend gives little support to those who argue that material progress, the increasing size and technical complexity of society and the increasing remoteness of political events have led to rising political bewilderment, apathy, and alienation. Or to those who suggest that increasing "other-directedness" in our century has led to increased political apathy (a condition specifically *not* equated with non-voting in these writings).[13] It is surely the case that over the last fifty or sixty years things political and governmental have gotten bigger and more complex. Yet, as the decline of abstention suggests, this has *not* led to bewilderment or apathy on the part of the voter. Quite the contrary: voters now—at least in California—seem to be much more confident of their ability to render valid decisions on the complexities of modern government than they ever were in the past. This is not to say, of course, that they are making better decisions than their predecessors; it is only to assert that psychologically they seem more likely to *feel* their decisions are meaningful.

A search by means of regression analysis for other variables associated with the average abstention rate for the noncontroversial measures for the 1918–1966 period discovers that the percentage of total registration gained by the Republican candidate for Governor or President is again a healthy contributor: good years for Republicans have been associated with low abstention. On the 1964 ballots, however, there was no tendency for abstainers to vote Republican more than non-abstainers.

The abstention rate for the most controversial proposition is also a highly significant contributor to abstention on the noncontroversial propositions: when the abstention on this proposition decreases by two percentage points, the average abstention on the noncontroversial propositions goes down by well over one percentage point. Controversial propositions appear to draw the voters' attention and interest to the proposition part of the ballot. As noted above, this may partly explain the sharp statewide drop in abstention on legislative measures which occurred in 1912 when the initiative and referendum were first used. This phenomenon can also be seen in some of the ballot data. Total abstention on the noncontroversial propositions on the ballots examined from the local elections of 1965 was two to three times higher than it had been on the similar propositions on the November 1964 ballots. The difference undoubtedly rests in the absence in the 1965 elections of any truly controversial ballot measure to catch the voter's attention and interest.

Turnout again is found to be inadequate in the regression analysis. It has no independent effect on abstention, although the simple correlation between the two is $-.44$. Thus those who vote at every election do not appear to be more (or less) likely to vote on the propositions than those who only appear at elections with high turnout. The length of the ballot, rather surprisingly, also is not related independently to abstention. Voters do not appear particularly to be put off by lengthy ballots.

### III. THE PROPOSITIONS IN 1964

Table 2 supplies an indication of the substance of each of the propositions in 1964.[14] The first three measures and the last two were bond issues on which there was no open controversy.[15] Propositions 4 through 12 were placed on the ballot by the legislature. All were accompanied by an utter absence of campaign debate and will be considered the "noncontroversial" propositions for the purpose of the ballot analysis.

While proposition 13 was "noncontroversial" in the sense that there was little or no organized campaigning for or against it, it was closely linked to proposition 16 which proposed to set up a private lottery in the state and was controversial in the extreme. To stifle the lottery proposal the legislature inserted on the ballot as proposition 13 a measure which would outlaw the naming of private corporations in the

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attentive public has been increasing. See his "The Attentive Public and Foreign Policy" (Center of International Studies, Princeton University, March, 1968).

[13] See Murray B. Levin, *The Alienated Voter: Politics in Boston* (New York: Holt, 1962), pp. 70–71; Kenneth Keniston, "Alienation and the Decline of Utopia," 29 *American Scholar* 179–180 (Spring 1960); and David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday-Anchor, 1955), pp. 196–199.

[14] A facsimile of much of the 1964 ballot, including all of the statewide propositions can be found in Clyde E. Jacobs and John F. Gallagher, *California Government: One Among Fifty* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 53.

[15] The ease with which these bonds passed is typical. Of the 31 bond issues referred by the California legislature to the electorate at general elections since 1910, only three have failed to pass. One of these was the school bond measure on the 1968 ballot, a reaction in large measure to student disorders. The most recent previous bond failure occurred in 1922.

TABLE 2. THE PROPOSITIONS AND THE VOTE

| | Proposition | Percent Yes of Votes Cast on the Proposition | | | Abstention Rate in percent | | | Newspaper Recommendation | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | County | Precinct | Absentee Sample | County | Precinct | Absentee Sample | Times | Herald-Examiner |
| 1 | Beach and park bonds ($150 million) | 58 | 72 | 63 | 12 | 10 | 11 | Y | N |
| 2 | College bonds ($380 million) | 62 | 64 | 70 | 14 | 14 | 11 | Y | Y |
| 3 | School building bonds ($260 million) | 66 | 70 | 70 | 15 | 17 | 13 | Y | Y |
| 4 | Restrict veterans' tax exemption to residents | 69 | 71 | 65 | 14 | 15 | 12 | Y | Y |
| 5 | Improve veterans' widows' tax exemption | 58 | 59 | 69 | 14 | 17 | 11 | N | N |
| 6 | Establish retaliatory tax on out of state insurers | 79 | 78 | 70 | 22 | 27 | 21 | Y | Y |
| 7 | Permit investment of public retirement funds in corporations | 44 | 48 | 45 | 20 | 22 | 18 | N | Y |
| 8 | Keep unopposed judicial races off the ballot | 67 | 72 | 68 | 24 | 28 | 26 | Y | Y |
| 9 | Apportion all supervisorial districts uniformly | 75 | 75 | 75 | 27 | 33 | 28 | Y | N |
| 10 | Permit use of certain school funds for other purposes | 53 | 55 | 49 | 20 | 24 | 19 | Y | N |
| 11 | Eliminate vote requirement in city-county contracts | 72 | 76 | 61 | 27 | 32 | 30 | Y | Y |
| 12 | Permit property tax relief in disaster areas | 73 | 75 | 85 | 17 | 23 | 14 | Y | N |
| 13 | Ban naming of corporations in the Constitution | 71 | 68 | 67 | 22 | 31 | 25 | Y | Y |
| 14 | Prohibit state from restricting owner's right to sell | 67 | 70 | 66 | 4 | 3 | 6 | Y | Y |
| 15 | Outlaw pay television | 62 | 54 | 55 | 6 | 4 | 9 | N | N |
| 16 | Set up privately-run lottery | 34 | 42 | 44 | 8 | 9 | 8 | N | N |
| 17 | Change railroad train crew laws | 62 | 66 | 70 | 8 | 8 | 15 | Y | Y |
| A | County Hospital bonds ($26.7 million) | 67 | 72 | 73 | 17 | 21 | 16 | Y | Y |
| B | County juvenile detention building bonds ($8.6 million) | 65 | 71 | 70 | 17 | 20 | 16 | Y | Y |

California constitution, a measure which would, in effect, make the lottery impossible. Had both propositions passed, the one with higher affirmative vote would have been authoritative.[16]

The last four state propositions, 14 through 17, were all initiatives and generated considerable controversy. The notorious proposition 14 prohibited state or local governments from limiting an owner's right to sell or rent residential property—in effect it repealed acts of the legislature which had been designed to halt racial discrimination in housing. Campaigning on this issue was easily the most intense of any in 1964. Except for a right to work proposition in 1958, fewer California voters abstained on proposition 14 than on any ballot measure in the century.[17]

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[16] A crude, but provocative, estimate of the extent of the role sheer caprice can play in the vote on the propositions can be gained by cross-tabulating the votes on propositions 13 and 16 as in the table below. A consistent pro-lottery vote would require a "yes" vote on 16 and a "no" on 13 while consistent anti-lottery people voted against 16 and for 13. Those 14 to 17 percent of the ballots marked favorably for both measures largely defy rational explanation for by approving proposition 13 these voters were moving to nullify their affirmative vote on 16. Most likely, they genuinely favored the well-publicized lottery measure but, uninformed and uninstructed, they also voted for proposition 13 without seeing the logical connection. Another 8 percent of the absentees and 12 percent in the precinct voted for the lottery and abstained on proposition 13. Since the latter measure was designed to nullify the lottery vote, these lottery proponents who let others decide on it can hardly be said to be fully aware of their own best interests in this matter. Together these two groups make up one quarter of the ballots. In addition the rationale for voting negatively on both propositions is a bit feeble. Furthermore, if those who voted affirmatively on both were voting randomly on proposition 13 it is to be expected many citizens voted consistently only because they "guessed right" on the proposition. A similar argument could be made for those who voted against both measures. If the "worst" assumptions are made in each case, the number of ballots marked capriciously for at least one of these measures is about 60 percent. This is an outside limit under these considerations and the argument is a bit strained, but the exercise should serve to suggest orders of magnitude. It would appear that the vote on these measures

While the lottery promoters sought in proposition 16 to create an industry, the theater owners in proposition 15 sought equally ingeniously to destroy one. Concerned by the threat of competition from a new pay television company, they endeavored to deal frontally with their problem: they organized to get petitions signed so that an initiative could be put on the ballot making (home) pay television forever illegal in the state of California.[18]

Proposition 17 suggested that California's laws about size of railroad crews be replaced with ones which would reduce the minimum requirement. The measure was supported by management and opposed by labor.

## IV. AGGREGATE RESULTS FROM THE BALLOT DATA AND THE COUNTY

Table 2 also displays the aggregate voting results on the propositions for the 209 precinct ballots and for the ballots sampled from the absentees. When these are compared to the results prevailing in the county as a whole it can be seen that, despite the rather middle class bias of the ballot data, there are no spectacular variations. In fact had no one been permitted to vote except for these 1294 citizens the decisions on all nineteen propositions would have been precisely the same.[19]

The precinct voters differ rather markedly from those in the county as a whole only on the first proposition—understandable since the proposition proposed funds for a large park near the precinct. The absentees' differences with the county are also generally quite small, the most notable discrepancies occurring in the vote on propositions 11 and 12.[20]

## V. ANALYSIS OF THE BALLOT DATA

The data from these ballots can be used to yield evidence about the following possible sources of influence in proposition voting: 1) newspaper recommendations, 2) political party endorsement, 3) campaigning, 4) cohabitation, 5) popular patterns of thinking, 6) order effects, 7) negativism, and 8) yeasaying and naysaying.

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was itself the result of a kind of lottery.

| Proposition 13 | | Proposition 16: Yes % | Abstain % | No % | Total % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Absentees* (N = 1085) | | | |
| Yes | | 17 | 1 | 32 | 50 |
| Abstain | | 8 | 8 | 9 | 25 |
| No | | 15 | — | 10 | 25 |
| | Total | 40 | 9 | 51 | 100 |
| | | *Precinct* (N = 209) | | | |
| Yes | | 14 | 1 | 32 | 47 |
| Abstain | | 12 | 8 | 11 | 31 |
| No | | 12 | — | 10 | 22 |
| | Total | 38 | 9 | 53 | 100 |

[17] See also Raymond E. Wolfinger and Fred I. Greenstein, "The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting," this REVIEW, 62 (September 1968), 753–769; and Harlan Hahn, "Northern Referenda on Fair Housing: The Response of White Voters," 21 *Western Political Quarterly*, 483–495 (September 1968.)

[18] Both propositions 14 and 15, passed by the state electorate at this election, were subsequently declared unconstitutional by the courts.

[19] The similarity between precinct and absentees found in the cross-tabulations in note 16 above is quite typical.

[20] A brief analysis of absentee voting from several California elections as well as of the limited literature on the subject suggests that the vote of the absentees does not usually differ greatly from the precinct vote. Absentees tend to be better off economically than the average and, as seen in Table 2, somewhat more likely to favor bond issues. Also, as often noted, absentees are likely to vote a few percentage points more Republican than other voters. The advantage for the Republicans, however, varies from election to election and from race to race and does not appear to depend on whether the Republican candidate is a moderate or a conservative. There is also some tendency for the Republican gain among the absentees to diminish as income increases; in poor areas the absentees are distinctly Republican while in wealthy areas they differ little from other voters. See John E. Mueller, "Reason and Caprice: Ballot Patterns in California," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1965, chapter 3. See also James K. Pollock, "Absent Voting with Particular Reference to Ohio's Experience," 15 *National Municipal Review* 282–292 (May 1926); Charles E. Merriam and Harold F. Gosnell, *Non-Voting: Causes and Methods of Control* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1924), pp. 63–72; Joseph P. Harris, *Election Administration in the United States* (Washington, D. C.: Brookings, 1934) pp. 283–301; Belmont Brice, Jr., "Absentee Voting and the Character of the Electorate," *BGR Observer*, June 1961 (Los Angeles: Bureau of Governmental Research, University of California).

1. *Newspaper recommendations.* The recommendations of local newspapers, it might be expected, are important aids to the voter's decision on the array of propositions. As Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson note, "Where voters must . . . pass on a multitude of referenda, the newspaper acquires added influence."[21] This is presumably very likely to occur in Los Angeles where "the *Times* has long been regarded as the most powerful single political force in the city."[22] The newspaper had a circulation in 1964 of over 800,000 daily and 1,144,000 on Sunday. The circulation of the Hearst *Los Angeles Herald-Examiner*, the other major newspaper in the county, is about three-quarters that of the *Times*.

The newspapers were far from secretive about their wishes. The *Herald Examiner*, published a full statement of its preferences on the editorial pages of both the Sunday and Monday editions before the Tuesday election. The *Times* did even better, printing its recommendations on the front page of the Sunday edition and including them also in the editorial pages on Monday and Tuesday.

To be counted, the absentee was required to mail his ballot so that it was received by the day before the election. Some 9 percent of the absentee ballots were received by the county clerk on Monday and another 7 percent were received in a special mail delivery on Sunday. Since the city's newspapers published their recommendations in full only on Sunday, this means that a maximum of only 16 percent of the absentees could have seen the recommendations in full before voting. This figure errs, of course, very much on the high side. A large majority, if not all, of the ballots received on Sunday and many of those received on Monday were undoubtedly mailed before the Sunday newspapers were printed. Furthermore a tenth of the ballots received on the two days were military ballots, suggesting an early and distant mailing.

Therefore, since the preferences of the absentees do not seem to differ much from those of the voters in the rest of the county who would find the newspapers' recommendations readily accessible (see Table 2), an initial hint that newspapers may not be a major influence on the proposition vote can be registered.

A further hint is given in the following information: *out of the sample of 1,293 ballots, not a single one was marked on the propositions exactly according to the recommendations of either of the county's newspapers.*

In reflecting on this fact, however, it should be noted that, since there were three ways to vote on each proposition (yes, no, abstain) there were 1,162,261,467 different patterns a voter could select on the nineteen propositions. Thus if people marked their ballots randomly one would expect a given pattern rarely to appear. This is important to keep in mind, even though it is not being argued that ballots are marked (purely) by chance. Nevertheless the idea that some voters slavishly duplicate their newspaper's wishes over the entire list of propositions is by no means bizarre. It might be expected that at least a few people methodically clip out the ballot recommendations section of their newspaper and take it to the polls with them. Indeed, in a survey of readers of the *News-Press* in Santa Barbara, California, 12 percent stated that they took the newspaper's recommendations to the polls with them at *every* election, while another 27 percent stated that they did so occasionally.[23] It is true that many of these may deviate here and there, but to expect some of them at least to make no exception whatsoever hardly seems unjustifiable. Furthermore, it is to be expected that some people in the county, especially in middle income areas, wholly without reference to the newspaper would follow the same reasoning as its editorial board—the "fiscally responsible" Republican attitude of the *Times*, for example—and thus by chance add to the group adopting the newspaper's line. Shortly after the November election a number of students of California politics were asked, "Out of 209 voters in a reasonably typical middle class precinct in Los Angeles, how many do you think voted the *Times* line exactly?" Estimates—not all of them carefully considered—generally ranged from 20 to 80 percent and the information that none of the voters had done so brought near-universal surprise (and glee).

Although no voter selected over the nineteen propositions the pattern suggested by either of the city's largest newspapers, it might be argued that to expect *perfect* agreement with newspaper recommendations on the ballot is really too stringent a test. In assessing the power of the press perhaps one should, first, allow for some "error" from a strict newspaper-line vote and, second, concentrate primarily on the noncontroversial propositions where campaigning is nonexistent, ideological predisposition is minimal, confusion is greatest and thus where the influence of the press is most likely to be exerted.

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[21] Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (New York: Vintage, 1963), p. 324.

[22] *Loc. cit.*

[23] James E. Gregg, "Newspaper Editorial Endorsement: Their Influence on California Elections," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1964) p. 266. See also James E. Brinton, Chilton R. Bush and Thomas M. Newell, *The Newspaper and Its Public* (Stanford: Institute for Communication Research, Department of Communication and Journalism, Stanford University, 1959), p. 63.

Table 3 displays the distributions of ballots according to the number of deviations from the pattern suggested by the newspapers. From this it can be seen, for example, that about 8 percent of the voters in the precinct voted the *Times* line with three or fewer deviations. It is doubtful that this percentage represents a significant indication of press influence, since the "error" distributions for the precinct and the presumably largely uninfluenced absentees are very similar. More faith could be put on this observation of course if the precinct data base were larger, but even as it stands the close parallelism of the distributions is impressive.

It might be argued that the data in the table demonstrate that the *Times* was more influential than the *Herald-Examiner* and therefore by implication that the *Times* at least had some impact. A more plausible explanation is that the difference is a function of negativism. As noted in Section II above, 1964 was a very affirmative year in California; only two of the propositions failed to get a majority in the state. Thus the more negative votes a newspaper recommends, the more unlike the consensus it was likely to appear; and the fewer the negative votes recommended, the sooner the newspaper is likely to pick up by this measure anyone inclined to vote affirmatively on all the propositions as a fellow traveler. Because of this the *Times*, which recommended negative votes on four propositions, is likely to appear more influential than the *Herald-Examiner* which recommended seven "no" votes (see Table 2). Indeed a newspaper which urged affirmative votes on *all* the propositions would do considerably better by this measure than either newspaper.

TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF BALLOTS ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF "ERRORS" FROM NEWSPAPER RECOMMENDATIONS ON NINETEEN PROPOSITIONS

| Number of "Errors" | Los Angeles *Times* | | Los Angeles *Herald-Examiner* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Absentees % | Precinct % | Absentees % | Precinct % |
| 0 | — | — | — | — |
| 1 | — | — | — | — |
| 2 | 2 | 4 | — | — |
| 3 | 4 | 4 | — | — |
| 4 | 7 | 6 | 1 | 2 |
| 5 | 9 | 10 | 4 | 4 |
| 6 | 10 | 10 | 8 | 9 |
| 7 | 12 | 13 | 9 | 11 |
| 8 | 10 | 8 | 15 | 15 |
| 9 | 8 | 8 | 14 | 10 |
| 10 | 8 | 5 | 9 | 11 |
| 11 | 6 | 3 | 10 | 8 |
| 12 | 6 | 4 | 7 | 6 |
| 13 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 4 |
| 14 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 |
| 15 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 |
| 16 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 5 |
| 17 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 5 |
| 18 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| 19 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| | 100 | 98 | 100 | 101 |
| N = | 1,085 | 209 | 1,085 | 209 |

When only the "noncontroversial" propositions, numbered 4 through 12, are considered, the case for the influence of the press remains feeble. Only two voters in the precinct selected the pattern suggested by the *Times* on this shortened list of propositions and only one voter applied the *Herald-Examiner's* formula. Perhaps one should remove the two veterans' propositions, 4 and 5, from consideration on the grounds that some voters may already have firm opinions about such perennial issues and thus would have little need to consult their newspaper. This process leaves as a residue propositions 6 through 12—the most complicated and obscure on the ballot. On these measures the *Herald-Examiner's* line is voted by only two voters in the precinct.

The *Times* does better, amassing seven voters in the precinct—about 3 percent. While this number is hardly spectacular, it becomes even less so on closer examination. On these propositions the *Times* recommended a "yes" vote on all except proposition 7. In Table 4 a comparison is made of the frequencies of ballots with affirmative votes on six of these measures and a negative vote on the seventh. It can be seen that the *Times* pattern is only about as frequent—*both* in the precinct and among the absentees—as would be expected from a knowledge of the *statewide* vote on the measures: proposition 7 did worst of the seven and accordingly the pattern with a single negative vote on that proposition has a high frequency and each frequency falls at about the expected rate. Had the *Times* recommendation exercised a special effect it is fair to expect this pattern to attain an embellished frequency.

It might be anticipated that the recom-

TABLE 4. FREQUENCIES OF PATTERNS ON PROPOSITIONS 6 THROUGH 12 WITH ONE NEGATIVE AND SIX AFFIRMATIVE VOTES

| Pattern | Number with Pattern | | Statewide "No" Vote on Negative Measure as % of Votes Cast on Measure |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Absentee Sample | Precinct | |
| NYYYYYY | 18 | 2 | 21 |
| YNYYYYY[a] | 34 | 7 | 58 |
| YYNYYYY | 16 | 5 | 41 |
| YYYNYYY | 5 | 1 | 24 |
| YYYYNYY | 27 | 8 | 49 |
| YYYYYNY | 15 | 1 | 28 |
| YYYYYYN | 6 | 1 | 34 |

[a] Los Angeles *Times* recommendation.

mendations of a more local newspaper would seem more relevant to the precinct voters and thus have greater impact. But, in fact, the results seem much the same. Only one of the 209 voters in the precinct voted the local newspaper's line on the 16 propositions for which it made recommendations.

The power of the press might also be tested by looking at the correlations among pairs of propositions, a procedure which gets away from the demand that perfect or near-perfect voting be found on a string of propositions. To suggest a newspaper influence is operating, the correlations should be positive when the newspapers recommended "yes" votes or "no" votes on both and they should be negative when the press suggested a favorable vote on one and a negative note on the other. In fact, however, no such patterns emerge and virtually all of the correlations among the propositions, regardless of the position of the press, are positive. This suggests nothing so much as an overriding influence by fairly persistent yeasayers and naysayers—a phenomenon to be examined below.

As noted above, some limited ballot data were also gathered for three municipal elections in the spring of 1965. Comparable analysis of patterns on the propositions on these ballots found little evidence that newspaper recommendations are more influential on these local elections.

In short, the evidence for believing that newspapers exercise little influence on the vote for the propositions seems quite persuasive.[24] It is true of course that none of the measures used with the ballot data can indicate finally and surely whether the vote of a particular individual on a particular proposition was or was not influenced by the position of the press. But *it seems quite likely that there is no major impact of newspaper recommendation on proposition voting, especially over a series of ballot items.*

2. *Party endorsement.* The Democratic party in California in 1964 strongly advocated a negative vote on proposition 14—the fair housing issue—and also urged its partisans to support the bond issues. At the same time, the official Republicans, split on the issue, smiled and said nothing. The strongest correlations among items on the ballots examined were precisely on these issues with Democratic voters 30 to 50 percent more likely than Republicans to support the bonds and to reject proposition 14.

The sharp polarization of attitude, especially on the fair housing issue, goes well beyond what one would expect on the basis of findings from surveys for the noncampaign situation and suggests that the *parties can be extremely important in shaping opinion on the propositions.*[25] However, this influence is limited (and made difficult to examine fully) by the fact that the parties take positions on only a few ballot measures. This is sensible from their point of view, of course, since they do not wish their position on the propositions to harm them in the partisan races—after all, every stand alienates somebody.

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[24] Most of the research in the area of newspaper influence on issues and referendum voting suggests that the impact of the press is low at best. See George A. Lundberg, "The Newspaper and Public Opinion," 4 *Social Forces* 709–715 (June, 1926); Harold F. Gosnell and Margaret J. Schmidt, "Relation of the Press to Voting in Chicago," 13 *Journalism Quarterly* 129–147 (June, 1936); James E. Brinton and Norman McKown, "Effects of Newspaper Reading on Knowledge and Attitude," 38 *Journalism Quarterly* 187–195 (Spring, 1961); and Alvin Boskoff and Harmon Zeigler, *Voting Patterns in a Local Election* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964), ch. 4. Impressions on the California case are given by Erwin A. Cottrell, "Twenty-five Years of Direct Legislation in California," 3 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 39–41 (January, 1939). Studies which argue that the newspapers do have influence include Gregg, *op cit.*, his "Newspaper Editorial Endorsements and California Elections, 1948–62," 42 *Journalism Quarterly* 532–538 (Autumn, 1965), and his "Newspaper Endorsements and Local Elections in California," (Institute of Governmental Affairs, University of California, Davis, May 1966). For a critique of Gregg's approach, see Mueller, *op. cit.*, pp. 183–185.

[25] The importance of active party endorsement of referendum issues is also noted in Wolfinger and Greenstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 760–764 and Norman C. Thomas, "The Electorate and State Constitutional Revision: An Analysis of Four Michigan Referenda," 12 *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 115–129 (February 1968). The studies also suggest that class voting differences can be overwhelmed by the influence of party endorsement.

3. *Campaigning.* When non-party campaigns are launched on particular propositions they may also make some difference. In the last days of the campaign, labor and management spent some effort in propagandizing for their position on proposition 17 which concerned railroad crew laws. The campaign probably helped to reduce abstention on the issue: as can be seen from Table 2, the absentees, many of whom must have missed the brief, last minute campaign, were notably more likely to leave their ballots blank for the proposition. Also, the preferences of the voters in the precinct were a bit more likely than those of the absentees to be correlated with their votes on other liberal-conservative issues and candidates. (A similar phenomenon is found in the nonpartisan race for district attorney between a liberal and a conservative where last minute campaigns served to stress ideological differences.)

Thus very limited evidence suggests that *campaigning can reduce abstention and align preferences.* However, the overall effect will, again, be limited to those few propositions on which active campaigning is done.[26]

4. *Cohabitation.* Of the ballots examined in the precinct there were eight or nine pairs of ballots marked on the propositions, and usually also on the partisan races, in an identical manner. Each of the patterns is quite individualistic and thus most likely represents a husband and wife pair in total agreement. That out of 209 voters in a residential section so few pairings occurred indicates that absolute household coordination on politics ("I always vote the way my husband tells me") is rather less than the rule.[27]

5. *Popular patterns of thinking.* An extensive search was made of the ballots to check for the existence of groups of voters who, for whatever reason, happen to think alike on a series of propositions. For example, a plausible interpretation of aggregate voting returns might be that there exists a sizeable group of like-minded individuals who represent the overall mood for the year; it is their votes which by and large determine the vote result while the votes of the remainder of the electorate more or less cancel each other out. Or, it might be expected that a significant number of voters would have left their ballots blank except to vote on the most hotly debated proposition, number 14.

In fact, it was found that there were almost as many ballot patterns as there were ballots. Over 90 percent of the voters in the 1964 ballot samples selected patterns on the propositions which were unique. Only one pattern reached a frequency of even 2 percent. This was a flat abstention on all the propositions by twenty-three absentees. There was not a single voter in the precinct who voted exactly in accordance with the majority of the precinct on the propositions. It may also be relevant (and perhaps marginally reassuring) to note that no ballots were marked in a manner indicating an obvious attempt to "make patterns," such as alternating affirmative and negative votes.

Taking subsets of the propositions, the only patterns that emerge distinctly are those noted between and among the bond issues, proposition 14, and the partisan races. Other correlations among ballot items are very low. Thus for the most part the *passage or defeat of any given proposition is due to the combined efforts of a body of voters who are quite unlike in their voting on other ballot measures.*

6. *Order effects.* There seems to be good reason to believe that the amount of abstention an item garners depends in part on its position on the ballot and on the items surrounding it. Noncontroversial propositions which can be expected to have relatively low abstention rates seem to have higher ones if they are placed among propositions with high expected abstention rates, while measures which immediately follow intensely fought propositions seem to have lower abstention rates than would be expected on other grounds. For example, the abstention on propositions 7, 10, and 12 (see

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[26] See also Wolfinger and Greenstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 762–764.

[27] Interviewing in a California city shortly after the 1958 election in which there were eighteen state propositions on the ballot, over 700 married couples were asked, "As far as you remember, did you both vote the same way on all the state propositions?" Fully *72 percent* of those who had voted in the election stated that they had voted the same way. The radically conflicting ballot data from the precinct indicate that one cannot rely on self-report in a survey situation to substitute for the actual examination of ballots.

Data derived from Table 5.7 in Richard F. Carter, "Voters and Their Schools," (Technical Report, Institute for Communication Research, Stanford University, Stanford, California, June, 1960), p. 173. Additional information from a personal communication from Mr. Carter.

Table 2) was largely bestowed by voters who skipped over the whole bloc of noncontroversial propositions. Very few of the voters who voted on all but one or two of the propositions selected any of these three measures for their abstention. Therefore had the propositions been positioned, say, among the bonds or immediately after proposition 14 their aggregate abstention probably would have been much lower. Only five ballot measures before 1964 received such low abstention as propositions 15, 16, and 17 and it is doubtful whether either the historical trend in abstention (see Section II) or the subject matter of these propositions fully accounts for these rates. Much of the voting on these measures probably was encouraged by their position immediately after the intensely-fought proposition 14.

Some insight into order effects can be gained by briefly looking at a curious pattern in the votes for three nonpartisan races on the ballot: two contested judicial seats and the race for district attorney. The names of the two candidates in each of these races were rotated from district to district so that each candidate was listed first on about half the ballots in the county and second on the other half. It is a fairly well established fact that on paper ballots the candidate who is listed first in low visibility races has a definite advantage.[28] And, in the present case, this finding is seen to hold, for each candidate received a vote six to eight percentage points higher when he was listed first than when he was listed second.[29] However, examining the ballot data from the absentees (who largely missed the belated DA campaign) it was found that those who voted consistently for the first (or last) candidates in the two judicial races were *not* particularly likely to persist in that idiosyncrasy on the district attorney race which was next on the ballot. In fact, they were rather inclined to *reverse* their pattern of selection: those who had voted for two *first*-listed judges tended slightly to vote for the *last*-listed district attorney candidate and vice versa. The gain for the first position in the district attorney race, curiously enough, is contributed almost entirely by those voters who abstained on the judicial races but voted for a DA candidate.

Thus a significant number of those voters who voted straight for the first or last position on the two judicial races seem to have become "tired" of it by the time they came to the district attorney race and thus were rather inclined to vote the other way, purely, it would seem, out of a desire to mix up their voting pattern. The abstainers, however, were unencumbered by any previous voting patterns and thus were more willing to let the innate preference for the first position affect them. In an array of races of equally low visibility, then, it is to be expected that ballot position would be most important on the first race or two, but would have an increasingly small impact on the races further on. In such a situation the candidates placed last on some of the later races in the array may be at no disadvantage whatever.

One implication of this conclusion is of special interest for the analysis of proposition voting: *on items of low visibility, voters seem to have a tendency to avoid over a long stretch a pattern of behavior which is obviously uniform.* This generalization may help to explain why such a large percentage of the vote on the propositions is idiosyncratic.[30]

The state legislature devoutly believes in the existence of a body of citizens who start out voting affirmatively on bond issues but turn to negativism as they move down the ballot viewing with mounting horror the extent of the proposed expenditures. Part of the reason for placing state bond issues at the top of the ballot is to catch the affirmative votes of these citizens before they turn sour.

Analysis of the ballot data indicates that there is indeed a small but significant number of voters, 7 percent in each ballot group, who begin by voting affirmatively on the bonds but turn negative before they reach the end. The trouble, however, is that there is an equal and opposite number of voters who start out voting negatively and end up on the favorable side! Important in this consideration of course is the subject matter of the bonds. Things might look entirely different in another election—or even in this one had the bonds appeared in a different order.[31]

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[28] See Henry M. Bain and Donald S. Hecock, *Ballot Position and Voters Choice* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1957); and Howard White, "Voters Plump for First on List," 39 *National Municipal Review* 110–111 (February, 1950).

[29] The names of the candidates in the presidential contest were also rotated. It is noteworthy that order had *no* effect on this high visibility race.

[30] Campbell and Miller have noted that when tickets are split, such splitting usually occurs at the state and local level: "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting," this REVIEW, 51 (June 1957), 293–312. At least part of this splitting may be done by voters who become embarrassed, one might say, by the fact that they have voted a straight party line on the national offices. Thus they are inclined to break with the party on the less visible local races simply because of a semi-capricious urge to mix up their vote pattern. Perhaps this somewhat tenuous line of reasoning could be used to explain in part why some cities with Democratic registration majorities elect Republicans to positions of local leadership.

7. *Negativism, alienation, and the boob.* One of the more striking discoveries in the examination of the ballots—even though they were largely from presumably middle class voters and even though 1964 was a notably "affirmative" year—was the low amount of negativism. *Only one of the 1,293 ballots was marked negatively for all the propositions.* There were *no* ballots marked negatively for eighteen of the nineteen propositions and only fourteen voters representing barely 1 percent of the combined sample voted against as many as fifteen of the nineteen propositions. Massive disaffection seems to have been missing.

Proponents of the concept of alienation frequently argue that alienation in the vote sometimes will be associated with negativism on ballot measures, although they usually argue that the negative voting will occur only on certain measures—ones in which a hostility to the political order can be clearly expressed. Specifically, students of the problem have suggested that alienation accounts in part for negative voting on bond issues, fluoridation measures, and proposals for metropolitan reorganization.[32] It does seem however, that if many voters really find voting to be "meaningless" and the "electoral process to be a sham,"[33] a few of them even in this sample should express this utter disgust by a blanket negative vote.

There were two groups of propositions on which a negative vote could be expected to express for some people an inner disenchantment with the political system. One comprised the noncontroversial propositions, numbered 4 through 12. As noted above, all of these were constitutional amendments placed on the ballot by the legislature and therefore, by implication at least, approved and endorsed by the political establishment. The other consisted of the bond issues.

On the noncontroversial propositions only *five* voters, comprising less than 0.4 percent of the combined sample, voted negatively on all nine. If the two veterans' issues are excluded (propositions 4 and 5) the amount of total naysaying is still less than 1 percent of the sample. If those who voted negatively on six of the seven measures are included in the group, the number rises to 3 percent.

There are many reasons for voting against all the bonds: a conservative outlook on spending, a resentment against high taxes, a preference for pay-as-you-go financing, caprice, and an ill-humor on election day, as well as alienation. Yet only one out of every ten or eleven ballots was marked negatively on all the bonds.

Negativism on three uncontested judicial races (voters could only approve or disapprove continuance in office) is also worth examination in this connection. Some writers find that a "large portion of the electorate," the "average voter" in fact, feels that voting is meaningless and that politicians are "selfish" and "irresponsible." These feelings are found not to be restricted by time, circumstances, or place: they "go beyond resentment toward the particular candidate in this election; they indicate a widespread disgust and disillusionment with the political process and politicans in general."[34]

If such "widespread disgust" existed it surely could be expected that a strong protest would have been delivered in a vote against the judicial political process. But nothing of the sort materialized. No more than 8 percent of the electorate in the county voted against any one of the judges. Of the absentee ballots examined (judicial voting data were not gathered in the precinct) only 4 percent were marked against all three judges.[35] The small amount of negativism (and even part of that surely is the result of caprice rather than alienation) is far surpassed by an overwhelming vote of confidence in the governing group. The advantage of incumbency in most political races is perhaps a further example of this confidence.

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[31] For other discussions of order effects on proposition voting see Key and Crouch, *op. cit.*, pp. 536–538; Joseph G. LaPalombara, *The Initiative and Referendum in Oregon: 1938–1948* (Corvallis: Oregon State College, Studies in Political Science, No. 1, 1950), pp. 95–97; and James K. Pollock, *The Initiative and Referendum in Michigan* (Ann Arbor: Michigan Governmental Studies No. 6, Bureau of Government, University of Michigan, 1940), pp. 45–49.

[32] Horton and Thompson, *op. cit.*, Wayne E. Thompson and John E. Horton, "Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action," 38 *Social Forces* 190–195 (March, 1960); William A. Gamson, "The Fluoridation Dialogue: Is It an Ideological Conflict?" 25 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 527–537 (Winter, 1961); Arnold Simmel, "A Signpost for Research on Fluoridation Conflicts: The Concept of Relative Deprivation," 17 *Journal of Social Issues* 26–36 (no. 4, 1961); Edward L. McDill and Jeanne C. Ridley, "Status, Anomia, Political Alienation and Political Participation," 63 *American Journal of Sociology* 205–213 (September, 1962); and Gene L. Mason and Dean Jaros, "Alienation and Support for Demogogues," 1 *Polity* 479–500 (Summer 1969).

[33] See Levin, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 61.

[35] On the basis of an "unstructured questionnaire" one would expect far more pure negativism

These data suggest therefore that, *while some voters may be alienated, the phenomenon is less than rampant among the electorate at large.* In addition they lend no support to the theory of the "boob" voter. It is frequently argued, especially in debates over direct legislation, that there exists a significant number of voters who respond according to the philosophy, "I always vote no, and I'm usually right."[36] A. J. Pillsbury, a rather bombastic California analyst of these matters has defined the boob as the citizen "who votes 'no' right down the line of measures submitted without shadow of knowledge or reason"; he was, Pillsbury assures us with precision, "abroad in this fair land as far back as 1862 and averaged 15.22 percent of the total vote on the measures throughout the period from 1849 to 1879."[37] The ballot data, even considering the affirmative mood of the electorate in 1964, strongly dispute the existence of such a large group.[38]

Data were also gathered on proposition voting in two local elections in Los Angeles in April and May, 1965. Ballots from two precincts were examined in the April election, 277 in all, and one of the precincts was revisited in May and information from 70 of the 101 ballots voted was gathered.

A most striking finding is that total negativism on noncontroversial propositions, though far from massive, was distinctly higher in the April election than it had been in November and than it was in the May election. Fully 4 percent of the voters in the quite substantial April sample voted negatively on all nine propositions while, as noted above, less than one half of 1 percent of the November ballots were so marked on the nine noncontroversial propositions. Furthermore, only one of the seventy ballots examined in the May election was marked negatively on all the ten propositions and no other ballot had more than seven marked negatively. This phenomenon would be entirely unexpected from an analysis of aggregate data, for all of the April propositions passed handsomely while one in November and two in May failed of passage and one or two others barely slipped through.

It is of cource possible that these negative votes were contributed by an enlarged turnout in April of the alienated, belated groundhogs who emerged for only a day to growl and snap, then to return to their lairs. However, a somewhat different explanation can be proffered. It might be said that voters follow what could be called the "categorical imperative" of voting: they vote on that maxim whereby they can at the same time will that it should become a universal—or at least statewide—law. In other words, they would like to see their vote selections prevail in the election. On several of the items on the 1964 ballot, however, the "categorical imperative" may not fully apply. These were the uncontested judicial races the outcome of which was such a foregone conclusion that one could vote negatively without any real fear that one's "wishes" would carry. Thus one could safely succumb to caprice or express rather harmlessly a protest against the system. The April propositions were also of this

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than this. See I. A. Berg and G. M. Rappaport, "Response Bias in an Unstructured Questionnaire," 37 *Journal of Psychology* 475–481 (October, 1954). Historical evidence, incidentally, suggests that the amount of negative voting on these judicial races may be a fairly good indicator of electoral discontent. Much larger, though still far from dominant, portions of the electorate voted against the judges during the depression than have so since that time—except for the campaign of 1966 noted above. (See note 11.)

[36] An antifluoridation voter quoted in William Attwood, "Fluoridation: Why All the Controversy?" *Look* (June 24, 1958), p. 23. See also Dewey Anderson, *California State Government* (Stanford University, 1942), p. 205. For a discussion and some analysis, see Waldo Schumacher, "Thirty Years of People's Rule in Oregon: An Analysis," 47 *Political Science Quarterly* 251 (June 1932); Harold F. Gosnell and Margaret J. Schmidt, "Popular Law Making in the United States, 1924–1936," in *Problems Relating to Legislative Organization and Powers,* Volume VII in a series published by the New York State Constitutional Convention Committee (Albany, 1938), p. 317; Key and Crouch, *op. cit.*, p. 536; and Pollock, *The Initiative . . .* , p. 50.

[37] "Participation of the People in Their Government," 7 *Transactions of the Commonwealth Club of California* 450–451 (No. 11, March 3, 1931).

[38] At least for the middle class. Poorer voters may express greater blanket negativism, but a brief analysis of precinct results suggests that voting on noncontroversial propositions in lower class neighborhoods shows more abstention (as the analysis in Section II above would predict), but no more negativism.

sort. They were without opposition, undiscussed, so trivial in content that the *Herald-Examiner* did not even bother to publish vote recommendations on them. And, almost mechanistically, precisely the same amount of total negativism (4 percent) is found on these measures as was found on the uncontested judicial races in November.

This may in part be alienation to be sure. But it is a rather mild, almost cowardly, utterance of disgust and, at 4 percent, hardly a threat to the system—especially since it finds expression only when it is likely to have no effect.

8. *Yeasaying and naysaying.* While the discussion above suggests that bloc negativism, whether from alienation or "boob" voting, is hardly endemic in the population, it is not to be denied that some people are inclined to be more affirmative and some more negative than others. It was noted above that virtually all correlations among the propositions were positive (if low), suggesting that supporters and opponents of a given proposition are more likely to pick the same option on any other proposition than they are to reverse themselves. Such "yeasaying" and "naysaying" is due to a generalized favorableness or unfavorableness toward the propositions as well as to the psychological phenomenon known as response set—the tendency for some people to select positive or negative options regardless of item content.[39]

In the ballot data, with their middle class bias, people inclined to favor the noncontroversial propositions tended to vote Democratic while the relatively small band of naysayers voted Republican disproportionately.

Yeasaying and naysaying are not found to be equally effective on all issues; they are affected at least in part by the prominence of the issue. Where controversy and interest are minimal yeasayers and naysayers will let their partly capricious biases prevail. Where the debate is noisy and the electorate relatively informed, however, reason, ideology, and psychological identification tend to dominate. For example, those inclined to approve or oppose the continuance in office of the three uncontested judges tended to persist in this voting pattern on the noncontroversial propositions, but not on the controversial ones.[40]

## VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This analysis of ballots has found little evidence to support the view that newspaper recommendations strongly affect the vote on the propositions. Nor can support be found for the suggestion that there exists a large block of voters intent on voting negatively on everything. For the most part voting on the propositions is a strikingly idiosyncratic process, although campaigning, especially if it is by political parties, does seem to structure opinion on those few propositions on which it is conducted and cohabitation has a noticeable, but quite limited, impact. It has also been possible to make some comments on the relevance of order and of yeasaying and naysaying to the proposition vote.[41]

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[39] See Arthur Couch and Kenneth Keniston, "Yeasayers and Naysayers: Agreeing Response Set as a Personality Variable," 60 *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 151–174 (March 1950); Bernard M. Bass, "Development and Evaluation of a Scale for Measuring Social Acquiescence," 53 *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 296–99 (November 1956); and Lee J. Cronbach, "Further Evidence on Response Sets and Test Design," 10 *Educational and Psychological Measurement* 3–31 (Spring 1950).

[40] This conclusion fits well with Cronbach's observation with respect to educational testing that "Response sets become most influential as items become difficult or ambiguous." *Op. cit.*, p. 3. It was noted above that there were also on the ballot two contested judicial races where the order in which the candidates were listed was rotated from district to district. There was little tendency for yeasayers to select the candidates listed first. Therefore for the most part yeasayers seem to pick the "yes" option not because it is listed first, but rather because they really are favorable in some sense toward the ballot item. A similar finding occurs in a study of response sets where the choice of the "yes" and "agree" responses were not particularly affected by the order in which the response options were presented. Berg and Rappaport, *op. cit.*

[41] These considerations, of course, are by no means exhaustive. Among the many factors left unconsidered, for example, is the effect on the vote of the way the proposition is worded on the ballot. One survey found that attitude on an important bond measure (not just an obscure technical proposition) apparently was sharply altered when confusion about its intent was cleared up. See Dwaine Marvick, "Electoral Opinion in the 59th Assembly District, Los Angeles, June 1962," (Falk Foundation Program of Political Training and Research, University of California, Los Angeles, Department of Political Science, 1962).

It also seems likely that the voters booklet, which is sent out to all voters several weeks before the election, can be quite important in in-

Hopefully, this analysis of a set of ballots, very limited in number and in class origin, will help to suggest the value of such data in voting research. In the last few years the popularity of punch card ballots has greatly increased, which means that millions of ballots, voted by all segments of society, are now becoming available in highly convenient form. An exploitation of this vast source of data could serve to broaden and clarify considerably the conclusions reached here.

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fluencing opinion, at least on the noncontroversial propositions. Fragmentary evidence to support this conclusion was found in the present study. At one point twenty-two judges were asked to select from proposition 6 through 12 the measures which they felt would appear to the "average voter" to be most unobjectionable. While their ratings generally reflected the statewide vote on these propositions, on propositions 11 and 12 the fit is quite poor. Proposition 12, which authorized the giving of tax relief in disaster areas proclaimed by the governor, is found by the judges to be easily the most unobjectionable of all—after all who could be in favor of disaster? Yet this proposition did less well in the state (66 percent favorable) than three other of the noncontroversial propositions. (As seen in Table 2 the proposition did somewhat better in Los Angeles county as it did in other areas which had recently undergone disasters—thus suggesting a certain amount of rationality in the vote.) Proposition 11, which did very well (73 percent favorable) despite a low unobjectionableness score, reads very poorly on the ballot. It sought to delete the requirement that the city electorate must approve when it is proposed that municipal functions be carried out by county officers; thus it appears to take power away from the voters.

It seems very likely that this anomaly in which a highly unobjectionable proposition does worse than a far more objectionable one can be explained by reference to the voters' booklet. There the lone favorable argument for proposition 11 points out that such city-county arrangements have been carried out hundreds of times without voter approval in the past and thus passage of the proposition would only recognize and legalize an efficient arrangement that is already in effect. This fact is not mentioned in any way in the ballot wording. The opposing argument to proposition 12 in the booklet also stresses an implication which is not at all obvious from the ballot wording: disaster tax relief would only go to those who suffer in an officially proclaimed disaster area and thus the measure discriminates against those who lose in small, nonsensational disasters. (If it is the case that the absentee is more likely than the voter in the precincts to become separated from his copy of the voters booklet, these considerations might also explain why the absentees differ with other voters on these two propositions as seen in Table 2.)

It is noteworthy in this regard that the propositions without opposing arguments in the voters booklet, 6, 9, and 11, tend to correlate with one another among the ballot data at somewhat higher levels than do other pairs of noncontroversial propositions. The three also correlate comparatively well with proposition 13. This linkage is interesting for the arguments on proposition 13 in the booklet are rather unusual: specifically, the argument which purports to be against the measure has little to do with the subject of the proposition but rather is a tirade against the lottery as presented in proposition 16! Thus 13 is rather like 6, 9, and 11 in essentially having no negative argument in the booklet.

For assessments of the value of the voters booklet in informing and influencing opinion, see La Palombara, *op. cit.*, p. 119; Key and Crouch, *op. cit.*, p. 532; John E. Mueller, "The Politics of Fluoridation in Seven California Cities," 19 *Western Political Quarterly* 62–63 (March 1966); and especially Stanley Kelley, Jr., *Political Campaigning: Problems in Creating an Informed Electorate* (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1960), pp. 41ff.

# PARTY, IDEOLOGY, AND THE CONGRESSIONAL CHALLENGER*

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Political Science, like Leo Durocher, is not distinguished by an excessive concern with losers.[1]

Although the reasons are not difficult to fathom, theories of recruitment and representation which omit systematic examination of those who are rejected, in addition to those selected, will only imperfectly comprehend the political conditions and consequences this process implies.[2]

This study, part of a broader cross-national examination of legislative recruitment,[3] focuses on a largely-ignored but perennial figure among the ranks of American political losers: those candidates who challenge incumbents for seats in the House of Representatives.

Few elective institutions in American political life have achieved the degree of stability which since the depression has characterized membership in the House. At no time since 1932 has the percentage of first-term members exceeded 26 percent and in the last 15 years, it has been rare when more than 15 percent of those incumbents who actively sought reelec-

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[1] Relatively more attention has been devoted to losers other than the common electoral variety, particularly the (old) revolutionary left and radical right, although the normative assumptions and methodological adequacy of such research are now a matter of intense dispute. Whatever minor problems might be created by attaching "loser" to revolutionary and/or radical is unintentional; the term is used in the electoral sense and neither group has been conspicuous for its success. However, research is beginning to appear more frequently on electoral losers. Frank Sorauf's study of legislative recruitment in Pennsylvania, *Party and Representation* (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), included social and political background data on winners and losers, as did Lester G. Seligman's analysis of candidates in Oregon, "Party Structure and Legislative Recruitment," this REVIEW, LV (September, 1961), 77–86. More recently, others have focused on the perception of winning and losing candidates toward voters, seeking to ascertain how politicians come to terms with electoral defeat or success. See, for example, John Kingdon, "Politicians' Beliefs About Voters," this REVIEW, LXI (March, 1967), 136–147, and his expanded treatment in *Candidates for Office: Beliefs and Strategies* (New York: Random House, 1968). The substantial barriers associated with acquiring campaign resources—organization, money, information—is explored in a comparative case-study of ten Northern California congressional races by David A. Leuthold, *Electioneering in a Democracy* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968). And, the Survey Research Center's representation and Congress study, under the direction of Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, sampled both incumbents and nonincumbents, but no work has been published which systematically compares these two groups except on occasional indicators of candidate salience; e.g., whether nonincumbents who live in the same community as voters are recognized more often. See their two articles, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Winter, 1962), 531–46, and "Constituency Influence in Congress," this REVIEW, LVII (March, 1963), 45–56.

[2] Lester G. Seligman, "Political Leadership: Status Loss and Downward Mobility," (paper delivered at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 2–6, 1966). Lewis Edinger's study of Kurt Schumacher, the post-war German SPD leader, is a brilliant example of an analysis which explores the conditions which made Schumacher a powerful success within the party, but a tragic failure in the West German political system, *Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965).

[3] For the larger study, see my *Parties, Candidates and Recruitment: West Germany and the United States* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1969).

tion were defeated.[4] The 1964 election was considered a striking anomaly when "only" 80 percent of the membership returned to the 89th Congress. It is not an exaggeration to concede that, collectively, congressional challengers stand somewhere between the Harold Stassens and Norman Thomases of campaign history in their impressive disregard for the first objective of American major-party politics: winning. The consequences of such low turnover on the internal structure of the House, as Nelson Polsby has recently argued,[5] are certainly responsible in part for the increasing institutionalization of this body, but the external consequences seem less demonstrable.[6]

Understandably, if regrettably, most studies of legislative recruitment begin with the members of a legislature and then trace back, directly or inferentially, to the sources and causes of their selection, treating career paths, socialization, and party support as each contributes to political success.[7] Herbert Jacob and Rufus Browning have both pointed out that very often these efforts are in reality studies of political promotion, not initial recruitment,[8] a persuasion increasingly shared by other recent models of political recruitment.[9]

Research which is primarily directed toward assessing the impact of the recruitment process on the functioning of a legislature overlooks a large variety of "outside" phenomena (communication, participation, interest articulation and aggregation, etc.) to which that process is intimately joined. By focusing on the nonlegislative side of recruitment, candidacy becomes a vehicle, in David Easton's terms, for demand articulation and communication feedback.

Therefore, the primary but not exclusive focus here will be on those who are screened *out* of elective office and one major consequence this suggests for the structure of opposition *outside* the legislative environment.[10] Since few electoral opportunities are available in a large majority of districts, what alternative function (to realistically competing for seats) might in fact be performed by the party apparatus and the 350-or-so candidates headed for certain defeat? The broad proposition entertained in this study, one suggested by Samuel Huntington 19 years ago[11] and recently modified by Herbert McClosky and others[12] who have returned to a concern with the role of ideology in American politics, is that campaign losers tend to articulate and sustain a coherent partisan ideology in the face of an electorate for whom such matters are still inchoate or irrelevant, or both.[13]

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[4] An excellent and comprehensive study of congressional elections since 1920 can be found in Milton G. Cummings, Jr., *Congressmen and the Electorate* (New York: The Free Press, 1966). See also, Charles O. Jones, "The Role of the Campaign in Congressional Elections," in M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler (eds.), *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), particularly pp. 21–27.

[5] "The Institutionalization of the U. S. House of Representatives," this REVIEW, LXII (March, 1968), 144–169.

[6] For some possibilities, see Polsby's speculative comments in his *Congress and the Presidency* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964).

[7] This is equally true of the older social background studies, examined by Donald Matthews in his *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers* (New York: Random House, 1953); the excellent career-line study by Joseph Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics* (New York: Rand, McNally, 1966); and those using social-psychological categories, exemplified by John Wahlke, *et al.*, *The Legislative System* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1963); or James Barber, *The Lawmakers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965). It is less relevant to the work of Sorauf, or Seligman, *op. cit.*

[8] Herbert Jacob, "Initial Recruitment of Elected Officials in the U. S.—A Model," *Journal of Politics* (1962), p. 708; and Rufus P. Browning, "The Interaction of Personality and Political System in Decisions to Run for Office," *Journal of Social Issues* (June, 1968).

[9] Among which see Lester Seligman, "Recruitment in Politics," *PROD*, (1958), 14–17; Jacob, *op. cit.*; Leo M. Snowiss, "Congressional Recruitment and Representation," this REVIEW, LX (September, 1966), 627–640; Allan Fiellin, "Recruitment and Legislative Role Conceptions: A Conceptual Scheme and Case Study," *Western Political Quarterly* (June, 1967); and David Schwartz, "Toward a Theory of Political Recruitment" (paper presented to the 1967 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 4–8, Chicago). Moreover, Rufus Browning has been in the process of developing a simulated model of recruitment, applicable to various groups in the political system, part of which is outlined in his "Hypotheses about Political Recruitment: A Partially Data-Based Computer Simulation," in William Coplin (ed.), *Simulation in the Study of Politics* (Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1968).

[10] Two other consequences were considered in the original study. First, it was anticipated that a modified "social ladder" process would be operating on the structure of recruitment reflecting an openness in the character of access not evident by looking only at the established (incumbent) leadership in each party; i.e., greater proportions would be black, female, socially-mobile, urban-born, and drawn from ethnic and religious minorities. While small cracks in the wall of white, Protestant, middle-class dominance did appear, these are not apparently preludes to a flood. Challengers, like their opponents, tend to reflect the high-status character of American political leaders. Second, ethnic, religious and more recently, racial balancing is a phenomenon long evident in the electoral strategies of each party and one would expect nonincumbent candidates to "mirror" the opposition, or at least depart significantly from their party's "normal"

Thus despite substantial countervailing electoral pressures, nonincumbent candidates may in fact provide an indispensable communications network—cemented by a coherent if impure ideology—which sharpens rather than blunts party conflict, intensifying rather than modifying ideological differences.[14]

The intention here is to examine these tendencies empirically and under varying conditions. Four independent variables will in turn be related to ideology, examining the conditions under which candidates move toward or away from, are more or less "cemented" by, the liberal-conservative positions normally associated with each national party. The problem of party unity and electoral outcome is then considered, tracing the fate of the few 1964 nonincumbent winners in the 1966 mid-

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social character. Some evidence did indicate that this was occurring among small numbers of Republican challengers, but, and significantly, GOP candidates from social minorities were almost without exception defeated. All the Blacks (5), all the educators, all those under 30, most of the upwardly mobile, almost all the Catholics, and all the Jews went down to defeat. Nor was this an artifact of the unusually bad Republican year in 1964. It is precisely in those districts where Republican nonincumbents tend most often to mirror the minority status of their Democratic opponents that they stand, statistically, the least chance of winning. This suggests that the electoral system is partially reinforcing those social cleavages which since the depression have divided the two parties, even though these divisions are *not* reflected among leaders to the same degree as among followers.

[11] "A Revised Theory of American Political Parties," this Review, XLIV (1950), 669–677. Unlike Huntington's, this paper does not propose that the most ideologically conscious tend to emerge precisely in those districts where they would stand the best opportunity of winning, but rather that a coherent party ideology is not suspended by a majority of each party's candidates simply because the structure of party competition would permit possible electoral victory. This point is developed further above.

[12] Besides McClosky's "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," this Review, LVIII (June, 1964), 361–382; and McClosky, Paul J. Hoffmann and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," this Review, LIV (June, 1960), 406–427, a sample would include, Dwaine Marvick and Charles Nixon, "Recruitment Contrasts in Rival Campaign Groups," in Marvick (ed.), *Political Decision-Makers* (Glencoe: The Free Press 1963); Robert Hirschfield, *et al.*, "A Profile of Political Activists in Manhattan," *Western Political Quarterly,* XV (September, 1962), 489–497; Edmund Costantini, "Interparty Attitude Conflict: Democratic Party Leadership in California," *Western Political Quarterly* (1963), 956–972: and three recent books, Samuel J. Eldersveld, *Political Parties: A Behavioral Approach* (New York: Rand, McNally, 1963); Robert Agger, *et al.*, *The Rulers and the Ruled* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964); and Harry M. Scoble, *Ideology and Electoral Action* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1967).

[13] The concept "ideology" has undergone such massive variation in use that discriminating observers will probably blanch at its intrusion here. Yet the liberal-conservative continuum has proved a useful organizing device for (some) political activists and (some) political scientists and is, Philip Converse suggests, " . . . a serviceable yardstick for simplifying and organizing events in most Western politics." It shares many attributes of formal ideologies, despite substantial change in particular issues and repeated efforts to refine by adding "corporate" or "radical" before either of these positions on the continuum. See his persuasive argument, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1964), p. 214. See also David Minar, "Ideology and Political Behavior," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* (November, 1961), 317–331; William Connolly, *Political Science and Ideology* (New York: Atherton Press, 1967), pp. 2–3; or Robert Lane, *Political Ideology* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 13–16.

[14] There is no logical contradiction between a politics which is simultaneously "ideological" *and* "brokerage" although many elements of the "new" and "old" left would deny this, as would most scholars (e.g., Daniel Bell) who take as their model the classic struggles of the European left and right.

term elections. Finally, the study considers the significance of these findings for patterns of campaign behavior, recruitment and party functions.

## I. PROCEDURES AND OPERATIONAL MEASURES

Most of the data collected and analyzed below were generated through a questionnaire mailed to all nonincumbent candidates for the House immediately after the 1964 election. Of 388 nonincumbents running in that election, 76 percent completed and returned the questionnaire, a response rate sufficiently high to justify the analysis undertaken here.[15] Selection of a mail questionnaire as the primary research instrument was based on the conviction that carefully administered questionnaires can be almost as efficient (in terms of overall response rate) as direct interviewing, usually are mandatory when the researcher is confronted with sizable geographical dispersion of target groups, and are infinitely cheaper if he is interested in securing data on a large number of respondents.[16] These data were later supplemented by open-ended but structured interviews with 69 of the 83 nonincumbents elected in 1964.

Among others, David Minar has forcefully argued that a substantial problem for political behavior research on ideology is empirical and operational.[17] The indicator employed throughout most of this study, a widely-used and simple self-anchoring index of liberalism-conservatism, enjoys some distinct advantages but is also subject to certain limitations.

The alternative most frequently suggested involves scaling individuals on the basis of responses to specific issues. By deriving cumulative or summated scale scores on a sample of issues, one is able to rank-order persons in a rough but reliable fashion and, with Guttman techniques or factor analysis, explore the internal consistency of various opinion clusters.[18] Since data on the candidate's orientation toward specific issue-areas was obtained in this study, and, as later analysis shows, the relationship between self-classification and these items was strong but far from perfect, a Guttman scale was also attempted. Using the Cornell technique, five items were combined,[19] but neither the coefficient of reproducibility (.82) nor of minimal marginal reproducibility (.52) met minimum standards of reliability. One of the five issue-areas (civil rights) was then dropped, some item "shuffling" undertaken, and the other four recombined. Each related to domestic economic orientation. Although the coefficient of reproducibility improved (.85), it still did not reach a satisfactory minimum. Hence cumulative scales are not used in the analysis.

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[15] This rate does not compare unfavorably with that reported for the Survey Research Center's national election studies (85 to 86 percent), is higher than James Barber's rate for Connecticut legislators (65 percent), somewhat lower than Leon Epstein's study of Wisconsin legislators (83 percent), but considerably lower than the range reported by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan and LeRoy Ferguson for their four-state legislative study (91 to 100 percent).

[16] Initially, the study was designed to include incumbents, but it seems clear that congressmen have been so deluged by mail questionnaires, from so many sources that continued use of "mailers" (and in this I agree with Lewis Dexter) will be destructive of other kinds of necessary research; i.e., via personal interviews. The same judgement does not, however, apply to nonincumbents, nor to a large variety of highly active partisans in American society. Others have shown that mail survey research techniques are not subject to the usual problems of abnormally high non-response rates where the population is skewed away from the normal adult population in terms of income, education, and political activity. See Harry M. Scoble (with Stanley Bachrach), "Mail Questionnare Efficiency: Controlled Reduction of Non-Response," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Summer, 1967), 265–272, and William Crotty, "The Utilization of Mail Questionnaires," *Western Political Quarterly,* XIX (March, 1966), 44–54. Basically, two techniques are available to increase the researcher's confidence that results from a mail questionnaire are reliable (from the viewpoint of response rate only). First, as Scoble has suggested, one should anticipate resistance and design procedures (advance mailings, personalized appeals, special delivery postage, diversified appeals in follow-ups) in advance to overcome it. Second, some technique for gaining information on the non-response should be introduced (for example, a number keying each questionnarie to an individual) so that statistical tests can be undertaken to enable the researcher to comparatively and partially measure non-response error where these tests are appropriate; that is to say, if one is attempting to inductively generalize from a sample to a finite population. However, where an effort is made at enumeration, and neither simple nor stratified random sampling procedures are employed, it is clearly inappropriate to use statistical tests associated with sampling methodology to estimate non-response error. This study, which was an attempted enumeration, does not rest on any misguided (or misleading) statistical tests estimating the probable bias created by non-response. On the other hand, since information on the non-response was collected, three critical baselines were established by which to compare those who responded with those who did not: party, region, and constituency characteristics. Differences between the response and non-response groups on these three factors did not exceed 2 percent, an encouraging if not completely reassuring finding. The sources of bias in survey research always involve much more than sampling problems (question construction, coding, interpretation, etc.) and every effort was made to reduce these sources, as well as those stemming from non-response.

[17] Minar, *op. cit.*, pp. 329–331.

Quite apart from questions of technical reliability, earlier examination on the Guttman scale and on a scale of Likert-type summated liberalism suggested some rather severe problems of validity with both these "objective" ideological measures. Each distinguished reasonably well between Republican conservatives and *all* Democratic challengers, but, particularly among Democrats, neither sufficiently tapped what appear to be genuine *intra*-party differences. Large majorities of the latter, whether considering themselves "liberal" or "middle of the road" clustered in the upper three positions of each scale.[20] Yet intuitively these two different psychological reference points suggest important distinctions among the candidates, distinctions that merit empirical examination.[21] Because I am centrally concerned with ideological conflict within as well as between the two parties, it was necessary to opt for a measure that does discriminate, however imperfectly, between candidates.

Previous research has demonstrated that the highly educated and politically sophisticated are much more capable than the typical citizen of organizing a variety " . . . of idea-elements into more tightly constrained wholes."[22] Thus one can anticipate that abstractions like "liberal" and "conservative" are operationally more reliable as devices for classifying and predicting the behavior (including opinions) of the highly active in American politics. The fact that substantial variation does exist—whether one uses objective or subjective tests—underscores the complexity, the lack of complete unidimensionality, and the tentativeness of these and other simplified ideological dimensions. Certainly self-classified liberals or conservatives are going to possess opinions that will be interpreted differently by different observers in different environments. But a similar problem applies equally to other measures of ideology. The qualification is no more, nor less, applicable to alternative operational criteria. When used in conjunction with other measures, the self-anchoring index provides a standardized and serviceable tool for large-scale research on the attitude structure of political activists.

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[18] The use of factor analysis with attitude data is rejected by many statisticians because social science has not yet created attitude scales which meet interval assumptions of measurement. Lewis Guttman and James Lingoes have developed a new set of programs for multivariant analysis on ordinal level data—smallest space analysis—which may enjoy increasing use in attitude research. For an example, see Glendon Schubert, "Ideological Distance: A Smallest Space Analysis Across Three Cultures," *Comparative Political Studies*, I (October, 1968), 319–347.

[19] Each related to the conventional question of federal domestic intervention and were directed at the following areas: regulating business; providing medical care for the aged; providing aid to assist public education; providing help for the poor generally; engaging in programs to assist Negroes and other minorities. See Table 2 for the exact format.

[20] On an eleven-point Guttman rank-ordering, 86 percent of the Democratic challengers scored one, two, or three.

[21] That these questions did not reveal substantial intra-party conflict in the fall of 1964 among Democrats suggests some interesting problems. Democratic nonincumbents were almost exclusively non-southern Democrats and one would expect maximum homogeniety among this group on general questions relating to economic intervention, particularly in 1964. The Vietnam war had not really surfaced as a divisive issue, although one year later my interviews with freshmen showed that some were becoming increasingly restless as American involvement grew more massive. However one might feel about events surrounding the 1968 campaign, and the impact of "new politics" on the stability of the New Deal coalition, it seems clear that many of the issues political scientists have been using for the past twenty years are undergoing as yet unpredictable modification. The situational character of all our operational measures reinforces the need for developmental studies, perhaps using a modified panel technique, on the way politicians adjust "old" labels to "new" issues or vice-versa.

[22] Converse, *op. cit.*, p. 229. McClosky has also provided some evidence along these lines, noting the strong association between scale scores and self-classification for leaders, but not followers, in his "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *op. cit.*, p. 375.

## II. IDEOLOGICAL PROFILES

It is perhaps a discomforting irony that at precisely the moment specialists on American political parties have returned to empirically documenting the extent of issue-conflict between the parties, new waves of discontent appear which find little that is different. On occasion the more benign may concede here a point, or there an exception, but these mental lapses are quickly remedied when the differences perceived are dismissed as irrelevant, insignificant, or inadequate. Again, as Lincoln Steffens and others found of New York in the late twenties,[23] it is fashionable to insist on the distinction between "radical" or "conservative" and "liberal."[24] Again, in the manner of the then-young turk editors of The New Republic—Wilson, Soule and Cowley—in 1931, conferences are held that question "the adequacy of America's dominant liberal ideology." And again the image of party candidates articulated by a Bryce or a Duverger takes hold: " . . . fundamentally men expert in the winning of votes . . . not ideological groups nor class communities . . . ," motivated by little other than personal gain.[25]

Yet, whether echo or choice,[26] the data presented in Table 1 demonstrate that opposition candidates for the House do quite naturally align themselves on an ideological dimension and that majorities (although not overwhelming) bunch at that position conventionally associated with each of the national parties.

TABLE 1. SUBJECTIVE IDEOLOGICAL POSITION OF NONINCUMBENT CANDIDATES FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1964[a]

| Self-Anchoring Position | Democrats | Republicans |
|---|---|---|
| Liberal | 59% | 8% |
| Middle of the Road | 37 | 34 |
| Conservative | 1 | 53 |
| Mixed[b] | 2 | 4 |
| Meaningless terms | 1 | 1 |
| | 100% | 100% |
| | (145) | (158) |

[a] Candidates were classified on the basis of their response to the following question: "Next, we would like some idea about how you feel on certain policy issues being discussed around the country this year. On most issues, would you consider yourself liberal, middle of the road, conservative, or what?"

[b] A category used to classify those who indicated a position between the choices above.

The assumption of a left-right spatial model of party conflict, postulated by Anthony Downs and others, is clearly more applicable to this admittedly atypical group of congressional challengers than it is to the party-in-the-electorate.[27] Candidates do in fact form "ideological communities," particularly between but also within parties, even though the association between party and issue-position, not unexpectedly, is far from one to one.

Obviously identification as "liberal," "middle of the road," or "conservative" does not mean, as stressed earlier, there are rigidly prescribed patterns of liberal or conservative behavior. But the distinction does have important consequences, both on specific opinions and behavior. Between that 59 percent among the Democrats who thought of themselves as liberal and the 53 percent among Republicans who identified as conservative, there are large[28] and consistent differences in responses to the six specific issue-areas presented in Table 2. Moreover, the manner in which moderates (middle of the road) of each party differ is striking testimony to the psychological framework the parties provide in mediating the ideological attitude of "moderation."

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[23] An excellent intellectual history which emphasizes similarities between the late twenties and mid-sixties is Christopher Lasch's *The New Radicalism in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), especially pp. 251–308.

[24] I don't mean to imply that the distinctions aren't important; quite the contrary. Each has ideological components that are very different and these differences are surely as significant as the similarities suggested in the sometimes radical, sometimes conservative, attacks on the ubiquity of American Liberalism.

[25] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, rev. ed., 1963), p. 22.

[26] The question of whether American parties offer a significant choice is one so obviously saturated by an individual's value preferences (in addition to empirically demonstrable evidence) that few answers will satisfy anyone. Since I believe that political scientists should make explicit their own value positions, I should add (if it is not already apparent) that mine usually dump me on the liberal to left wing of the Democratic party. Thus, while often finding party differences "inadequate," I rarely agree they are "insignificant" or "echoes."

[27] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), particularly pp. 96–142. This is a phenomenon stressed in the work of McClosky, Eldersveld, and James Q. Wilson and entertained more formally in the reformulation of Downs by Donald Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," reprinted in Angus Campbell, *et al.*, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), pp. 175–176.

Conventionally, differences between parties in two-party systems have been conceived as embracing three zones, two on the polar ends and one in the center composed of groups from both parties who are closer to each other than to their respective poles. On the three social welfare issues presented here, the spread suggests a slightly different arrangement, with both the liberal and moderate Democrats joined by the few (8 percent) liberal Republicans constituting one bloc, moderate Republicans a second, and conservative Republicans a third. The tilt on these dimensions is surely "left." The relative absence of disagreement between liberal and moderate Democrats on each of these issues shows how the argument over federal economic intervention—among nonincumbents—has become a party issue and not simply a division between different wings within each party.

Although similar evidence has been provided for the parties in Congress,[29] it should be remembered that Democratic nonincumbents are contesting disproportionately in districts outside the South. On two of the noneconomic issues, one dealing with civil rights and the other with foreign policy, the distribution described above undergoes some rearrangement. The civil rights question, raised *after* the 1964 Civil Rights Bill had been passed, provides the closest approximation of an issue on which candidates are distributed by ideology and not by party affiliation; i.e., liberal Democrats and Republicans on the left, moderates of both parties in the center, conservative Republicans on the right.

Interestingly, however, one out of five of the conservative Republicans felt the federal government should do more in this area although 47 percent also believed government should do less. This question, excluding the labor union item which sought to invert expected responses, also saw a drop-off in the unanimity of support given by liberal Democrats for domestic intervention. While a majority (57 percent) favored increased federal activity, the much-larger-than-normal proportion who were willing to see the federal government continue present levels of activity (40 percent) lends some support to the notion that liberals, like conservatives, are most consistent on economic issues.

The other noneconomic item, a question on relations with the Soviet Union, provoked two significant patterns. First, although one fifth of the liberal Democrats felt the U. S. should do more to encourage cooperation with Russia, huge majorities in both liberal and moderate Democratic camps were agreed on continuing present policy. Among Republicans, the issue evoked not only the most consistent nay-saying response for the conservatives (74 percent

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[28] Tests of statistical significance will not be used on these data, for reasons similar to those argued by Heinz Eulau in *The Legislative System, op. cit.*, pp. 455–463. Tests of significance, like chi-square, are based on the assumption that data are drawn from a random sample of the population to which the analyst is interested in making references. Since the data reported above are not a sample, but an attempted enumeration, the assumptions of randomization are not met and tests based on that assumption are misleading. On the other hand, Hubert Blalock suggests that even enumerations are implied samples (of a theoretically infinite population) and hence " . . . some sort of significance test will practically always be helpful in evaluating one's findings," but then admits that " . . . . a skeptic can legitimately claim that had he divided his (data) into three classes according to almost any irrelevant criteria, he would probably have obtained differences as large as ours," *Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 270. The choice is thus not an easy one. I have followed those conventions outlined by Eulau and will treat only those differences of 10 percentage points or more as "large," less than that as "small." On these problems, and the long simmering controversy, the best recent discussion can be found in Johan Galtung, *The Theory and Method of Social Research* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 358–388.

[29] Among which, see Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951); Duncan MacRae, Jr., *Dimensions of Congressional Voting* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959); David B. Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959); and, Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *Congressmen and Their Constituencies* (Chicago: Rand, McNally & Co., 1963).

TABLE 2. SIX TESTS OF ATTITUDE CONSISTENCY: SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE COMPONENTS OF LIBERALISM-CONSERVATISM[a]

| Issue | Democrats[b] | | Party Distance[c] | Republicans | | | Party Distance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Libs | Mods | | Libs | Mods | Cons | |
| On programs for minority and Negro rights, should the federal government: | | | | | | | |
| DO MORE | 57% | 27% | *30%* | 38% | 26% | 19% | |
| DO SAME | 40 | 62 | | 54 | 53 | 30 | |
| DO LESS | 1 | 8 | | 8 | 16 | 47 | |
| NA | 2 | 3 | | — | 5 | 4 | *31%* |
| On programs to assist public education: | | | | | | | |
| DO MORE | 79% | 73% | *6%* | 69% | 19% | 8% | |
| DO SAME | 6 | 13 | | 8 | 46 | 14 | |
| DO LESS | — | 2 | | 8 | 16 | 56 | *45%* |
| NA | 15 | 8 | | 15 | 19 | 20 | |
| On programs to provide medical care for the elderly: | | | | | | | |
| DO MORE | 96% | 73% | *26%* | 85% | 28% | 8% | |
| DO SAME | 4 | 13 | | 15 | 47 | 33 | |
| DO LESS | — | 2 | | — | 16 | 53 | *37%* |
| NA | — | 10 | | — | 9 | 16 | |
| On programs to help the poverty-stricken generally: | | | | | | | |
| DO MORE | 87% | 60% | *27%* | 54% | 19% | 12% | |
| DO SAME | 13 | 37 | | 31 | 63 | 31 | |
| DO LESS | — | — | | 12 | 12 | 50 | *38%* |
| NA | — | 3 | | — | 6 | 7 | |
| On programs to regulate labor unions: | | | | | | | |
| DO MORE | 9% | 12% | | 31% | 56% | 60% | *4%* |
| DO SAME | 66 | 67 | | 54 | 35 | 22 | |
| DO LESS | 22 | 17 | *5%* | 15 | 9 | 6 | |
| NA | 3 | 4 | | — | — | 12 | |
| On programs that encourage cooperation with Russia: | | | | | | | |
| DO MORE | 21% | 6% | *15%* | 31% | 2% | 3% | |
| DO SAME | 74 | 81 | | 54 | 42 | 19 | |
| DO LESS | 3 | 6 | | 15 | 49 | 74 | *25%* |
| NA | 2 | 7 | | — | 7 | 4 | |
| | (83) | (57) | | (12) | (56) | (83) | |

[a] The question used: "Much of what the federal government does can be judged in terms of whether it should do *more*, just about the *same*, or *less*. Please check the following to indicate what your judgment is about each of the following policies or program areas."

[b] Only two Democratic candidates claimed to be conservatives; they have not been included in this analysis.

[c] A simple measure based on the percentage difference (for Democrats) between liberals and "middles" favoring *more* activity on each issue, and (for Republicans) between conservatives and middles favoring *less* activity.

advocated "less"), but it also moved about half (49 percent) of the moderates into this category. Moderate and conservative Republicans were moved toward the most unanimity on this question and on the need for increased regulation of labor. Again, the few liberal Republicans were closer to Democrats than they were to either wing of their own party.[30]

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[30] LeRoy Rieselbach has shown, however, that few presidents can rely on a generalized ideology of "internationalism" when attempting to build support for specific programs, if the president's

These data are of course derived exclusively from nonincumbents and any ideological differences (or similarities) between Democratic and Republican challengers could be quite deceptive from the viewpoint of alternatives presented the electorate in specific districts. It is possible that nonincumbents are more like their incumbent opponents in most districts while pairs of congressional candidates differ from district to district. Thus my data would show substantial party differences, since only nonincumbents are considered, when in fact district rather than party was the critical variable. I cannot directly test this hypothesis, but other evidence suggests that it is more often the exception than the rule.

First, substantial research has demonstrated that the parties tend to differ on roll call votes in the House in a manner quite consistent with the findings presented here for nonincumbents. The independent effects of constituency, while significant, do not substantially alter this basic partisan division. Second, previous studies which have compared the voting behavior of successive incumbents from different parties, have consistently shown that substantial differences in behavior do occur, that the "particular incumbent does make a difference"; i.e., votes differently from his predecessor on similar issues.[31] Intensive comparative analysis of the few (83) nonincumbents who were successful in 1964 with their predecessors on four Great Society issues corroborated this finding. I am not suggesting that individual challengers don't alter their positions in specific districts, but the findings above suggest that *in the aggregate* congressional challengers do differ significantly by party. This seems persuasive for understanding the structural (as contrasted with micro-level) character of ideological conflict between the parties. Nevertheless, the absence of direct information about incumbents should be remembered and inferences treated accordingly.

Table 2 also presents a rather simple index of ideological distance within the parties on each issue. The bitter division within the presidential wing of the Republican party during 1964, while not to be anticipated as universally occurring in each congressional district, is still partially reflected in the degree of intra-party conflict suggested by differences on four of the six issues.

Considering differences between moderates and liberal/conservatives for each party as an indication of significant intra-party conflict (liberals are clearly out of the Republican party's ideological ballpark, statistically and attitudinally), the GOP is certainly the more divided. On federal aid to education, 56 percent of the conservatives, but only 9 percent of the moderates, felt the federal government should do less, a difference of 45 percent. On three other issues, poverty, medicare and civil rights, the moderates and conservatives were separated by a spread greater than 30 percent. For Democrats the civil rights issue was the only one which approached this magnitude in showing substantial intra-party conflict; 57 percent of the liberals, but only 27 percent of the moderates, believed the government should do more.

Congressional challengers, whether potential winners or doomed losers, are not simply an aggregate of individuals contesting in isolated constituencies on issues relevant only to their districts. As Eldersveld has shown for the organizations in Detroit,[32] or Scoble has argued of the NCEC,[33] these party candidates constitute groups in ideological terms, although the foregoing analysis indicates these "communities of co-believers" are neither monolithic entities nor ideological oligarchies. If, as this study suggests, they provide some degree of ideological coherence for each national party, then an important question centers on those factors which tend to magnify, mediate or reduce this coherence. How tough is the cement?

### III. SOURCES OF IDEOLOGICAL PLURALISM

"Congressional recruitment," writes one contemporary analyst, "is essentially a process for organizing power."[34] The primary agency through which opportunity is structured and power organized has generally but not always been the political party.

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strategy is based on expectations of party differences that were more obvious in the immediate post-war period. See his *The Roots of Isolationism* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966). pp. 141–164.

[31] See the citations in footmote 29. These studies, based on roll call voting behavior, are subject to the same logical problem since they deal only with incumbents. But the probability of inter-party differences disappearing under the impact of constituency (outside the South) seems remote, particularly in light of the extensive constituency controls examined in each of the above. Further, Lewis Froman has shown that there is even significant variation among congressmen from the same party, although his analysis is restricted to votes on reciprocal trade. Froman *op. cit.*, Chapter 8.

[32] Eldersveld, *op. cit.*, pp. 528–535.

[33] Scoble, *Ideology and Electoral Action*, *op. cit.*, pp. 26–61.

[34] Snowiss, "Congressional Recruitment . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 628.

TABLE 3. PARTY STRUCTURE AND RECRUITMENT: RELATIONSHIP OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION TO POLITICAL IDEOLOGY, CONGRESSIONAL CHALLENGERS BY PARTY*

| Ideology | Democrats | | | Republicans | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Demo. Dominant | Competi-tive | Repub. Dominant | Demo. Dominant | Competi-tive | Repub. Dominant |
| Liberal | 53% | 57% | 57% | 9% | 4% | 5% |
| Middle-Road | 30 | 39 | 40 | 35 | 30 | 55 |
| Conservative | 7 | 1 | — | 51 | 61 | 38 |
| NA | 10 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 99% | 100% |
| | (13) | (61) | (71) | (98) | (42) | (18) |

* The index of party competition is a modified version of the one used in Lewis Froman, *Congressmen and Their Constituencies* (New York: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 29. Categories were collapsed because of the relatively small number of candidates in each cell. The following conventions were used above: Competitive districts were those in which the opposition had won at least 45 percent of the vote in the five elections preceding 1964 at least once or had actually won the district. Party dominant districts are those in which the opposition had not won once in the five preceding elections nor been able to gain more than 44 percent of the vote. About one-fourth of the districts were redrawn in the 1961–63 period, 42 of which are included in the totals above. Electoral totals for these are based solely on the 1962 and 1964 elections. However, those districts in which the 1964 winner was a Democrat, but the preceding elections had been won by a Republican with more than 55 percent of the vote were placed in the Republican dominant category. Data source: *Congressional Quarterly Almanac,* XIX (1963), p. 1173–1184.

Building on the pioneering efforts of Turner and MacRae,[35] numerous studies have sought to ascertain the effects of party competition and constituency characteristics on the roll call voting behavior of legislators, although only a handful have dealt in a comprehensive way with the inter-relationship of party, constituency, recruitment processes, and the professional and ideological styles of those selected in these environments.[36]

Two strands of inquiry have dominated the roll call studies of the past 15 years: one dealing with legislative party cohesion, the other

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[35] Turner, *op. cit.*, and MacRae, "The Relationship . . . " *op. cit.*

[36] Among which, see Sorauf, *op. cit.*; John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, et al., *op. cit.*,; and Snowiss *op. cit.*

TABLE 4. URBANISM AND RECRUITMENT: RELATIONSHIP OF CONSTITUENCY TO POLITICAL IDEOLOGY, CONGRESSIONAL CHALLENGERS BY PARTY**

| Ideology | Democrats | | | | Republicans | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Urban | Suburban | Rural | Mixed | Urban | Suburban | Rural | Mixed |
| Liberal | 61% | 63% | 51% | 65% | 13% | 7% | 5% | 6% |
| Middle-Road | 35 | 36 | 44 | 35 | 43 | 39 | 28 | 39 |
| Conservative | 4 | — | 2 | — | 38 | 46 | 66 | 50 |
| NA | — | 1 | 3 | — | 6 | 8 | 1 | 5 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| | (23) | (39) | (63) | (20) | (47) | (28) | (65) | (18) |

** The classification of districts is taken from *Congressional Quarterly Almanac,* XIX, (1963), pp. 1173–1184. "Mixed" districts were those for which CQ could not determine a predominant character. The urban, suburban, rural include those few (38) which CQ classified as "mixed, but predominantly. . . ." A discussion of criteria, cutting points, etc., is contained in the almanac.

with ideology. Considerable evidence has piled up since MacRae's early research showing that departures from party regularity in voting occur most frequently—when they occur at all—among legislators from districts that are most competitive and "least typical" socially and economically of their own parties.

Further, the results on specific measures of liberalism/conservatism, although inconsistent and characterized by exceptions, tend to confirm MacRae: ideological departures occur most frequently—and it should be stressed again, when they do occur—among legislators from districts that are electorally marginal and environmentally atypical of their own parties.[37] The majority of these studies have focused on state legislatures. Lewis Froman, however, has shown the first proposition (party regularity) to be false for Democrats and only partially true for Republicans in the House when inter-party competition is the independent variable, and the second proposition (ideological deviance) generally accurate (with some major exceptions) using both competitiveness and constituency as independent variables.[38]

The reasoning behind both these hypotheses is quite plausible—candidates seek to maximize their electoral appeal by 1) moving toward the rival party in districts where the opposition party is dominant, 2) pursuing a middle of the road course in districts where the parties are evenly matched, and 3) assuming polar positions where their own party is dominant and the problem of reelection not critical. These political forces, perhaps more than any others, would logically be expected to undercut the ideological homogeneity of challengers in congressional campaigns.

Although the indices of competition and constituency presented in Tables 3 and 4 are necessarily crude, the hypothesis linking ideology to party structure receives little confirmation by the data presented here. Among Democrats, for example, approximately equal proportions tend to identify as liberal or middle-of-the-road, despite variation in the degree of inter-party competition. And this holds even for those districts which are overwhelmingly dominated by the opposition (the GOP's share of the total vote never dipped below 60 percent).

Among Republicans, there is in fact a tendency for a greater proportion of candidates contesting marginal districts to identify on the polar position (conservative) than those candidates secure in Republican-dominant districts (who are more often moderates), but the small number of nonincumbents contesting in districts dominated by their own party makes any analysis here risky. The differences between Republicans running in competitive and Democratic-dominant districts are, however, in a direction consistent with MacRae's prediction, but the proportion is just barely large enough to qualify as substantively significant: 51 percent in Democratic-dominant compared to 61 percent in competitive districts were conservative, showing a mild drop-off effect among Republicans confronted with an intractable Democratic district.

The effects of constituency, measured by an urban/suburban/rural typology, are more consistent with expectations, particularly for Republican challengers. Excluding those districts which could not be classified (included in the table as "Mixed"), Table 4 shows a sharp and monotonic increase in the proportion of Republican conservatives and a decrease in moderates as one moves from urban to suburban to rural constituencies. This is almost the same result found by Froman for congressional incumbents and helps to explain why there are *more* conservative Republicans in competitive districts: the most competitive Republican districts tend also to have the most rural constituencies.[39]

Similarly, while there are no significant differences between the proportions of suburban and urban Democratic candidates who are liberal, the percentage does drop among rural Democrats. Though it is probably true, as Robert Friedman has argued,[40] that if present economic and social trends continue, the urban-rural dichotomy will cease to have a distinctive, measurable difference independent of party, it does not follow that some cleavages, particularly intra-party conflict, will not continue to be rooted in the character of these different constituencies. Still, these data, as well as Froman's and others, raise substantial questions of interpretation.

A large majority of rural Republicans and a small majority (51 percent) of rural Democrats do think of themselves as conservative and

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[37] Most of these studies are extensively summarized and critically examined in Heinz Eulau and Katherine Hinckley, "Legislative Institutions and Processes," James Robinson (ed.), *Political Science Annual*, I (1966), pp. 85–150.

[38] Froman, *op. cit.*, pp. 85–122. I think he overemphasizes what are actually quite small statistical differences.

[39] See the discussion on this point by Froman, *ibid.*, pp. 118–119. Among the competitive districts included above, 49 percent were rural.

[40] Robert Freidman, "The Urban-Rural Conflict Revisited," *Western Political Quarterly*, (1961), 959.

TABLE 5. COMPARATIVE IDEOLOGICAL POSITION OF CONGRESSIONAL CHALLENGERS, BY AGE AND PARTY

| Ideology | All Candidates | | Democrats | | Republicans | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 40 and Over | Under 40 | 40 and Over | Under 40 | 40 and Over | Under 40 |
| Liberal | 34% | 26% | 62% | 48% | 10% | 4% |
| Middle-Road | 36 | 41 | 33 | 52 | 38 | 30 |
| Conservative | 26 | 32 | 2 | — | 46 | 64 |
| NA | 4 | 1 | 3 | — | 6 | 2 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| | (195) | (105) | (89) | (53) | (105) | (52) |

liberal respectively. The differences between Republicans and Democrats are obviously much greater than differences within each party, regardless of whether candidates are contesting in urban, suburban, or rural districts. Party is still the most powerful variable for explaining inter-party differences, while the party system (based on competition) is unrelated and constituency factors are only mildly operative on that rare deviance that does exist.[41] But again, since I do not have data matching incumbent and nonincumbent in the same district, these findings must be treated quite tentatively.

Perhaps Leo Snowiss is correct when he suggests that the more important differences are really between "machine" and "amateur" liberals, or between "traditional" Republican conservatives and the "newer" pragmatic variety, and these differences can be explained by reference to party environments which are quite distinctive in terms of organizational resources, structure and professional ethos,[42] but this is a task clearly beyond the present analysis.

Age, the third independent variable, is almost universally considered an enduring factor in ideological conflict within American party organizations. The belief in a sharp and widespread generational conflict is part of the persistent proverbial wisdom of American politics. This belief, however, tends to ignore the considerable social and political research which has established the profound continuity, the extensive sources of stability, which characterize the transmission of values from one age to another.[43] Yet current student unrest, the McCarthy campaign, or the generous publicity heaped on the behavior of young political leaders like Senators Kennedy, Percy or Brooke, are often treated as typical (rather than atypical) of substantial cleavages in the belief systems of two generations.

Usually, the old guard (itself a term reflecting this wisdom) is pictured as representing the forces of moderation, if not reaction, against a newer, more liberalizing younger generation. Among others, Harvey Lehman[44] and David

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[41] Running counter to the drift of much postwar attitude research on the mass electorate, the importance of party as a strong discriminating factor in explaining differences toward public issues, even on civil rights, has recently been reemphasized in Raymond E. Wolfinger and Fred Greenstein, "The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting," this REVIEW, LXII (September, 1968), particularly pp. 759–760. The authors found that Democrats with a high school diploma were "scarcely less likely to vote No (favoring fair housing) than Republicans with a college education." Wolfinger and Greenstein suggest this finding "... may serve as a corrective to interpretations of discrimination and backlash politics that place exclusive emphasis on social class as an independent variable."

[42] This finding applies only to the Chicago delegation, a group conspicuous for the extensive number of "machine" liberals. Large-scale comparative research, as Snowiss suggests, will be necessary before the generality of such an argument can be tested.

[43] The work on political socialization is large and growing. More recently, see Richard Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, *Political Socialization* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969). Even among those who are now the center of popular "generation gap" literature, college radicals, some evidence exists which suggests that it is less a "gap" and more an extension of the traditionally left-wing, highly involved political activity of their parents. For some not very reliable but highly suggestive data, see S. M. Lipset and Philip Altbach, "Student Politics and Higher Education in the United States," in Lipset (ed.), *Student Politics* (New York: Basic Books, 1967), pp. 199–253.

[44] Harvey Lehman, *Age and Achievement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).

TABLE 6. AGE, CONSTITUENCY AND IDEOLOGY, CONGRESSIONAL CHALLENGERS BY PARTY

| | Democratic Challengers | | | | | | Republican Challengers | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Urban | | Suburban | | Rural | | Urban | | Suburban | | Rural | |
| | 40 & Over | Under 40 | 40 & Over | Under 40 | 40 & Over | Under 40 | 40 & Over | Under 40 | 40 & Over | Under 40 | 40 & Over | Under 40 |
| Liberal | 70% | 60% | 67% | 50% | 58% | 40% | 11% | 8% | 13% | —% | 6% | —% |
| Middle-Road | 27 | 40 | 30 | 50 | 36 | 60 | 49 | 37 | 39 | 44 | 36 | 14 |
| Conservative | — | — | — | — | — | — | 35 | 50 | 39 | 55 | 56 | 85 |
| NA | 3 | — | 3 | — | 6 | — | 6 | 5 | 9 | — | 2 | 1 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% |
| | (22) | (10) | (26) | (16) | (37) | (25) | (34) | (24) | (23) | (9) | (44) | (21) |

Walker[45] have argued that age in recruitment is a factor which affects the ideological outlook of candidates and that youthful politicos are more often the selection of forces of protest and unrest. Further, one would expect that non-incumbents, whose median age is 10 years younger than incumbents, might clearly reflect such conflict.

Consider, then, the data in Table 5. The so-called generational split does exist, but in precisely the opposite direction from that expected. For both parties, those *under* forty were more often in the conservative ranks than those forty and over. Among Democrats, 62 percent of the candidates over forty considered themselves liberal while 48 percent of their counterparts who were under forty did so. Of Republicans, 64 percent under forty identified as conservative compared with only 46 percent of their older colleagues.

Two interpretations of this rather unexpected finding are possible. First, an argument could be made that the reversal is not really unexpected if one assumes that it is the youth organizations close to the Republican party, such as the YAF, which most closely approximate "pure" conservatism and who are most insistent on sustaining doctrinal purity against the pragmatic, electorally-oriented drive of their elders. However, a similar argument must then apply equally to younger members of the Democratic party, but this clearly is not the case. Nor is it true that Democratic candidates under forty no longer felt the term "liberal" adequately described contemporary choices since they consciously identified as "middle of the road."

Nevertheless, on the assumption that younger challengers, regardless of subjective orientation, do in fact differ on post-New Deal, non-economic issues from older candidates, and that these differences are not adequately handled by the conventional meaning of liberalism/conservatism, analysis was undertaken by age on the civil rights issue. Although the differences are reduced, the distribution is still in the same direction: 43 percent of the older but 40 percent of the younger Democratic candidates believed the federal government should do more in this area; 27 percent of the GOP candidates forty and above felt the federal government should do less on civil rights while 38 percent of the younger Republican challengers considered less activity appropri-

TABLE 7. AGE, PARTY STRUCTURE, AND IDEOLOGY, CONGRESSIONAL CHALLENGERS BY PARTY

| | Democratic Challengers | | | | | | Republican Challengers | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Tend Demo | | Competitive | | Tend Rep | | Tend Demo | | Competitive | | Tend Rep | |
| | 40 & Over | Under 40 | 40 & Over | Under 40 | 40 & Over | Under 40 | 40 & Over | Under 40 | 40 & Over | Under 40 | 40 & Over | Under 40 |
| Liberal | 60% | 34% | 60% | 54% | 70% | 41% | 2% | 3% | 3% | —% | 6% | —% |
| Middle-Road | 20 | 66 | 36 | 46 | 30 | 59 | 48 | 25 | 30 | 21 | 53 | 75 |
| Conservative | 20 | — | — | — | — | — | 44 | 70 | 65 | 73 | 41 | 25 |
| NA | — | — | 4 | — | — | — | 6 | 2 | 2 | 4 | — | — |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 98% | 100% | 100% |
| | (10) | (3) | (32) | (24) | (41) | (24) | (56) | (35) | (27) | (14) | (13) | (4) |

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[45] David Walker, "The Age Factor in the 1958 Congressional Elections," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* IV (February, 1960).

ate. To the extent federal intervention in civil rights is an issue which goes beyond the older economic conflict, younger men are no more likely than older to favor such extension.

A second interpretation, one consistent with some of Joseph Schlesinger's work on ambition theory,[46] would hold that younger candidates, more ambitious and career-oriented than their elders, are more flexible ideologically because ideology is tempered by realistic appraisals of the opportunity structure. The argument would seem even more persuasive when applied to nonincumbent congressional candidates, many of whom are just beginning serious consideration of the political vocation. But this fails to explain the findings for Republicans.

Nor does the independent effect of constituency or party structure, shown in Tables 6 and 7, substantially alter this paradox. Because the number of respondents in each cell is generally quite small, and any percentage differences based on these cells are not very meaningful, the control variables are included for illustrative purposes only. But they are extremely suggestive.

Constituency characteristics obviously affect the distribution of liberal, moderate and conservative candidates in each party, but this impact tends to move both younger and older candidates in a direction consistent with the original finding; i.e., younger challengers are still more often in the conservative camps of each party. For example, 85 percent of rural Republican challengers under forty thought of themselves as conservative, while only 56 percent of their similarly rural but older counterparts were so inclined. Among Democrats, 60 percent of those under 40 contesting in rural districts, but 36 percent of those 40 and over, were self-identified middle-of-the-roaders. The influence of party competition also reduces generational differences, particularly in competitive districts, yet younger and older Republican candidates continue to differ along the lines suggested above. And this holds precisely in those districts (Demo-dominant) where in fact one might anticipate ambitious younger Republicans to move toward the center.

The relationship between age and ideology is complex and it is doubtful the operational measures used here are powerful enough to embrace some rather important components in a generational conflict, such as style, which surface in situations where age differences are a factor. An excellent example, partially involving just such a conflict, would be the Halleck-Ford leadership struggle.[47] Also, the cutting point employed, 40 years, is obviously not appropriate for youth-adult political conflict although it does fit the requirements for generational battles among political leaders, who are rarely under 30. Still, the fact is that the common proposition about generational conflict receives little confirmation from these data on nonincumbents, and possibly might be quite contrary to expectations. This should serve as considerable warning to those who see younger candidates as an unqualified source for liberalizing tendencies in the two national parties.

The final independent variable, former office-holding, was selected because it taps two dimensions of the process many have argued would lead challengers in congressional campaigns to converge rather than differ on issues of public policy, presumably expanding rather than restricting their electoral appeal.

Edmund Costantini has shown[48] that California Democratic officie-holders as a group, while more ideological than the rank and file party members in the electorate, are still more

TABLE 8. PUBLIC OFFICE EXPERIENCE AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY, CONGRESSIONAL CHALLENGERS BY PARTY

| Ideology | Democrats |  | Republicans |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | Some Public Office Experience | No Public Office Experience | Some Public Office Experience | No Public Office Experience |
| Liberal | 55% | 56% | 11% | 7% |
| Middle-Road | 40 | 38 | 48 | 20 |
| Conservative | 4 | 3 | 36 | 63 |
| NA | 1 | 1 | 5 | — |
|  | 100% | 98% | 100% | 100% |
|  | (77) | (71) | (64) | (91) |

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[46] Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

[47] Peabody, *op. cit.*

[48] Costantini, *op. cit.*

TABLE 9. PARTY OFFICE EXPERIENCE AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY, CONGRESSIONAL CHALLENGERS BY PARTY

| Ideology | Democrats | | | Republicans | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Nat'l/State | Local | No Office | Nat'l/State | Local | No Office |
| Liberal | 60% | 59% | 56% | 7% | 11% | 4% |
| Middle-Road | 34 | 41 | 41 | 44 | 30 | 39 |
| Conservative | 2 | — | 1 | 46 | 56 | 53 |
| NA | 4 | — | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| | (41) | (48) | (56) | (45) | (63) | (47) |

"centrist" than active, committed party workers, in a test of a notion long prevalent among observers of American politics. Moreover, the simple effect of actually holding office, where one is forced to deal with the conflicting desires, aspirations, and needs of a polyglot constituency, is usually "educational" for even the most ideological office holder in a democratic polity—the less wordy but more popular description for which is "copping out."

Since Costantini used a scale reflecting positions on specific issues, these data are not quite comparable, but one would still expect differences between those who have held public and party—but particularly public—office and those without such experience within each of the parties. This expectation is totally disconfirmed for Democrats, but remarkably borne out for Republicans, as a glance at the data in Table 8 will indicate.

Virtually no difference exists between Democratic candidates with or without prior office experience, but for Republicans the difference is quite large: 63 percent of the GOP candidates who had no public office experience considered themselves conservative, but only 36 percent of those who had held public offices did so, a difference of 27 percent.[49]

On the other hand, *party* office experience apparently has little effect (see Table 9) on tendencies to anchor oneself in either a centrist or polar position, even when different levels (national, state or local) are considered. This is consistent with the belief that, at least for Republicans, there is a distinct difference in the way party and public office-holding socializes candidates, the former maximizing partisan ("purist") attitudes, the latter mitigating them.

TABLE 10. ELECTORAL OUTCOME AND IDEOLOGY IN THE 1964 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, BY PARTY

| Ideology | Democrats | | Republicans | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Winners | Losers | Winners | Losers |
| Liberal | 54% | 59% | 4% | 9% |
| Middle-Road | 39 | 39 | 27 | 35 |
| Conservative | 2 | — | 70 | 51 |
| Mixed | 2 | 2 | — | 4 |
| NA | 2 | — | — | 1 |
| | 99% | 100% | 101% | 100% |
| | (63) | (82) | (16) | (142) |

The finding for Democratic candidates suggests that either these men perceive less dissonance between their ideology and office holding, or they hold different kinds of offices than do Republicans, or both. Among Republicans it is clear that intra-party conflict and ideological purity is emphasized by the entry of challengers with little public office-holding experience. Alternatively, countervailing forces may begin to operate when Republicans have managed to endure the tribulations of public office. But the

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[49] A similar lack of experience (although of a different type) was noted by Aaron Wildavsky for Goldwater supporters at the 1964 convention in his "The Goldwater Phenomenon: Purists, Politicians and the Two-Party System," *Review of Politics*, 27 (July, 1965). Nelson Polsby points out that Goldwater appealed, in addition, to a considerable number of professionals, regardless of misgivings about the electoral consequences, simply because they agreed with his specific programs. But he adds that 74 percent of the delegates—an unusually high figure—had not been to either of the two previous conventions. See his "Strategic Considerations," in Milton Cummings (ed.), *The National Elections of 1964* (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966), pp. 100–1.

TABLE 11. IDEOLOGY AND ELECTORAL MARGIN IN THE 1964 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, BY PARTY

| Outcome | Dems | Repubs | Democrats* | | Republicans | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Libs | Mods | Libs | Mods | Cons |
| Winners | 33% | 9% | 40% | 44% | 8% | 6% | 13% |
| Losers | 67 | 91 | 60 | 56 | 92 | 94 | 87 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Won (61% plus) | 6% | 1% | 6% | 8% | 8% | 2% | —% |
| Won (56–60%) | 6 | 3 | 7 | 11 | — | — | 6 |
| Won (55% & less) | 21 | 5 | 27 | 25 | — | 4 | 7 |
| Lost (45% plus) | 29% | 18% | 26% | 29% | 15% | 16% | 17% |
| Lost (40–44%) | 27 | 22 | 21 | 21 | 23 | 26 | 10 |
| Lost (39% & less) | 11 | 50 | 13 | 6 | 54 | 53 | 60 |
| | 100% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 101% | 100% |
| | (145) | (158) | (83) | (57) | (12) | (56) | (83) |

* The two self-identified conservative Democrats scored a 100% victory, and therein lies a tale of the Democrats in, as opposed to outside, Congress.

experience apparently has differential effects depending on party and ideological position.

These findings also suggest another line of speculative inquiry. A huge majority of these candidates face demonstrably hostile electoral conditions and it stretches the imagination to believe that any amount of institutional tinkering with the national party organization (regardless of what else might be accomplished) would in fact generate even more candidates who identified clearly as liberal or conservative without radically altering the number of parties in the system, a common argument of those attracted to the "responsible" party position. Despite the electoral environment, and the powerful countervailing social and organizational features of American political life, it is remarkable that a majority of congressional challengers in each party do in fact continue to offer what this observer takes to be a clear choice, at least in districts outside the South. The question remains: what follows electorally?

### IV. THE STRUCTURE OF DEFEAT

Two observations can be made about the character of congressional campaigns in the United States. First, except for a handful of districts, and under unusual circumstances, the behavior of the challenger, including his ideological stance, is probably the least influential factor bearing on electoral outcome.[50] Second, given necessary conditions, even a small increase in the number of incumbents defeated by challengers can have significant consequences on the output of the House of Representatives.

The data presented in Tables 10 and 11 can be interpreted as providing some evidence consistent with the first argument: liberals and moderates are distributed among winners and losers in about the same proportion as they are among Democratic nonincumbents as a whole. Nor does Table 11 show any evidence that indicates moderate Democrats tended to gain victory—when they did so—by a larger margin than liberals, an assumption implicit in some campaign theories. There are no appreciable differences in either the margin of victory, or defeat, between Democratic moderate and liberal candidates.

I am aware that no evidence regarding different campaign resources, strategies, activities, etc., of liberals or moderates is provided here. Rather, I assume that these factors, more or less under the control of individual candidates, are evenly distributed among both groups. The question involves the common argument that a liberal (and by extension, a conservative) ideology can only be sustained in districts that are leaning to the other party at the expense of electoral victory. These data suggest that a candidate's general position (within the usual ideological bounds) is unimportant.

Among Republicans, the magnitude of de-

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[50] Lewis A. Froman, "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies and Tactics," in M. Kent Jennings and Harmon Zeigler (eds.), *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 4.

TABLE 12. PARTY STRUCTURE, CONSTITUENCY, AND ELECTORAL OUTCOME, NONINCUMBENT CANDIDATES FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1964

| Party and Outcome | Two-Party Relationship | | | Constituency | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Demo Dominant | Competitive | Repub Dominant | Urban | Suburban | Rural | Mixed |
| Democrats | | | | | | | |
| Won (61% plus) | 91% | —% | —% | 26% | 3% | 9% | —% |
| Won (56–60%) | 9 | 10 | 6 | 13 | 5 | 2 | 5 |
| Won (55% & less) | — | 42 | 22 | 27 | 19 | 35 | 35 |
| Percent won: | 100 | 52 | 28 | 66 | 27 | 46 | 40 |
| Lost (45% plus) | — | 36 | 21 | 13 | 31 | 29 | 20 |
| Lost (40–44%) | — | 10 | 30 | 9 | 26 | 21 | 25 |
| Lost (39% & less) | — | 2 | 21 | 13 | 18 | 3 | 10 |
| N | (13) | (61) | (71) | (23) | (39) | (63) | (20) |
| Republicans | | | | | | | |
| Won (61% plus) | —% | 5% | 6% | 2% | 4% | 6% | —% |
| Won (56–60%) | 4 | 11 | 11 | — | 7 | 8 | — |
| Won (55% & less) | — | 9 | 11 | — | 4 | 3 | — |
| Percent won: | 4 | 25 | 28 | 2 | 15 | 17 | — |
| Lost (45% plus) | 7 | 33 | 27 | 11 | 14 | 22 | 17 |
| Lost (40–44%) | 13 | 26 | 12 | 13 | 21 | 14 | 28 |
| Lost (39% & less) | 76 | 14 | 33 | 74 | 50 | 45 | 55 |
| N | (98) | (42) | (18) | (47) | (28) | (65) | (18) |

feat affected all wings almost equally, except that the few (16) winners considered here were disproportionately conservative, but 87 percent of the GOP conservatives running in 1964 were defeated, just as were 94 percent of the Republican moderates and 92 percent of the liberals. As V. O. Key once observed in another context, when the rain falls, it falls equally on the willing and unwilling. Although the data are far from satisfactory, they do lend some support to the notion that the more important determinants of electoral outcome are structural, involving the constituency and the pattern of party competition in each district. Some indication of the relationship of different party structures and different constituencies to the electoral fate of the 1964 challengers is shown in Table 12.

The Democratic margin is underscored by the following: nonincumbents were able to sweep all of the few Democratic-dominant districts in which they ran (five of the thirteen considered here were opened to nonincumbents by defeating incumbents in the primaries), while Republicans held only seven out of ten of their own Republican-dominant districts, perhaps equally significant given the massiveness of Goldwater's defeat.

Democratic nominees were also able to win 52 percent of the competitive district races they entered, but four out of five were by margins less than 55 percent. Contrarily, Republican nonincumbents won only 28 percent of the competitive districts they sought. Excluding Alabama, Milton Cummings' study of the 1964 electoral races also shows how successful Democratic incumbents were in maintaining their seats, even in districts (mainly southern) where Johnson's total dipped below 40 percent.[51]

Moreover, as these same data suggest, Democratic challengers maintained a predictable dominance in urban constituencies and were able to capture almost half of the rural dis-

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[51] Cummings, *op. cit.*, pp. 232–233.

TABLE 13. ELECTORAL FATE IN THE 1966 MID-TERM ELECTIONS OF FRESHMEN IN THE 89TH CONGRESS, BY PARTY AND IDEOLOGY[a]
(In Numbers)

| Outcome | Freshmen | | Democrats | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Demos | Repubs | Libs | Mods | Cons |
| Won (61% plus) | 18 | 14 | 6 | 5 | 4 |
| Won (56–60%) | 4 | — | 3 | 1 | — |
| Won (55% & less) | 17 | — | 9 | 7 | — |
| Lost (45% plus) | 19 | — | 12 | 7 | — |
| Lost (40–44%) | 4 | 1 | 2 | 2 | — |
| Lost (39% & less) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Retired/Other office | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | — |
| Total Losers | 23 | 1 | 14 | 9 | — |
| Total Winners | 39 | 14 | 18 | 13 | 4 |
| Other[b] | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | — |
| Totals | (66) | (18) | (35) | (23) | (4) |

[a] The three freshmen who entered in the second session and three former Congressmen who ran in 1964 were omitted from these figures. The ideology classification includes three Democrats and two Republicans who either didn't respond to the original questionnaire or were not subsequently interviewed. They were classified on the basis of federal role scores. Since only one Republican freshman was defeated, Glenn Andrews (Alabama), breakdowns for the GOP would be pointless.

[b] Among those who voluntarily left the House, Democrats Charles Farnsley (Ky.) retired; Paul Krebs lost his seat through reapportionment in New Jersey; Robert Sweeney ran for the Attorney General's office in Ohio; Teno Roncalio contested for United States Senator from Wyoming. Both Sweeney and Roncalio were defeated. Among Republicans, all three were southerners and all ran for governor: Howard "Bo" Calloway in Georgia; James Martin in Alabama; Prentiss Walker in Mississippi. All were defeated.

tricts in which they were running. Because of the small number of rural Democratic winners, no extensive further cross-tabulations were undertaken, but it is suggestive that of the 30 newly-elected rural-based Democrats, 16 considered themselves liberal, 13 middle of the road, and one conservative, a finding once more calling into question the presumed electoral advantages of moving to the center. But again this judgment must be treated gingerly since this analysis does not explore variation in individual stands on particular policies.

One other fact about electoral success—rare as it may be for nonincumbents—is suggested by these figures. Those Democrats who did win in environments that were either competitive or in constituencies generally not oriented to the Democratic party, were also invariably the most unstable in the next elections. Although subsequent analyses will deal intensively with the behavior and fate of the Republican and Democratic freshmen of 1964, some indication of what happened in 1966 is presented in Table 13.

This election, of course, reversed the Democratic victories of 1964, giving the Republicans a net gain of 48 seats, 10 more than the Democrats had managed two years before, and an unusually high off-year gain in congressional elections (the average off-year switch since 1950 has been 25). The lone Republican loser, Glenn Andrews of Alabama, was widely believed to be "too moderate" on civil rights.

Parenthetically, if Andrews was in fact defeated on the civil rights issue, and there is every reason to believe he was, this case should serve as a reminder of the inapplicability of the generalizations explored above to individual campaigns. Miller and Stokes find that single issues, in special areas under unique circumstances, can become powerful determinants of electoral outcome.[52] But the present data again underscore the above argument since there are no significant differences in the electoral margin of defeat, or victory, among those Democratic moderate and liberal freshmen up for reelection in 1966.

During the course of long and structured interviews with most of the winners of 1964, I was impressed by the consistency of two essentially different approaches to the problem of reelection among freshman Democrats. The first is typified by the following, a midwesterner:

> Let me tell you a story. Of course I'm more liberal than my district, but I've been a life-long liberal Democrat and I didn't come down here to simply play games with a bunch of people back home whom I wouldn't fart with—so to speak—normally. I've done a better job, I'm sure, than my predecessor, servicing my constituency, but I'm appalled by the war and the poverty programs are absolutely necessary. When I go back, I tell them exactly that and many obviously don't like it. So what? I'm here to help with the President's program and I intend to do it . . . except the war . . . things have got to change, and change soon, in Vietnam . . .

The other was captured also by the response of a midwestern Democrat:

> People are always saying, and this bothers me, that Congressmen don't do anything unless it's in the interest of reelection . . . but hell, that's the name of the game. I can't compete with Wil-

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[52] The Hays-Alford contest in the fifth district of Arkansas, the example cited, was extraordinary: 100 percent of the voters knew who Hays and Alford were and apparently also thought Brooks Hays, a 20-year veteran, too soft on civil rights. He was defeated by a write-in campaign for Alford.

bur Mills or George Mahon. How much sense does it make to spend hours wading through some of these reports to be able to change a comma, or going over the legislation in detail which comes down here every day. The problem is my district and I've got to win again there before any of this makes any sense. Sure I vote with the President on most programs, but I've been in my district twice a week, every week, for the past year and I intend to continue it until next November. These people have never known this kind of attention and it's going to pay off . . .

Both of these men, so dissimilar in approach, shared one thing in common: they were defeated in November.

### V. CONCLUSIONS AND SPECULATIONS

Every two years a sizable number of candidates for public office go through the sometimes tedious, often strenuous process of gaining nomination, creating organizations, raising money, charting strategies, making speeches, working charity, service and labor groups, knowing, as Key once said, that "the voice of the people consists mainly of the words 'yes' and 'no' and at times one cannot be certain which word is being uttered." For at least four-fifths of the group examined in this paper, however, the response was quite audible. Boss Plunkitt's famous epitaph, "He seen his opportunities and he took 'em," could properly be rephrased for the majority of congressional challengers to read, "He seen no opportunities but he took 'em anyway."

Popular and scholarly opinion has not been exceptionally kind to this cadre of highly active citizens—the two most frequently heard stereotypes are attorneys on the make and party dullards—but this study suggests another role.

It seems pointless continually to reiterate that American political parties are aggregations of extraordinarily diverse, often conflicting social and political units and then professionally gun down those who long for the classic, presumably well organized and clear ideological choices associated with continental political systems. Just as there are tendencies in the party system fostering homogeneity, so too there are countervailing forces creating significant choice.

The function most often imputed to political opposition is to provide alternatives, and the data examined here indicate that congressional challengers in the aggregate are psychologically by and large performing that function. Whether liberalism and conservatism are meaningful alternatives I shall leave to the judgment of my colleagues, but they apparently seem so to these candidates, who empirically resist being poured into those old stand-bys—the twin bottles—of intellectual contempt.

Differences between the two parties are not a function of differences in the social backgrounds of their respective candidates (with one minor exception),[53] but rather a result of the way similar backgrounds are apparently differentially internalized. The small social cleavages that do exist between the candidates are reinforced by fact that the majority of social "deviants" nominated by Republicans were almost without exception defeated.

The organizational decentralization of American political parties has led many commentators to believe significant nationalizing tendencies (other than the drive to gain and hold power) are rarely operative. While three of the four independent variables introduced do in fact generate sources of ideological variation, this should be considered in light of a substantial similarity of commitment. The data suggest there is a large core of Democratic liberalism and Republican conservatism which withstands the impact of almost any environmental factor, and this core may provide a strong corrective to further structural balkanization. But it appears to be more typical of Democratic then Republican challengers.

Some evidence is presented which very tentatively supports the argument that for most districts the electoral outcome is little dependent on whether a nonincumbent candidate is conservative, middle-of-the-road or liberal, a finding which undercuts the belief that it is electorally profitable for parties to enter campaigns on the assumption that moving to the center will produce at least short-run gains (whatever else might be the reason for adopting such strategy).[54] And it is precisely because large numbers of ideologically consistent challengers do not act "rationally"[55] in this sense that when the rain falls, and a few are elected, large enough majorities (or minorities) are created to move (or prevent from moving) major public innovations in social policy. As one Democratic freshman sarcastically remarked, "We are the cannon fodder of the 'Great Society'."

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[53] Professionals among the Democrats were more often educators, journalists and ministers than were Republicans, but the differences are not substantial.

[54] The low visibility of most congressional campaigns restricts any possible extension of this argument to other (more salient) electoral arenas. For two recent studies of the presidential struggle which go beyond the more typically unsystematic or "how to" research on political campaigns, see Karl Lamb and Paul Smith, *Campaign Decision-Making* (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1968); and, John H. Kessel, *The Goldwater Coalition* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968).

[55] On this point, I part company with Froman, if I understand the character of his recommenda-

Of course the stability of congressional elections also discourages more rapid and consistent action in the House (or consolidates past gains, depending on one's perspective). This is hardly an original observation and I know it will not sit well with those Republicans whose goal is winning, since few elections following the thirties have provided similar occasions for ideologically conservative nonincumbents to participate in charting a clear alternative course for public policy. For some—and not only conservatives—this represents the tragedy of American politics; for others, the genius.

Independent of the other functions performed by these candidates, it seems clear that congressional challengers make a substantial contribution to whatever ideological difference now exists between the two national parties.

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tions, since I still believe campaigns can be educational in the old-fashioned sense and that restructuring the present relationship between candidates and the public is perhaps one of the most important long-run effects losers could have on electoral politics. Froman does recognize that "latent functions" (including issue development) are important components of the campaign process, but the gist of his paper is concerned with exploiting the current environment. See his "A Realistic Approach. . . " *op. cit.*, pp. 8–19.

# DEDUCTION, EXPLANATION, AND SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose here is to explore certain aspects of the philosophy of science which have serious implications both for the practice of social and political science and for understanding that practice. The current relationship between social science and the philosophy of science (or the philosophy of the social sciences) is a curious one. Despite the emergence of a considerable body of literature in philosophy which is pertinent to the methodological problems of social science, there has been a lack of ostensive ties between the two areas. A justified concern with the independence of social scientific research has contributed to a tendency toward isolation which is unfortunate in view of the proliferation of philosophical problems which necessarily attends the rapid expansion of any empirical discipline. Although in the literature of contemporary social science there are frequent references to certain works in the philosophy of science and to philosophical issues relating to methodology, these are most often in the context of bald pronouncements and shibboleths relating to the nature of science, its goals, and the character of its reasoning. But what is most disturbing about the fact that social scientists have little direct and thorough acquaintance with the philosophy of science is not merely that there has been a failure to carefully examine the many logical and epistemological assumptions which are implicit in social scientific inquiry, since this task might normally and properly be considered to be within the province of the philospher of science. It is more significant that this unfamiliarity has, paradoxically, obscured the extent to which certain doctrines originating in the philosophy of science have been uncritically insinuated into the enterprise of social science as informing categoricals.

Much of the theoretical literature in political and social science, as well as attempts to explicate the epistemic features of social scientific investigation, rest on a belief that the activity of the natural scientist is an appropriate model for understanding and prescribing the role of the social scientist. Although it may be granted that social and natural science must be distinguished in terms of such characteristics as technique and subject matter, this is often understood as explaining certain inherent or temporary limitations of social science. Generally it has been assumed that with regard to the logic of explanation, social science must be fundamentally symmetrical with natural science if it is to count as science. Although there are a number of common features that would support the idea of symmetry, such as a mutual empirical orientation and concern for systematic explanation and description, and although philosophy, science, and everday life may be analytically as well as existentially differentiated as modes of thought and activity, this view is misconceived to the extent that it tends to postulate a hierarchy of epistemological structures with impermeable boundaries and fails to take account of some of the more generic aspects of explanation. As a consequence of this misconception, social scientists have been reluctant to move beyond the realm of natural science when seeking a model of inquiry even when the requirements of explanation in the two spheres seem hopelessly disparate. The result has been principally either an imperious attempt at assimilation or an assignment of social science to some inferior position within the general class of activities understood as science. Both positions are seriously defective, and a more adequate formulation is possible only by breaking down some of the alleged constraints which are assumed to be endemic to scientific inquiry.

A conception of social scientific explanation can be elaborated which will not only support the case for logical asymmetry between the natural and social sciences and at the same time preserve the characteristics essential to any mode of empirical inquiry but will better illuminate what most social scientists in fact do in producing explanations as well as what sort of explanations are required by the character of the phenomena with which they are concerned.[1] But the problem of supporting the contention that natural science is inadequate as a paradigm governing the conception of methodology in the social sciences is complicated by the fact that what is often construed by social scientists as natural science is actually an ideal typification of the logic of science which is the invention of certain philosophers of science. This philosophical reconstruction has been accepted in one form or another by many social scientists, especially those concerned with the problems of theory construction, as an adequate representation of the character of all scientific explanation and as a prescriptive norm for inquiry. What the social scientist accepts as his model is, then, itself a model and one that, although popularly received for many years, has recently been severely criticized within the philosophy of science itself not only as a reconstruction of the logic of scientific explanation in general but even natural science in particular.

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[1] For some preliminary arguments supporting this position, see John G. Gunnell, "Social Science and Political Reality: The Problem of Explanation," *Social Research*, 35 (Spring, 1968).

A thorough critical analysis of this model, the so-called deductive model, is a necessary prologue to any further evaluation of the thesis of logical symmetry between explanation in the natural and social sciences as well as an explication of the substantive character of social scientific explanation, and such an analysis is the principal, although limited, concern of this essay. Consideration of the deductive model also provides a vehicle for examining certain more general problems about explanation and the relationship between social science and the philosophy of science. Since social scientists, and especially political scientists, have been influenced, either directly or indirectly, by the deductive model and other aspects of the philosphy of logical empiricism from which it emanates, there is not only the obvious question whether social scientists have correctly understood this construct and this school of thought but the question of the validity of logical empiricism, even if correctly understood, as an approach to the philosophy of science (and social science). Finally, and possibly most important, there is the problem of the extent to which the philosophy of science may be understood as an enterprise charged with establishing a theory of science which can serve as an authoritative guide for substantive empirical inquiry and a norm for the evaluation of particular explanations.

## II. THE DEDUCTIVE MODEL

The persistent, pervasive, and yet largely unexamined assumptions that the logic of any enterprise claiming the title of science must be symmetrical with that of natural science and that there is universality in the logic of empirical inquiry, as well as the conception of the logic of explanation in natural science accepted by most social scientists, have for the most part been derived either explicitly or implicitly from certain formulations in the philosophy of science. In seeking to emulate natural science, "the model taken for imitation has been the artifact of the philosopher of science rather than the actual practice of scientists."[2] This formulation, the deductive model, has become the basis of the modern "textbook" view of science. Although in many instances it is difficult to judge whether social scientists have drawn their model of inquiry directly from the philosophy of science or whether they have merely unreflectively accepted some popular version of that model, the latter hypothesis seems more tenable in view of the numerous and basically unexplicated statements in the literature of social science to the effect that "the task of science is the reasoned interpretation of experience through the discovery of valid generalizations and the application of such generalizations to particular events."[3] The precise meaning of such assertions is seldom unpacked; they are inserted as ritualistic formulae. But whether the conception of natural science which is entertained is once or twice removed from that activity, it is clear that social scientists have rarely attempted either to defend in any rigorous manner the idea that there must be symmetry in the logic of inquiry or to systematically support the notion of the exemplary character of natural science. Yet, more specifically, there has been a failure both to justify the deductive model as a proper reconstruction of the logic of natural science and to demonstrate its applicability to empirical science as a whole, including social science.

The argument to be advanced here is that the deductive model is deficient in most relevant respects. It presents an incorrect, or at least otiose, reconstruction of the logic of natural science, and there has been no adequate demonstration that it is applicable either as a norm for social scientific inquiry or as an explication of social scientific explanation. But unfortunately this argument can be set against social scientists only indirectly, since they themselves have not developed a defense of the deductive model. The battle must be joined on the ground of the philosophy of science, and this would be entirely the proper ground for such a discussion if the question were merely one of developing a general structural description of social scientific explanation, i.e., if it were not for the extraordinary fact that much of theory construction in the social sciences takes the philosophers' deductive model as a standard, however poorly approximated and understood. This assertion may invite the charge of setting up a straw man since the defense of the deductive model in principle as well as its applicability to social scientific explanation has been conducted essentially by philosophers of science while there is little in the way of explicit advocation by social scientists.[4] But although a separate treatment would be required to thoroughly support the intellectual history of the influence of the deductive model and logical empiricism on social science, it is assumed that this influence is not a matter of serious dispute and that it can be readily recognized in a variety of works dealing with methodological problems of social and political science as well as popular treatises on theory construction and specific empirical studies.

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[2] Norton E. Long, Foreword to Eugene J. Meehan, *Explanation in Social Science* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1968), p. v.

[3] Harry Eckstein and David Apter, *Comparative Politics* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1963), p. v.

Some of the most prestigious theoretical literature in political science contains numerous phrases such as "scientific method," "scientific enterprise," "scientific credo," "the rigorous logic and rules of science," "scientific reasoning," and "scientific rules of procedure," but little concrete elaboration is presented. Despite professions of faith in the unity of science and an enumeration of attributes often associated with natural science such as "systematization," "quantification," and the search for "regularities," there is a singular absence of argument which would support the assumption of the logical equivalence of social and natural science, and there are few explicit references to either the philosophy of science or the actual practice of natural scientists which would give tangible meaning to these vague assertions about the defining characteristics of scientific activity.[5] When David Easton, in *The Political System*, challenged political science to become truly scientific, it was far from clear what he meant in substantive terms. Notwithstanding the plea for the development of an empirically grounded "causal theory," which in his view was the only indication of "the attainment of reliable knowledge," and despite his later pronouncements about the "gargantuan strides" which have been taken during the intervening period toward the goal of a social science that would compare favorably with the natural sciences, the meaning of "science" in the sense of a logic of inquiry has remained nebulous.[6] Neither in 1953 nor in the 1960's has Easton either defended the accuracy of his conception of natural science or detailed the philosophical view on which this conception is based. Yet it was assumed that the character of this anticipated theory would be "deductive" and that although a theoretic framework which "might reach the stage of maturity associated with theory in physics" where "from a few basic premises, empirically derived, it has proved possible to formulate deductively a whole body of intermediate theory and from this in turn, to predict the occurrence of empirical events," might be a long way off, such a "theoretical system" was to be the goal and standard of inquiry in political science.[7]

For political scientists, the meaning of "science" is seldom interpreted beyond such formal, and essentially empty, equations of explanation and "generalization" and statements to the effect that explanation can be understood as "simply the subsuming of a particular event or class of events . . . under a more general law or hypothesis," or "deriving it from some more general proposition that describes a regular sequence which we believe to hold true in the world of politics."[8] It is from the philosophy of science, and from a rather well-defined group of scholars within that discipline, that political and social scientists have ultimately derived their views about explanation and the requirements of scientific logic. The works of such philosophers as Carl Hempel and Ernest Nagel[9] have become philosophical primers for social scientists and are continually cited as presumably unimpeachable authority to support statements about the purpose and function of science, the symmetry of natural and social science, and the logic of scientific explanation. The indefeasibility of this philosophical perspective and the incorrigibility of its representation of science is taken for granted, and it is assumed that from this body of literature can be extracted the fundamental principles which must govern and give direction to empirical inquiry in political science.[10]

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[4] See, for example, Richard S. Rudner, *Philosophy of Social Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

[5] David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 316–317; *The Political System* (New York: Knopf 1953), p. 25.

[6] Easton, *System*, pp. 52–59; *Framework*, p. 3.

[7] Easton, *System*, p. 58; *Framework*, p. 7.

[8] Robert Dahl, "Cause and Effect in the Study of Politics," in Daniel Lerner (ed.), *Cause and Effect* (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 75, 77–78.

[9] For the most comprehensive statement of Hempel's position see his *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* (New York: Free Press, 1965). Ernest Nagel's most popular work is *The Structure of Science* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World 1961).

As Eugene Meehan has recently noted, the deductive model has become "an albatross around the neck of the social scientist"[11] in the sense that it provides a set of demands which are not only impossible to realize but often irrelevant to the requirements of explanation in social science. But the answer to the problem is not to substitute a "systems paradigm" for the deductive model as Meehan has suggested; these constructs are not logically comparable. Before embarking on any extended criticism of the deductive model, it is necessary to precisely determine its character and to understand its present status in the philosophy of science. Meehan, perpetuating a common misconception in social science, tends to view the deductive model as if it were essentially a procedural recommendation for scientific inquiry; but the model, as presented by most of its proponents, was never conceived either as a methodological norm in the sense of how to go about the task of explanation or as a reconstruction of the process of explanation. Meehan also maintains that this model has been "rarely criticized" in the literature of the philosophy of science, but, on the contrary, every indication is that at present the weight of argument is against the deductive model, and that the revolt against the model as well as other aspects of logical empiricism "has now lasted long enough to produce something of a counterrevolution."[12] Even the defenders of the deductive model recognize that the "global nature of the attack gives the current controversy its special interest."[13] Yet the fact that the impact of the debate has scarcely been felt in the social sciences is only a symptom of the cultural lag in the relationship between these two disciplines.

As the term "deductive model" is used here, it refers to a quite specific formulation which in its essential characteristics is embraced and advocated by a number of philosophers but most prominently associated with the work of Hempel. The Hempelian thesis of deductive nomological explanation is most fundamentally an argument for the "methodological unity of all empirical science"[14] since it attempts to reduce the criteria of scientific explanation to one universal logical pattern. It asserts that "all scientific explanation," as opposed to the manifold everyday senses of "explain" and other specialized meanings of the term, "involves, explicitly or by implication, a subsumption of its subject matter under general regularities; that it seeks to provide a systematic understanding of empirical phenomena by showing that they fit into a nomic nexus."[15] More specifically, it is argued that an event or phenomenon that is to be explained, or strictly speaking, the statement describing the phenomenon or event (the *explanandum*), must be deducible from premises (the *explanans*) which are assumed to be true and contain, in addition to certain statements of fact or initial or antecedent conditions, at least one general law expressing empirical regularities. Empirical laws are in turn explained in the same manner by deductive subsumption under more inclusive laws or comprehensive theories which consist of a deductively joined system of axioms and theorems. The proponents of the model are unequivocal in their assertion that "science looks for laws, because without them neither explanation nor prediction is possible" and that the sense in which the term "deduction" is to be taken is the strict one of following the rule of *modus ponens* of formal logic, i.e., that laws function as the "premises of a deductive argument" and "the conclusion may be deduced from the premises because the premises logically imply the conclusion. And the premises logically imply the conclusion because the corresponding conditional, if the premises are true then the conclusion is true, is a tautology."[16] Explanation is viewed principally as answering "why" questions, and explanation and prediction, although differing pragmatically, are construed as possessing the same logical form in the sense that any explained event could, in principle, have been predicted in advance. There are certain aspects of the deductive model about which there is less than complete agreement among its exponents, such as whether the relationship between explanation and prediction is actually one of logical symmetry and whether an explanation in terms of statistical and probabilistic laws is strictly deductive. There are also a number of other features of the model, and logical empiricism in general, which are significantly related to issues of social scientific inquiry, such as the problems of hypothesis confirmation and especially the questions of theoretical reductionism and the relation between theoretical and observation terms and their cognitive status. But these problems are less relevant to the particular focus of this discussion.[17]

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[10] See, for example, Eugene Meehan, *The Theory and Method of Political Analysis* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1965), pp. v, vi, 3, 8, 9.

[11] Meehan, *Explanation*, p. 3.

[12] *Ibid*, p. 2; Edward MacKinnon, "Epistemological Problems in the Philosophy of Science, I," *Review of Metaphysics*, XXII (Sept., 1968), p. 113.

[13] May Brodbeck, "Explanation, Prediction, and 'Imperfect' Knowledge," in Brodbeck (ed.), *Readings in The Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 364; cf. M. B. Hesse, "A New Look at Scientific Explanation," *Review of Metaphysics*, XVII (Spring, 1963).

[14] Hempel, "Explanation in Science and History," in Robert G. Colodny (ed.), *Frontiers of Science and Philosophy* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962), p. 32.

[15] Hempel, *Aspects*, p. 488.

[16] Brodbeck, "Introduction," in Brodbeck (ed.), pp. 7, 9.

What must be clearly understood is that the deductive model is expressly "not intended to reflect the manner in which working scientists actually formulate their explanatory accounts."[18] Although it is offered as an explication of the "logical structure and rationale of various ways in which empirical science answers explanation-seeking why-questions," it is a "philosophical thesis" and not an empirical claim.[19] It is sometimes argued that a defect of the model is that it accepts physical mechanics as the paradigm of scientific explanation and thus judges all other forms of explanation accordingly, but the reverse is the case. From the point of view of May Brodbeck and others who accept and defend this concept of explanation, "physics is an advanced and 'model' science precisely because it does provide deductive explanation and prediction of its phenomena."[20] But to argue that the model is prescriptive rather than descriptive may be to attempt too general a characterization, since on the one hand its exponents do not primarily intend it as a norm for scientists to follow and on the other hand it does provide a conceptual framework in terms of which one can view and categorize particular explanations.

The model principally provides a set of formal logical criteria which are timeless and placeless and state what any explanation must include to truly count as a scientific explanation, i.e., "a *philosophic* demand is being put upon explanation—a demand that the cohesion of its components should not depend upon the background of the person who asks for the explanation, nor upon the context in which it is given, but upon the relations which are, so to speak, intrinsic to explanation."[21] And the essence of the demand is simply that what is to be explained must be strictly deducible from a law to count as a fully adequate explanation. Whether the content of explanations in any branch of science in fact does, or conceivably can, coincide with this meta-scientific reconstruction is considered irrelevant as far as judging the validity of the model, and there is "no claim whatever concerning the extent to which scientific explanations can actually be achieved for the phenomena studied in different branches of scientific inquiry."[22] In other words, there is no necessary coincidence between science and scientific explanation.

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[17] For a discussion of some of these problems and their relation to assumptions about theory construction in social science, see John G. Gunnell, "The Idea of The Conceptual Framework: A Philosophical Critique," *Journal of Comparative Administration*, I (August, 1969). In order to scotch any misunderstanding from the outset, it must be emphasized that in this context the "deductive model" is not to be understood as equivalent to the rather loose and variable characterization of scientific reasoning often referred to as the hypothetico-deductive method or, roughly, the idea that explanation is a process of formulating hypotheses which are tentatively confirmed or disconfirmed by observational tests. Although there are often numerous similarities between the deductive model and specific formulations of the H-D method [*e.g.*, R. B. Braithwaite, *Scientific Explanation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953)] such as the tendency to view the logic of science as essentially deductive in character and although many of the criticisms relating to the accuracy and sufficiency of the H-D account such as those most prominently associated with the work of N. R. Hanson and his concern with the "logic of discovery" are pertinent to a consideration of the deductive model, it is probably generally accepted that science utilizes a form of inference which in its broad outlines resembles this representation. Neither should the deductive model be equated with Karl Popper's ideas on the deductive testing of theories and the attending thesis of falsifiability. Although Popper maintains that the logic of science is entirely deductive in character in the sense that the principle of *modus tollens* is the only rule of inference available to science, his concern is essentially with the criteria for the rejection and corroboration of empirical hypotheses and choosing between hypotheses [*The Logic of Discovery* (New York: Science Editions, 1961), pp. 41, 75–76]. Whatever labels may be attached to Popper's position, his focus is on "providing some sort of justification for a mode of nondemonstrative inference," and it might well be argued that in this sense his approach "is not properly characterized as *deductivism*." [Wesley C. Salmon, "The Foundations of Scientific Inference," in Robert G. Colodny (ed.), *Mind and Cosmos* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), pp. 160–161]. While the deductive model stresses the subsumption of phenomena under general laws, Popper stresses the development of theories and conjectures which can survive the severest possible tests or attempts at falsification, and the difference in distribution of emphasis is significant. Finally, Popper's views, especially those concerning the relation between theory and observation language, have provided the foundations for some of the most damaging criticism of traditional logical empiricism.

[18] Hempel, "Explanation in Science and History," p. 15.

[19] Hempel, "Explanatory Incompleteness," in Brodbeck (ed.), p. 399.

[20] Brodbeck, "Explanation, Prediction, and 'Imperfect' Knowledge," p. 369.

### III. LOGICAL EMPIRICISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

In addition to clarifying the content of the deductive model, it is necessary to understand the philosophical position which supports it. Logical empiricism as an approach to the philosophy of science has been concerned with developing formal representations or reconstructions of the logical structure of scientific explanation and with a meta-logical analysis of the language applied to science. In this view there is a very strict correlation between the philosophy of science and formal logic. Although the object of analysis is science, and despite the claim of providing reconstructions of scientific logic, neither the history nor the current practice of any branch of science is considered pivotal, and references to specific scientific theories are seldom invoked to support conclusions about the character of scientific explanation. Although the aim is not to provide a guideline for empirical research, the import of this reconstructed logic is clearly nominative or legislative, in the sense that it is considered to stand above and outside any particular scientific context and to serve as an authoritative guide for judging or evaluating the explanatory adequacy of any particular scientific assertion. Recent work in the philosophy of science has severely challenged many of the specific formulations of logical empiricism such as the deductive model, but most of these criticisms are intelligible only in terms of a fundamental change in the conception of the philosophy of science itself. This recent literature is marked by its empirical orientation, i.e., its attention to actual scientific practice and especially the history of science. The attitude is non-legislative, and the role of the philosophy of science is understood as principally one of explication; the stress is on the diversity rather than the unity of science and on the autonomy of science rather than its dependence on formal logic and philosophy.

Philosophers such as Stephen Toulmin and Michael Scriven, who may be described as embracing a descriptive or contextualist approach to the philosophy of science, attack the deductive model on many grounds, but the basis of the attack is centered around the charge that the model does not actually reflect the character of scientific explanation. From their standpoint, the philosophy of science is principally an endeavor which describes and renders scientific practice intelligible rather than attempting to construct formal and definitive representations of scientific explanation and provide trans-contextual logical standards by which to judge any aspect of scientific explanation. What is involved in the conflict between these approaches is "a disagreement about the nature of philosophic method,"[23] and this difference in perspective can be clearly discerned in the attitude of the adherents of these respective positions toward the notion of logic. For the deductivist, "logic" is defined in the narrow and specific sense of the formal logician, and a sharp distinction is drawn between the "context of discovery" or theory formulation and the "context of justification," with the logic of science restricted to the latter.[24] The opponents of the deductive model use the term "logic" in its more generic sense to encompass the various modes of inquiry and inference actually followed by scientists and stress the distinction between "working logic" and "idealized logic" or "logic-in-use" and "reconstructed logic."[25] It is the reluctance of the reconstructionists to grant any autonomy to "working logic" and the non-justificatory aspects of explanation, or in fact to recognize it as logic at all, which leads them to ignore many aspects of scientific inquiry and to characterize all explanations which do not approach the deductive ideal as "imperfect," "incomplete," "elliptical," "partial," or, worst of all, merely "explanation sketches" which is the phrase understood as best describing most explanations in history and social science. In this view, "perfect knowledge is the ideal, actualized only in certain branches of physical science. Elsewhere, as in biology, economics, sociology, psychology, and the social sciences generally, knowledge is conspicuously 'imperfect'. "[26]

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[21] Rudolph H. Weingartner, "The Quarrel About Historical Explanation," in Brodbeck (ed.) *op. cit.*, p. 355.

[22] Hempel, "Explanation and Prediction by Covering Laws," in Bernard Baumrin (ed.), *Philosophy of Science: The Delaware Seminar*, (New York: Interscience Publishers, 1963), Vol. I., p. 116.

[23] Weingartner, p. 350; Also see Dudley Shapere, "Meaning and Scientific Change," in Robert G. Colodny (ed.), *Mind and Cosmos* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), pp. 41–50.

[24] Rudner, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–5.

[25] See Stephen Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), Ch. IV and Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), Ch. 1.

The opponents of the deductive model reject this rationalistic approach and the attempt to postulate an extra-scientific standard of completeness of explanations and perfect knowledge. They argue that the notion of complete explanation in any absolute sense is misconceived and that completeness and perfection are contextually relative rather than depending on some universal standard such as the idea that explanations are "imperfect" if they do not make it possible "to compute (predict or postdict) the state of a system, either an individual or a group, at *any* moment from its state at *one* moment."[27] The contextualist holds that "where the standards for judging the soundness, validity, cogency or strength of arguments are in practice field-dependent, logical theorists restrict these notions and attempt to define them in field-invariant terms."[28] For the contextualist, "explanations are practical, context bound affairs" and the "completeness or correctness of an explanation is a notion without meaning except in a given context."[29] To neglect substantive "context criteria" and require that a complete scientific explanation involves laws, that it be logically symmetrical with a predictive statement, and that it be limited to answering "why" questions is to impose standards which are at once too restrictive in the sense that they exclude much of what scientific practice finds perfectly acceptable and too inclusive in the sense that they admit assertions which in many instances would not count as relevant explanations.[30] Mere deduction may be wrong, trivial or no explanation at all, and thus "it is an illusion to suppose that scientific explanation is anything as simple as deductive subsumption under a true generalization."[31] While the deductivist holds that explanations which do not conform to the model are inadequate *a priori*, the contextualist maintains that there is a "family of explanations" and "a diversity of types" and that "the simple fact must be faced that certain evidence is adequate to guarantee certain explanations without the benefit of deduction from laws."[32]

The criticism of the deductive model, however, reaches deeper than merely asserting a certain relativity and autonomy with regard to the logic of explanation and renouncing a legislative role for the philosophy of science, for it is further maintained that there can be no deductive demonstration in empirical inquiry in the sense in which Hempel and others employ the term "deduction," since there is a necessary "divergence between the categories of practical argument-criticism and those of formal logic."[33] Toulmin argues that many of the current problems in logic and the philosophy of science have arisen from a historical tendency to make the analytic syllogism and the categories of formal logic a paradigm for all arguments. Contrary to what certain defenders of the deductive model maintain,[34] the opponents do not wish to claim that there is no such thing as "deduction" in science but rather that the term should apply to detective work as well as physics and that there is no reason why the notion of deductive inference and the meaning of concepts such as "valid" and "certain" should be interpreted in terms of formal logic or why formal logic should be a standard for judging the infinite variety of substantive scientific arguments. The seemingly irredeemable difference between the certainty of formal logic and the contingent character of scientific assertions has sometimes led to a view such as that of Reichenbach that all scientific explanation is inductive and probabilistic, but such a formulation accepts the logician's preference for certainty and fails to recognize that terms like "probable" and "certain" are modals whose substantive meaning is contextually determined.

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[26] These distinctions are set forth by Hempel in many of his writings. See *Aspects*. Brodbeck, "Explanation, Prediction, and 'Imperfect' Knowledge," p. 375. Also Gustav Bergmann, "Imperfect Knowledge," in Brodbeck (ed.), *op. cit.*

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 375, 371–372.

[28] Toulmin, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

[29] Michael Scriven, "Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation," in Patrick Gardiner (ed.), *Theories of History* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), p. 450.

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 468–469; Scriven, "Explanations, Predictions, and Laws," in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell (eds.), *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), Vol. III, pp. 173–190, 196, 202.

[31] Scriven, "Explanations, Predictions, and Laws," p. 225.

[32] Scriven, "Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation," pp. 452, 456.

[33] Toulmin, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

[34] Brodbeck, "Explanation, Prediction, and Imperfect' Knowledge," p. 371.

For Toulmin, and contextualists in general, the structure of analytical arguments, and the very notion of deduction implied there, are inapplicable for judging substantial arguments whether in science, ethics, or jurisprudence, but it is precisely this standard which the strict deductivist has attempted to apply to scientific explanation. Many difficulties "spring from the misapplication of these categories to arguments of other sorts," and this approach tends to obscure the fact that the most important distinction is not between deductive and inductive reasoning but between analytical and substantial arguments or between demonstrative inference and ampliative or non-demonstrative inference.[35] The philosopher of science who embraces the contextualist perspective does not reject formal logic but only its application as a criterion for evaluating and explicating actual forms of justification in various fields of empirical inquiry. What the contextualist will accept as the logic of explanation in any field, the strict deductivist dismisses as the "psychological and pragmatic aspects of explanation" and demands a "non-pragmatic conception of scientific explanation."[36] But for the contextualist, explanation itself is a "pragmatic notion." The contextualist approach is, again, "largely an empirical one" and assumes that the "meaning of terms and concepts or logical problems can only be thoroughly understood if we include a meticulous examination of the circumstances in which they occur, rather than relying on a relatively rapidly extracted formulation of their apparent internal logical features."[37]

## IV. THE INADEQUACY OF DEDUCTIVISM

Once this difference in perspective is understood the basis for much of the controversy over the logic of explanation becomes clear, and it should be equally clear that the conflict between these positions cannot be reconciled. An understanding of these two approaches to the philosophy of science makes it evident why the arguments on both sides tend to pass one another by, yet there are grounds for choosing between them, and such a choice is necessary if there is to be any clarity in philosophical discussions of social scientific explanation and any meaningful critical analysis of the claims of social scientists regarding the adequacy of substantive explanations. The choice in the first instance must be essentially between the recontructionist and contextualist approaches, yet even if the reconstructionist position were to be accepted, the particular philosophical criteria advocated by the deductivist seems questionable. The basic assumptions which inform reconstructionism as well as its particular offspring, in this case the deductive model and the implications of this model as a standard for judging social scientific practice, are unacceptable.

Philosophers such as Hempel maintain that deductive-nomological explanation, or what has been termed the "covering laws," obviously do not encompass all the contexts in which one speaks of explanation. They are quick to point out that the concern is with explicating the concept of *scientific* explanation rather than explanation in its more generic sense, in somewhat the same way that there are meta-mathematical formulations of mathematical proof which do not apply to all the fields in which one might speak of proof.[38] But the problem facing the deductive model is its justification as *the* standard or ideal for the critical appraisal of scientific explanation and as a form for exhibiting its underlying "logical structure and rationale." To approach scientific explanation from the standpoint of an ideal type may be defensible, but it is more problematical when this idealization is admittedly not primarily extracted from an examination of the activity which it seeks to judge and illuminate. It would seem that we could not ask more of an argument in any particular field than that it "achieve whatever sort of cogency or well-foundedness can relevantly be asked for in that field."[39] But even if an idealization is constructed in view of some non-empirically grounded external philosophical criterion, such a procedure is not necessarily defective if the criterion can be adequately justified, i.e., if it can be demonstrated that deductiveness should, or must, be the standard of the logic of scientific explanation. Hempel admits that such a conclusion is not "susceptible to strict 'proof'" and that "its soundness has to be judged by the light it can shed on the rationale and force of explanatory accounts offered in different branches of empirical science."[40] But this would seem to land him in something of a contradiction. He emphasizes that the validity of the model is independent of explanations actually formulated by scientists in various branches of empirical inquiry and yet maintains "that the logic of *all* scientific explanations *is* basically of the covering-law variety"[41] and further that the viability of the covering-law model must essentially be justified pragmatically. The peculiar and circular chain of reasoning would seem to be that only explanations subsumable under the covering-law model can be classified as scientific, and consequently, by definition, the logic of scientific explanation is of this type and thus the model necessarily illuminates "scientific" explanations.

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[35] Toulmin, *op. cit.*, p. 146. Also Scriven, "Definitions, Explanation, and Theories," in Feigl, Scriven, and Maxwell (eds.), *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), Vol. II, pp. 192–193; Max Black, "The Justification of Induction," in Sidney Morgenbesser (ed.), *Philosophy of Science Today* (New York: Basic Books, 1967).

[36] Hempel, "Explanatory Incompleteness," p. 400 and "Explanations and Prediction by Cover-Laws," p. 130.

[37] Scriven, "Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation," p. 452 and "Definitions, Explanations, and Theories," p. 100.

[38] Hempel, "Explanatory Incompleteness," p. 399.

[39] Toulmin, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

It is apparent that few, if any, actual explanations in natural science, let alone social science, do conform to this schema, and thus the saving clause which enables the deductive model to perform a descriptive or typological function is the notion of explanatory incompleteness. This allows almost any branch of empirical inquiry and most of history and social science a certain claim to scientificness as long as it is willing to pay the price of humility and accept the stigma of incompleteness and imperfection. But

> the important difference between the social sciences and the physical sciences is not that one has and one does not have complete explanations, but that one has more quantitative laws than the other. . . But they confer no benefit on the explanation that cannot be obtained in other ways, and in particular they do not convey the blessing of deduced truth since they are usually only approximations.[42]

Hempel and other deductivists have been singularly unsuccessful in providing examples from physics or any other science which conform to the deductive model. Even the laws of physics produce no automatic deductions or explanations; they require judgment in their application, and judgment necessitates substantive criteria.[43] The idea of "exact deduction" in science is a myth because the laws of science are not exact.[44] To claim that scientific inference is purely "a logical question" in the sense of formal logic is to fail to recognize that explanation is primarily an epistemological concept.[45]

The justification for the deductive model is in fact not "pragmatic" at all. It relies instead on the submerged informing assumption that the norm of acceptable argument is analytic or demonstrative argument, but it is unreasonable, and misleading, "to treat this type of argument as a paradigm and to demand that arguments in other fields should conform to its standard regardless, or to build up from a study of the simplest forms of argument alone a set of categories intended for application to arguments of all sorts."[46] It is not merely that the identification of the logic of science with analytic or demonstrative argument presents a very truncated view of both logic and science, but that the judgment of all justification by the ideal of analyticity neither provides a relevant standard for judging empirical or substantial arguments nor illuminates in any significant manner the underlying logical structure of most aspects of scientific explanation. The deductivist denies the charge that he equates deduction with either analytic or syllogistic reasoning.[47] But whatever label is applied, the argument is that "geometry is the prototype of all scientific theories" and that "in philosophy and elsewhere an appeal either to a definition or to a logical truth is conclusive" and "conclusive in a way that appeal to contingent truth is not" and that "any other kind of explanation of individual facts cannot possess this conclusiveness. Either the explanation is deductive or else it does not justify what it is said to explain."[48]

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[40] Hempel, "Explanatory Incompleteness," p. 411.

[41] *Loc. cit.*, emphasis added.

[42] Scriven, "Explanations, Predictions, and Laws," p. 211.

[43] Scriven, "Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation," pp. 459, 460, 462.

[44] Scriven, "Definitions, Explanations, and Theories," p. 193. See also Scriven, "The Limits of Physical Explanation," in Bernard Baumrin (ed.), *Philosophy of Science: The Delaware Seminar* (New York: Interscience, 1963), Vol. 2.

[45] Brodbeck, "Explanation, Prediction, and 'Imperfect' Knowledge," pp. 369, 374; John Yolton, "Explanation," *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 10 (1959), p. 195.

[46] Toulmin, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

[47] Scriven, "Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation," p. 462; Toulmin, *The Philosophy of Science* (London: Hutchinson, 1953) p. 25, 33, 49, 102; Hempel, "Explanation and Prediction by Covering Laws," p. 120; Brodbeck, "Explanation, Prediction, and 'Imperfect' Knowledge," pp. 370, 371, 373.

It is often maintained that the deductive model is epistemologically neutral, and although this is not entirely true since it does preclude certain substantive explanatory accounts, it is precisely this formal or empty character which vitiates its adequacy as an explanatory norm. What the model demands is that the cogency of an explanation depend on a particular logical form, but this severing of logic and epistemology and the attempt to find an Archimedean point from which to view and judge all scientific explanation is untenable. "Not deducibility, but intelligibility constitutes the basic feature of the logic of explanation,"[49] and to understand and criticize the explanations produced in any science is at once to become acquainted with that science both in its present form and its historical development and with what characterizes its claims to know. The point is not that existential explanations in social science and history are by their very nature partial, incomplete, sketchy, or in some other way fundamentally unsound (although in any particular instance and judged by the contextual field-dependent criteria of a specific science they may be) but rather that they are qualitatively different and autonomous kinds of explanation. To reject the deductive model and argue for the contextual evaluation of explanations does not constitute, as Brodbeck and others insist, an abandonment of critical judgment and philosophical questions about explanation or the acceptance of a precept that would read "every man his own explainer." Nor does it entail the approval of "ordinary usage" as a paradigm of explanation or make all criticism finally dependent on subjective psychological tests.[50]

> The request for an explanation presupposes that *something* is understood, and a complete answer is one that relates the object of inquiry to the realm of understanding in some comprehensible and appropriate way. What this way is varies from subject matter to subject matter just as what makes something better than something else varies from the field of automobiles to the solution of chess problems; but the *logical function* of explanation, as of evaluation, is the same in each field. And what counts as complete will vary from context to context within a field; but the logical category of complete explanation can still be characterized in the perfectly general way just given, i.e., the logical function of 'complete' as applied to 'explanation' can be described.[51]

What will count as an adequate explanation or what will constitute valid inferences in any scientific or other context in which there are recognized rules and forms of judgment and criticism has a "systematic" aspect. It is against a background of accepted laws, theories and regulative principles, i.e., a substantive scientific paradigm, that the intelligibility of any explanation is judged.[52] Generalizations, laws, and theories function as rules, "inference tickets," or "warrants," or justifying grounds in terms of which explanatory inferences are drawn, not as premises in a deductive argument.[53] To see this as the logical function of laws and theories is not to confuse "experience and the logical methods by which we think about the experience"[54] as long as the distinction between the logical function a justifying statement plays and the substantive meaning of that statement are distinguished. But the more important point is that much of scientific explanation does not involve laws. The statements justifying inferences or serving the logical function of principles of inference cannot be restricted to laws without either radically curtailing what might be called science or arbitrarily assigning a large part of the results of inquiry in both the natural and social sciences to the status of imprefectness or incompleteness. To maintain that "insofar as an individual fact justifies the inference to one or more facts, laws are always implicitly invoked" since "otherwise, the justification remains a mystery,"[55] is not only to take a very narrow view of scientific reasoning but to distort scientific practice. Yet such a narrow view is precisely what the deductive model requires by its insistence that laws which can constitute the premises of a formal deductive argument must be present, either overtly or in some suppressed form, before any assertion may be accepted as a fully adequate explanation.

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[48] Bergmann, *Philosophy of Science* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958), p. 31; Brodbeck, "Explanation, Prediction, and 'Imperfect' Knowledge," pp. 370, 385.

[49] Yolton, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

[50] Brodbeck, "Explanation, Prediction, and 'Imperfect' Knowledge," pp. 365–368.

[51] Scriven, "Explanations, Predictions, and Laws," p. 202.

[52] Theodore Mischel, "Pragmatic Aspects of Explanation," *Philosophy of Science*, 33 (1966).

[53] Toulmin, *Philosophy of Science*, pp. 93–94, 103–104; *Uses of Arguments*, 101, 114, 121–122, 220; Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949), pp. 120–125; Scriven, "Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation," pp. 445–451; Wilfrid Sellars, "The Language of Theories," in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell (eds.), *Current Issues in The Philosophy of Science* (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1961), esp. p. 71.

[54] Brodbeck, "Explanation, Prediction, and 'Imperfect' Knowledge," p. 384.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 383.

This demand becomes particularly pernicious in its effects on social science which, attempting to be "scientific," begins with this model, or at least hearsay about it, and seeks to formulate procedures and goals of inquiry accordingly while uncritically accepting the philosophers' evaluation of its present claims to knowledge as imperfect. What has happened in social science, unlike natural science in which the philosophy of science and reconstructed logic have had little or no impact or as in history where, despite a long-standing debate about the Hempelian model in the philosophy of history,[56] there has been only a minor influence on historiography, is that there has been a peculiar synthesis of the language of the philosophy of science and the language of substantive inquiry which has resulted in a rather bizarre corpus of theoretical literature. In a sense the idea of a science of society modeled after natural science has been an ideology from the very beginning of social science, and the acceptance of the deductive model is part of the continuing tradition of that ideology. The result has been an overriding concern with developing generalizations and a proliferation of pseudo-laws which are little more than abstracted summaries of empirical findings which carry no explanatory value in any commonly accepted sense of the term "explain".[57] The theorist in the social sciences tends merely to take Hempel and others at face value without careful regard for what constitutes, or must constitute, explanation in his particular field, and finds it sufficient to state that "the higher the level of generality in ordering. . . facts and clarifying their relations, the broader will be the range of explanation and understanding."[58] Social scientists find little in the deductive model except the precept ordering them to generalize, but explanation in terms of a " 'mere empirical generalization' is very rarely explanatory, and it is only because laws usually involve more than this. . . that they carry explanatory force."[59] But raising the question of "more than this" is what social scientists have avoided by their allegiance to the formalistic standard of the deductive model.

The idea derived from the deductive model which most seriously infects the social scientific enterprise is the attenuated picture of the model which enters the literature of social science as the dictum that all suitable explanation involves the subsumption of phenomena under general laws, or, given the imperfect nature or at best temporary theoretical impurity of social science, at least generalizations. But the acceptance of this dictum, the equation of explanation and generalization, has been *a priori*, i.e., it has not evolved from a consideration of what constitutes social scientific phenomena and consequently what in any substantive sense would constitute an adequate explanation, and thus it has been able to provide neither a tenable description nor a viable prescriptive ideal. As Abraham Kaplan points out, any such offering of reconstructed logic must be treated as a "hypothesis."[60] But to accept without question the general demand for laws and generalizations as the prerequisites of explanation often leads in practive only to truisms which add nothing to the explanation of individual phenomena.[61] The problem is not so much to "stop trying to imitate physics" but rather "only what a particular reconstruction claims physics to be,"[62] and the first lesson that social science might learn from natural science, if it penetrated beyond the ideological screen of the deductive model, is the value of devotion to the autonomy of inquiry and a passionate concern with the substance of explanation rather than a fixation on the form of explanation. Social science might well remember that some of the most important advances in science have been achieved not by solving problems but by abondoning them, and this might well be the case in regard to the social scientist's attempt at explanation through conformance with the deductive model.

The deductive model is only one more attempt to find *the* scientific method. The model's more strenuous advocates go so far as to identify the acceptance of the deductive model with the acceptance of science itself and, like Brodbeck, classify those who dissent as humanists, members of the literary tradition, and intuitionists.[63] But this dichotomizing technique is too facile to be convincing, and the contemporary logical empiricist must be reminded, as the logical positivist before him, that "often what presents itself to us as obscurantism is only a departure from the particular reconstruction that we have come to identify with reason itself."[64] The deductivist's definition of science is especially misleading, because it subverts what Kaplan has termed the "autonomy of inquiry"[65] not only by creating a hierarchy of sciences but by attempting to subject empirical inquiry, which is always contingent, to the rule of noncontingent *a priori* extra-scientific principles and ideas of certainty and conclusiveness which belong to formal logic. There would seem to be little justification for social science, or any other science, seeking its standards and concepts of explanation from philosophers and logicians. This is not to say that science does not involve "philosophic" and even metaphysical presuppositions or that philosophy is irrelevant for science. It also does not mean that there are no similarities between certain modes of scientific and philosophic explanation. One of the disabilities of the deductive model is that it implies a strict separation between science and other forms of explanation which may not adequately represent scientific practice and which, if accepted, may block fruitful avenues of inquiry. Finally, to deny that philosophy and formal logic can provide the criteria of what will count as explanation in empirical science is not to deny that there are philosophical and logical problems in science or that science is amenable to logical or philosophical analysis either in the sense of illuminating the structure of scientific reasoning or clarifying, and even dissolving, certain "scientific" problems, dilemmas, or confusions which have their origin in the language of science.

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[56] For representative discussions see Gardiner (ed.), *op. cit.*

[57] See, for example, Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, *Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964).

[58] Easton, *System*, p. 4.

[59] Scriven, "Explanations, Predictions, and Laws," p. 212.

[60] Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

[61] A. R. Louch, *Explanation and Human Action* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966) pp. 38–40.

[62] Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

## V. CONCLUSION: THE MEANING OF "EXPLANATION"

The social scientists' fascination with the deductive model, or at least the mandates which spring from it, is closely allied to the search for what Toulmin has termed "portmanteau characterizations of science, finding in some one requirement (such as predictive success) the unique test of a scientific hypothesis."[66] But this attempt to discover some final standard by which to define and judge scientific assertions is ultimately regressive since some exception or counter-example can always be suggested where prediction, the presence of laws, or deductive relationships between statements is not the criterion. Any analysis of scientific inquiry must include not only classificatory criteria which serve to differentiate it from other activities but also standards of "appraisal."[67] Yet it is a mistake to assume that there is some ultimate criterion and form of appraisal for scientific assertions which is based on or implied by the purpose or function of science. Appraisal in science does not carry with it any such universal criterion, nor does it entail any unitary logical standard. There is appraisal in ethics, politics, and in the various branches of science, but both the criteria and logic of appraisal differ from field to field and from context to context within a field. There is no reason to believe that in not accepting some purpose such as prediction as the ultimate standard for judging a scientific assertion or in rejecting deduction from general laws as the hallmark of adequate explanation that one is somehow placing himself outside the realm of scientific activity. One must not be mislead by the fact that scientists have purposes and science has functions and assume that there is a given purpose or function for science which governs its logic and serves as a final standard of justification and appraisal. The meaning of "science" at any time or place is determined by the paradigm which informs scientific activity and reasoning and which specifies the conception of reality and the phenomena to be investigated, designates problems for investigation, and determines the criteria of acceptable explanation and inference.[68] But the specific content of paradigms is in principle infinitely variable both in time and space.

> Science has not one aim but many, and its development has passed through many contrasted stages. It is therefore fruitless to look for a single, all-purpose "scientific method": the growth and evolution of scientific ideas depends on no one method, and will always call for a broad range of different inquiries. Science as a whole—the activity, its aim, its methods and ideas—evolves by variation and selection.[69]

Faced with the dilemmas arising out of attempts to state the governing value and defining characteristics of science, there has been a tendency to move toward positing some more general and seemingly more neutral formulation of the purpose of scientific activity. Probably the leading candidate in this regard is the idea "that the goal of inquiry is explanation,"[70] but such a notion seems to complicate the problem rather than solve it. Such a definition is at once too broad and too narrow, for, on the one hand, the search for explanation encompasses a greater range of activities than science and, on the other hand, it would seem much too restrictive to limit science to merely a search for explanation. It would seem that "if the goal of some branch of science does *not* consist in explaining, it can scarcely be criticized on the count of *failing* to do so."[71] A great deal of scientific activity is concerned with what might be termed "positing" and "substantiating" which cannot easily be accommodated within the notion of explanation.[72] It might well be argued that although science includes more than explanation, this is nevertheless its central aim, but then the problem becomes one of distinguishing *scientific* explanation, and inevitably one is driven back to seeking the essence, purpose or function of science and to such postures as the equation of science and a search for causes. But, as with prediction, it would appear that "neither the search for causes, nor causal explanation, is *primary* in any likely sense that may be assigned to this vague term."[73] In the end, attempts to isolate and define scientific explanation seem to result in a regressive process of conceptual reduplication.

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[63] Brodbeck, "Introduction," p. 2.

[64] Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 346.

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[66] Toulmin, *Foresight and Understanding* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), p. 15.

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[68] See Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

[69] Toulmin, *Foresight and Understanding*, p. 17.

These comments should suffice to demonstrate that there is something fundamentally wrong with this entire line of argument. There is, however, a sense in which science and explanation are related, or, better, there is a manner in which one can speak cogently about the relationship between these concepts. But this involves conceiving of explanation neither as a goal of science nor as a product, but rather as a kind of activity of which scientific explanation is one type. This idea might be expressed by saying that in this sense of "explanation" it would be as odd to say that explanation is the goal or function of science as it would be to say that playing games is the goal or function of card games. To engage in science is, in part, to engage in a particular kind of explaining activity, and "explaining" must be understood in terms of "systemic explanation" or a "generic form of explanation of which scientific explanation is only a species," and the various fields of science, such as social science and natural science, are sub-species.[74] This idea of explanation may be described as a "search for understanding" or intelligibility and it encompasses many modes of thought including logic, philosophy, science, and everyday life; "explaining, in short, is a particular way of using a form of argument; it has no logical form peculiar to it."[75] What the particular logical structure of explanation will consist of in any of these areas will differ, but "the only ultimate element in the logic of explanation is understanding itself, and that comes in many ways."[76] There are certainly aspects of scientific explanation which distinguish it from other species of explanation, but to state precisely what the boundaries are is an empirical problem and a problem to which there is no final solution. Most important, it is necessary to guard against the presumption that the logic of explanation in any particular field such as formal logic can claim trans-contextual validity or that a model, and therefore corrigible picture, of the logical structure of some sub-field, such as natural science, can be universalized into an authoritative paradigm for all sub-fields.

At first it may appear that the introduction of concepts such as "understanding" and "intelligibility" merely confuses rather than clarifies the issue, since to seek their meaning is to again embark on a regressive journey. It is obvious that what one person or community may accept as intelligibility will be rejected by another and that what will constitute scientific understanding in one historical period may be viewed as inadequate at a later time. But this is precisely the point. Explanation, and in fact most of the central concepts relating to the epistemic and logical structure of science, must be construed as carrying a certain universal force with regard to their characteristic use or meaning but varying contextually with regard to their specific and substantive meaning, i.e., with regard to their sense and reference and criteria of application. To speak of intelligibility and understanding as the characteristic logical force of explanatory assertions and as the differentiating criteria of explanatory activity is not to lapse into some sort of obscurantism. Explanation (or intelligibility) is not merely a psychological matter, for what will count as explanation as well as what requires explanation is pragmatically determined against a framework of ideas about reality, theories, and rules which together constitute a paradigm or conceptual scheme for interpreting and organizing experience. This is true whether we are speaking of philosophy, science, religion, or everyday life. What will constitute the standards of adequate understanding in any field at any time is similarly contextually determined; "what is required for understanding differs with the type of explanation," and "the epistemic features, usually in the background of explanations, emerge when we shift from one to another kind of explanation within science."[77] "Scientific explanation" can be defined as "a topically unified communication, the content of which imparts understanding of some scientific phenomenon" and

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[70] Meehan, *Explanations in Social Science*, p. 1.

[71] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

[72] Israel Scheffler, *The Anatomy of Inquiry* (New York: Knopf, 1963), pp. 53–55.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

[74] Yolton, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

[75] Toulmin, *Foresight and Understanding*, p. 99.

[76] Scriven, "Explanations, Predictions, and Laws," p. 213.

> understanding is, roughly, organized knowledge, i.e., knowledge of the relations between various facts and/or laws. These relations are of many kinds—deductive, inductive, analogical, etc. . . . It is for the most part a perfectly objective matter to test understanding, just as it is to test knowledge, and it is absurd to identify it with a subjective feeling, as have some critics of this kind of view.[78]

To throw off the burden of the deductive model and the approach to the philosophy of science and explanation advocated by logical empiricism implies first of all a re-examination, although not necessarily a rejection, of the idea that there is logical symmetry between explanations in the natural and social sciences; it allows an investigation of the actual logical and epistemological foundations of these two enterprises rather than merely accepting popular philosophical reconstructions. What is required is that social scientists undertake a consideration of what counts, or should count, as adequate explanation, and this in turn means the formulation of a substantive view of social and political phenomena which must provide the criteria for such judgment. It is precisely such an undertaking which has been prevented, or avoided, by adherence to the deductive model. Yet to reject the deductive model and support an approach to the philosophy of science which recognizes the relativity and autonomy of explanations in various branches of science immediately engenders the charge of subjectivity and the abdication of objective standards of appraisal which would allow everything from astrology to cooking to claim the title of science. What Hempel and other deductivists are searching for is a standard of explanation which clearly distinguishes scientific assertions and which is "objective in the sense that its implications and evidential support do not depend essentially on the individuals who happen to apply or to test them."[79] But to charge the advocates of the contextualist approach with abandoning the ideals of objectivity and intersubjectivity is to completely miss the point of their argument.

The reconstructionist and contextualist approaches to the philosophy of science are not comparable in the sense that the contextualist thesis is basically descriptive and explanatory rather than normative. It is not an argument for subjectivity and the abandonment of objective criteria since it assumes in any particular context that perfectly objective or inter-subjective standards may obtain, and it is not an argument advocating relativity but rather a recognition that appraisal in science is, and must be, relative to a context. The choice is not between logical positivism and subjectivism. To reject a legislative role for the philosophy of science and advocate the autonomy of scientific inquiry is not to suggest that evaluations of scientific explanations are impossible. Those who see the contextualist approach as "the current threat of subjectivism" assume that the philosophy of science must be responsible for developing standards of evaluation for empirical science, but to accuse the contextualist of advocating subjectivism because he fails to develop universal standards of appraisal and criteria for what will count as science to replace the deductive model would be like suggesting that an anthropologist must be an ethical relativist if he recognizes a diversity of moral systems and fails to establish universal moral norms for judging the values of particular societies. The analogy with morality is not strained, for one recent critic of the contextualist position sees this approach as a threat to "the moral import of science: its dynamic articulation of the impulse to responsible belief, and its suggestion of the hope of an increased rationality and responsibility in all realms of conduct and thought."[80] He suggests that this was the real meaning of the positivist doctrine of "the unity of science,"[81] and it may well have been. But moral dogmata have often been obstacles to the advancement of science.

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[77] Yolton, *op. cit.*, pp. 200–201.

[78] Scriven, "Explanations, Predictions, and Laws," p. 225; "Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation," p. 452.

[79] Hempel, "Explanation and Prediction by Governing Laws," p. 130.

[80] Israel Scheffler, *Science and Subjectivity* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), p. 4.

[81] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

# ON THE NEED FOR CONTEXTUALIST CRITERIA: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR GUNNELL

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Professor Gunnell seems to be arguing that if political scientists follow the deductivist path they will almost certainly fall into a bottomless and sterile abyss. My understanding of the deductivist conception of science, and my *verstehen* about social phenomena lead me to believe that this is a very real risk. The risk derives from the apparent complexity of social phenomena and the relatively limited ability of the human mind to deal with complexity in a rigorous deductive manner. It is just possible that social phenomena are sufficiently complex that they will never be manageable within the neat framework of deductive models. It is precisely for this reason that, at least at this point in time, I would prefer *not* to have the whole of the discipline tread this path. But why should even one man risk a lifetime of scholarly endeavor against such a possible outcome? Well, if there is another possible outcome to which he attaches a sufficiently high utility, he will take the gamble. I suggest that there *is* another possible outcome, and hope that, for some, its utility will be sufficiently high to warrant the gamble. That outcome consists in the production of a cumulatively reliable body of knowledge about those social phenomena called political. Consider the worth of being able to reduce the errors of calculation on the parts of voters, office seekers, secretaries of state, etc.

I assume that Professor Gunnell believes that the same rewards are possible along the contextualist path, but with a much lower risk of falling into the sterile abyss. However, he most certainly has not proven this in his article. What he has proven is that there is an argument about this matter currently in progress among philosophers of science. He proves this by offering us quotations from participants in the debate. Unfortunately, the quotations from the contextualists consist typically in simple assertions that theirs is the better path. Let us consider just one case.

Professor Gunnell quotes Michael Scriven as follows: "The simple fact must be faced that certain evidence is adequate to guarantee certain explanations without the benefit of deductions from laws."[1] The correctness of this assertion not being at all obvious to me, I referred to Scriven's article. Having read it, I am persuaded that the assertion is either irrelevant or incorrect. Scriven's assertion is made in relation to an illustration which he offers in argument. He suggests we consider the following situation:

> As you reach for the dictionary, your knee catches the edge of the table and thus turns over the ink-bottle, the contents of which proceed to run over the table's edge and ruin the carpet. If you are subsequently asked to explain how the carpet was damaged you have a complete explanation. You did it by knocking over the ink.[2]

He then asserts:

> The certainty of this explanation is primeval. It has absolutely nothing to do with your knowledge of the laws of physics; a cave-man could supply the same account and be quite as certain of it.[3]

Two things seem worth pointing out about Scriven's example. First, both the ink-spiller and the cave-man could be wrong, despite their respective feelings of certainty. Second, if one is interested only in this carpet, this bottle of ink, this knee, etc. and in no more general question, then the matter is irrelevant for the production of a cumulatively reliable body of knowledge.

Although it is not really the main issue, let us consider for a moment the possibility of error in this "explanation." One might first inquire into the possibility that the carpet is not actually ruined. By "ruined," I mean that there has been produced an irreversible change in the dye pattern of the carpet. Depending upon the chemical composition of the fibers of the rug, the dyes used in the carpet, and the ink, the carpet may or may not be ruined. Indeed, it may well be the case that the carpet is not ruined, but that some well meaning but improperly tutored person attempting to remove the ink may finally bring it to ruin. "Who then 'caused damage' to the carpet?" is a proper question only for metaphysicians and lawyers.

For purposes of analyzing the main issue, let us assume that the carpet is actually ruined. Is it really of any interest to those who would build a general body of knowledge which would enable man to cope better with his environs to know that "You did it, by knocking over the ink"? I think not. Of far greater interest would be answers to some of the following questions:

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[1] Michael Scriven, "Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation," in Patrick Gardiner (ed.), *Theories of History* (New York: The Free Press, 1959), p. 456.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

Why does striking the edge of the table result in the ink-bottle being turned over?
Why does the ink move laterally across the surface of the table?
Why does the ink move downward when it reaches the edge?
Why is the ink drawn into the carpet more readily than it is drawn into the top of the table?

Answers to these questions might enable one to develop ink-bottles which would be difficult to tip over, ink which would not pour easily, and carpeting which might be quite impervious to ink. Consider, in particular, how useful it has been to us to have a good deductivist explanation for why the ink moves downward from the edge of the table. In the absence of the deductivist method, there would have been little to learn from Newton's experience with the apple, save perhaps that one ought not to sit under apple trees.

What, then, is the deductivist method? Most briefly it consists in asking a series of questions, and, hopefully, of generating some answers. The central question is "How might the world be organized (i.e., according to what basic principles) such that one would logically expect the phenomenon of interest at the moment (e.g. the *downward* movement of an apple or of ink) to occur? In general, the answer requires an inspired guess, sometimes called retroduction.[4] If one succeeds in conjuring up a relatively simple set of premises which logically explain the phenomenon in question, one then asks two other questions, to wit: "If these premises are indeed operative in the universe, what other phenomena ought logically to follow from them? Are these deduced phenomenological relationships actually observable in the 'real' world?" (In this context, inductive research is primarily a search for clues as to what might be rewarding premises.)

Whatever the motivations of the individual scientist (intellectual curiosity, greed, one-upsmanship), and whatever the bases of his insights (random thoughts, inspired guesses, plagiarism), the social benefit derived from the enterprise called scientific is an increasingly reliable body of knowledge about the phenomena which encompass us. Such a body of knowledge has probably been sought by man since he first perceived the threatening nature of his environment. With such knowledge, he could enhance his chances for survival by manipulating or adapting himself to that environment. Such prestige as science may have seems to derive from the provision of that knowledge.

The success of science in this regard is the result of a characteristic relationship between its idea content and the phenomena toward which it is directed. Specifically, the former are testable against the latter. It is not retroduction which is the secret, but rather the constraints placed upon the product of that retroduction. Throughout his written history, and probably long before that, man has sought to understand the rhyme and reason of things. He has conjured up gods, goddesses, and demons to account for observed phenomena. The distinguishing feature of science is that it seeks to generate not only explanations, but logically consistent deductive explanations, testable against data. When an hypothesis fails empirically, the whole set of premises from which it is derived is called into question. When it is no longer possible to dismiss the failure as a product of measurement error, we are forced to face the fact that the theory is *empirically in error*. The deductive nature of the model then becomes relevant We search therein for a permissible adjustment; one which will allow us to account for the phenomenon in question, without losing our ability to account for phenomena already explained within the theory. No such adjustment may be possible, and that particular paradigm may have to be replaced—a most formidable task, However, if we succeed we have increased the reliability of our knowledge.

In general, I do not believe that Professor Gunnell and I are very far apart in our perceptions of the scientific enterprise—save on one decisive point. He seems to believe that in science, at least as perceived by social science deductivists, explanation is equated with generalization.[5] He cites an an example Berelson and Steiner, *Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings*. While I cannot claim to speak for all social science deductivists, I must, for myself, dissent from his position. For me, explanation does not consist in generalization, but in deduction from premises. That a correlation has been found to exist between self-identification, in terms of social class, and party identification, and that such a correlation has been found in numerous studies, suggesting a general relationship between these two phenomena is, to me, no explanation whatsoever. It is, instead, the stimulus for the question, "*Why* does such a relationship exist?" An answer might be derived from an appropriate set of premises, and they, in turn, might be tested against the empirical aspects of their implications. In fact, I have made some such gestures myself on this particular question.[6]

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[4] On retroduction, see Norwood Russell Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), chap. iv.

[5] John G. Gunnell, "Deduction, Explanation and Social Scientific Inquiry," this REVIEW, LXIII (December, 1969), p. 1243.

There are a few major works in political science which I believe reflect the scientific-deductivist thrust. Riker's *Theory of Political Coalitions*[7] and Downs' *An Economic Theory of Democracy*[8] come readily to mind. However, the Berelson and Steiner work most certainly should not be taken as an end product of science. It is instead, a source of stimuli for questions which *might* be answered scientifically.

Here, perhaps, it ought to be pointed out that science is not suited to answering all questions. Professor Gunnell inveighs against any hierarchy of epistemologies and I couldn't agree more. The tendency to attach status, in the sense of prestige, to any particular mode of explanation is pernicious to inquiry. Science simply does not provide an all-purpose epistemology. Its requirements for deduction in the context of the limited human mind require one to abstract and strip away much of the richness of life. Elegance and precision are gained at the cost of the poets' pleasures. It deals in the correctness of descriptions regarding relationships among abstractions, and not in the correctness of the ends of real men. Thus, to seek in science answers to questions of ethics or faith is to give science both more and less than its due.

In so far as we believe that we are dealing with caused phenomena governed by a constant set of principles (i.e., not by some variant of a Manichaean devil), the epistemology of science seems appropriate. This is not to say that no contextual questions are relevant. While I believe that the structure of deductive logic, and hence of explanation is invariant with context, the matter of empirical testing is more complex. As my colleague William H. Riker has pointed out to me, the set of constraints which enable one to characterize a field of inquiry as a "discipline" deal very much with the question of what shall count as persuasive evidence. The answer to that seems to be very much contextually determined. If one is dealing with a relatively simple set of phenomena, such as moving bodies, with concepts that are well-defined in terms of their operational implications, in the context of a theory which has yielded many accurate predictions, then a rather small and esoteric bit of evidence, e.g., a streak in a Wilson cloud-chamber, may count for a very great deal. If, on the other hand, one is dealing with a very complex phenomena, such as a human bargaining situation, with concepts which are so defined as to leave their operational implications rather vague, e.g., utility, in the context of a theory still in its infancy, then perhaps one wants a great deal of evidence, before yielding much credence to the theory.

If the problem of evidence is Professor Gunnell's central concern, then we have no quarrel. But I doubt that this is his central concern, for he keeps hammering away at the deductive model. He says, for example:

> What is required is that social scientists undertake a consideration of what counts, or should count, as adequate explanation, and this in turn means the formulation of a substantive view of social and political phenomena which must provide the criteria for such judgment. It is precisely such an undertaking which has been prevented, or avoided, by adherence to the deductive model.[9]

For me, adequate explanation, *in any field*, consists in logical derivation from premises and correct prediction. If the same derivations can be obtained from two sets of premises, I opt for parsimony. Indeed, there may be situations in which equally parsimonious theories account for equally large but overlapping sets of phenomena. Then I may not be able to choose. Yet, if there is a phenomenon of great importance to me in one of these sets, but not in the other, then I might well choose to act as though the premises explaining the relevant phenomena were truly operative in the world.

If the contextualists have other criteria for adequate explanation, or rules for developing such criteria, they should set them forth. If they wish to call them scientific, then I believe that these criteria should have the following characteristics: a) they should enable one to recognize both logical and empirical errors, b) they should permit the development of non-obvious, testable inferences, and c) they should provide for explanatory paradigms with internal structures sufficiently explicated that they can be modified with inferable consequences. Of course, they may call anything they wish scientific. No sanctioning system obtains.

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[6] See Arthur S. Goldberg, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification, this REVIEW, LXIII (March, 1969), 5–25.

[7] William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

[8] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1957).

[9] Gunnell, *op. cit.*, p. 1246.

Although Professor Gunnell is nowhere very clear about the substance of the contextualist approach, its nexus seems to consist in the notion of understanding. Now, I have always regarded understanding as an intrasubjective phenomenon.[10] Yet the author denies that this is a problem. He quotes Scriven as follows:

> Understanding is, roughly, organized knowledge, i.e., knowledge of the relations between various facts and/or laws. These relations are of many kinds—deductive, inductive, analogical, etc. . . It is for the most part a perfectly objective matter to test understanding, just as it is to test knowledge, and it is absurd to identify it with a subjective feeling, as have some critics of this kind of view.[11]

I am afraid that, for me at least, this simple set of assertions does not contain evidence of its own correctness. Rather, it puts me in mind of two other quotations—one from Hanson and the other from Easton. Hanson comments:

> Causes certainly are connected with effects; but that is because our theories connect them, not because the world is held together by cosmic glue. The world *may* be glued together by imponderables, but that is irrelevant for causal explanation.[12]

For Scriven, and possibly for Professor Gunnell, knowledge seems to imply having a direct comprehension of the cosmic glue. The second quote that comes to mind is Easton's comment that "A fact is a peculiar ordering of reality in terms of a theoretic interest."[13] For the contextualists, facts seem to be readily discernible self-circumscribing sub-sets of reality.

However, I am afraid that reality is not nearly so amenable to immediate and correct apprehension as the contextualists would have us believe. It seems, therefore, crucial to have means for recognizing errors in our approximations of reality. Two such intersubjective means exist, i.e., discernment of logical errors in a model, and the failure of the model to provide empirically correct predictions. The contextualists seem to reject both of these for social phenomena. It behooves them, then, to tell us what alternatives are available.

Apparently with this in mind, Professor Gunnell, in part quoting Toulmin, asserts the following:

> It would seem that we could not ask more of an argument in any particular field than it "achieve whatever sort of cogency of well-foundedness can relevantly be asked for in that field."[14]

This is as close as the author seems to come to stating the contextualists' rules of adequate explanation. I granted earlier that the deductivists' approach runs the risk of the sterile abyss But if this is the contextualist approach, it seems to run a much greater risk of leading to the all too fecund morass.

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[10] For an excellent treatment of one aspect of understanding, see Theodore Abel, "The Operation Called *Verstehen*," *American Journal of Sociology* LIV (1948), 211–218.

[11] Michael Scriven, "Explanations, Predictions, and Laws," in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell (eds.), *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. III (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), p. 225. The reader should note that while I disagree with Scriven on the matter of objectivity, I do not disagree with him in much of his work. His general theme seems to be that there are a whole host of decisions that one must make, and that one cannot wait upon formal deductive theorists. One therefore uses other ways of trying to make sense of things. Professor Gunnell, however, pushes the argument much further, seeking to carve out domains of epistemological appropriateness, and to label all of them "scientific."

[12] Hanson, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

[13] David Easton, *The Political System* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 53.

[14] Gunnell, *op. cit.*, p. 1240.

# GUNNELL ON "DEDUCTIVISM," THE "LOGIC" OF SCIENCE AND SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION: A RIPOSTE

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## I. INTRODUCTION

It is impossible to tender a reply to Professor Gunnell's essay, "Deduction, Explanation and Social Scientific Inquiry," that would be both brief and adequate. It would be impossible to be brief because Gunnell conjures up a tagraggery of issues, none of which he seems prepared and/or disposed to resolve. But no matter how extensive a reply might be, it would still be impossible to conceive it as adequate for I am not sure that I, or anyone else, can determine precisely what he means to say in the essay before us. It is impossible for me to determine with any specificity whatsoever, for example, what it means to say:

> Logical empiricism as an approach to the philosophy of science has been concerned with developing formal representations or reconstructions of the logical structure of scientific explanation and with a *meta-logical* analysis of the language applied to science. In this view there is a very strict *correlation* between the philosophy of science and formal logic.[1]

I haven't the foggiest notion what a "metalogical analysis of the language applied to science" might mean. I had always understood "metalogic" to refer to discourse employing logic as its object language—just as metamathematics would be a language employed in the analysis of mathematics as an object language.[2] If this is what "metalogic" means, how one might go about undertaking a "metalogical analysis of the language applied to science"—a language conducted essentially in the *material* rather than the *formal* mode—is a complete mystery to me.

Moreover, to insist that "logical empiricists" conceive "a very strict *correlation*" to obtain "between philosophy of science and formal logic" leaves me completely baffled. What could such an assertion mean? If "formal logic" is minimally understood to refer to the systematic study of the valid forms (rather than the substantive content) of inference, and has as a consequence only the *forms* of argument as its concern—and the "philosophy of science" is minimally understood to refer to analytical and methodological discourse about science, and has as its object of concern the *substantive* claims of science (in terms, for example, of analyzing strategies employed in generating and confirming lawlike assertions, empirical generalizations, theories, direct, inverse and extensional statistical inference)[3]—and since the objects of formal logic and the philosophy of science are clearly disparate—I fail to understand how anyone, much less a "logical empiricist," could conceive of a "very strict correlation" obtaining between them.

When this confusion is coupled with Gunnell's countersuggestion that not only is there no "correlation" between formal logic and the philosophy of science, but that science is "autonomous" rather than "dependent on formal logic"—the implications stagger the imagination. In what sense would Gunnell have science (however he would like to have the term understood) be "independent" of formal logic? Does he mean to say that if a formal logician could demonstrate to an empirical scientist that the complex linguistic artifact the scientist identifies as a theory involves, in fact, one or more literal contradictions, that the scientist could simply proclaim his "autonomy" and "independence" from formal logic? While such a posture would seem incredible to me—I might timidly suggest that it would appear to be equally outrageous to most other social scientists—Gunnell seems to suggest as much.

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[1] John G. Gunnell, "Deduction, Explanation, and Social Scientific Inquiry," this REVIEW, LXIII (December, 1969), p. 1238, emphasis added.

[2] Lukasiewicz and Carnap have used "metalogic" to refer to that metalanguage concerned with logic as its object language—more specifically with a subdomain of syntactical (not substantive) analysis which treats of logical sentences to the exclusion of specifically mathematical ones. Certainly "metalogic" would never refer to the analysis of sentences in the material mode, i.e., substantive sentences. Arthur Pap simply uses the term. "metalogic" to designate discourse about logic (as a formal language). Cf. R. Carnap, *The Logical Syntax of Language* (New York: Humanities Press, 1951), p. 9; and A. Pap, *Semantics and Necessary Truth* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), p. 432.

[3] Cf. J. J. C. Smart, *Between Science and Philosophy* (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 3–6; S. Morgenbesser, "Introduction," *Philosophy of Science Today* (Edited by S. Morgenbesser; New York: Basic Books, 1967), p. xiii.

In effect, I cannot believe that Gunnell means what he says—either that, or he hasn't said what he means. Which makes it very difficult to discharge the obligation of treating his ideas adequately. Even if I had been allowed more space, his utterances, which I find singularly opaque and idiosyncratic, would have rendered such a task all but impossible.

Nonetheless, a proper regard for the integrity of our discipline and a fiduciary responsibility to our students compels an assessment (albeit inadequate) of Gunnell's arguments. I have chosen, as a consequence, to attempt to disentangle one or two major confusions in which all of Gunnell's subsequent confusions find their source.

## II. THE "DEDUCTIVIST" THESIS

Gunnell's article seems to grow out of (1) a positive attraction to Stephen Toulmin's work, particularly his *The Uses of Argument* and (2) a relatively object specific repugnance to the work of Carl Hempel. Unfortunately, there is only a partial overlap of the several concerns which characterize Toulmin's work and that of Hempel. As a consequence what the one says has very little direct bearing on anything said by the other. Only in one specific, but important, instance is there a direct engagement of their concerns—and that, as I shall suggest, is with respect to scientific inference. Other than that Toulmin's interesting and insightful work can be construed as devoted to an exclusive inquiry into "the soundness of the claims we make—with the solidity of the grounds we produce to support them—or, to change the metaphor, with the sort of case we present in defense of our claims."[4] This preoccupation, what Toulmin calls a concern with the "logic" (in the informal or extended sense of the term) of inquiry in general, has very little (if any) relevance to Hempel's analysis of the logical properties of explanation. Toulmin's book on argument is a systematic appraisal of the nature of truth accreditation in a variety of scientific *and* nonscientific concerns including, among others, jurisprudence and ethics. His book is a sustained attack on the conception of "deductive inference," i.e., logical criteria, as some sort of ultimate or prescriptive truth warranting strategy subtending all rational or cognitive truth claims.

If one turns, on the other hand, to the work of Hempel one finds, in general, a relatively restricted concern with one relatively specific cognitive problem: an adequate construal of what it means to say we have achieved *scientific* explanation. Wherever Hempel has occupied himself with general problems of truth ascription and confirmation it is clear that he has not committed himself to a consideration of logical criteria of adequacy alone. He has explicitly stated that the concept of confirmation of substantive claims necessarily entails *pragmatic* as well as *semantic* concerns, i.e., concerns which are clearly *extra-logical*.[5]

Recognizing these substantive distinctions between the works of Toulmin and Hempel we find that Gunnell attempts to make the work of one relevant to the work of the other only by confounding a variety of problems. One set of problems has to do with something vaguely characterized as the "logic" of science or of inquiry in general. A host of other ill-defined problems are made to revolve around this broad question. Can, for one thing, the "logic" of inquiry be somehow construed as "deductive"? Gunnell goes so far as to maintain that some unnamed philosophers of science have insisted that "deductive inference," in some obscure sense, is the ultimate truth-warranting strategy for the *substantive* claims of science! Another set of problems has to do with Hempel's construal of explanation that maintains that certain logical properties subtend *all* competent *scientific* explanations. Certainly any decision concerning the nature of scientific explanation could not conceivably be interpreted as a solution to the question of how one might construe the "logic" of science or inquiry in general. Explanation is only *one* product of science. Science, as an activity, produces a wide variety of linguistic entities, taxonomies, typologies, axiomatic systems, calculi, descriptions, statistical generalizations, exhaustive enumerations, lawlike assertions, direct, inverse, extensional and theoretical inferences, to mention only those that come immediately to mind.

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[4] S. Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), p. 7. That Toulmin's interesting arguments involve (in any sense of the term) a rejection of Hempel's models of explanation is, at least in part, belied by the fact that I have made extensive use of Toulmin's insights in my forthcoming *Introduction to Metapolitics: A Brief Inquiry into the Conceptual Language of Political Inquiry* (Free Press) without abandoning the substance of Hempel's construal of scientific explanation. In effect, one can find Toulmin's arguments substantially correct and yet not abandon Hempel's models of scientific explanation.

[5] Cf. C. G. Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation," in *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 3–51, particularly p. 51.

As though these distinct, but complex, concerns were not enough Gunnell interjects still another issue. He enjoins us to consider the "more generic aspects of explanation." There are obviously more kinds of explanations than those advanced by scientists. There are theological explications (e.g. "*Explain* what Jesus meant when he admonished us to turn the other cheek."), questions about linguistic usage ("*Explain* what you meant by calling your girl-friend a dog."), lexical definitions ("*Explain* what 'diadic' means."), geometric demonstrations ("*Explain* why the area of a triangle equals ½bh."), as well as requests for the conveyance of procedural instructions ("*Explain* how one sets a ship's course"). All this is very true—there are many kinds of explanation—but don't we really have enough problems for one essay without concerning ourselves with explanation *in general*?

But not only does Gunnell confront us with a veritable avalanche of issues—he proceeds to move artlessly and capriciously among them. He seeks to conceal his transits by attempting to relate all these issues to something he calls "the so-called deductive model."

We are never told precisely what Gunnell takes the "so-called deductive model" to be. What Gunnell calls the "deductive model" in some instances would more accurately be referred to as models of scientific explanation—since Hempel distinguishes between deductive-nomological and inductive-probabilistic models. Hempel's models attempt a construal of explanation which conceives adequate scientific explanation to be characterized by relatively specific logical properties. In other instances of its use, however, Gunnell uses the term "deductive model" to refer to questions of the general "logic" of science or to "generic explanations." Hempel's models of explanation address themselves specifically to the issue of criteria governing the adequacy of *scientific* explanation, not to the question of the general "logic" of science, and still less to explicating the *generic* notion of explanation.[6]

Gunnell seems manifestly indisposed to keep all these things separate. He uses "deductive model" to refer to all of them. He makes bewildering transits from the "deductive model" conceived as (1) a "proper reconstruction of the *logic* of *natural* science," (2) a "standard" for "*theory construction* in the *social* sciences," (3) as contributing to the explication of "a general structural description of *social scientific explanation*," and finally (4) an effort to characterize *generic explanation*.

Gunnell seems incorrigibly unaware of the ambiguity that afflicts his use of the expression "deductive model." The systematic ambiguity conspires to produce in Gunnell the conviction that "logical empiricists" somehow entertain a "deductivist definition of science" which entertains "noncontingent *a priori* extra-scientific principles and ideas of certainty and conclusiveness which belong to formal logic."

He attempts to support this particular grotesquery by producing what must easily be the most bizarre sentence in the history of scholarship. After insisting that some philosophers of science—"logical empiricists" in general and Carl Hempel and May Brodbeck specifically—employ the "ideal of analyticity" in judging "empirical or substantial arguments" he produces the following sentence in support:

> But whatever label is applied, the argument is that 'geometry is the prototype of all scientific theories' and that 'in philosophy and elsewhere an appeal either to a definition or to a logical truth is conclusive' and 'conclusive in a way that appeal to contingent truth is not' and that 'any kind of explanation of individual facts cannot possess this conclusiveness. Either the explanation is deductive or else it does not justify what it is said to explain.'[7]

The quotation is composed of four snippets or "quotlets'—the first, "geometry is the prototype of all scientific theories" is from Gustav Bergmann's *Philosophy of Science* (p. 31) where Bergmann is attempting to illustrate the logic of theory construction—recognizing full well that substantive theory is produced by "observation, induction, and deduction" (*ibid.*) and not "deduction" alone. The second snippet, "in philosophy and elsewhere an appeal either to a definition to a logical truth is conclusive" is taken from pages 369 f. of May Brodbeck's article, "Explanation, Prediction, and 'Imperfect' Knowledge," where Brodbeck is concerned with characterizing the truth of an assertion that is *true by convention*. At the same time, she makes perfectly clear (p. 370) that if a proposition is empirical it *cannot* be construed as true by convention—it is a *contingent truth*. The third quotlet, "conclusive in a way that appeal to contingent truth is not," is from the same article only separated from the antecedent quotlet by fifteen pages (it is found on page 385) and simply refers, once again, to the distinction between truths that result from linguistic convention and truths which are confirmed directly or indirectly by observations. The fourth snippet, "any other kind of explanation of individual facts cannot possess this conclusiveness. Either the explanation is deductive or else it does not justify what it is said to explain," comes once again from Brodbeck's article—only it is drawn from page 370 and refers to the *logical properties of explanation*—not to the *logic of theory construction* in general nor to *linguistic conventions*.

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[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 333–412, "Scientific Explanation," in Morgenbesser, *op. cit.*, pp. 79–88.

[7] Gunnell, *op. cit.*, p. 1241–42.

Gunnell has contrived the above "quotation" in order to charge "logical empiricists" with being "deductivists"—a grievous charge which he seems to construe to mean that they hold nothing to be true except definitions, formal truths and truths derived from formal truths. He does this even though Brodbeck goes to great pains to say "no one holds that deductions from definitions are the only kind we make in the course of an explanation" (p. 394 of her article, "Explanation, Prediction and 'Imperfect' Knowledge"). In effect, neither Brodbeck, nor any "logical empiricist" I know of, has confused the criteria for assigning truth status to formal truths with those appropriate to assigning truth status to substantive truths—whether such truth claims appear in explanations, theories, or as particular candidates for truth status.

Only irrepressible and endemic confusion could produce sentences about philosophers of science undertaking *metalogical* analyses of the language of science and "correlating" formal logic and the philosophy of science. Only confusion could compel Gunnell to systematically equivocate between using the expression "the deductive model" to mean, on the one hand, the disposition on the part of some formal logicians to insist "that the criteria for assessing analytic arguments should be given a preferential status, and *arguments in all fields be judged by these criteria alone*"[8]—and, on the other hand, using the same expression to refer to an entirely different issue, i.e., the claim made by philosophers of science such as Popper, Hempel, Nagel, and Brodbeck that *all scientific explanations share isomorphic properties*.

It is relatively clear, of course, that the principal advocates of the Hempelian models of scientific explanation accept the general thesis of the methodological unity of all the sciences, predicated on the hypothetico-deductive "model" of science.[9] This commitment could not entail—in fact, it would preclude—a commitment to any "deductivist thesis" that would hold that "concepts such as 'valid' and 'certain' should be interpreted in terms of formal logic" if that is understood to mean that "*formal logic* should be a standard for judging the infinite variety of *substantive* scientific arguments" (my emphasis).

To make this obvious to Gunnell I suggest that he ponder the expression "logical empiricist." Why should an ill defined group of philosophers identify themselves in such a manner—and why should they be so identified by others? I suggest that it is crystal clear to anyone that has read no more than A. J. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic* that they have been so identified because they wished to indicate the *significant* differences between certifying logical as distinct from substantive knowledge claims. That is why they have passed into history as "logical *empiricists*" and not "formalists," "rationalists," or "deductivists." One of the cardinal tenets which we now identify with "logical empiricism" is the claim that the evidence conditions certifying truth ascriptions in the formal language domain are irreducibly different from those certifying truth ascriptions in the substantive (or to use the language loosely, empirical) language domain. Hempel very carefully rehearses the differences between formal demonstrations and the evidence conditions which produce the warrant for empirical hypotheses.[10] The difference between formal proofs and empirical confirmation turns on the degree of reliability of their domain specific truth status. Formal truths provide *absolute* reliability, i.e., in any case involving formal inference it would be a contradiction to assert the truth of the antecedent and then reject the truth of the consequent. Empirical confirmation (on the other hand and at its best) provides for *maximal*, but, in principle, corrigible, reliability. What constitutes maximal reliability (a domain variant reliability) will be determined by the intersection of an indeterminate but finite array of factors including funded or entrenched auxiliary assumptions,[11] linguistic and quantitative precision, and the reduction of threats to internal and external empirical validity (Toulmin's "field variant conditions") —to mention only the most obvious.

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[8] Toulmin, *op. cit.*, pp. 168f.

[9] Cf. M. Brodbeck, "General Introduction," in *Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (edited by M. Brodbeck. New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 1–11; E. Nagel, *The Structure of Science* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961); R. Rudner, *Philosophy of Social Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1966).

[10] Cf. C. G. Hempel, *Philosophy of Natural Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1966).

[11] For a discussion of "entrenchment," cf. N. Goodman, *Fact, Fiction and Forecast* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), chapter iv; for Hempel's acceptance of funded and contingent conditions for truth ascription in the case of substantive truths, *vide* his "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation," *op. cit.*

Such a characterization of the variety of criteria for establishing truth status would minimally satisfy Toulmin's central arguments. To assert, as Gunnell does, that *only* "Toulmin and contextualists in general" advance the notion that "analytical arguments, and the very notion of deduction implied there, are inapplicable for judging substantial arguments whether in science, ethics, or jurisprudence . . ." is to misconceive the most central tenet of "logical empiricism" (however loosely that term is applied by Gunnell). The very notion of a distinction between logical and substantive truth claims (not to involve ourselves in assessing normative claims), the one meeting *formal* criteria, and the other *empirical evidence conditions* for truth certification, is the one tenet that has served to identify some ill-defined class of philosophers as "logical empiricists" for over a generation.

Toulmin (and Gunnell) insist that the criterion of incorrigibility is applicable to one "field" (I would suggest one "language domain," i.e., the formal domain) and cannot be used as a standard against which *substantive* truths are measured. But "logical empiricists" have never denied that. Toulmin argues that some formal logicians have. Whether or not he is correct, and if correct what that implies, has nothing to do with Gunnell's confused and confusing discussion about the "logic" of science or what "logical empiricists" conceive that "logic" to be. Nor does it have anything to do with the thesis that there is a methodological unity subtending the sciences or any attempted explication of the concept of scientific explanation.

### III. "METHODOLOGICAL UNITY" IN THE SCIENCES

The thesis of "methodological unity of the sciences," as distinct from what might be called the "deductivist thesis" need claim no more than that all the sciences, in varying measure and proportion, employ the same formal as well as empirical techniques for truth accreditation. The more formalized sciences will employ highly articulated and artificial language artifacts like calculi and axiomatized systems; the less formalized sciences (like political science) will employ empirical generalizations sometimes housed in partially formalized systems called "conceptual schemata." In effect, the truths of science *are* domain variant and field contingent and every "logical empiricist" so conceives them.

When a formalized science like geometry or physics employs a calculus, its deductions are *empty*—simply because a calculus is an *uninterpreted* axiomatic system. To apply the uninterpreted system, even partially, to the real world requires restoring the binding ligaments of "meaning rules," "semantic rules," or "rules of correspondence" that relate elements of the calculus to the object world. Every "logical empiricist" knows that this requires judgment and "substantive criteria"—that is what "rules of correspondence" are all about. That Gunnell doesn't know this and assumes that there are some philosophers of science who believe that "the laws of physics" produce "automatic deductions or explanations" is staggering. Deductions are, of course, "automatic" in the sense that they obey the transformation rules of logic—but that any "logical empiricist" should think that "the laws of physics" automatically produce "explanations" is an absurdity that boggles the mind. A minimal condition for the application of any "law" (however construed) is a statement of the empirical initial conditions in which it is understood to have effect.

What we have rehearsed is a simplistic account of the hypothetico-deductive method of science. In footnote seventeen Gunnell advises us that he is not concerned with "the rather loose and variable characterization of scientific reasoning often referred to as the 'hypothetico-deductive method.' " He is concerned with the "deductive model." But as I have tried to indicate, he systematically equivocates in his use of the expression "deductive model." Is he really arguing that Hempel, Nagel, and Brodbeck conceive only analytic truths as true? If that is what he means then clearly no "logical empiricist" has ever defended such a contention.

The point to be emphasized here is that the notions of "deductivism" (whatever it means to Gunnell), the "methodological unity of the sciences," and the "deductive model of explanation" refer to a variety of distinct and essentially unrelated issues in the philosophy of science. That Gunnell chose to jumble them all together serves no cognitive purpose whatsoever.

### IV. THE LOGIC OF EXPLANATION

Hempel's construal of scientific explanation asserts that any adequate *scientific* explanation of an event (the explanandum) traffics explicitly or implicitly on conjointly held (1) relevant general laws (or a relevant general law) and (2) specified particular and empirical circumstances (the "initial conditions") that (3) make the explanandum event their deductive consequence.

Once we have boiled off all the confusions which attend Gunnell's discussion, what criticisms remain lodged against the "deductive model of explanation"? The coherent criticisms that emerge are that (1) "explanations are practical, context bound affairs," that the "completeness or correctness of an explanation is a notion without meaning except in a given context" and that (2) "certain evidence is adequate to guarantee certain explanations without the benefit of deduction from laws." Now these criticisms—which are coherent—are quotes from Michael Scriven. It is clear that Gunnell takes these criticisms to be applicable to scientific explanations—one subset of explanations, but it is equally transparent that Scriven addresses himself not to *scientific* but to the "logic" of *generic* explanation. Generic explanation includes a variety of explanation-types including, as we have suggested, literary exegesis, lexical definitions, formal demonstrations, conveyances of procedures, the recounting of recipes, demands for justification ("*Explain* why you did that!") among an indeterminate number of others.

It is not surprising that Scriven can maintain that explanations are "practical, context-bound affairs," and that some explanations obtain "without benefit of deduction from laws." What function would general laws have in literary or religious exegesis? or conveying procedural information? or providing excuses? No one denies that all such activities are spoken of in ordinary language as "explanatory." But Hempel is concerned with the adequate construal of only a subset of explanations—those conceived as *scientific*.[12] Scriven's comments would be perfectly germane had Hempel addressed himself to the problem of generic explanation—but since he didn't, I fail to understand why Gunnell thinks they are relevant to the discussion.

Hempel has *not* attempted to explicate the logic of explanation in general. He would accept, I am sure, Scriven's contention that "explanation presupposes that something is understood, and a complete answer is one that relates the object of inquiry to the realm of understanding in some comprehensible and appropriate way . . . " He might also indicate that as much could be said, *to no profit*, of *any* explanation. It is as true of explaining how to fry an egg, perform logical proofs, convey lexical meanings as it is of scientific explanations. But how does this help us to distinguish *bona fides* from counterfeit *scientific* explanation? How are we to explicate "understanding," "intelligibility," "comprehensibility," and "appropriateness"? To tell us, as Gunnell does, that "explanation" is "contextually dependent" is to tell us nothing at all. To compound our frustration by confusing us with the suggestion that the "criteria of acceptance and inference" are "determined by the paradigm" is cruel. It would seem than "contextually dependent" means nothing more than "paradigm dependent" and the whole notion of "paradigms" is as opaque as "contextually dependent."

Surely Gunnell is right in maintaining that "the search for explanation encompasses a greater range of activities than science"—everyone is prepared to grant as much. But what does all this have to do with Hempelian models of *scientific* explanation?

Hempel's suggestions concerning the logical properties of scientific explanation have been the objects of scrutiny now for over a generation. They have been subject to considerable revision—both at the hands of others and of Hempel himself. For an account which advertises itself as a "thorough critical analysis," Gunnel's is singularly innocent of any substantive criticism. His account does not even reiterate past criticism. Precisely what are the objections that Gunnell raises against Hempel's construal?

Only one possible criticism remains—and that attends Gunnell's curious and *ad hoc* reference to "inference tickets." Hempel refers, in his construal of scientific explanation, to "covering laws" in his schema of scientific explanation. If "inference tickets" are to be substituted for "lawlike assertions" or "covering laws" it would be pleasant if Gunnell provided some indication of what they are supposed to be, how they function in explanation, and what objections have been raised against the entire notion.

Gunnell tells us that "generalizations, laws, and theories function as rules, 'inference tickets,' or 'warrants,' or justifying grounds in terms of which explanatory inferences are drawn, not as premises in a deductive argument."[13] In a footnote appended to this elusive pronouncement Gunnell cites Toulmin, Ryle, Scriven and Sellars as the sources of this insight.

Now the notion of "inference tickets" has a relatively long history and seems to have been coined by Gilbert Ryle. It seems relatively clear that as a "rule" Ryle considers such a "ticket" or "warrant" as neither true nor false. Gunnell is clearly committed, as a consequence, to the construal which argues that what we call "laws" are more *rules* than *propositions*—that (as Toulmin insists) the "laws of nature tell us nothing about phenomena, if taken by themselves, but rather express the form of a regularity whose scope is stated elsewhere; and accordingly, they are the sorts of statements about which it is appropriate to ask not 'Is this true or not?' but rather 'To what systems can this be applied?' " In effect, Toulmin is arguing an instrumentalist position and a "law" is not a "law" at all—but a "principle" or "rule." The "laws" employed by scientists in making inferences are more like "rules and regulations. These are not themselves true or false . . . "[14] Now such a construal of the "laws" with which scientists operate can only apply to a special subset of laws, the generic and most basic "laws of nature" for example (if they apply to any at all), because many if not most laws, as they are employed by scientists do, as a matter of fact, specify their scope of application. Moreover, with some possible few exceptions, the laws employed by scientists (particularly social scientists) can be directly or indirectly falsified by empirical observations, which means that they can best be construed as empirical generalizations or general lawlike propositions that can only be characterized as being either empirically true or false. To refer to "laws" (particularly those of interest to political scientists) as "inference tickets," implying they are more rules than propositions is, at best, deceptive.[15] Michael Scriven himself has raised similar objections in his review of Toulmin's book[16]—all of which makes Gunnell's invocation of "inference tickets" singularly ineffectual in the criticism of Hempel's models of explanation.

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[12] C. G. Hempel, "Explanation and Prediction by Covering Laws," in *Philosophy of Science: The Delaware Seminar* (edited by B. Baumrin; New York: Wiley, 1963), pp. 125–132.

[13] Gunnell, *op. cit.*, p. 1242.

No discussion of Sellar's interpretation of "inference tickets" will be attempted here because it would involve a digression of imposing length—and because I am not at all convinced that Gunnell is serious in his introduction of the notion. In the article by Brodbeck ("Explanation, Prediction and 'Imperfect' Knowledge," pp. 383–85), to which Gunnell frequently refers she reviews the difficulties which afflict the notion of "inference tickets." Nagel, in turn, discusses some of the problems generated by the introduction of this vexed notion in his *Structure of Science* (pp. 129–140). Gunnell neither reviews these criticisms nor rebuts them. This is sad, because his injection of the notion of "inference tickets" is the sole substantive criticism of Hempel's construal of scientific explanation offered in Gunnell's essay. Finally, and as an aside, since none of the protagonists of the "inference ticket" notion ever suggested that a theory could be an "inference ticket" or a "rule" (as Gunnell insists), I suggest that Gunnell offer some account of what he might mean by the now hopelessly tortured expression.

## V. CONCLUSIONS

All this suggests to me why I find Gunnell's discussion confusing: Gunnell is confused. His discussion is, in various places, either confused, trivial or basically mistaken—and where it is none of these—it is irrelevant to the central issue—which I understood to be the adequacy or inadequacy of Hempel's models of explanation. Gunnell does not seem to have, for one thing, the vaguest idea of what the claims of "logical empiricism" might be—furthermore, he has failed to attempt even the most elementary analysis of the models of explanation Hempel advances—and finally he has left us with notions about explanation that can only be stultifying and irredeemably subjectivistic and obscurantist.

What, in effect, does Gunnell imagine an explanation to be? We are all prepared to grant that any effort to unpack so complex and systematically ambiguous a term must necessarily be difficult. We are all equally aware that the issues can be reduced, in some sense, to "appraisals" of adequacy. And surely no one would resist the suggestion that there are different standards for adequacy governing the variety of language domains which reveal themselves in field-variant criteria (in ethics, politics and the various branches of science). But to suggest that not only "the criteria of acceptable explanation and inference" but the very "meaning of 'science' " is *determined* by something he calls a "paradigm" is really to tax our patience. Such an assertion would mean that something called a "paradigm" develops and *then informs* "science" and *determines* what an "acceptable explanation" and an "inference" might be! And how, and where, pray tell, does a "paradigm" originate? Is the articulation of a "paradigm" *antecedent* to logic, as well as prior to, and independent of, the collection, processing, and interpretation of data? Surely a "paradigm" must be a most unusual kind of cognitive product—recognizing no logical or linguistic rules nor observational constraints.[17]

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[14] Cf. S. Toulmin, *The Philosophy of Science* (London: Arrow, 1962), pp. 86 and 79.

[15] H. Gavin Alexander, "General Statements as Rules of Inference," in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science* (edited by H. Feigl, M. Scriven and G. Maxwell; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1958), II, pp. 309–29.

[16] M. Scriven, *Philosophical Review,* XXIV (1955), 124–128

Gunnell does want to address himself to "explanation"—and we are told again that there are many kinds of explanation. With which we can only (once again) heartily agree. (We thought we were only concerned with *scientific* explanation.) We are then told that "explanation" is a "kind of activity."[18] If Gunnell wants to call "explanation" a kind of activity we can grant that without making too much of the issue. But just what kind of activity might "explanation" be? We are told that "explanation" is a "search for understanding." Even Gunnell seems prepared to admit that this is not a very sharp analytic distinction. By characterizing explanation as "a search for understanding" we have no reason to exclude from the reference class yoga exercises (done to "enhance your understanding"), phrenology, tealeaf reading, crystal ball gazing, Christian Science, and reading Mao's Little Red Book, as well as a variety of other activities advertised as constituting just such a search.

But what *can* "understanding" (not to concern ourselves with the "search" for it) mean? It is "obvious," Gunnell tells us, that what one person or community may accept as intelligible or understandable will be rejected by another. This is as true for scientific understanding as it is for any other variety. But should we take this to mean that every man should be his own "explainer?" No indeed. Explanation, understanding and intelligibility are not simply "psychological matters," simple avowals that one understands or finds something intelligible. That would be admittedly obscurantist. Gunnell tells us that what will count as an explanation is "pragmatically determined against a framework of ideas about reality, theories and rules which together constitute a paradigm . . ."[19] But we had just been told that a "paradigm" determines rules of inference—and remember we were also informed that a "theory" is a "rule of inference." Now I am hopelessly confused. Do theories and inference rules (they are two ways of saying the same thing apparently) constitute part of the "paradigm" or does the antecedent "paradigm" determine inference rules and theories? It doesn't seem that one can have it both ways—but since Gunnell feels that "substantive" claims are "independent" of logic, perhaps this is an illustration of his more generous rules of inquiry.

But more than that, if we commit ourselves to a notion of explanation "pragmatically determined against a framework of ideas about reality, theories and rules which together constitute a paradigm," would we not be compelled to admit that the necromancer provides perfectly legitimate "explanations"? And what of devil-worshippers? Do they not meet the same criteria of adequacy? Explanations by flying-saucer addicts and Zoroastrians would seem equally well to meet such adequacy criteria. The real question is: who could *not* meet such loosely framed and porous criteria?

But really what *is* to count as an explanation or as an understanding? Gunnell tells us that "in any particular context" he can provide "perfectly objective or inter-subjective standards." Would he provide just *one* instance to support such a claim? Perhaps he might provide a "contextual" explanation in political science. I suspect, should he attempt such a *tour de force,* what would result would be the generation of a collection of propositions containing one or more lawlike assertions which, conjoined with some reasonably adequate statement of initial conditions, would logically imply the event to be explained. The lawlike assertions would be perhaps statistical or unrestricted generalizations—and the initial conditions would be essentially descriptive—and the relationship between the generalizations, the initial conditions, and the explanandum would be strict entailment or probabilistic subsumption.

Having done that, Gunnell would have resolved some of his confusions and then he would have to rewrite his paper—and start somewhere near the beginning.

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[17] For a discussion of Thomas Kuhn's notion of "paradigms" in science, cf. I. Sheffler, *Science and Subjectivity* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), pp. 74–89 and Gregor, *op. cit.*, chapter 10.

[18] This, on the face of it, seems to involve what has been called the process-product confusion—there is the *process of explaining,* which is an activity, and then there are *products called explanations*—in much the same way that we say we both swim and have a swim.

[19] Gunnell, *op. cit.*, p. 1242.

# SCIENCE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: A REJOINDER TO PROFESSORS GOLDBERG AND GREGOR

JOHN G. GUNNELL

## I

Since both Mr. Goldberg and Mr. Gregor have limited their responses principally to my specific criticisms of the deductive model, it would seem appropriate to emphasize once more the purpose of this criticism. The issue which I wish to raise, using the discussion of the deductive model as a vehicle, goes far beyond the model itself and even the approach to the philosophy of science which it represents. It should be apparent that there may be little chance of resolving the differences that stand between the respondents and myself regarding either the character of the philosophy of science as a discipline of inquiry or its product, but to some extent these differences can be separated from the more general problem of the relationship between social science and the philosophy of science.

I suggested that there is a significant intellectual lag or gulf between political science and contemporary work in the philosophy of science. This situation need not, in principle, be viewed as odd or even undesirable since the distance between philosophy and other fields of science is at least as great. What is unique about political science is that, although it has lost touch with philosophy, it has to a large extent derived its conception of science and its notion of the procedural rules of empirical inquiry from a restricted body of literature in the philosophy of science, i.e., traditional logical empiricism. Among the many notions appropriated from this literature is a relatively well-defined philosophical reconstruction of the logical structure of scientific explanation which I, and many others including some of its proponents, refer to as the deductive model. It is doubtful that political scientists have correctly understood the character of either this model or logical empiricism, but it is undeniable that they have taken the model, or at least their interpretations of it, as an authoritative representation of the nature of science in general, a guide to substantive empirical inquiry in social science, and a formal measure of adequate explanation. One important derivation of the attachment to this model has been the assumption that any complete and truly scientific explanation in social science must involve laws and generalizations. In this essay I attempted neither to formulate any alternative formal criteria of adequate explanation nor to present any substantive notions about the explanation of social phenomena. My purpose was to call into question both the deductive model and certain other aspects of logical empiricism and to suggest that the specification of the criteria of acceptable social scientific explanation belongs to social science. It is doubtful that it is either logically or epistemologically sound for any empirical discipline to seek its methodological categoricals and concepts of explanation from the philosophy of science, but once it has taken this step, it can hardly avoid the implications of controversies in the philosophy of science for its own conception of inquiry. Probably at least part of the historical explanation for the acceptance of logical empiricism and the deductive model was its utility as an ideological device in the struggle for the autonomy of empirical political science; it provided a convenient set of definitions of science and scientific explanation. But to continue to simply catechistically intone these largely unexamined precepts, especially when logical empiricism and the deductive model are being soundly attacked within the philosophy of science itself, can no longer be regarded as sufficient.

## II

I am not sure how much divergence there is between Goldberg's position and mine except on certain issues which may involve misunderstanding rather than disagreement. Goldberg seems to believe that I am advocating something which he terms "the contextualist path" in political science but that all I have "proven" is that there is "an argument about this matter currently in progress among philosophers of science." If I have succeeded in "proving" this point, then I have accomplished much of what I wished to do within the limits of this specific essay. To admit that many of the theses of logical empiricism, including the deductive model, are seriously being questioned in the literature of the philosophy of science should certainly raise doubts about whether political scientists can any longer merely repeat popular versions of these theses and assume that they are delivering final truths about the nature of science. With regard to my recommendation of the "contextualist approach," I do recommend it as an approach to the philosophy of science (and the philosophy of the social sciences), but I explicitly denied that it entailed any recommendations about the character of explanation in political science or any other science; the formulation of such answers is precisely what the contextualist argues philosophy should not undertake. To ask what, in general, this approach specifies as the "criteria for adequate explanation, or rules for developing such criteria" is to ask an inappropriate question, i. e., from the contextualist perspective it is science and not philosophy which establishes these criteria and rules while the philosophy of science seeks to understand and explain the character and content of these criteria and rules.

My references to the contextualist literature and statements such as those of Scriven were intended to demonstrate that the deductive model is not free from challenge. Scriven's assertion about the adequacy of explanations which do not include deductions from laws cannot be passed off as "either irrelevant or incorrect." Goldberg's discussion of this point leads me to believe that although he has read the article from which the statement is extracted he has not grasped the thrust of Scriven's argument which can be briefly, although partially, summarized as the idea that a judgment of the adequacy of an explanation depends primarily on the criteria of acceptable explanation formulated and applied in the community of science in which the explanation is offered, and if science (either social or natural) does in fact count certain explanations as adequate and complete when deduction from laws is not involved, then it makes little sense, either logically or epistemologically, for philosophers to designate them incomplete or imperfect.

What Goldberg characterizes as "deductive explanation" and "the deductivist method" appear to have little to do with what I explicitly stated that I meant by the phrase "deductive model." Goldberg seems to be offering a general characterization of the H-D method which I specifically excluded from my discussion. When Goldberg states that he believes "that the structure of deductive logic, and hence of explanation is invariant with context," he would appear to directly confront my argument which is directed against any simple equation of explanation and deductive logic. But he does not pursue this point, and I am not at all sure what Goldberg means by "deductive logic," which is far from an unproblematical notion. He states that "adequate explanation, *in any field*, consists in logical derivation from premises and correct prediction," but this is both vague and ambiguous. Is it a philosophical recommendation or an empirical generalization about science? Is it an affirmation of the thesis of the logical symmetry of explanation and prediction in any field of science? And above all, what is the meaning of "logical derivation" in this case?

Finally, although I attempted to carefully specify what I meant by the relationship between understanding and explanation, I suppose that it was inevitable that it would be taken as an advocation of some kind of intuitive approach grounded on "direct comprehension." I can only reiterate that my discussion of "understanding" does not refer to any approach at all, but only to the view that it makes no sense to attempt to offer a universal characterization of scientific explanation and that neither the formal nor substantive meaning of explanation and understanding can be discussed apart from particular scientific contexts.

## III

I might be able to make better sense of Gregor's "riposte" if I understood the meaning implied in his use of the term. After surveying some of the possible dictionary definitions and applying a "contextual" analysis it would seem that what he has in mind must be a "retaliatory verbal sally."[1] I find it difficult to separate the substance of his criticism from the many overt and implicit accusations, the sustained misrepresentations of my argument, and the extravagant and emotive language which he employs (tagraggery, idiosyncratic, bewildering, grotesquery, snippets, irrespressible and endemic confusion, absurdity, jumble, trivial, stultifying, irredeemably subjectivist and obscurantist, etc.). I can appreciate his hypersensitivity to the issues I have raised, since in a recent article published in the REVIEW he finds it adequate to state without elaboration that "for a science to most reliably discharge its two principal functions, explanation and prediction, statements embodying acquired knowledge must be systematically organized in subsumptive or deductive relations."[2] He then goes on to provide a sketch of the formal characteristics of a "theory" that is little more than a précis of statements from the literature of logical empiricism which he supports only by footnotes referring to the traditional wisdom literature and philosophers such as Braithwaite,

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[1] *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* (Springfield: G. & C. Merriam, 1963).

[2] "Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis," this REVIEW, LXII (June, 1968), p. 425.

Rudner, and Nagel. This is precisely the kind of ritualism that I wish to question. Since I am limited by the space allotted for my reply, I cannot respond to all of Gregor's "confusing" remarks, and "no matter how extensive a reply might be, it would still be impossible to conceive it as adequate for I am not sure that I, nor anyone else, can determine precisely what he means to say. " But nevertheless I am compelled by "a proper regard for the integrity of our discipline and a fiduciary responsibility to our students" to attempt an "assessment." Enough of this pompous nonsense.

By characterizing logical empiricism as concerned with a "meta-logical analysis of the language applied to science," I am simply referring to an analysis of terms such as "explanation," "inference," "theory," which are common in discussions of the logic of science as distinguished, for example, from the actual language of science (although the two may overlap). This is not an unusual use of the term "meta-logical," and there is no reason to suppose that all the language "applied" to science is in the "*material* rather than the *formal* mode." But this point, as well as my assertion to the effect that logical empiricists conceive "a very strict correlation between the philosophy of science and formal logic," are clarified in the argument of the essay, and I am not at all sure what Gregor's purpose is in fastening on a couple of sentences and attributing all sorts of hypothetical dicta to them. Although both the logical empiricist (or reconstructionist) and the contextualist see the task of the philosophy of science as logical analysis and an explication of the logic of science, their conceptions of both logical analysis and the logic of science are, as I attempted to demonstrate, quite disparate. My "countersuggestion" regarding the relation between formal logic and the philosophy of science involved my approval of the contextualist position. It should be obvious that to press these distinctions has nothing whatsoever to do with whether formal logic is relevant to science in the sense of, for example, pointing up "literal contradictions" in a theory.

Whether or not these two approaches to the philosophy of science and these conceptions of the logic of science are compatible or complementary is a more difficult problem. I tend to think that they are not, but the answer to this question is not as crucial to the main argument of my essay as a rejection of certain specific products of the reconstructionist approach. It should be clear to anyone familiar with this literature that the relation between, for example, the work of Toulmin and Scriven on the one hand and Hempel and Brodbeck on the other cannot be passed off, as Gregor suggests, as having "very little direct bearing on anything said by the other." At least this is certainly not the judgment of the individuals involved who have expended a great deal of effort in criticizing one another. He states that the only "direct engagement" is with regard to "*scientific inference*," but if Gregor is suggesting that the deductive model does not relate to the problem of scientific inference, I am mystified. He then proceeds to a very partial characterization of the positions of Toulmin and Hempel and suggests, as he does throughout his riposte, that these positions are really not at all in conflict, either in approach or substance. The only evidence of such a consensus which he introduces is in a footnote where he tells us that in a forthcoming book he has "made extensive use of Toulmin's insights . . . without abandoning the substance of Hempel's construal of scientific explanation." Social scientists have tended to believe that there are no important disagreements in the philosophy of science and that it offers a neat and integral body of knowledge to which they can authoritatively refer for guidance, and Gregor seems to wish to perpetuate this myth.

Despite the fact that I explicitly stated that it was a mistake to equate the activity of science with explanation, alone, Gregor accuses me of such a move, and then proceeds to question the relevance of my discussion of the "generic aspects of explanation" without any reference to the context in which I introduced the notion, i.e., with regard to questioning the assumption that the meaning of scientific explanation could be specified in a non-contextual sense. My doubts that Gregor carefully examined my argument are corroborated by the fact that although I devoted nearly a thousand words to a detailed statement of what I mean by the "deductive model" and in a long footnote differentiated it from other possible interpretations (including that of Popper, which Gregor suggests I equate with those of Hempel, Nagel, and Brodbeck), he nevertheless asserts that "we are never told precisely what Gunnell takes the 'so-called deductive model' to be."

If I am to go down in history for "producing what must easily be the most bizarre sentence in the history of scholarship," I am certainly happy that Gregor will allow that the sentence belongs to "scholarship," because I am not at all sure about the genus to which Gregor's interpretation of that sentence belongs. Notwithstanding Gregor's assertion to the contrary, each of my "quotlets" is extracted from the context of arguments which imply that the standard of acceptable scientific argument and justification is analytic or demonstrative argument. The purpose of the sentence is to summarize that portion of my argument which preceded it and in no way is it offered as a proof "that logical empiricists" are necessarily "deductivists." These terms are certainly not definitional equivalents although it is within the philosophy of logical empiricism that the deductive model has been formulated. There are many other claims of logical empiricism, especially those revolving around the cognitive status of theories and the relationship between theoretical statements and observation statements, which I believe are fundamentally unsound but which I explicitly put outside the boundaries of this essay. If Gregor wishes to insist that a concern with "*empirical evidence conditions*" is the distinguishing characteristic of logical empiricism, I have no particular quarrel with this view, but I fail to see its direct relevance to my arguments here. It is certainly crucial to my thesis to demonstrate that those who embrace the deductive model assume that demonstrative argument is a norm for judging the validity of scientific argument. Gregor clearly disagrees with this, but, instead of confronting the issue, he simply feigns incredulity, states repeatedly that it is not the case, and jumps off onto such other points as the proper definition of logical empiricism, restatements of the H-D thesis, and what amounts to a summary of Hempel's reply to Scriven (Gregor's footnote 10).

Gregor devotes considerable attention to my "curious and *ad hoc* reference to 'inference tickets'," and I am quite willing to admit that I raised an issue which I could not adequately discuss within the scope of this essay. The problem of inference tickets raises a number of questions relating to the complex problem of theoretical instrumentalism and realism which I wished to rule out here, and my only defense is that it was Gregor, not I, who "tortured" the "expression." I have discussed these problems and their implications for social science elsewhere (my footnote 17), and my only purpose in mentioning the problem was to indicate that there are concrete arguments against the deductivist's conception of the logical function of laws in scientific explanation and the necessity of such laws for adequate explanation.

With regard to Gregor's discussion of my concluding remarks on science and explanation, I can only agree with his admission that he is "hopelessly confused," but it would be presumptuous for me to claim complete credit for the extent of his confusion. Rather than discuss the issue which is raised in this section, Gregor is content to engage in a facetious and ridiculous parody of my argument. That argument is that social scientists in their search for scientific respectability have turned to a restricted body of literature in the philosophy of science for authority and have found, especially in the deductive model and other formulations of logical empiricism, a set of ready-made answers about the meaning and purpose of science, the unity of science, the logic of science, and the character of scientific explanation. What they have derived from this literature amounts to little more than a series of empty cliches about the equivalency of explanation and generalization, the logical symmetry of explanation and prediction, and the deductive subsumption of particulars under laws. I would again suggest that it is, in principle, a mistake to assume that any scientific community can turn to the philosophy of science, as an academic discipline, for standards of adequate explanation and that, in particular, logical empiricism, as an approach to the philosophy of science, and the deductive model as its product, have severe deficiencies. This belief in the authority of the philosophy of science and the deductive model has in part been responsible for the failure of social science to develop a substantive conception of what constitutes adequate explanation of social phenomena. This is the task of social science, and to assume, as Gregor apparently does, that there is some final incorrigible meta-scientific standard, either logical or epistemological, to which we can appeal regarding what will constitute acceptable scientific inferences and explanations in any field of natural or social science is precisely what I wish to call into question. I would reject the idea that the task of the philosophy of science is to produce answers to abstract questions about the purpose, meaning, and structure of all scientific explanation. To suggest, as I do, that the meaning of science is "determined by the paradigm which informs scientific activity and reasoning and which specifies the conception of reality and the phenomena to be investigated, designates problems for investigation, and determines the criteria of acceptable explanation and inference" in no way entails asserting the impossibility of discriminating between science and necromancy. But whatever may account for the differentiation between science and necromancy in our society, it is doubtful that it can be attributed to the deductive model.

# COMMUNICATIONS

To the Editor:

At the "open meeting with the editor" held at the recent APSA convention, you expressed the view that it was not the function of the APSR to respond to the diverse tendencies within the organization, since "the APSR cannot do everything." Instead, you suggested, APSA encouragement of other journals, such as *Public Policy*, could meet these needs. My impression was that you wish to reserve as much space as possible for the backlog of sound articles of the type currently dominating the APSR and do not wish to sacrifice space to meet the demands of other tendencies within the organization.

In my opinion, this policy is wrong. It is one which seems designed to promote a formal split within the APSA. For most members, the APSR *is* the APSA; it is the only concrete manifestation of our organization that they ever see, with rare exceptions. If the APSA is a democratic organization, then the APSR must be a representative journal.

The APSR is not now representative of the diversity of what is best in our profession. As an undergraduate, graduate student and now teacher at "Ivy League" and other East Coast schools, I have noticed how few of the better teachers seemed to pay any attention to the APSR. Instead, I constantly encountered colleagues turned off by the Review and the association. In fact, the supporters of the Review whom I have met number no more than a handful. I believe that the Review represents a vast failure in communication and a lost opportunity.

It does not need to be this way. There are many things that can and should be done, but in this letter I would like to outline only four—two in response to failures of communication and two in response to failures of representativeness.

The first failure of communication lies in the area of methodology. Most members of the association receive the APSR and cannot understand most of its articles. In my opinion this is not primarily because APSA members are ill-trained or stupid. I myself teach undergraduate and graduate-level coures about statistics, yet I must struggle with many of the articles simply because the presentation of method is condensed into virtual code. If the APSR is going to publish articles with complex methodologies, then it has an obligation to explain those procedures in greater detail for the general political scientist. It has that obligation if it conceives of itself primarily as a medium of communication, rather than primarily as an avenue for advancement through publication or as a club for methodologists.

Viewing the APSR as a medium for communication brings me to my second point. From the point of view of communication, the APSR is a literary and aesthetic disaster area. The APSA should spare no expense in hiring someone literate with an eye toward format diversity, layout design, reader engagement, not to mention style. Let us reintroduce "sophistication" to elegance.

Third, and more important, the APSR will never be representative until it accepts partisan politics as a legitimate human activity. It is a fact that our profession contains thousands of persons like myself who have come to political science because of our interest in politics, not science. The APSR may select articles partly from the view of building the study of politics into a rigorous, scientific thing. But it must also select articles from the view of substantive relevance to partisan issues now widely felt to be important. The APSR cannot be a representative medium of communication while denying partisan exchange.

Finally, there are many in our profession who, in addition to keeping "up" with the field and perhaps publishing, have a deep, perhaps deeper interest in teaching. Most of us could benefit from studies and experiences related to teaching political science. It is a disgrace to our profession that teaching has been shown to rank so low in prestige among our members. There is quite a bit of relevant information around, most of it in other disciplines; its publication should be encouraged by the APSR, and not relegated to the backwaters of PS (which would thus confirm our profession's attitude toward teaching as an inferior relation).

These proposals are not radical. In fact, they are only the barest beginning toward penetrating the spell which seems to enchant the association.

Dave Garson

*Tufts University*

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To The Editor:

Professor William Riker has reported the results of a study in which some of his subjects divided the payoffs to coalitions in a three-person, non-zero-sum game as the solution notions of von Neumann and Morgenstern, and Aumann and Maschler prescribe. He contrasts his findings with results I obtained in a three-person, zero-sum game study, where subjects frequently divided payoffs to a coalition equally. Professor Riker also states that he obtained strong evidence that my results can be disregarded "as the artifact of particular and restrictive institutions"—the particular conditions of my study. Essentially, his argument is that the prescriptive solution notions of Aumann and Maschler are quite successful as a descriptive theory, and that the results I obtained—the equal divisions of the payoffs—are idiosyncratic and result from the artificial, unrepresentative conditions of my study.[1]

After examining Professor Riker's results quite carefully and reconsidering my own work I must conclude that my results are not an artifact. Unfortunately the space limitations of this journal do not permit me to discuss Professor Riker's results and my own in detail, but a more comprehensive discussion of the issues is contained in a research memorandum which is available.[2] In the memorandum I offer and discuss the following, and some other arguments.

1) The result that Professor Riker has called an artifact has been found so frequently by myself and others, and is so pervasive a feature of experimental game studies, that it does not seem to make sense to consider it an artifact.

2) In his study Professor Riker used procedures quite different from mine; he employed a three-person, non-zero-sum game while my subjects played a three-person, zero-sum game. In addition, Professor Riker permitted communication among his subjects outside of the experimental situation. I employed more conventional procedures, restricting the communication among subjects to the experimental situation.

3) Further analyses of Professor Riker's data and my own indicate that, although there are differences in our results, both of us obtained some outcomes that are equal divisions, some that conform to the Aumann-Maschler prescription, and some that have neither of these two characteristics.

Finally, in my memorandum, I describe an empirical study that, if done, would shed some light on the question of whether Professor Riker's results or my own are more representative of behavior in game situations.

Bernhardt Lieberman
*University of Pittsburgh*

To the Editor:

I am sorry that I may have hurt Professor Lieberman, whom I respect as a very conscientious scholar. He apparently believes my use of the word "artifact" reflects on his conscientiousness. It certainly was not intended to do so. We do have, however, a genuine intellectual disagreement.

The disagreement concerns the appropriate conditions in a test of the validity of game theoretic predictions. Von Neumann and Morgenstern and Aumann and Maschler in setting up the initial circumstances of the simplest three-person game assume an indefinitely lengthy amount of negotiation. Obviously no real world experiment can satisfy that assumption. But one can approximate it so far as is practical. The difference between us concerns how far one ought to go in such an approximation.

Professor Lieberman believes that, regardless of the assumptions of the theory, one should conduct experiments in the conventional ways of psychologists whose traditions certainly have not dealt with such complex and thoughtful behavior as is involved in games. Presumably out of fear of some sort of contamination he did not allow his subjects to spend enough time on the game to understand it. Hence, in my opinion, his subjects did not engage in a meaningful test of the theory simply because they never had a chance to do what theory assumes that they will do, namely learn and understand the game.

I do not argue that, on the contrary, my subjects did engage in a valid experiment. All I assert is that they came closer to it because they negotiated for nearly an hour in each game (as against a couple of minutes for Lieberman's subjects) and they played over a period of several weeks and talked about the problems of the game with other players (as against Lieberman's subjects who spent only one several hour session on the game).

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[1] William H. Riker, "Bargaining in a Three-Person Game," *The American Political Science Review*, 61 (1967), 642–656. My results are reported in two papers: Bernhardt Lieberman, "Experimental Studies of Conflict in Some Two-Person and Three-Person Games," in J. Criswell, H. Solomon, and P. Suppes (eds.), *Mathematical Methods in Small Group Processes* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962) and "*i*-Trust: A Notion of Trust in Three-Person Games and International Affairs" *Journal of Conflict Resolutions*, 8, (1964), 271–280.

[2] The memorandum can be obtained by writing to me at the Department of Sociology, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, request: *Not An Artifact*, Research Memorandum SP-108. 1.

A three-person game is more complex than poker. Sophisticated behavior in such a game—and all game theory is about sophisticated behavior—can occur only after considerable immersion, probably on the order of tens and even hundreds of hours of thoughtful experience. Since the conditions of Professor Lieberman's experiment largely prevented the occurance of sophisticated behavior in the game, the majority of his outcomes are, from the point of view of the theory, second-best. It is in that sense that his results are an artifact of the conditions, as are the results of all other investigators whose experiments embody the same conditions.

William H. Riker
*University of Rochester*

To the Editor:

There seem to be two primary justifications for the social sciences to develop their own vocabulary, or jargon. The first is to denude concepts of connotations suggested by everyday usage that are not intended by the scholar. The second is to allow scholars working in a given field to achieve some consensus on the names by which social phenomena are to be known. This latter function expedites communication among researchers, and serves to provide key-word referents that allow them to place new information in the context of the appropriate body of accumulated knowledge. The scholar who uses conceptual terms merely as pegs upon which to hang bodies of data does disservice thereby to himself and to his colleagues.

Such a disservice was performed by Boyd in his paper on "Presidential Elections: An Explanation of Voting Defection" (this Review, June, 1969, pp. 498–514). Boyd calls his major independent variable cross-pressures. According to my reading of the literature, the cross-pressured individual is one who belongs to multiple reference groups, at least two of which have mutually incompatible behavioral expectations of him, e.g. one expects him to vote Democratic, while the other expects him to vote Republican. In Boyd's usage, however, the notion of reference groups has little relevance.

Boyd defines cross-pressures as a state of incompatibility among party, candidate, and policy orientations. This operationalization involves an intrapsychic rather than a social structural phenomenon and there exists a large body of social psychological literature on such cognitive-affective inconsistencies. Save for a passing reference to a paper by Rokeach and Rothman, we have no indication that Boyd sees the relevance of this literature to the problem that he is confronting. I would expect a researcher to place his findings in their appropriate theoretical context, especially where he must cross disciplinary lines to do so. As an expert in his field, he would perform a service to his readers if he informed them of relevant lines of thought that he presumably is more aware of than they are.

Boyd's labelling of his independent variable has a further theoretical dysfunction, for it confuses the relationship between status inconsistency, social mobility, and cross pressures. While both status inconsistency and social mobility may be seen as contributing to cognitive-affective inconsistency (there are other causes as well), they are special cases of, rather than causes of, the cross-pressure phenomenon.

None of this criticism, of course, is meant to challenge the importance of Boyd's findings. If anything, they become more interesting when placed in the proper theoretical perspective.

David R. Segal
*University of Michigan*

To the Editor:

At first blush it appears that Professor Segal is arguing that it is improper to define cross-pressures as an attitudinal as opposed to a structural property. Only if this were the right interpretation would his point that status inconsistency and social mobility are special cases of cross-pressures be of any merit. However, other points in the letter—plus the fact that I am certain that Professor Segal knows that all of the voting research of Michigan's Survey Research Center defines cross-pressure as an attitudinal state—lead me to believe that he accepts the propriety of my attitudinal operationalization.

What he is saying, I conclude, is that if I am going to define cross-pressures in terms of attitudes, I should have utilized more the social-psychological literature on attitudinal conflict (e.g., dissonance, balance, and congruity theory). As a matter of fact, in the initial stages of the research, I made a considerable effort to construct my hypothesis in terms of one of these "strain toward consistency" theories. However, I discarded my work because at critical steps either I failed to come up with interesting deductions from these theories or I failed to find measures of some necessary concepts across the three election surveys.

Richard W. Boyd
*Wesleyan University*

To THE EDITOR:

Professor Giovanni Sartori in his "Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems" (this REVIEW, June 1969, 398–411) sets out to accomplish some important objectives. Most significantly, he seeks to "explain" ideology, and to use ideology to "explain" politics (p. 409).

Imposing as Sartori's formulations are, they may be open to two qualifications:

1. Sartori employs two important dimensions of ideology to construct a typology of belief systems: (1) cognition: whether a belief system is open or closed, and (2) emotive intensity: whether a belief system is held with low or high intensity. He identifies four types of belief systems: Adamant (closed cognition, high affect), Resilient (closed cognition, low affect), Firm (open cognition, high affect), and Flexible (open cognition, low affect). This typology reveals certain inherent weaknesses when he tries to apply it to the decline of ideology hypothesis.

Sartori argues that the requirement of the decline hypothesis would not be met by a decline in the emotive intensity of ideology, i.e., by a passage from Adamant to Resilient. "A real decline of ideology is safely indicated" by a trend toward relative openness in the cognitive dimension, i.e., by a passage from Adamant to Firm (p. 406). A literal *end* of ideology, he adds, would require the complete transformation of ideology, i.e., a passage from Adamant to Flexible.

In making this argument Sartori introduces an unnecessary disjunction between the cognitive and emotive dimensions, for, although analytically distinct, the two are in fact closely interrelated. Thus, for example, if the emotive intensity of a belief system is high, that belief system is almost by definition "closed." Similarly, if a belief system is "closed," it is probably because it is held with high emotive intensity.

This suggests that cognition and affect may be inadequate or insufficient criteria for a typology of ideologies. The objective or goal of ideology, for example, may provide a more relevant dimension—a dimension, in fact, that would yield a threefold typology of ideologies as "instrumental," "expressive," and "consummatory." In this context, a decline of ideology hypothesis might refer to any one of three propositions: (1) the transformation of a consummatory belief system into an expressive one, (2) the transformation of a consummatory belief system into an instrumental one, or (3) the transformation of an expressive belief system into an instrumental one. (The idea of an "end of ideology," by the way, is simply a euphemism. No one has suggested a literal ending of all ideologies, but an ending of "apocalyptic" or "extremist" ideologies—that is to say, a decline of ideology.)

2. Professor Sartori's "major and most comprehensive point" (p. 410) is that, since mass belief systems appear to be dependent on elite belief systems, the elite publics are in a position to mobilize and manipulate mass publics. He states: "ideologies are the crucial lever at the disposal of elite for obtaining mass mobilization and for maximizing the possibilities of mass manipulation. That is . . . the single major reason that ideology is so important to us" (p. 411).

Insofar as the mobilization-manipulation potentials of ideology have been insisted upon by most writers on this subject since Karl Marx, one cannot help wonder whether Sartori's logical operations, though admittedly impressive, were necessary for reaching this conclusion. And having reached this conclusion, has one used ideology to "explain" politics?

MOSTAFA REJAI

*Miami University, Ohio*

To THE EDITOR:

Professor Mostafa Rejai's comment is a welcome opportunity for clarifying my views. He takes issue with me on three points.

1) The disjunction between the cognitive and emotive dimensions of ideology is unnecessary: "although analytically distinct, the two are in fact closely interrelated." However, "interrelation" does not imply that a distinction is "unnecessary": the premise does not warrant the conclusion. The point simply is, therefore, that Professor Rejai takes the view that the emotive and cognitive dimensions vary together. As he puts it, "if the emotive intensity of a belief system is high, that belief system is almost by definition closed. Similarly, if a belief system is closed it is probably because it is held with high emotive intensity." If this were the case, then my distinction would be unnecessary. But is this the case? I very much doubt it. Indeed my experience with marxists and clericals (with which my country is well supplied) is that no matter how feeble the *passion* may become, the *mentality* remains constant. So the point simply is that Rejai takes for granted the covariance that I challenge.

2) Professor Rejai goes on to suggest that the "objective or goal of ideology" may provide better criteria for a typology of ideologies than the criteria suggested in my article. This may

well be the case, even though I happen to be very skeptical about the typological validity of the distinction between instrumental, expressive and consummatory ideologies. In principle, however, there is no reason why two criteria—one of these being teleological—would necessarily turn out to be mutually exclusive rather than complementary and additive.

3) Professor Rejai's concluding point is that "Insofar as the mobilization-manipulation potentials of ideology have been insisted upon by most writers . . . since Marx, one cannot help wonder whether Sartori's logical operations . . . were necessary. . . . And, having reached this conclusion, has one used ideology to explain politics?" Quite frankly I do not see why the last question should be addressed to me, for throughout my article I asked whether "ideology" still has a scientific use, and my conclusion was that the concept retains an explanatory value only if used far less cosmically and ambitiously than we tend to do. And I feel that the other points touched in the above quoted paragraph equally imply a misreading of my text.

The suggestion conveyed by Professor Rejai is that my logical operations break through an open door. We must be knocking, however, at very different doors. An illustrative, if cursory, selection of the current conceptualizations of ideology reads as follows: "an organization of opinions, attitudes and values—a way of thinking about man and society" (T. W. Adorno, 1950); "the systematic and explicit formulation of a general orientation to politics" (G. Almond, 1956); "A verbal image of the good society and of the chief means of constructing such a society" (A. Downs, 1957); "an application of particular moral prescriptions to collectivities" (D. Apter, 1964). The most recent work I have read on ideology is Nigel Harris, *Beliefs in Society—The Problem of Ideology*, where it takes the author 266 pages of debunking to reach this thrilling insight: "Ideology can mean both the views of any and all social groups, and the views of social groups other than my own." Whether my article lacks originality or not, the fact remains that it does run counter to the prevailing mood of the discipline.

Professor Rejai links my argument with Marx. This linkage appears to miss my major point, which was to separate ideology conceived as a doctrine (and an epistemological issue) from ideology conceived as a perception of politics (the ideological mentality), and to show that the argument can be neatly pursued from beginning to end in a contentless fashion, with regard to *how* one believes, regardless of content, i.e., regardless of *what* one believes. If anything, therefore, my insistence has been upon disentangling what Marx entangled for himself and posterity.

GIOVANNI SARTORI
*Visiting Professor, Yale University*

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# REVIEW SYMPOSIUM

*Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (New York: Bantam Books, 1968); and *Supplemental Studies for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968): (Angus Campbell and Howard Schuman, "Racial Attitudes in Fifteen American Cities;" Peter Rossi, Richard A. Beck, David P. Boesel, Bettye K. Eidson, and W. Eugene Groves, "Between White and Black—The Faces of American Institutions in the Ghetto;" and Robert M. Fogelson and Robert B. Hill, "Who Riots? A Study of Participation in the 1967 Riots.")

Aside from Gary Marx and a few other scholars, few Americans have subjected the Kerner Commission report to careful scrutiny. Nor, in all probability, will many others do so in the foreseeable future. The widespread protest against the Vietnam War has diverted social criticism from domestic policies to foreign affairs and military appropriations. The intermittent outbreaks of black terrorism have channeled official concern from long-term questions of reform to short-term problems of repression. And the recurrent uprisings at the nation's universities have distracted many Americans from the issues raised by the 1960's riots. This situation, though understandable, is most unfortunate. For the report, while not, as the New York *Times* observed, "a major turning point in the history of the nation," epitomized the liberal response to the riots and embodied the liberal approach to the ghettos. Better than any other report, better than the report on the Newark riots and better by far than the report on the Los Angeles riots, it posed the question whether liberalism has the capacity to resolve the racial crisis. And if for no other reason than to consider this question an evaluation of the Kerner Commission report is in order.

It was fairly easy for the commission to choose between a liberal and a conservative interpretation. Most of the commissioners (including the chairman, vice-chairman, and most of the more influential and knowledgeable commissioners) were, broadly defined, liberals. So were most of the staff and the consultants. What is more, virtually everyone on the commission knew (or, after a while, learned) that the basic assumptions of a conservative interpretation, namely the outside agitator theory and the riffraff theory, were already partially discredited. The outside agitator theory, which blamed the rioting on irresponsible extremists and, in particular, left-wing radicals and black militants, was sharply at odds with the reports of the F.B.I., C.I.A., and other investigative agencies and the findings of the commission's own field terms. The riffraff theory, which traced the rioting to a small and unrepresentative minority of unemployed, ill-educated, and uprooted Negroes, was incompatible with survey research reported by social scientists and arrest statistics compiled by police and correctional authorities. And the commission, to its credit, sponsored the studies which further discredited these misleading assumptions.

But it was much harder for the commission to devise a consistent liberal interpretation. For, as Allan Silver has shrewdly pointed out, the commission was caught in the same bind as the Chicago Commission on Race Relations, the Mayor's Commission on Conditions in Harlem, and other liberal riot commissions. Although the commission was committed to racial equality, it was also committed to public order; and though it was appalled by ghetto conditions, it was also appalled by violent uprisings. From the very outset, then, its overriding objective was to reconcile these conflicting convictions—or, in other words, to retain sympathy for the rioters without conferring legitimacy on the riots. To this end the commission, much like other riot commissions, adopted the perspective of what Professor Silver aptly calls "diagnostic sociology," a perspective from which collective violence appears the inevitable response, as opposed to the deliberate choice of an oppressed group.[1] By so doing the commission viewed the riots as reactions rather than protests, the rioters as victims rather than demonstrators, and racial unrest as a manifestation of problems which can be resolved within the existing institutional structure.

Given this perspective, the commission's interpretations fall neatly into place. At the core of the riots, the commission argued, are racial discrimination, economic deprivation, family disorganization, personal insecurity, consumer exploitation, residential segregation, and the Negroes' other grievances. Combined with the black migration from the south and the white exodus from the city, these conditions have created a situation of exceptional degradation in the black ghetto and unprecedented disorder in the entire society. Underlying this situation, the commission insisted, is white racism. Also, by virtue of inadequate communication in the cities, ineffective organization of local government, and inequitable representation of the Negroes, many blacks find it hard to redress grievances in legitimate ways. And by virtue of the rising expectations of most Negroes, the increasing legitimacy of violent action, and the growing influence of black militants, many blacks tend to regard violence as feasible alternative. Under these circumstances a minor incident or a series of minor incidents, often involving the police or other visible symbols of white authority, can easily trigger full-scale rioting in the black ghettos.

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[1] Allan A. Silver, "Official Interpretations of Racial Riots," in Robert H. Connery (ed.), *Urban Riots: Violence and Social Change*, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, XXIX, 1 (July, 1968), 149–154.

This was a formidable interpretation of the riots. It was much more sophisticated than the McCone Commission's conception of the Los Angeles riots and the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury's conception of the Cleveland riots, two well known documents with a conservative viewpoint. And it was far more elaborate than the conception of the Governor's Commission on the Newark riots, the Chicago Riot Study Committee, and the other official commissions with a liberal perspective.[2] This was a plausible interpretation of the riots too. The findings were not sharply inconsistent with available information on the ghettos: by any criteria unemployment rates are excessive, educational practices are defective, welfare regulations are humiliating, and housing facilities are dreadful. Nor were the conclusions inconsistent with the available information on the riots: the Negroes' grievances and frustrations are closely related to the recent violence, and white racism is inextricably connected with ghetto conditions. Given the sensitivity of the topic, the prominence of the commissioners, and the impatience of the public, this was no mean accomplishment.

But it is one thing to be plausible and another to be credible, one thing to offer an explanation and another to prove it. And here, as Gary Marx has observed, the report left a good deal to be desired.[3] By classifying the riots simply as "major," "serious," and "minor," the report overlooked the specific differences and general similarities which might have revealed the critical patterns. By separating the accounts of the riots from the analysis of the ghettos, the report failed to described how the Negro's grievances and frustrations combined to precipitate the violence. And by applying its main concepts too broadly, the report neglected to document (though ample documentation was available) precisely how white racism has engendered black grievances and frustration. This critique could be extended to the report's desultory and sometimes misinformed surveys of black history and racial protest and to its mistaken impression of the riot's impact on the black ghettos and white suburbs. Rather than do so, it is enough to point out that these criticisms (which probably reflect the commission's tight schedule and deserve the scholar's judicious sympathy) do not prove that the report was wrong. Only that its findings cannot always be taken at face value.

Other criticisms are more damaging. Consider the report's approach to the Negro's grievances. In line with its conviction that at the core of the rioting are racial discrimination and many other grievances, the commission attempted to discern and measure black discontent. To this end it analyzed twelve hundred interviews conducted soon after the disorders (and sponsored two public opinion surveys in nineteen communities, which were finished afterwards). What is objectionable about this approach is not the technique but rather the presumption that the grievances could be found just by interviewing the blacks. Had the commission looked more closely at the riots, and particularly the violent acts and precise targets, it would have uncovered rather different grievances with rather different intensities. And these findings might have persuaded the commission to reconsider its position that ghetto grievances were a reflection less of misguided policy than of widespread apathy. To do so, however, the commission would have been obliged to acknowledge a direct relationship between violence and grievances. And though there is much evidence to support this position, the commission could not subscribe to it without regarding the riots as protests and the rioters as demonstrators. Which, in view of its liberal perspective, it could not do.

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[2] Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots, *Violence in the City—an End or a Beginning* (Los Angeles, 1965). Cuyahoga County Grand Jury, "Special Grand Jury Report Relating to the Hough Riots" (August 9, 1966); Governor's Select Commission on Divil Disorder, *Report for Action* (February, 1968); *Report of the Chicago Riot Study Committee to the Hon. Richard J. Daley* (Chicago, 1968).

[3] Gary Marx, "Two Cheers for the Riot Commission Report," *The Harvard Review,* IV, 3 (Second Quarter, 1968), 3–14.

Consider next the report's treatment of the Negro's frustration. In line with its conviction that many blacks find it hard to redress grievances in legitimate ways, the commission attempted to locate the source of the blacks' powerlessness. To this end it reviewed the hearings, field reports, and academic papers, examined recent histories of the stricken cities, and surveyed black attitudes toward local government. And from these studies it concluded that the Negro's frustration is essentially a function of inadequate communication, ineffective organization, and inequitable representation. What is objectionable about this treatment is not so much the conclusion as the implication that these barriers are accidental or technical. Had the commission studied the evidence more carefully, it would have learned that these barriers are intentional and political. They are employed by individuals and organizations, including ethnic minorities and municipal bureaucracies, to prevent blacks from influencing decisions. But the commission could not accept this idea without admitting the possibility that the racial problem cannot be resolved within the existing institutional structure. Which, in view of its underlying assumptions, it could not do.

Consider also the report's concept of white racism. Although the commission shied away from a precise definition, it applied this concept in two distinctive ways: first, as if all whites, regardless of age, class, or region, are racist, and racist to the same degree too; second, as if individual prejudice rather than institutional rigidity is the major reason for racial inequality in urban America. According to recent studies of prejudice and discrimination, the first application is plainly wrong. It is also misleading: for as Hannah Arendt has recently remarked in the *New York Review of Books*, "Where all are guilty, no one is; confessions of collective guilt are always the best possible safeguard against the discovery of the actual culprits."[4] The second application is misleading too. Not only is individual prejudice much on the wane and institutional rigidity much on the rise nowadays, but, even more important, rigid institutions have a more pervasive and deleterious effect on the everyday life of the ordinary black today than do prejudiced individuals. But the commission could not incorporate these objections without seriously undermining the credibility of its interpretations.

These criticisms raise doubts about the validity of the recommendations too. For the commission drew from its interpretations the conclusion that American society could not prevent future rioting by resorting to outright repression or abject capitulation. Nor by pursuing present policies, which would perpetuate subordination and segregation and probably culminate in black rioting, white retaliation, and eventually a police state. And not by yielding to separatist pressures to enrich the ghetto and abandon integration, which would culminate in affluent suburbs, impoverished ghettos, and permanent inferiority for Negroes. Rather the commission insisted that American society could prevent future rioting only by adopting a forthright policy to enrich the ghetto and at the same time encourage integration. To this end the commission recommended large-scale and long-term private and public programs to alleviate ghetto grievances, reduce Negro frustration, and eliminate white racism. Only by implementing these programs, the commission warned, could American society halt the movement towards two societies and, in the report's resounding peroration, end the violence "not only in the streets of the ghetto but in the lives of people."

This was an admirable approach to racial unrest. Few responsible Americans would challenge the commission's conviction that American society cannot maintain public order by resorting to outright repression or by pursuing present policies. Nor would many responsible Americans challenge the commission's conclusion that American society must alleviate ghetto's grievances, reduce Negro frustrations, and eliminate white racism. This was an ambitious blueprint for public policy too. The commission took advantage of its special mandate to recommend policies not only to the states, the cities and their respective bureaucracies, which many riot commissions had already done, but also to the Congress, the President, and the American people. And whatever the immediate problem, whether employment, education, welfare, housing, or law enforcement, the report proposed not only broad national programs, which was what most public officials probably expected, but also specific legislative action. Given the tight schedule imposed on the commission, the sharp divisions among the commissioners, and the popular demand for law and order, this was no mean achievement.

But it is one thing to be admirable and another to be relevant, one thing to be ambitious and another to be feasible. And thus the recommendations must be subjected to more careful scrutiny. To alleviate the ghetto's grievances, the commission recommended that the authorities increase employment by expanding training programs, consolidating recruitment activities, creating additional jobs, developing impoverished regions, and encouraging ghetto enterprise. Improve education by attracting first-rate teachers, developing new curricula, reducing class size, offering supplementary services, and reinforcing pre-school and college-preparatory programs. Reform welfare by setting minimal benefits, increasing the federal ogvernment's share, eliminating residency and other onerous requirements, and providing due process and other legal safeguards. Upgrade housing by granting low-interest loans to builders, enlarging rent-supplement funds, amending building codes, diversifying public housing, reorienting urban renewal, and expanding the model cities program. These recommendations, which epitomize the liberal approach to domestic problems, suggest how strongly the commission believed that the ghetto's grievances were a reflection of wide-spread apathy, which required new will not new porgrams.

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[4] Hannah Arendt, "Reflections on Violence," *The New York Review of Books*, XII, 4 (February 27, 1969), 28.

But if the ghetto's grievances are also a reflection of misguided policy, these programs are of questionable value. In view of the costs of the Vietnam War, the demands of the defense establishment, and the conservative reaction in the country, it is highly unlikely that the authorities will pass the legislation or appropriate the funds. Even if the money is made available, these programs may increase employment, improve education, reform welfare, and upgrade housing a bit, though job training, head start, A.F.D.C., and public housing have not exactly been unqualified successes. They may even enlarge the welfare state enough so that, in terms of income, housing, health, and other vital services, the public sector will provide for depressed blacks what the private (or quasi-private) sector provides for affluent whites. But these programs will not affect the inequitable distribution of wealth which underlies the ghetto's grievances; this requires not minor changes in existing programs nor modest extensions of welfare capitalism but drastic changes in income distribution. And by failing to include an effective mechanism for redistribution, these programs will probably not alleviate the ghetto's grievances.

The commission realized that in view of the likelihood that ghetto grievances will still be a severe problem in the immediate future other recommendations had to be devised to reduce the Negro's frustration. And to this end it recommended that the authorities open channels of communication by organizing Neighborhood Action Task Forces, joint community-government agencies which would discuss and redress neighborhood grievances. Enhance governmental efficiency by establishing Neighborhood City Halls, which would institutionalize the task forces, and Multi-Service Centers, which would expedite the delivery of health, welfare, legal assistance, and other municipal services. Increase Negro representation by appointing blacks to high-level policy posts, employing them at all levels of local government, curtailing at large representation on city councils, and encouraging participation by representative community organizations. These recommendations, which were probably modeled on the Lindsay administration's response to black militancy in New York City, reveal how strongly the commission believed that the Negro's frustration was essentially a technical problem. And one which did not require radical institutional change.

But if the Negro's frustration is essentially a political problem, the commission's recommendations are beside the point. Neighborhood task forces and city halls may give blacks a greater sense of participation, and multi-service centers may provide them a more convenient arrangement for acquiring public services. Black civil servants and community organizations may also wrest occasional concessions from mayors and other officeholders whose political futures are closely tied to public order in the ghetto. But these programs will not end the bureaucratic irresponsibility which underlies the Negro's frustration. This requires not only adequate communication, efficient organization, and equitable representation but also a redistribution of political power, which is underway in many cities, and a transformation of urban institutions, which is meeting furious resistance in the same cities. About these issues the commission said virtually nothing. Thus by neglecting to include an effective mechanism for participation, its programs will not reduce the Negroes' frustration; and by raising their expectations, they may even increase it.

The commission also realized that these programs will not eliminate white racism, that, if anything, white racism might eliminate these programs. Thus it also recommended that the authorities remove racial barriers to employment by extending federal anti-discrimination legislation to government agencies, granting the F.E.P.C. strong cease and desist powers, and supplying the E.E.O.C. additional staff and resources. Curtail de facto school segregation by providing financial bonuses to integrated school systems, creating exemplary schools and educational parks, opposing racial discrimination by school boards, and, if necessary, cutting off federal funds to segregated school districts. Abolish racial restrictions on housing by enacting a national, comprehensive, and enforceable open occupancy law for private (and not only federally-assisted private) housing and, by financial inducements, rent supplements, and direct construction, enlarge the stock of low-income housing in the suburbs. These recommendations, which extend the civil rights legislation of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, suggest how strongly the commission believed that the major reason for racial inequality was individual prejudice, which could be effectively controlled by federal anti-discrimination legislation.

But if the major reason for racial inequality is institutional rigidity, these recommendations are wide of the mark. Fair employment practices may remove certain barriers to employment, but, if the E.E.O.C. reports are a reliable indicator, they will not guarantee equal opportunity to Negroes. Legislative action may prompt many schemes to eliminate de facto school segregation, but, in the face of bureaucratic procrastination, it will not generate many integrated schools. Open occupancy laws may inconvenience realtors and property owners, but, if recent studies are an accurate guide they will not inhibit residential segregation. To put it bluntly, federal anti-discrimination legislation may benefit some Negroes, and especially middle-class Negroes, but, no matter how strong and thorough, it will not end racial inequality. For, if individual prejudice once made the Negroes inferior, institutional rigidity, notably in the police, schools, welfare, housing, and other institutions, now keeps them so. And not only because of racial antipathy, a serious problem to be sure, but also because of the bureaucratization, professionalization, and centralization of these institutions. About which the report made no recommendations.

These criticisms not only undermine confidence in the report; they also raise the possibility that by holding to its liberal assumptions the commission might have overlooked more relevant and feasible approaches to the ghetto's problems. Doubtless the black militants thought so. They regarded the disorders not as riots but as rebellions and racial unrest as a manifestation of problems which cannot be resolved within the existing institutional structure—a position the commission casually dismissed. Now the militants' interpretations are probably not worth extended analysis: a thorough examination of the riots, and especially the violent acts and precise targets, leaves little doubt that they were protests, even highly articulate protests, but not rebellions. But the militants' recommendations are another matter entirely: a careful examination of the commission's recommendations leaves a good deal of doubt that the ghetto's problems can be resolved within the existing institutional structure. And if only to determine whether the commission overlooked a more promising approach an evaluation of black power is in order.

According to the commission, black power is an outgrowth of two closely-related developments. First, the failure of civil rights legislation and non-violent direct action to overcome segregation in the rural South and subordination in the urban North. And second, the resurgence of racial pride among blacks of all regions and particularly among the upcoming generation of blacks in the northern ghettos. The commission conceded that black power does more than simply reflect the Negroes' growing alienation from white America. It also expresses the increasing pressure for black autonomy, ranging from economic self-sufficiency and independent political action to retaliatory violence, and underlies the demand for community control of schools, police, welfare, housing, and other institutions. But the commission also contended that black power is nothing but a modern version of the nationalist (or separatist), as opposed to the assimilationist (or integrationist), tradition of Negro protest. An old program encased in a new rhetoric—or, as the report put it, "old wine in new bottles"—black power is a revival of the "separate but equal" notion, a retreat from racial integration, a victory for white racism, and a defeat for black equality.

Much can be said for the commission's indictment. Black power does belong to the nationalist tradition of Negro protest which extends beyond Elijah Muhammed, Marcus Garvey, and Booker T. Washington well into the ante-bellum period. It emerges out of the disintegration of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s much like the Atlanta Compromise developed out of the breakdown of the civil war reconstruction in the 1870s and 1880s. Its ideology of racial solidarity, self-reliance, and autonomy is a variation on traditional nationalist themes; and so is its program of economic self-sufficiency, independent political action, and retaliatory violence. Black power also reflects the revival of the "separate but equal" notion. It expresses an increasing disparity between expectations and achievements and a growing frustration with the assimilationist approach to ghetto problems. It regards racial integration as undesirable and, in view of white attitude, impossible; and it considers white racism, individual or institutional, ineradicable. And given the Negro's economic and political position, it is possible that black power will, as the commission argued, rationalize segregation and subordination in urban America.

But more can be said against the commission's indictment. The militants' conviction that integration and equality are not the same thing is not unreasonable; nor is its belief that at this moment the concern for integration may set back the struggle for equality. It is open to question whether, as the commission contended, integration is a prerequisite for equality. The militants' contention that the community control of ghetto institutions (and not an extension of welfare capitalism or an appeal to white conscience) is the only relevant program for equality is defensible too. It may well be that, as the militants contend, participation is a prerequisite for redistribution. From this prespective the militants' demand for community control is fundamentally different from the Garveyites' quest for an independent African nation and the Black Muslims' demand for a separate American state. It is more realistic and yet more radical; it is, above all, more political. So much so that, notwithstanding the militants' revolutionary rhetoric and military posture, there is little doubt that with the emergence of community control black nationalism has come of age politically. And if, as the commission suggested, this is "old wine," it is heady stuff.

So, too, are its implications. Community control rejects the Kerner Commission's distinction between grievances and frustration; it insists that they are inextricably connected and that, if anything, grievances are a function of frustration. It argues that integration is irrelevant and, even more important, that meaningful participation is a prerequisite for effective redistribution. Community control also rejects the commission's commitment to the existing institutional structure; it demands a thorough overhaul of welfare capitalism (and particularly the institutions which administer it). It insists that the bueraucratization, professionalization, and centralization of urban institutions be halted, if not reversed. Hence community control repudiates the progressive view of local government which has prevailed since the turn of the century and the liberal notion of federal authority which has prevailed since the start of the New Deal. And it calls instead for a return to public authority which emphasizes political responsibility, citizen participation, and administrative decentralization.

Now community control is not as promising an approach to ghetto problems as the black militants argue. As a device for redistribution, it may be feasible, but it is probably not relevant (or at any rate not without radical changes in the American economy which are inconceivable in the foreseeable future). And as a device for participation, it may be relevant, but it is probably not feasible (or at any rate not until the blacks gain control of the cities, which will not happen for at least another generation). But community control is not as trivial an approach to ghetto problems as the Kerner Commission concluded. It emphasizes the connections between institutional rigidity and racial injustice and thereby serves as a valuable corrective to the commission's focus on individual prejudice. It also questions the conventional wisdom about the relationships between integration and equality and redistribution and participation. And for these reasons alone the Kerner Commission should have given community control (and black power) a more extensive hearing and more thorough evaluation.

But the commission could not do so without reconsidering its fundamental principles, namely, the integrationist approach to race relations, the progressive view of local government, the liberal version of welfare capitalism, and the traditional commitment to the existing institutional structure. It could not do so without contemplating whether integration is the prerequisite for equality or, as the militants contend, integration is irrelevant to equality (and, if anything, equality is a prerequisite for integration). Whether the bureaucratization, professionalization, and centralization of municipal institutions has enhanced social justice or, as the militants argue, perpetuated racial subordination and segregation. Whether distribution and participation are two different issues or, as the militants claim, equitable distribution is inconceivable without effective participation. And whether the racial troubles can be resolved within the existing institutional structure or, as the militants declare, community control is the only relevant and feasible approach to ghetto problems. In other words, the commission could not give community control (and black power) due consideration without inquiring into the conventional wisdom of American liberalism.

All things considered, the Kerner Commission did a good, but not splendid, job. As I have observed, its approach to ghetto grievances, its treatment of Negro frustration, and its concept of white racism leave a good deal to be desired. So do its recommendations to extend welfare capitalism, increase citizen participation, and restrain individual prejudice without changing the existing institutional structure. Its casual dismissal of community control and black power, not to speak of more radical proposals for social change, is particularly disappointing. But, in view of the public opinion polls, the Kerner Commission did a better job than the country deserves. It offered a comprehensive and plausible interpretation of the riots when it could have explained them away as the product of outside agitators and irresponsible riffraff. It also offered elaborate and reasonable recommendations for the ghettos when it would have written them off with vague phrases about private enterprise and local initiative. And had the commission abandoned its liberal perspective and submitted a more original interpretation and more radical recommendations, it would probably have been rejected outright by most Americans.

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It seems fairly clear, even now, that in the mid 1960's we entered a new era in race relations in the United States. The nonviolent marches and passive civil disobedience of earlier years have, during the past five years, given way to newer, and sometimes more violent, forms of black militancy, and the coalition politics of the Civil Rights Movement is now forced to share the public stage with the Black Power Movement and black separatism. Although the Civil Rights Movement is far from dead, it has lost ground with the emergence of a new "pluralism" in the black community, a "pluralism" that ranges from those who would pursue social changes through traditional legal and institutional reform to those who have abandoned the political system altogether and who would force change through violent attacks on the existing institutions.

As everyone knows, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (generally referred to as the Kerner Commission after its Chairman, Otto Kerner) was constituted by President Johnson with the mandate that the Commission should explore the causes of the riots and make recommendations for dealing with the problem of racial discontent. Unhappily for many people, the Commission did just that and the result was a document that was surprisingly strong in its condemnation of white America. The Commission suggested that we didn't have simply a "black problem," but that the real villain was the "white problem" of racism, both individual and institutional. At the root of the "white problem" lay a barrier of white attitudes, values, and practices that has, for three hundred years, successfully prevented most black Americans from sharing the benefits of freedom and prosperity.

Two of the three supplemental studies in this *latest publication* for the Kerner Commission are concerned with the attitudes of both the black and the white citizens of fifteen large cities. The first study, by Campbell and Schuman of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, is based on 5,759 interviews with the residents of the fifteen cities and two suburbs. The second study, by Rossi, *et al.*, of the Department of Social Relations, Johns Hopkins University, is based on 1,953 interviews with individuals in six occupational categories that have regular contact with Ghetto residents in these fifteen cities. The occupational categories included social workers, primary and secondary school teachers, police, retail merchants, political workers (all of them black), and the personnel managers for large firms in the riot cities. The third study, by Fogelson and Hill, is not concerned with attitudes, but it focuses on the social, economic, and other characteristics of the rioters.

It should be stressed at the outset, as all of the authors emphasize, that these reports are preliminary in character; they represent only a brief overview of the data collected and they contain only a few relevant cross tabulations beyond the simple "marginal" results. In this form, the reports tend to be descriptive and speculative in tone, and the authors justifiably end up asking more questions than they answer. Nevertheless the reports contain a great body of information, and some of the results, even in a generally under-analyzed form, are of considerable importance. My comments, however, will have to be limited to a few high points because there is far too much in these reports to be covered in a few paragraphs.

One of the more important findings is the extent to which the white residents of these cities underestimate the amount of discrimination in their cities. Nearly 40% of the white respondents believe that "only a few" or "none" of the Negroes in their communities "miss out on jobs and promotions because of racial discrimination," and about a quarter of the respondents believe that "only a few" or "none" of the Negroes "miss out on good housing" for the same reason. More importantly, over half of the respondents believe that the inferior social and economic conditions of Negroes are due "mainly to the

Negroes themselves." At the same time, police mistreatment, which is one of the main complaints of blacks, is thought not to occur by a majority of the white residents.

If white recognition of the racial dilemma of black Americans is a precondition for eliminating poverty and discrimination, these results are not very encouraging. There are, however, two additional pieces of information which modify these results somewhat. One is that evaluations of the "black condition" are rather strongly related to the age of the respondents with the younger respondents more inclined to appreciate the discrimination that confronts Negroes. The second consideration is that a majority of the respondents are willing to see the government assume an active role in improving the conditions for blacks. This support for governmental action was strong enough that a majority of the respondents were willing to see their taxes increased 10% in order to fund the necessary programs.

Although one can overestimate the support for governmental intervention among whites, the findings by Campbell and Schuman, when seen in the context of the numerous other studies of white attitudes, provide some basis for a sense of cautious optimism. White resistance to black advancement has decreased over the past two decades, and the more sympathetic views held by young people may indicate that an even more dramatic reversal in the distribution of attitudes is approaching. In addition, virtually every study of white attitudes indicates that the least resistance is found among the more highly educated, and this segment of our society is increasing in size.

At the same time, however, one of the main points of irritation between the black community and the larger society is still with us, and that is the relationship between the black community and the police. A large segment of the black community expresses very great discontent with police practices in the cities. A majority, for example, believe that the police don't come quickly when called (27% for whites), nearly 4 out of 10 believe that the police are disrespectful and insulting (16% for whites), and over a third believe that the police frisk and search without reason (11% for whites).

And parallel to these findings, Rossi, et al., report data that suggest that the police are the least sympathetic to blacks of the six occupational groups that they interviewed. Police, for example, are about three times as likely as educators and social workers to believe that Negroes are "as well off" or "better off" than whites with respect to employment, housing, and police treatment, and they are about twice as likely to believe the same with regard to education, the treatment of public officials, and recreation. In addition, over 60% of the police believe that "Negro gains toward equality" are either "much too fast" or "too fast." Moreover, they are the only group in which a majority disagrees with the findings of the Kerner Commission, perhaps because of the criticisms voiced in the Commission's report of police practices.

These findings, when coupled with the Commission's report that nearly every riot began with a "police incident," suggest that the composition of urban police forces is a critical problem for race relations. This is particularly apparent when the attitudes of white policemen are compared with those of black policemen. Although black policemen may be considered "Uncle Toms" by many black militants, these data show them to be much more sympathetic to the problems of their race than are their white counterparts. In addition, they report a greater acquaintance with the people of the ghetto, and they are far more likely to have relatives, friends, or themselves live in the neighborhoods where they work. The overall import of these results seems to be that the white policeman is, in many respects, the alien agent of the "white power structure" that the Negro tends to believe he is. His black counterpart, on the other hand, fits more an older model of the policeman as the agent of the neighborhood from which he comes. The policeman is one of the principal agents of the society with whom neighborhood residents have contact, and the probability of continued exacerbation is this contact seems very high. For that reason the logic behind the black demand for "community control" of the police seems very understandable.

A third important aspect of these studies is information they provide on the "causes" of the urban riots. The findings almost universally portray a black community that is extremely discontented with the conditions in which they live, discontented with the institutions that exclude them, and discontented with the primary agents of the white society with whom they are in contact. Although only a minority indicate a willingness to directly participate in the riots themselves, a majority are sympathetic with those who do join the riots and a sizeable minority of the young indicate a willingness to use violence to obtain social justice. Under these conditions, the direct "cause" of a riot is somewhat less important than the general set of conditions upon which an "incident" feeds.

The alienation of the majority of urban

blacks, whether due to their "rising expectations," relative deprivation, or the restriction of their social and economic possibilities, creates a condition where the normal restraints of social life are removed. Although many blacks may not be willing to join a riot, they are also clearly not willing to condemn those who do. It has always been the case that social order rests on the condition that most people do not have to be restrained; in fact, the most general and effective control over disruption is probably the informal sanctions exerted by those who stand to lose because of disruption. What white racism has fostered in the black community is the breakdown of this normal sanctioning process. This is coupled with the condition that the riots may be beneficial to a sizeable minority in the community, a minority that includes those for whom the riot represents an opportunity to express anger and hostility, those who can obtain desired goods through looting, and those who can use the riots for political gain.

The continued existence of these conditions, however, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that more rioting is in prospect. Riots also exact a cost, and that cost may have been sufficient to deter blacks from following this course of action in the future. Although the studies discussed here do not give us any indication of how high these costs have been, it appears on the surface that the costs may outweigh the benefits such that the period of mass riots is passed. What is more ominous, however, is that the discontent does not appear to be decreasing, and the demise of the riot may foreshadow a turn towards even more militant forms of protest, particularly since it remains to be seen whether the militant demands for "community control" will be successful.

All this is in the way of conjecture, however, but it does suggest that we have a long way to go in our understanding of either the riots or how to deal effectively with a deprived minority. These studies, along with many aspects of the Kerner Commission Report, suggest that social scientists can be of considerable use in the search for understanding. These studies are all preliminary reports and are not specifically intended for an academic community, but, as the authors note, we can expect more detailed and scientifically interesting publications at a later date.

At the same time, these data and many of the preceding studies only skim the surface of the research that needs to be done. We have, for example, almost nothing on the development of attitudes over time in the area of race relations. For this, we need longitudinal data from panel studies of both blacks and whites. If we do not obtain this data, it will be very difficult to discern what experiences are associated with attitudinal modifications among blacks and whites. We also have little or no research on inter-racial bargaining and negotiation. If the drive for community control continues to develop within the black community, it would be useful to know what contributes to or detracts from a successful bargaining process among racial groups.

These concerns are secondary to the more paramount problem of bringing blacks into the mainstream of American economic life. The Kerner Commission proposes a vast number of programs with which to confront this problem, but they offer very little in the way of research or substantive knowledge that would permit us to choose between the various approaches to poverty and skill deprivation. The economic pie is, as we all know, limited, and if we have to choose between programs, it seems more appropriate to choose with insight, not ignorance.

These comments point to a concluding note that is perhaps the most severe criticism of the Supplemental Studies and of the Kerner Commission in general. These studies and the larger Commission report were a response to a severe "crisis" in the American political system. As such, they represent an admirable attempt to understand certain aspects of the intricate and complex problem of race relations in the United States. But the process of science and the process of understanding these phenomena requires a more systematic and orderly approach than is displayed in these efforts. A survey of over 7000 respondents represents a major investment in social research, and one would hope that such investments in the future are preceded by the development of theories, propositions, and hypotheses to be tested. We need, as in so many areas of social research, more theory development and proposition testing rather than simply more data.

Given the "crisis" atmosphere in which these studies were developed, however, the preliminary reports represent a surprisingly high quality of social research, but they also suggest a number of important questions about the whole research enterprise. Could we, for example, have learned more by extending the examination to a broader range of American cities? Could we have learned more by reducing the number of respondents while interviewing them at a later date? These comments are not intended simply as *post hoc* second guessing. The researchers had choices to make and they were operating under the constraint of providing information for policy makers. At the same time, "crisis research" would be less necessary if research support were available in this area on a more continuous basis.

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Reviewing the Supplemental Studies for the National Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission) provides an opportunity to examine some specific questions about the approach of riot commissions to their subjects, and their use of social science.* Our attention is first drawn to these considerations by the apologetic tone appropriately adopted in two of the three supplemental studies. This is suggestive of the time pressures under which the Kerner Commission operated. Campbell and Schuman provide an analysis that "is a very preliminary statement of the findings that will eventually flow from this study." For the most part they present their findings only by race and by sex, although in a few tables they provide age and educational distributions. They are painfully aware that they illuminate "very little . . . about the social locations of the basic attitudes with which the study is concerned." Similarly, Rossi and his colleagues in introducing their study, also stress that their "report contains [only] the first sounding of our data." It provides "an overall picture," although the findings presented here are not directed to questions which are of greatest interest to the researchers.

The prominence of such caveats is clear and understandable. Campbell and Schuman provided a report written within a few weeks of the end of data collection. Interviewers for the Rossi study were still in the field when Martin Luther King was assassinated in April, 1968. In this volume only the study by Robert Fogelson and Robert Hill, an effective critique of the "riff-raff" theory, appears complete for its purposes. Even here the potential richness of the study appears untapped.

Two general, related questions are raised by the hurried nature of the presentations. First, why did the Commission consider it essential to provide these research reports under such time pressures? Second, what is the relationship between social science inquiry and the writing of reports in the riot commission process?

A number of answers may be proposed to explain the premature publication of the Supplemental Studies. From interviews with key commission strategists, it appears that the commission staff took extremely seriously President Johnson's original charge. They also needed to "cover" the commission from potential criticism that it had not provided answers to questions that were asked of it by the President. Additionally, they recognized that they could not even begin to answer some of the questions authoritatively (if then), except through sophisticated contemporary methods of social science inquiry. Futher, they wanted to evoke the structure of social science investigation in order to: 1) demonstrate that the analysis was founded as much as possible upon "hard data"; 2) make it appear that "hard data" were employed even if they were not; and 3) deflect the potential criticism of academics and others who were lobbying for the Commission to deploy the arsenal of social science on the problems of riots.

Because the commission staff felt that their effort would be incomplete without these investigations, and in order to deal with some of the problems of political legitimacy mentioned above, the Kerner Commission "farmed out" several key studies: an attitudinal survey of white and black attitudes; a more intensive, 15 city survey of policemen, teachers, and others who provide services to the ghetto; an analysis of riot arrest data; a content analysis of riot coverage in communications media; and survey research in Newark and Detroit ghettoes, among others.

Another insight into the Commission's concerns for developing political legitimacy may be obtained by asking why the Commission contracted for sophisticated outside research at a period when it could not possibly have made use of the findings in developing its analysis and recommendation. Analysis and recommendation are supposed to flow from commission research. But it is clear that this was not the case in the Kerner Commission's use of material presented in the Supplemental Studies and could never have been the case, given the time constraints under which the Commission operated. The studies presented here were commissioned so late that the findings were not available to inform the analysis. It would have been difficult to use these findings when the Commission still intended to produce both an interim report, around January 1, and a final report in July. The decision to produce only one report, in March, made these studies irrelevant for use in the final report. In some cases the data were not even collected until after the commission had reported. In other cases, such as the Simulmatics content analysis of television riot coverage, the Commission prepared its recommendations on communications media without the benefit of this research.

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* These notes have been developed as part of the writer's continued collaboration with David J. Olson in a study of the politics of riot commissions in American cities. Our extensive research on the Kerner Commission, the New Jersey (Lilley) Commission, and post-riot politics in Newark, Detroit and Milwaukee has provided the underlying perspective for these comments. I am grateful to Murray Edelman for comments on the first draft.

There is considerable justification for arguing that the Kerner Commission, given the time constraints under which it operated, acted appropriately in utilizing the best available research and consultants to write its report, concurrently commissioning studies to advance still further knowledge of selected factors affecting riots. At the same time, however, we should clearly acknowledge the extent to which the Kerner Commission Report was not based upon these studies, and should further inquire into the relative importance of empirical research in writing such reports.

Does it make a difference? Careful comparison of the Kerner Commission Report with the Supplemental Studies suggests that in some cases the Commission's report would not have been affected particularly by the research findings. This is the case with the study by Fogelson and Hill of riot arrest records. Although Fogelson and Hill effectively and pursuasively demolish the riff-raff theory, evidence in the Kerner Commission is consistent with, and supportive of, their analysis.[1]

In other cases, it seems that the Kerner Commission might have profited from the availability of some of its commissioned research. Not only would individual findings have been useful for the Kerner Commission deliberations, but some of this research might have directed the attention of the Commission to critical (and in the Report neglected) areas of investigation. It is instructive to compare some aspects of the Kerner Commission Report with the findings developed in the Supplemental Studies. While such comparisons are somewhat speculative, they are illuminating for investigating whether the Kerner Commission might have developed different conclusions, or pursued different directions in analysis, if it had had at hand its own commissioned research.

Take, for example, findings related to ghetto education. The Kerner Commission asserted that "school administrators, teachers, . . . regard ghetto schools as inferior." It concluded that this was "[a]nother strong influence on achievement." (K427) Rossi and his associates, however, as reported in the Supplemental Studies, found that ghetto teachers generally considered their schools to be average or better when compared to other schools in the city. Only in the area of adequacy of physical plant did the ghetto teachers in Rossi's survey approach agreement that their schools were inferior. (SS135)

Although much is made in the Kerner Commission of increasing the number of blacks employed in various occupational roles, the Kerner Commission fails to discuss racial differences in teacher attitudes. If, somehow, the Kerner Commission had been able to develop its analysis of education on the basis of research on teacher attitudes, it might have been compelled to discuss racial differences in teacher attitudes because of the discriminatory power of this variable. Rossi and his associates discovered that black teachers are less likely than white to conclude that their ghetto schools are adequate, but more likely to regard their black students as having potential for education. (SS137)

The disadvantages of not being able to write the Report with empirical studies at hand are again illustrated in the Kerner Report treatment of ghetto teacher attitudes toward schools. Apparently for want of pertinent research, the Kerner Commission cites a 1963 Chicago survey of public school teachers as evidence that "the condition creating the highest amount of dissatisfaction among teachers was lack of adequate provision for the treatment of maladjusted, retarded and disturbed pupils." (K429) This contrasts with the Rossi findings that, on the whole, ghetto teachers are relatively satisfied with their schools except over the adequacy of physical plant. (SS135)

Omission of teacher attitudes in the Kerner Commission analysis is also pointed up by examining Rossi's findings of ghetto teacher attitudes toward their pupils. The Kerner Commission explains negative teacher attitudes toward ghetto schools by a chain of development which starts when the least experienced teachers are assigned to disadvantaged schools. According to the Kerner Commission, teachers thus start out with negative attitudes towards students: "This process reinforces the view of ghetto schools as inferior." These attitudes are "aggravated" by: discipline problems; high crime rates in the surrounding areas; greater difficulty in teaching students from disadvantaged background; higher proportions of emotionally disturbed and other problem children in schools because of neighborhood school districting; greater health problems; inadequate facilities relative to the greater needs for supplementary instruction and counseling; and serious mental and physical health problems that are found with greater frequency in poverty areas. (K429) High student turnover in disadvantaged areas is also mentioned as a cause of teacher dissatisfaction and difficulty. (K430)

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[1] See Fogelson's earlier statement, "White on Black: A Critique of the McCone Commission Report on the Los Angeles Riots," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXXII (Sept., 1967), 217–47.

Appropriately, the Kerner Commission takes note of the fact that negative teacher attitudes function as self-fulfilling prophecies wherein low teacher expectations result in low student achievement. (K429) But nowhere in the section on teachers in the Kerner Commission Report does the Commission comment on teacher attitudes toward students as students. Problems that teachers have in ghetto schools, listed above, are all "objectified" so as to relate to community characteristics independent of teacher attitudes toward ghetto kids.

Rossi and associates, in attempting to get at this consideration, developed some interesting findings, although the data may be somewhat ambiguous. They found, for example, that more than half of the teachers interviewed (56 percent) agreed that "many communities provide such a terrible environment for the pupils that education doesn't do much good in the end." Over 80 percent of the teacher repondents thought that parents tried to help children get a good education, but that too many other influences distract the pupils. Rossi and associates conclude that the educators surveyed adhere to a theory of "cultural deprivation" which "finds the reason for bad education primarily in the student's environment rather than in the schools." (SS136)

Similar comments may be made in comparing materials developed by Rossi and his associates in the Supplemental Studies on police behavior and attitudes, and the section in the Kerner Commission Report dealing with police practices. Generally speaking, the Kerner Commission fails to deal with the deeply rooted attitudes concerning Negroes and lawlessness which are revealed in the Rossi survey of police attitudes. While the Kerner Commission Report does cite the research of Albert Reiss concerning the high degree of prejudice toward Negroes expressed by police officers (K306),[2] the Commission does not deal with the implications of these findings. It is content to recommend that officers with poor reputations in ghetto areas be reassigned, that screening procedures be developed to assure that superior officers be assigned to minority group areas, and that incentives be developed to attract outstanding officers to ghetto assignments.

Rossi found that police feel overwhelmingly that riots are caused by criminal elements and agitators, holding this view even more than ghetto merchants (the other occupational group which subscribed to such views in similar proportions). Police also believe, again in contrast to the views of other civil servants (e.g., teachers, social workers), that Negroes have achieved equal treatment in the city and parity in terms of services. These views undoubtedly are reinforced by the fact that police have virtually no personal acquaintances among ghetto residents. (SS113) These findings suggest that police overwhelmingly hold views which deny that social factors may cause civil disorders, deny the relationship of racism to Negro attitudes, and explain ghetto violence in terms of criminal agitation. Equally important, these findings suggest that the police hold a self-justifying theory of riot causation which is impermeable to falsification because rioters are defined as criminal; hence, riots are caused by criminals, and it is unnecessary to search further for causal explanations.

The Kerner Commission recognized that there is "no easy solution to police community relations." (K320) But in the Report the assumption prevails that the police problem is amenable to solution. Perhaps the Kerner Commission was unable to develop a discussion of these perceptions because of the time constraints under which it worked. But the Kerner Commission consistently omits discussion of the attitudes and feelings of various segments of the population in viewing various aspects of riot causation. Thus, it most blatently failed to discuss what the riots meant to the black population, although some such materials were available. Thus the Commission failed to deal with questions of the problems of perceiving riots as protest. Thus the Commission failed to talk about the inferior and worsening quality of police recruitment and training that Skolnick outlines in his recent report.[3] Thus at the same time that the Commission was discrediting the riff-raff theory, police appear to be holding on to it quite firmly. (SS110–111) The Commission does not deal with sources of continued support for various alternative interpretations of riot causation.

Allan Silver has written intriguingly that riot commissions in the United States have generally adopted a perspective in which social causes and conditions are seen to underlie civil disorders to the exclusion of other factors. Silver argues that this perspective functions to permit the various publics of commission reports "to maintain broad political sympathy for the urban Negro 'underclass' and simultaneously come to terms with popular unruliness, riot and violence even though these things are especially disturbing to them."[4] This perspective also permits elites to avoid confronting the revolutionary challenge of civil disorders. By attributing disorders to remote social causes, riot commissions may avoid raising fundamental questions about the nature of the political system. The perspective is the opposite but functional equivalent of the riff-raff theory, which also serves to deflect attention away from the practical content of violent protest by attributing riots to criminals, the uneducated and the socially dislocated.

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[2] See Albert Reiss, "Police Brutality—Answers to Key Questions," *Transaction* (July/August, 1968), 10–19.

[3] Jerome Skolnick, *The Politics of Protest* (New York: Ballantine, 1969), ch. 7.

Having compared some of the Supplemental Studies with the Kerner Commission Report, this analysis may be extended by recognizing the function played by a social causal analysis in permitting the Commission, and those sympathetic to it, to demand changes and advocate radical reforms without calling names. The Kerner Commission viewed the political system as *insufficient*. Drastic program changes and additions are advocated. But just as Silver argues that the perspective often adopted by riot commissions tends to "objectify the causes of violence, to show their roots in environment and social structure, to depersonalize the connection between particular violent groups and the specific content of violent acts,"[5] we may argue that there is a depersonalization, and an objectification in the Kerner Commission's analysis *which permits the Commission to ignore purposive actions in creating preconditions for violence.* There is little or no discussion in the Kerner Commission Report of the ways in which institutions and bureaucracies are structured so as to sustain racism.

As suggested by our review of the Supplemental Studies, attitudes are not scrutinized individually. No one is to blame. In the Kerner Commission Report, police departments have great problems and have difficulty being effective; but policemen are under great stress, too, and their racist attitudes are said on the basis of one study not to affect their work behavior. (K306) Teachers are said to have many reasons why they think ghetto schools are inferior and their status is challenged by being assigned there; but teachers' attitudes toward children in the ghetto are not discussed. Labor union discrimination is barely mentioned in the Report. Politicians are not responsible for lack of progress, and so on. The problem is identified and solutions are proposed. But no one is responsible, and no one is blamed, or urged to act, as an individual, any differently.

This characteristic of the Report, as other illustrations presented here, suggests some insights into the operation of riot commissions. The objectivist and depersonalistic tone of the report may be attributable to the commission's concern for maximizing its political legitimacy (thereby trying to avoid divisions and conflicts among commissioners, some of whom are protective of certain institutions or values). It may be attributable to the desire not to arouse opposition among groups whose future cooperation would be required for implementation of recommendations, or it may be attributable to the genuine convictions of the commissioners. While we cannot finally provide authoritative answers in this note to questions of commission motivation, we can suggest that it would be useful to continue to raise questions about the uses to which government agencies put social scientists and the social sciences.

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[4] Allan Silver, "Official Interpretations of Racial Riots," in Robert Connery (ed.), *Urban Riots: Violence and Social Change,* Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, XXIX, 1 (New York, 1968), 151.

[5] *Ibid.*, 150.

# BOOK REVIEWS

*The Government of Science.* By Harvey Brooks. (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press. 1968. Pp. 343. $10.00.)

*Science and the Federal Patron.* By Michael D. Reagan. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 346. $7.50.)

It is only a few years since Don K. Price pointed out that science had become an American "establishment." Already, however, as Price has lately noted ("Purists and Politicians," *Science,* 163, Jan. 3, 1969), it has come under attack from a motley army of New Puritans aroused by what they see as an unholy alliance of science and the state. President Eisenhower (appropriately an admirer of Cromwell) sounded the tocsin with his farewell warning against "the scientific-technological elite" and "the military-industrial complex." Others have described the active orders of the establishment as a "new priesthood" (Ralph Lapp) wielding sinister influence in the "cardinal decisions" (C. P. Snow) and only too willing, "in the name of science" (H. L. Nieburg), to lend their talents to the cause of temporal power. Even the contemplative orders have been accused of corruption. They are said to tolerate every species of evil, from holy wars to social misery, in exchange for splendid cathedrals (housing accelerators and radio telescopes rather than altars and chantries)—from which presumably only the gargoyles are missing to comment once again upon human folly.

Dangerous as it is to stretch even the best of analogies too far, it is tempting to apply this one to the books under review. Harvey Brooks might be cast as a modern judicious Hooker, writing a twentieth century *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* in defense of establishment, convinced that it is the rational course to follow and that its abuses stem from human frailty and external maldirection. Michael Reagan could be described as a latter-day Leveller, less radical than the establishment's utopian-anarchist critics, agitating for a constructive reform to secure greater popular control under an "agreement of the people" laying down explicit guidelines.

At best, alas, the analogy is imperfect, since neither Brooks nor Reagan has undertaken a defense or critique of the establishment *in toto.* Both concern themselves almost exclusively with the science end of the "science and technology" spectrum—with basic and applied research, rather than with development, which accounts for over two-thirds of the federal budget for "R and D." Brooks does not doubt that *development* should be planned and controlled in accordance with social goals, but in the papers assembled in this volume he concentrates on the problems of science policy narrowly construed. Similarly, although Reagan occasionally touches on other and larger issues, he is mainly concerned in this book with the justifications, criteria, and administrative organization for the support of research and scientific education.

Brooks and Reagan point out that as of now decisions to allocate public funds for science are made in accordance with the pluralistic, decentralized structure and the pressure group style typical of American decision-making generally. Funding for research and training is supplied to support agency missions, to advance knowledge in certain defined areas of special interest (such as atomic energy, outer space and the diseases studied by the National Institutes of Health), to subsidize projects in the various disciplines, and to promote scientific education. The National Science Foundation, which was originally expected to develop overall policies, has actually functioned as the special patron of university science and as a "balance wheel" correcting for deficiencies in areas inadequately funded by other agencies. What planning and coordination there is has been the work of the Budget Bureau, the Office of Science and Technology, and the interagency Federal Council for Science and Technology. These agencies have drawn upon data collected by the NSF, recommendations by the task-force panels of the President's Science Advisory Committee, and studies of needs and opportunities in the disciplines by the Committee on Science and Public Policy (COSPUP) of the National Academy of Sciences. Congressional oversight is performed by a diffuse and overlapping network of committees and subcommittees.

Reagan argues that under the present arrangement, support for science is in continual jeopardy because there is no clear appreciation of why and how it should be provided. He would prefer to see national objectives in science spelled out and the machinery of coordination and review overhauled so that these objectives could be pursued according to some rational plan. Congress could begin by enacting a law similar to the Employment Act of

1946, setting forth overall aims. Although no fixed percentage of the federal budget or of G. N. P. should be prescribed as the "science budget," it would be advisable to establish priorities. First priority, in Reagan's admittedly personal opinion, should be attached to projects serving major social goals; second, to science-related educational needs; third, to undirected small-scale research ("little science"); and last, to large and costly projects ("big science").

Coordination would be made the responsibility of an enlarged OST to be paralleled by a single Joint Congressional Committee for Science and Technology. Like Brooks, Reagan doubts the advisability of a Department of Science, among other reasons because too many of the activities it would have to house would be incompatible with each other and because some are better located in the mission-oriented agencies they are designed to serve. Instead, he suggests that it might be a better idea to associate the NSF, the NIH, the National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities, the Office of Education, and the proposed National Foundation for the Social Sciences, perhaps in a Department of Research and Higher Education. Interfield comparisons could be made by COSPUP (which has so far restricted itself to reviews by discipline) and by an interagency committee of administrators.

Brooks has no great enthusiasm for the effort to set priorities. He points out that none of the proposed rankings—and Reagan's is no exception—offers quantitative guidance. The trouble with all such efforts is that "the problem of scientific choice is multidimensional." (45) "From the standpoint of research allocation, it is difficult to compare atomic energy with pollution control, or space with the removal of urban blight. . . . " (64) How can the value of chemistry to agriculture and industry be measured against the value of astronomy to man's understanding of his place in the universe? (50) It is virtually impossible to assign a meaningful priority to a field as a whole because "there is too large a variation in the quality and relevance of projects within a broad field. . . . " (50) Nor does it make sense to rely on such indices as "proposal pressure," output of publishable papers, or the availability of qualified researchers since, when it comes to absorbing funds, even little science can be open-ended. On the other hand, how is it possible to decide that a given field has attracted all the talented manpower it could conceivably recruit if it were offered unlimited funding? (73)

Categories, as distinct from priorities, are necessary and useful. Brooks offers several sets of these, but he points out that they too are fluid and sometimes misleading. In fiscal 1964, the NSF reported total federal expenditures for basic research of $1.6 billion. Nearly half this sum was accounted for by NASA; but nearly 80 per cent of what NASA classified as "basic research" went into the design and procurement of space vehicles, tracking ranges, etc. (131) Similar ambiguities arise in other areas where "last year's basic research is often this year's applied research" and "the basic research of one field may be the technology of another." (180) Virtually all fundamental research in biology may be classed as applied science "since in our rudimentary state almost any advance is likely to find applications rather quickly in medicine or agriculture." (180) Even presumably mission-oriented and presumably basic research projects funded by the military services have resulted in such practical applications as the laser and maser, the plastic cornea, and a technique for rapidly freezing blood. (113, 124) If disciplines are treated as categories, how can due account be taken of hybrids like biochemistry and geophysics that have lately appeared in rich profusion? (181)

In view of all these subtleties—of which Brooks seems to have an inexhaustible supply—the best way to govern something as inherently ungovernable as science is by "providing over a sustained period the best possible environment for decentralized initiative, and for individual and institutional creativity." (51) The most useful way to classify research is according to "the primary purpose of the institutions or organizational subdivisions that perform it." (184) "The criteria," in other words, "are considerably less important than who applies them." (160)

Although he claims to be avoiding the "unrealistic" extremes of complete autonomy or centralized control, Brooks is actually expounding the ideology of establishment: instead of trying vainly to construct and impose political directives, just hand over the alms box to those who understand the mysteries and let them decide how to divide the collection. The trouble with this ideology is that it is as unacceptable to politicians as dictation by government is unacceptable to scientists. As Reagan puts it, echoing Congressional sentiment, "the funds are not to be left in a hollow stump in the middle of the night, as some researchers would like." (109) Brooks' solution is no more immune to criticism than Reagan's. Again, it provides no quantitative guidance. It relies on the exercise of responsibility by institutions, notably universities, even though Brooks himself points out that the academic climate "generates strong pressures for equal distribution of support, regardless of merit, especially to senior people whose earlier productivity may have declined." (75) Worst of all, instead of confronting the admittedly thorny but vital problem of setting priorities, it fragments and relocates the problem, in effect asking public and private organizations to do separately what the government presumably cannot manage to do collectively on behalf of the taxpaying public.

Brooks' skepticism is nevertheless an effective counterweight to Reagan's reformism. Brooks, who is Dean of Engineering and Applied Physics at Harvard, is probably the most widely experienced and the most thoughtful member of the establishment's hierarchy. Each of his papers is studded with brilliant insights and caveats. The rare flaws crop up only when he ranges far afield or when he is overly defensive. In an otherwise illuminating discussion of similarities between scientific thought and other facets of modern culture, he mistakenly claims that the philosophic concept of progress is derived from the natural scientific theory of evolution and natural selection. In fact, of course, it is the other way round. In an essay on "the scientific adviser" he argues that criticism of PSAC for failing to give due representation to certain of the scientific disciplines and to the diversity of scientists' political views is either exaggerated or beside the point, since PSAC is not supposed to be a legislative body—a response to a perfectly reasonable complaint which is, to say the least, disappointing. Reagan's accurate and readable study also merits high praise, especially for its creative approach to the practical tasks of reform. The main limitation of the study is one that the author has himself imposed by confining his attention to policy for "pure" science. This is a serious limitation because it makes his recommendations less clear and less convincing than they might otherwise be. Would an expanded OST and the proposed JCST be expected to handle development as well as research? How would a reform of science policy affect the links between industry and government? Would it change the present role of scientists in policy-making? Such questions are neither asked nor answered. Another shortcoming of both these books is that at a time when the U. S. should be thinking seriously about meshing its domestic policies with its foreign policies, especially in science and technology, neither author gives more than passing attention to the problem of formulating domestic science policy to take account of international commitments and constraints.

Regardless of their limitations, however, both these works make valuable contributions to the more comprehensive study now well underway of the interaction of science and society. In time, to revert to the historical analogy, this study may help make it possible for some future Locke to put the interaction in proper perspective. From a later point of view, the controversy over the establishment of science may come to be regarded, much as we now regard the controversy over the establishment of religion, as the forerunner of a great social transformation, fully as significant as the earlier passage from feudalism to liberalism and industrial society. David Apter hints at the character of this transformation when he suggests (*The Politics of Modernization*, 433) that in an age of science "the application of knowledge by political means—and not the responsiveness of government to private wants—becomes the test of good government."

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*Television in Politics*. BY JAY G. BLUMLER, AND DENIS MCQUAIL. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. Pp. 361. $13.25.)

This book should be of interest to political scientists for at least two reasons. First, and most important, it is a major contribution to the literature on the political impact of television. This literature oscillates between impressionistic accounts that are uninformed by data and small-scale analyses that are relevant to the Big Issues only by strained inferences; *Television in Politics* presents hard-data analysis that *is* relevant to the Big Issues. Second, it gives valuable insights into British electoral processes during a period of political change.

The book's analytic strength comes from its focus on the O part of the S-O-R paradigm. In the author's words, its point of departure was "the expectation that in the persuasive process sheer amount of exposure to television might matter less than the precise motives, and the different degrees of motivation, underlying the reception by viewers of political materials." (p. 6) Accordingly, they adopt a "uses-and-gratifications approach" which asks about the reasons why people watch political broadcasts, the uses made of the broadcasts, and preferences for different formats. This lets them develop their findings about the *impact* of broadcasts in terms of an interaction between motivation and exposure.

The basic fact which stimulates concern about T.V. is its wide reach. The authors show that almost three quarters of all voters watched at least one party broadcast in 1964 compared to two-fifths in 1955. But even more important is the wide reach among voters who would not otherwise be paying much attention to the campaign. This part of the population (about one-half of those tuned-in) watches out of *toleration* for party broadcasts ("It never gets switched off. I was waiting for Frank Sinatra Jr.") in more or less the way one watches the news; it is best described as surveillance of the political environment. These people are *reached* by political information but do not seek it out for political ends.

The two most important motives for seeking information, on the other hand, are a desire for reinforcement of political predispositions and a need for help in the voting decision. About fifteen percent of viewers were "pure" vote-guidance seekers, and twenty-three percent were "pure" reinforcement seekers; a further eleven percent had some mixture of these motives. This distinction is important (as the authors point out) because of various attempts to describe the "typical voter" as *simply* reinforcement-seeking or *simply* collecting information in order to help with a rational vote-calculus. More accurately, there is a large body with no political motive for watching and, beyond this, a continuum of electors stretched between the reinforcement-seeking end and the vote-guidance end. Party loyalty is the motivating factor for the former, and party choice the motivating factor for the latter.

The central theoretical variable in this study is a measure of the strength of a viewer's motivation to follow the election campaign on T.V. Some such variable is necessary because exposure to T.V. is so widespread; high exposure can be explained by habitual use of the set or by deep concern for the political subject matter of broadcasts. It is also necessary because of the theoretical expectation that motivation is related to susceptibility to influence. In short, it is likely to be an important intervening variable between exposure to the stimulus and the attitude-change response.

As expected, exposure to the T.V. campaign varied positively with motivation to attend the campaign on T.V. (although, interestingly enough, there was a negative relationship between such motivation and general use of T.V.). The interaction of exposure and motivation, however, is best demonstrated by the fortunes of the Liberal party during the campaign. It is clear that the Liberal Party gained most from the campaign. The panel data show the Liberals gaining votes from Conservative and Labour defections, but losing very little themselves, and pro-Liberal attitude change was strongly (and positively) related to exposure to Liberal campaign broadcasts. But when motivation is held constant this latter relationship becomes erratic for the high motivated group and very strong indeed for the low motivated group. Attitude change, in other words, is a function of exposure *when viewer motivation is low but not when it is high.*

From the perspective of trends in British politics, the important question this raises is why the campaign should have so helped the Liberal Party. The authors suggest that its central position in a bi-polar party system helped it: a shift to the middle is easier than a shift to the other extreme. They also make two suggestions which, in the light of their main theoretical thrust, seem to deserve more attention than they get. The first is that the politically indifferent section of the electorate (those who are less motivated to attend to broadcasts but who, nevertheless, are exposed to them) were particularly receptive to Liberal propaganda because of generally lukewarm feelings about the other parties. The second is that the election campaign coverage boosts the Liberal Party more than the others because of its relative obscurity in the period between the elections. The average citizen "who is not actively seeking political information but takes it as it comes" (i.e.: the low motivated citizen) will be strongly affected when he is exposed to campaign-levels of transmission. As the authors point out, this happens more with T.V. than with the press because T.V. is obliged to devote a definite time allocation to the Liberal case. These are speculations of some significance; if they are correct, the fortunes of all third parties are considerably boosted by the T.V. revolution in political communications.

Since voting theory generally points to "issue factors" and "candidate factors" as the main components of the vote (after "party factors") their findings about the role of T.V. in shaping issue awareness and candidate-related attitudes are important. Exposure to the T.V. campaign, as expected, is related to information gain about party issue positions, but motivation again plays a central role: information gain falls off at the highest levels of exposure, *unless* such exposure goes with high motivation to attend, in which case "motivation takes over".

Their data also help to resolve (or at least make more sophisticated) the debate over the role of T.V. in perceptions of candidates. In a nutshell, they find that *factual* knowledge about the candidates—for example, about personality characteristics—changed considerably during the campaign, and that the change was "stimulus determined" rather than "perceiver determined". On the other hand, *evaluations*—moral characteristics—tended to be "perceiver determined" rather than "stimulus determined". Thus it is not sufficient to say, as many have, that what one gets out of T.V. depends on what political prejudices are brought to the viewing situation; this might be true for evaluations, but it is not true for more substantive information.

One might have asked the authors for a somewhat more systematic attempt at formalizing their theory; as it is, the reader sometimes has to do the job himself. However, the theory is there for the picking. It is a classic in the field.

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*Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R., 1917–1967*. BY T. H. RIGBY. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, Pp. 573, $15.00.)

Professor Rigby has written a sterling monograph of heroic proportions, which is precisely limited to a dynamic profile of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during its half-century period of power. The book is studded with charts and statistical tables, unencumbered with irrelevant quantitative prestidigitation. The apparent unsophistication of his statistical computations may disturb some readers, but his data will probably provide years of employment to other scholars as they mine the rich lode of numbers he supplies.

The book is organized very simply. It includes a conceptual introduction which appears to be an afterthought that seems to have little organic connection with the body of the study. The work is largely descriptive and bears little relationship to the author's claim that "the framework we shall employ here is a fairly radical adaptation of that proposed by Gabriel Almond in his introduction to *The Politics of Developing Areas* (p. 18)." As a meticulously documented work of descriptive analysis, the study can stand sturdily and independently on its own merits and hardly requires the conceptual crutch provided in the introduction. After 54 pages of paying ritualistic obeisance to the cult of concept-manipulation, the author dispenses with his framework until page 510, where it is resurrected for another 15 pages. "This framework," Rigby writes, "is implicit in the body of the book, but we have avoided rigid pigeon-holing of data in terms of abstract concepts or constant explicit reference back to our analytical framework, since this would overload the text with jargon and exasperate readers who did not happen to be students of comparative politics or political sociology. In the Conclusion we attempt to summarize our findings in terms of this framework." (p. 50).

The body of the work is not cast within the framework described in the first 54 or last 15 pages of the book, nor indeed is it cast within any systematic conceptual mold, aside from that of traditional descriptive analysis. This does not in any way detract from the significance of his research or its usefulness to others, for Professor Rigby has produced a monumental study which will remain definitive for many years. Previous readers of Professor Rigby's articles on the Soviet Communist Party need no introduction either to his methods and approaches, which might be characterized as traditional-innovative, or to the significance of his research, which has always been rigorous in its precision, meticulous in its documentation, modest in its claims, thoroughly reliable in its presentation, perhaps a little too prudent and judicious in its conclusions, and nearly always heuristic in its exfoliation. The book under review, which is an extrapolation and refinement of his previous research, reflects equal care and discrimination in the employment of data and reportage of conclusions.

The substance of the book is divided into two unequal parts. Part One covers "the main lines of CPSU recruitment policies and trends in membership, particularly social and occupational trends . . . in historical sequences." The second, somewhat shorter part, deals with a "number of special aspects . . . isolated for special treatment," *i.e.*, it deals with the over-all character and composition of the Party in terms of turnover, sex, age, nationality, education, representativeness, and geographical distribution. Part One is thus essentially a chronological history of the Party as it was alternately "proletarianized," and "de-proletarianized" during the vicissitudes of the Stalinist era and its transformation into an instrument of the multi-faceted ruling bureaucracy. The periodic attempts to establish a balance between the imperatives of a proletarian party and an effective or competent party is also covered, culminating in the emergence of Khrushchev's All-People's Party, *i.e.* a quasi-mass political organization, within which is secreted the "ruling elite." Part Two, which is divided into six chapters, also contains much useful information of a statistical nature, although it, too suffers from insufficient analysis.

Although it was clearly not the intention of the author to produce a work on the Soviet political system as such, his reluctance to deal with the dynamics or "stuff" of Soviet politics in a book of more than 500 pages on the CPSU inevitably imparts to his study an eviscerated quality. This becomes particularly apparent when Professor Rigby, in his most determined effort at analysis in a chapter entitled "A Representative Elite?," fails to answer satisfactorily the tantalizing question he poses. In this chapter, the author devotes considerable attention to the socio-occupational composition of the Party and the Party composition of socio-occupational groupings, but nowhere does he deal with the institutional patterns of interlock and interaction at the Summit of the Soviet system, which he must do if he wishes to provide an answer to his own question. The last paragraph of the chapter begins with the promising words, "We are now in a position to refine our proposed concept of the CPSU as a 'representative elite,' " but characteristically, he leaves the reader pleading for a judgment which does not materialize. "The CPSU is certainly an elite in Soviet society," he observes, "and it certainly consists of representatives of all sections of that society." Yet, one would conclude from his own preceding descriptive account that a 13,000,000 member organization, over half of whom are nobodies, can hardly be called an "elite," although it might be described as "representative" (p. 453).

But because the author did not examine the interlocking membership and interacting character of the important decision-making organs of the Soviet political system, he is not really in a position to define or delineate the Soviet elite or elites, much less to determine whether the Party itself is in fact an "elite." As Professor Rigby's data itself demonstrates, the CPSU cannot be an elite organization, but rather is an organization which incorporates three elites almost completely (the armed forces, the police, and the Party Apparatus, although the author mystifyingly omits the latter) and "links up the various [other] elites of Soviet society . . .by overlapping with them, not by incorporating them." Hence, the Party emerges quite clearly, not as an elite, but as an arena within which the various elites in Soviet society articulate their interests and make their demands known upon one another as they compete for power, influence and resources. And how this is executed cannot be fully understood without an examination of the structural and institutional relationship between the Party and other structures and institutions in Soviet society A single chapter devoted to this aspect of the Soviet system would have made an excellent study even more rewarding

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*Mr. Justice Murphy: A Political Biography.* BY J. WOODFORD HOWARD. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. Pp. 578. $12.50.)

Revelations of judicial life in the Supreme Court of the United States from the time Frank Murphy took his seat on February 5, 1940 to his death on July 19, 1949 make this an important, fascinating study. The book also holds riches for students of personality and of institutions. Murphy was born in 1890, went to the University of Michigan Law School, practiced law, was a Captain in the A.E.F., a losing Democratic candidate for Congress in 1920, a big electoral winner in Detroit for judge of Recorder's Court in 1923 and 1929, for mayor of Detroit in 1930, and for Governor of Michigan in 1936. He won national attention as judge in the 1925 Ossian Sweet racial defense case, as compassionate depression mayor and cool, adroit governor in the climactic sit-down strikes. Murphy was For-Roosevelt-Before-Chicago, and F.D.R. named him chief American representative to the Philippines in 1933, Attorney General in 1939 and, the final reward, Associate Justice. Each episode in Murphy's career is treated in such rich detail that the book encompasses legal education, urban politics, colonialism, federalism, parties and patronage, the President's cabinet, and policy-making in the Justice Department. The treatment is personal and specific, however, so the focus is on Frank Murphy in each setting and there are no elaborate hypotheses of office or reviews of the specialized writing on these topics. The book is well informed on each point and it is thorough; it simply offers little novelty in biographical method.

Howard is the first to tap the magnificent Murphy manuscript collection in the University of Michigan Library but the sparsity of other judicial papers and Howard's rules in using those of Murphy keeps the book from being a full-fledged study of the Roosevelt Court. Four brethren (Black, Reed, Frankfurter and Douglas) preceded Murphy to the Court and were there after he died, serving all nine terms with him. The coincidence of terms of service with others was Jackson, eight; Stone, C. J., and Rutledge, five each; Roberts and Burton, four each; Vinson, C. J., three; McReynolds, Hughes, C. J., and Byrnes, one each. I do not take exception to Howard's discretionary rules in tapping the available confidential papers but wish those rules were more completely spelled out along with an account of other available papers. This would show the possibilities open to future students. This task is not done by the impeccable footnotes and brief preface.

Consider the problem of confidential sources further. Howard rules out "embarrassing individuals or the Court," abhors quotes that "might be misconstrued as an effort to discredit a Justice," and "chooses not to undertake extensive treatment of a Justice on the bench." For the living, also, he has not quoted from the papers of any Justice without permission. He acknowledges "the cost is to present Justices Black and Douglas as relatively wooden characters." (p. ix) Essentially the same result holds for Reed and Byrnes, who today are living retired justices; Roberts, Vinson and McReynolds, who seem to have left no manuscript collections; and Burton, whose papers in the Library of Congress are dull, though helpful in corroborating votes in conference and the like. The Library of Congress manuscript collection for Hughes was used in the Merlo Pusey biography, that for Stone in Alpheus Mason's notable and exhaustive biography. The Rutledge papers, not very well exploited in the Fowler Harper biography, remain in family hands and were apparently not available to Howard. There seem to be no papers for Robert H. Jackson and his long oral history reminiscence will not be open in the Columbia Special Collections until June 1, 1980!

What remains, then, is very largely a study of two justices, Frank Murphy and Felix Frankfurter. The Murphy papers are full of notes from Frankfurter, beseeching, praising, belittling, mocking. They are stuff for a playwright, like Albee perhaps, and are tantalizing to the straight scholar who sees in them the possibilities for analysis but lacks the tools and the daring. Howard presents them as part of descriptions of decision making by the Court and of the anxieties Justice Murphy felt in reaching outcomes. At points this book becomes a dual biography of Frankfurter and Murphy but even with Frankfurter damning himself by tart, mean notes and persistence connivance to win votes to his views he seems to come off better in Howard's estimation than does Murphy.

Murphy is praised for his instincts and for his courage in the *Korematsu* and *Yamashita* cases for "he seldom muffed the big ones." (p. 487) Yet Howard concludes that Murphy was not a "great" jurist, had no "well-rounded philosophy of the judicial function" but rather exemplified "the native tradition which distrusts 'legalism,' scholastics, and theoreticians." (p. 486). This was the kind of assessment Frankfurter made in his note to Justice Murphy addressed "Dear god" where he says "it must be wonderful to be a god" for, after all, "a god does not have to read or study things in order to understand them." (p. 396) By themselves, the spiciness of the Frankfurter notes makes this biography of Murphy fascinating. Mostly the material comes from the Murphy papers at Michigan. The Frankfurter correspondence in the Library of Congress is now open and was also used to an extent. When the Frankfurter judicial papers now at Harvard Law School are meshed with other related materials there will be work for an army of scholars to piece his career together and for dramatists to bring it to life.

Just as the Frankfurter characterization is implicit and simply keeps pushing itself upon the reader in the context of this study of Murphy, so, too, is the theme of irrationality and political by-play put down by Howard's assertion that appellate courts "probably achieve greater rationality in their decision-making than legislative or executive organs, whose processes of resolving disputes necessarily require negotiation, unprincipled behavior, and secrecy which judges must eschew." (p. 483) Howard shares Chief Justice Hughes' belief that "knowledge of how courts operate would vindicate popular respect for the judiciary." (p. viii) It would be interesting to operationalize the meaning of "vindicate" and "popular respect" and test this hypothesis by apprising and polling different publics about 1) Justice Murphy asking his Budget Bureau friend and roommate, Edward G. Kemp, to comment on drafts of his opinions; 2) colleagues hiding doubts from Murphy, while as a freshman justice he wrote the *Thornhill* opinion, because they hoped he would join them as an ally later; 3) how Black and Douglas shed extreme equivocation in the decision-making process and set forth conclusions in their opinions which were stripped of even a hint of this difficulty; 4) Frankfurter's caucus of justices he hoped would vote with him in the *Everson* case; 5) Frankfurter's Sunday letter of appeal to Murphy to decide that case in the liberal Catholic tradition of Cardinal Gibbons; 6) Murphy's outrage at being publicly denounced by the clergy for his position in the *McCollum* case and his action in planting rebuttals among friendly priests and journalists; 7) Murphy being reviled within the Court for his decisions which, it was said, gave him a constituency of aliens, crooks and communists.

Apart from the sensational items that appeal to us tabloid readers we get a picture of decision-making which seems to me to be definitely believable. Howard has done a beautiful job of capturing the complexities of that process in a whole series of cases. I like the book. It contributes mightily to understanding, especially when read with Herman Pritchett's *Roosevelt Court* and the *Vinson Court and Civil Liberties*. Yet I am not convinced that Howard's *Mr. Justice Murphy* demonstrates that the Supreme Court of the 1940's achieved greater rationality than Congress or the President. I await the polls to learn whether Howard's nicely wrought inside story will "vindicate popular respect for the judiciary."

CLEMENT E. VOSE

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*Obscenity and Public Morality: Censorship in a Liberal Society*. BY HARRY M. CLOR. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969. Pp. 315. $9.50.)

Here is a book that sets out to "develop a philosophy of censorship," by an author who, addressing what is probably a largely libertarian audience, recognizes that the trends of the times seem to be "contrary to the thesis of this book." Clearly, we are in the presence of a brave man. Here, also, is a book of breadth and sophistication, well-researched, closely argued, and moderate in tone. In short, this is one of the most effective statements of the value of obscenity control to be made to date, and one that deserves a full hearing, especially from libertarians. It is a book not without difficulties, but first, Professor Clor's argument, or at least a compression of it, should be set forth.

The author, presenting a systematic review of arguments and evidence on the effects of obscenity, concludes that though the evidence on whether obscenity is a cause of anti-social behavior is inconclusive, there is good reason to believe that it "can contribute to the debasement of moral standards and ultimately of character." Asserting that these standards are a legitimate concern of government, he argues that not only have all societies dealt with depiction of the physical and sensual side of life by establishing binding public moral standards, but also that such standards are, in fact, *essential* to a civil society. Yet the community cannot rely solely on non-governmental institutions—the family, church, public opinion—to maintain these moral standards, since these agencies are, today, more often shaped by the standards than they are the shapers of them. Government and the law, then, have a necessary and legitimate function to perform in preventing the most corrupt influence and in holding up an authoritative standard for the guidance of opinions and judgment. However, ordinary notions and legal formulas of obscenity are not suitable guides for censorship, because they do not sufficiently explain what is wrong with obscenity. Obscenity should be seen in moral perspective, as a "way of looking at man which dehumanizes human purposes and human beings." Its harm lies in its reductionist isolation of sex, death, and suffering to the animal or subhuman level.

In actual obscenity control, these moral considerations must be joined with both the community's interest in protecting its "common beliefs" or "moral consensus," and its interest in the circulation of literature. Clor would exempt from control works of acknowledged excellence or seriousness. For more difficult cases, he calls for a "recognition" (as opposed to "blanket imposition") of community standards, and suggests four "public opinions," beginning with the lowest common denominator of shared attitudes and prescriptions, which can be utilized to discern community standards. This is too important a matter to be left to literary critics, whose function does not ordinarily include a careful weighing of "those elements of the public interest which may be found on the philistine's side of the controversy." Instead, this responsibility must be assumed by a "judge, or a jury under a judge's guidance." Clor believes that such a system, though leaving untouched much that might otherwise be considered obscene, would be a barrier to the "worst instrusions." Our obscenity jurisprudence should reflect a concern for public morality at least in its rhetoric, if not always in its decisions. He concludes that censorship of obscenity, though not a liberal-democratic measure, can still serve a liberal democracy by "helping it maintain ethical and political proportion," in being a "counterweight to those evils or excesses which are a by-product of its virtues."

I shall leave ideological criticism of this book to those who see any kind word for governmental censorship as Armageddon, in order to consider some practical aspects of Clor's analysis and thesis. His critique of the Supreme Court's work in obscenity cases and of the libertarian position generally, is painstaking and impressive. In fact, it is hard to see how any further examination of the obscenity decisions, already a well-worn ground for scholars, can improve upon this searching analysis. Probing the libertarian mind, however, is a much less frequently assumed task, and Clor, examining the works of a number of modern writers, finds the libertarian position to be a "complex combination of truths, partial truths, fallacies, and unexamined assumptions." Its ethical relativism and absolute commitment to individual liberty combine to create a climate of irresponsibility. This assertion will raise hackles, but if it succeeds in inducing any self-examination at all, it will sharpen future value debate. Clor also shifts the burden of proof, asserting that libertarians have not established that *all* censorship is bad, nor that obscenity is *totally* without harmful effects. In times less super-permissive than those of the present, this would be a less defensible tactic. Actually, in relying upon the availability of constitutional checks and the fact that "censorship is not our normal way of governing," Clor displays greater confidence in the viability of the free speech system than do many libertarians. However, at these and various other crucial points—the requisites of a civil society, the ineffectuality of nongovernmental institutions, etc.—we are mightily in the realm of conjecture, where philosophers thrive and policymakers founder.

Clor's arguments are less impressive as he turns from critique to prescription, and it is exactly here that the considerable distance between general value guidelines and operational concerns becomes most apparent. It is not clear, for example, whether his "contemporary community" is the nation or some lesser social entity (a reflection of the same ambiguity for which he has earlier criticized the Supreme Court). In his prescriptive ambitions for it, the concept seems to refer to the former, but as a society that would yield up a discoverable "moral consensus," it appears to be decidedly local. In fact, the entire notion of a national "moral consensus," one that is more than just the most conservative opinion and yet sharp enough to be a judgmental instrument, is a highly dubious one, to say the least. The role Clor sets out for his judge is equally improbable. It appears that this key public servant must be equal parts man of letters, moral philosopher, and public opinion analyst, besides being blessed with the political isolation of a monk. Some triers of some obscenity cases have perhaps approached this ideal, but a *system* of such judicial supermen is a little too much to expect. When and if the more conservative disposition in local communities or in the nation makes itself felt on obscenity questions, its vehicle will likely be that of political pressure, variously applied, rather than the juridical discoveries outlined here. Clor also says nothing about the prosecutor, who has much formal as well as informal discretion in any governmental obscenity censorship. Likewise, he excuses himself at the outset from dealing with either the procedural aspects of obscenity censorship or with informal censorship of a governmental or group character and its relationship to formal censorship, though he does recognize the importance of these questions. Yet it is on just the latter question that Clor's ideas about community standards have much relevance, and it is from that problem area that we find empirical studies of conflict management which would support some of his arguments.

A philosophy or rationale for censorship cannot rest on the interest of public morality alone. Before we can feel at ease with governmental obscenity censorship, we need to know more about the effects of obscenity itself, the effects of various censorship devices and methods, and something about the relationship of informal censorship to governmental controls. Though Clor has told us nothing new about these problems, he has impressively analyzed, evaluated, and clarified what we do know, and has in addition, made a forceful and skillful case for giving renewed attention to the concerns of public morality.

RICHARD S. RANDALL
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*The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon.* BY MICHAEL C. HUDSON. (New York: Random House, 1968. Pp. 364. $8.95.)

This single-nation case study is an example of the small but growing body of scholarship on contemporary Middle Eastern politics that reflects the continuing revolution in the field of comparative politics. Professor Hudson addresses himself to many of the questions and problems posed in recent years by students of political development. The influence of the conceptual and theoretical approaches of Karl Deutsch, Samuel Huntington and others is apparent; also apparent is the perspective on data-making and data-analysis associated with users of nation-level aggregate data.

Professor Hudson organizes his study around two questions: (1) how has Lebanon's shallowly rooted liberal democracy managed to survive the formidable challenges of the first two decades of independence; and (2) what are its chances for survival in the forseeable future? He attempts to answer these questions through an analysis of the relationships between the changing capabilities of the Lebanese political system and the changing burden of demands emenating from its changing environment, domestic and external. As he sees it, such an analysis requires study of the nature, velocity and amplitude of change in both the political system and its environment.

Professor Hudson's major and most provocative proposition concerns the relationships between democratic instrumentation, political stability and societal development. Standing the prevailing theory of stable democracy on its head, he suggests that in the Lebanese case "there is reason to think that . . . democratic institutions have been a requisite for political stability, not a result of it." (8) Strong sectarian sentiments and a deeply rooted pattern of "traditional pluralism" deny Lebanon the political consensus and highly legitimate machinery of state that are presumed to be the bases of order and stability in the modern nation-state. Hudson draws a suggestive analogy between the domestic environment of Lebanese politics and the classic international balance of power system: in each case, a number of both highly autonomous and interdependent actors seek security and attempt to advance their interests in a setting marked by mutual suspicion and hostility. According to Hudson, democratic instrumentation—albeit limited by situation and intent—has provided the institutional framework in which Lebanon has managed to avoid sliding into the Hobbesian "state of nature." Flexible and porous, Lebanon's oligarchical bargaining system has been remarkably successful in maintaining and incrementally adjusting the delicate balance upon which order and stability have depended. In this fashion, the political system has managed to survive in an environment made inhospitable by recurring sectarian tensions and external influences.

This, however, is only half the story. Lebanon's quasi-democratic system has a much less adequate performance record in matters of national integration, modernization and social justice. What lends urgency to this situation is the fact that private (and some public) initiatives over the past two decades have produced a pattern of extremely rapid, uneven economic development and social mobilization. As a result, the stability of the Lebanese system is increasingly threatened by the demands of the recently mobilized for fundamental reforms. The Lebanese political establishment, concludes Hudson, is confronted with a potential dilemma: "To adjust to the new social justice and the newly politicized elements may lead to a derangement of the traditional balance of power, with its attendent instability; not to adjust may invite the total destruction of the political system." (12)

Professor Hudson draws upon a rich variety of data to support his thesis that democracy has been more a blessing than a curse to Lebanon. In addition to a wide range of secondary sources, he makes good use of interview data, census-type aggregate data and electoral statistics. His skillful use of the available aggregate data to construct a picture of the rate and scope of social mobilization is particularly noteworthy, as is his resourceful manipulation of electoral data to determine changes in the patterns of political participation, competitiveness and organizational development. These varied materials are woven together and interpreted in ways that are always interesting and intelligible. The different patterns of presidential power and institutional performance of the Khoury, Chamoun and Chehab regimes are presented against a rich environmental backdrop: the personalities, factions and social bases of the "establishment" and the "radical outsiders;" the ebb and flow of parochial strains and external influences; and the changing patterns of social mobilization, development and political participation.

Lebanese politics is, among other things, exciting. By including ample portions of narrative history, Hudson is able to subject two decades of Lebanese politics to systematic analysis without sacrificing this excitement. What results is the best macropolitical study in English of contemporary Lebanon.

Despite its undeniable virtues—or perhaps because of them—this volume is a sharp reminder of the gap between aspiration and realization in the study of comparative politics. Hudson's study reveals notable disjunctions among theory, data and mode of analysis. For example, he seems to consider the "shared doctrine" (126) or "common code" (147) of the ruling elite as an intervening (or independent) variable explaining Lebanon's capacity to survive. Nevertheless, the specific content of this elite culture is not studied (or at least not reported) systematically; nor is the fragmented political culture of the non-elites related to that of the elite. To tap these dimensions, of course, would require extensive survey or content analysis. An important disjunction also exists between the mode of analysis on the one hand, and theory and data on the other. Single-nation studies of so time-oriented a theoretical concern as political development and mobilization may be more appropriately approached by longitudinal techniques. Multiple time-series analysis, which orders and relates data in terms of precise units of time, may be the best way to handle questions in which rate and sequence of change are crucially important and to integrate quantitative and non-quantitative materials in the same historical study. Admittedly, the data constraints are formidable. Nevertheless, in the case of Lebanon, sufficient data seem to be available to attempt to relate series of "event statistics" to data on an interesting range of quarterly, semi-annual or annual social indicators. In this fashion, a tighter fit might be achieved between changing system performance and stability on the one hand, and changing demands from the domestic and external environment on the other hand.

Nevertheless, Professor Hudson does carry us a number of steps towards an understanding of the dynamics of Lebanese politics. Moreover, his volume whets the appetite. Lebanon recommends itself as a laboratory for the close study of political development and modernization. Perhaps Professor Hudson will find time in the future to seek answers to the questions that his volume raises and leaves unanswered.

ROBERT BURROWES
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*Democracy in the Administrative State.* BY EMMETT S. REDFORD. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 211. $5.00; paper, $2.25.)

This is a careful, thoughtful and systematic effort, characteristic of its author, to assess the actualities and potentialities of democratic performance in the workings of the "administrative state"—by which he means the institutions and processes of administration considered in the context of the total political system. He does not try for quantification in the assessment, but he is clear about standards of qualitative judgment, and he comes up with some analytical categories that mark, I think, a substantial advance over previous thinking on this subject.

The first chapter states his three tenets of democratic morality—a premium on "individual realization" as a goal of public policy; the equality of men in their claims for attention; and the widest practicable provision for participation—along with three ways of arriving at policies, by elaboration of consensus, by majority vote and by brokerage of interests. It proceeds to suggest typical "quandaries" inherent in attempts to meet democratic standards as well as other tests of government such as wisdom, the reduction of tensions and order. Humane policy, open access to those who make it, and a share in the processes of developing it, are his touchstones.

The second chapter reflects on significant features of administrative institutions and notes the influence of the official roles, the personal stakes and the professional norms of the decision makers. The third chapter sketches a generalized but realistic model of institutional relationships.

With this much by way of groundwork the fourth and fifth chapters develop three generic categories of administrative action—the author calls them "micropolitics", "subsystem politics" and "macropolitics", respectively—and examines each in turn to see how the tenets of democratic morality fare. A sixth chapter considers the protections and remedies available to citizens as subjects, in connection with such topics as redress of individual grievances, invasions of privacy and participation. The seventh chapter treats the problems of public employees and ways of ameliorating the divergences between their personal interests and the public goals of the agencies they work for. The final chapter strikes a more philosophical note and ends in a judicious balance of satisfaction and concern for the prospects for "workable" democracy in the processes of administration.

Five years ago, Theodore Lowi, in a notably original essay (in *World Politics*, July 1964) distinguished three kinds of what he called policy "arenas" for domestic legislation—"distributive", "regulatory" and "redistributive". They were particularly suggestive because each was associated with a type of politics said to be characteristic of it—patronage, pressure group and class politics, respectively—and therefore was explanatory as well as descriptive. The distinctions, however, were clearer in concept than in practice and broke down at the water's edge.

Redford notes (p. 84n) the parallel between his "micropolitics"—the satisfaction of an individual claim, the award of a contract or license, the location of a particular federal installation, the avoidance of a pending threat; more generally, a decision in which one or a very few persons, firms or localities have a very heavy stake in a matter that no one else cares about—and Lowi's "distributive" arena. But where Lowi was content to throw out a suggestion, Redford was gone on to analyze its operation and to show not only the grounds for its durability but also how the application of democratic tenets of morality to a repetitive group of cases tends to reduce the process from the methods of patronage and favoritism to an administrative routine conducted according to prescribed standards.

Beyond this, as it seems to me, Redford's two further categories, subsystem and macropolitics, are both more realistic and more explanatory than Lowi's. The parallel between "regulatory" and "subsystem" is close. But the cosy arrangements that writers from Pendleton Herring to Leiper Freeman have made familiar, the triangular arrangements that link cognate bureaus, congressional committees and outside interest groups, have more than regulation in view. Redford's extensive and intensive previous work in regulatory administration puts him on home grounds in treating this topic. Moreover, his "macropolitics" is a concept at once more inclusive and more serviceable than "redistribution". Every transfer is some sort of redistribution, and it is not only class conflict such as produced the Wagner Act that broadens the scope of political involvement beyond the capacity of a subsystem to contain the ensuing controversy. Redford itemizes no less then seven distinct grounds for appeal to or intervention by macropolitical forces, to upset subsystem arrangements.

On other aspects of his general subject, he views sympathetically but without elaboration the demands for more participatory democracy in urban anti-poverty programs. He finds that the basic problem in improving executive-congressional relations, from the standpoint of advancing the democratic ideal, "lies in the pockets of narrow responsiveness in the leadership posts in Congress" (p. 131). And in anticipating the continued expansion of the administrative state, he offers the hypothesis that "*comprehensive, democratic jurisdiction attracts power*" (p. 184).

It is a book to cherish, from the hand of a scholar and statesman.

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD
*Columbia University*

*Political Socialization.* BY RICHARD E. DAWSON AND KENNETH PREWITT. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1969, Pp. 226. $1.95.)

*Political Socialization* has a comprehensible plan in developing an approach to political life, the processes by which new members of a polity learn about politics, and the agencies (family, education, media, peers etc.) that transmit popular political culture at various stages in the life cycle. This is competently and professionally done with the distinction between direct and indirect political learning (Chapter V), discontinuities in the socialization process (Chapter VI), and the discussion of peer group influence (Chapter VII) of particular value. Furthermore, in the introductory and concluding chapters, Dawson and Prewitt go to lengths beyond the usual call for more research to say how much we (and they) do not know about comparative socialization, relations among socialization agencies, collective processes of political change, and other critical matters.

However, the intellectual uneasiness of authors and reviewer ought to be articulated. Here are empirical propositions drawn from Dawson and Prewitt's volume, propositions that the reader can test for himself:

1. Political Socialization is much more useful in exploring and understanding the attitudes and behavior of children and adolescents than of young adults and mature citizens.
2. Political Socialization is more significant to processes of political continuity and consensus than it is to processes of political discontinuity and conflict.
3. Political Socialization is more useful in dealing with mediating agencies and institutions (schools, families, political parties) than with the influence of central political agencies (government bureacracies, the military, corporations).
4. Political Socialization has a greater explanatory and ideological affinity for the politics and outlooks of middle-class socializers (parents, teachers, party activists) than it does for the politics and outlooks of cumulatively advantaged and disadvantaged strata in the United States. Consequently, it deals with electoral and voluntary group politics more often than with the politics of policy-makers and protest.
5. Political Socialization is most useful in dealing with personality and cultural dimensions. It is least useful in understanding political contexts in which direct, unique, and significant struggles for power and values are going on.
6. In striving for organic explanations (system theory, functionalism, agency reinforcement) mainstream Political Socialization research is less sensitive to political processes and purposive striving that determine distributive policies and the rules of the game within socializing agencies themselves (universities, political parties, control of community and poverty agencies).
7. If valid, these propositions yield an important generalization: Political Socialization research as reviewed by Dawson and Prewitt can explain a very limited range of politics under very limited conditions with very limited applicability to political phenomena.

Dawson and Prewitt do observe that "the influence of political socialization includes more than the formation of the citizen's political views. Every dimension of the polity public order, justice, legitimacy, policy, stability, leadership is affected by the processes of political socialization and the structure through which this process occurs." (p. 201). Why, then, are these central political matters not explained through the Political Socialization construct?

Consider that the authors adopt a building block premise in which individual patterns must be explored before one can develop more politically comprehensive and cumulative explanations (see pp. 201–2). Consider further that the scope of politics under discussion tends to be circumscribed by citizen experience with the ballot box:

> Democracy is no longer just a vague symbol but one which specifically connotes competitive elections and control of political authorities by constitutional means. The individual learns how his world is structured and where he fits into it. Government officials are elected and he, the citizen, gets to cast his ballot along with everyone else." (p. 23)

Experiences with military induction, the policeman's mace, the informal power structure of the ghetto and the corporate board fall outside the parameters of "getting to cast his ballot along with everyone else."

Moreover, political socialization occurs among diffuse and potentially similar agencies:

> In the United States the political culture is transmitted from parent to child, from teacher to student, from den mother to cub scout . . . there is no institution to oversee the entire process. There is no way to guarantee that all children will be similarly informed about the adult, political positions they will someday fill. (p. 30)

It is as if the government had been abolished by scholarly decree. What is one to make of a book in which the den mother and Selective Service are merely two socializing agencies, and in which changes in the Presidency and ABM policies are no more important than an influx of young Democrats into the teenage peer group on the block?

> Changes in the political world also make people revise their political outlooks. Political leaders come and go. The fortunes of political factions rise and fall. Old policy supports disappear and new policy demands come into being. (p. 54).

While socializing goes marching on! Dawson and Prewitt pepper their work with politically relevant examples from urban politics, black activism, and foreign policy issues. Yet they are unable to meaningfully integrate these illustrations within the text because these political examples are merely 'asides' to the central concept they are developing. Some of the uneasy feeling conveyed by the authors may indicate their awareness that they are fatally stuck with a concept that is applicable to the political norms of a milieu (essentially white, middle-class, suburban America). Herein, ongoing socialization norms must from time to time encounter and deal with irritating 'problems; racial conflict, wars, changes in political leadership and policy. Instead of being explained as public positional issues, these 'problems' become the problems of improperly socialized groups and individuals. *Ultimately, genuine political controversy and allocative processes get in the way of socialization theory.* Therefore, Dawson and Prewitt simply cannot explain the 'aside' issues of policy, justice, legitimacy, and power.

The difficulties are not the sole responsibility of the authors who have mined the professional literature at their disposal. The only question remaining is whether students of Political Socialization, and Political Science, wish to explain the critical issues of our time to their students.

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*A Theory of Political Exchange: Economic Reasoning in Political Analysis.* BY R. L. CURRY, JR. AND L. L. WADE. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968. Pp. 130.)

Although both are concerned with the processes of government, political science and economics are disparate enterprises. The concern of political scientists focuses on recording, correlating, or otherwise analyzing empirical data in the belief that rigorous theory grows from refinements in methodology or the application of relatively simple statistical techniques. Economics proceeds more directly to the development of rigorous deductive theory so that today few political scientists comprehend the research of these colleagues. Separating the economic from the political, however, is dangerous to the extent that the activities of governments have economic implications, and to the extent that economic activity affects the behavior of political institutions. Similarly, this separation, the success of economic theory, and the relative failure of political science to develop equally satisfactory theories leaves political science at a distinct disadvantage with respect to economics in its ability to conjecture about, advise on, and devise policy.

A prospective solution to this problem, however, is afforded by recent theorizing about individual decision-making which concludes that fundamental principles of behavior developed for economics are applicable to political activity. The "new" political economy asserts that the economic definition of rational man is consistent generally with individual behavior, and that theories derived from this definition should assist in the explanation and prediction of noneconomic activity. The research of political and economic theorists such as Downs, Olson, Riker, Buchanan and Tullock, and Davis and Hinich demonstrates the relevance of economic theory to problems traditionally posed as political. Professors Curry and Wade adopt this perspective because, in their words, "empirical political research can profit . . . from attempts to move from a preoccupation with sociopsychological correlates of individual and group action to a more concerted concern with interaction." (p. 115)

This book commences with a general introduction to the economic concepts of utility and preference, and proceeds to a consideration of political processes as a form of market activity. The authors review the basic ideas of supply and demand and the derivation of these ideas from assumptions concerning preferences, budget constraints, and technical rates of substitution. The particular market considered is the demand and supply of administrative elites, with the conclusion that "The government intervenes into the market to coerce an equilibrium quantity of appointments when the reservation demand of the administrative elite group [the maximum demand permitted by established elites] prevents attainment of equilibrium." (p. 65)

The authors then consider briefly the problem of attaining an equilibrium when the assumption (of pure competition) that the behavior of an individual consumer or firm cannot affect other participants in the market is not satisfied (monopoly and duopoly). The authors provide a review of some elements of the relevant economic theory and suggest some political interpretations of these elements. For example, two party electoral contests exhibit many of the characteristics of duopolistic markets, where parties allocate policies in order to secure votes. The approach in this example, however, is symptomatic of the difficulties of this book. No theorems are derived from the analysis, and few testable propositions are presented. Since the authors fail to conduct any serious rigorous analysis, many of their conclusions fail to be supported by the more rigorous and thorough treatments in existence (e.g., the authors' conclusion that "From the perspective of exchange theory . . . it is impossible to specify the 'best' decision for either party," (p. 87), is clearly contradicted by the analyses of Davis and Hinich).

These difficulties derive from the confusion of two dimensions in studying politics from the economist's perspective. The first dimension concerns the concept of exchange, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for exchange to occur. The second dimension concerns the institutional and organizational environment of exchange relationships, and the theoretical properties of the commodities exchanged. As the authors correctly point out with reference to the first dimension, the concepts of economic and political exchange become synonomous once the perspective of behavior as utility maximization is adopted; only the commodities exchanged may differ. But this difference can be of significant theoretical importance with respect to the second dimension, and thus the market models constructed in economics may not be relevant for describing political exchange processes.

The theoretical generality of the concept of exchange insures that demand and supply relationships exist in all social processes, but an understanding of these relationships as they pertain to political processes requires an understanding of the concept of externality and the distinction between public and private goods. Briefly, externalities are said to exist whenever the utility of one or more individuals is dependent on the activity of other individuals. Public goods, as opposed to private goods, exhibit externalities in that if one or more individuals consumes such a good other individuals benefit from this consumption. An example of a public good is an automobile pollution control device; if some individuals purchase such a device the level of pollution which other members of the community must tolerate is decreased, and the externality associated with such purchases is the general reduction of air pollution. Theoretically, however, market mechanisms inefficiently allocate for public goods consumption; although everyone might agree that all cars should be equipped with anti-pollution devices, an individual is unlikely to purchase such a device because the incremental benefit of his purchase is exceeded by its cost. Decisions concerning the demand and supply of such goods, and the regulation of externalities, therefore, are frequently centralized (in governments).

The central difficulty associated with public goods and externalities, however, is that their benefits are not easily, if at all, measurable. Because the cost of providing a public good or the regulation of an externality must be allocated within the community, an individual may find it advantageous to disguise his true preferences from a government or any supplier of a public good. Any individual can claim that he doesn't value this provision, and, knowing full well that once the provision is made he will benefit from it, claim that he should finance none of its costs. Governments, nevertheless, must allocate the rewards and costs of public goods, and the manner in which they do so is at the center of all political processes. A prerequisite to a satisfactory theory of political exchange, therefore, is a more explicit discussion than the authors provide of the conditions under which political exchange takes place, and a discussion of how specific factors such as elections, interest groups, constitutional structure, and leadership affect the allocation of benefits and costs.

The theorist might first attempt to postulate a specific process of exchange, and to deduce the patterns of exchange from the nature of the commodities involved. The authors' case, therefore, would have been stronger if they derived testable hypotheses in specific institutional environments. An alternative approach is to attempt to predict the institutional structures that emerge from the exchange of theoretical classes of commodities. Until these problems are solved theories of political exchange remain inaccurate descriptions or vacuous tautologies.

One completes a review such as this, however, with the conviction that the authors have been criticized for not accomplishing what the reviewer has not accomplished himself. This comment is not the gratuitous tip of the hat prescribed by etiquette. The problems encountered, and the insights and suggested interpretations of economic relationships provided by the authors undoubtedly will feed the development of deductive political theory. And it is this reviewer's conviction that the basic theoretical perspective advocated by Professors Curry and Wade is the proper one for realizing this development.

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*Tangle of Hopes: American Commitments and World Order*. BY ERNST B. HAAS. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969. Pp. 295. $7.95.)

Ernst Haas' many admirers have learned to expect much of him. He must therefore labor under their perhaps unrealistic expectations that he will give to every subject he touches the intellectual power of elegant theory, rigorous empiricism, and common sense. The present book is no exception. And for one Haas admirer, this *is* a generally persuasive, sometimes brilliant, and unfailingly stimulating reappraisal of the conventional wisdom that has dominated U.S. policy toward international organization for 25 years.

The second expectation with which Haas' reputation encumbers him is that he will successfully integrate into something approaching a general systems theory any given political sector to which he turns his hand. His look a few years ago at ILO was the occasion for a seminal theory-building exercise in integration, functionalism, and regionalism. Scholars and students hungry for some new theoretical magic that will elevate their own sometimes pedestrian descriptive efforts may be frustrated with this new work. But I don't think theory was the author's objective; his book could in fact have started on page 219, and it would have still been worth the price to watch a social scientist known for his analytical rigor articulate his ideals in a way at least one reader found both comely and professionally rewarding.

Professor Haas' avowed purpose is to:

> . . . recapitulate what happened to American expectations of the network of international organization and to American objectives in joining it; (p. viii)

> . . . throw into relief, and submit to our judgment, aspects of evolving international systems that clash with our aspirations; (p. viii)

and

> . . . criticize current American policy toward international organizations as probably destructive of the chief values we cherish, and . . . demonstrate that the continuation of this policy will not meet the challenges and demands of future international systems. (p. ix)

If Haas' disciples have their hang-ups, so naturally has the master. In Part I, the neo-Linnaean compulsion to taxonomy produces seven systems of international relations, with four characteristics, six types of nations, three styles of thinking, and three models of democracy and foreign policy. Still, the sections on international systems and American democracy keep social science jargon under reasonable control, and in places actively advance understanding of the role of elites.

I myself found him weakest in dealing with military power, strategic concepts, and the role defense analysts played a decade ago in sorting out the arms-controlling elements in strategic deterrence. On the latter he uncharacteristically does not credit those he might, perhaps because he is least at home in that literature. On the former, he proposes to discuss changing perceptions "without complicating our analysis with the elusive notion of power," but ten pages later this of course leaves him unable to analyze comprehensively the questions he raises there about the working of security systems. Still, in this the most abstract section of the work, one can profit from the rigor an imaginative social scientist brings to a complex policy sector.

By the time Part II begins, it is established that Haas sees the relationship between national actors and the international milieu as a "learning process" with feedback both ways. It is important to understand however that he does not swallow whole the earlier belief in UN procedures as "habit-forming," nor the later "reform school" interpretation of the organization's "civilizing" influences. (We however must swallow something slightly less digestible—that the world is "multipolar heterosymmetrical"—but becoming "multibloc asymmetrical").

Against this background Haas defines the chief strands in the web of interdependence, and here in the main his work is a useful redefinition for the 1970's of that buzzword of the 1960's—interdependence. I will (or rather will not) refrain from recalling to him the several official exegeses by the pre-Vietnam Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow of the same themes of pluralism, diversity, and democratic values.

My own biases were appealed to most forcefully by Part III, where Dr. Haas the observer drops his stethoscope, pronounces the diagnosis, writes a padful of prescriptions, and so to speak jumps into bed with the patient. The most appealing thing of all to me is Haas' willingness to assert clearly and cogently his own intensely humanistic system of values, and on that basis to take policy stands of courage, vision, and in most cases common sense, based precisely on his personal and political commitment to individual worth and political freedom. For the 1970's—indubitably a new time for political and social man—this seems every bit as good a way to redefine the national interest as the Pentagon's classic (and sometimes maladroit) "definition of the threat."

In the political-security-ideological area, his prescription for curing U.S. "over-enmeshment" is a slimming diet of "prudential withdrawal" and a longer term regime of "selective recommitment." His ideas will be called neo-isolationist and even irresponsible by those who still believe in containment and the "responsibilities" of great power. Until, that is, they notice that even while joining the popular cry against unilateral interventionism, he proclaims a positively Wilsonian commitment to "defend the institutions and territorial integrity of democracies everywhere, not only in Europe and Australasia." If I understand him correctly—and I hope I do not—this is a call for precisely the kind of ideological crusade he finds fault with in at least the rhetoric of four Presidents.

But on many another front he says new, fresh, and often exciting things about the proper role of international institutions at this juncture in history. In the process he poses as open questions virtually all the revealed liberal theology of development, trade, aid, self-determination, the UN, peace itself. Hard-hitting analysis is accompanied by imaginative proposals in the vital "functionalist" areas, bearing on the technological encroachments on freedom and the environmental encroachment on life.

On the assumption that my reviewer's union card is in jeopardy unless I pick at least a handful of nits, I do not think: that the Uniting for Peace Resolution has totally "languished from disuse"; that any serious argument has yet been advanced (including here) for a "standing" UN peacekeeping force; that what happened in the disarmament dialogue in 1955 isn't worth mentioning; or that the U.S. Dominican Republic landings took place in 1964. I also wish he hadn't (or rather, I wish he had) tried to square his desire that the UN "enforce" (what?) against South Africa with his earlier assertion that the UN's "primordial task [is] . . . to keep conflict localized."

Ernst Haas gets full marks for yet another work of originality, great power, and high worth. His publisher gets high marks as well for readable type, no obvious typos, and attractive abstract drawings preceding each chapter.

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# BOOK NOTES

## POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

*Power and Leadership in Pluralist Systems.* By ANDREW S. MCFARLAND. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969. Pp 273. $7.50)

Pluralists and elitists continue to debate the issue: "Who has power?" This is another way of arguing about who causes things to get done or keeps them from being done; for, McFarland contends, power is really intended causation, and theories of power are in fact explanatory systems about such phenomena. Explanatory systems, like the corresponding realities they seek to render intellectually manageable and intelligible, may be *complex* or *simple* depending upon 1) the number and variety of components belonging to the system, 2) the amount of relational interdependence among these components (to what degree a change in the state of one component is accompanied by additional changes in the states of other components), and 3) the variability of separate components and their relationships through time (p. 16). Pluralists contend, as McFarland convincingly shows, that the answer to the question "Who Governs?" is *complex*, that "power structures," i.e., systems of intended causation, in most American communities are *complex* and therefore require *complex* systems of hypotheses for their explanation and understanding. Elitists on the other hand are said to view power, i.e., intended causation, in more simplistic terms requiring only *simple* models for successful explanation. To carry this basic contrast further, pluralists view conflict as multilateral, elitists see it as dualistic; pluralists characterize power relationships as symmetrical and see leaders as negotiating brokers, while elitists depict power relationships as asymmetrical, thus permitting dictation and manipulation by leaders. Most importantly, perhaps, pluralists focus on the empirically verifiable activities of different individuals making a variety of choices; while elitists, employing more an historical and macro-sociological approach, focus on the nature and shaping of the structural context that determines the scope of alternatives to which the individualistic choice-making behavior studied by the pluralists refer. On the basis of this latter distinction, it may not be inappropriate to suggest that in fact the pluralists and elitists really are not talking about the same thing, that each is focusing his attention at a different level of analysis and coming up with a correspondingly different set of conclusions that do not so much as clash with one another as bypass one another.

There is something else at issue here besides "who has power?" More to the point: "Who has power over *what*?" This question the author suggests is important to testing for the presence of democracy. Complex systems of intended causality that in fact are restricted in their operation to the level of routine decisions rather than critical ones, while pluralistic are not democratic, for the membership does not possess sufficient power to keep control over the really important decisions. Because popular control over the making of important decisions is the basis for equating pluralism with democracy, according to McFarland (p. 226), where complex systems do not provide popular control over important decisions, we encounter only "spurious pluralism," as the author argues in his own pains-taking review of the literature on decision-making in the U. S. Forest Service and in decentralized Soviet industrial management. But how does one go about deciding on a truly scientific basis what decisions are innocuous and which important? Not just "who causes?" but, again, most importantly, "who causes *what*?" The middle part of the book takes up this issue of distinguishing between incidental and important decisions. Here the discussion is only suggestive, not at all conclusive, and the author does not pretend his effort to be any other than a tentative and exploratory one. At times the going seems to get a bit tedious, but the reader quickly recognizes this as a small price for the author's rigorous exercise in conceptual clarification and stock-taking and soon develops a charitable attitude. Here McFarland draws from the literature of the theoretical fields of games and sets, organization behavior, and structuralism in order to identify relevant concepts bearing on the task of distinguishing important decisions from the unimportant; and giving close attention to their high degree of argeement, he relates these concepts heuristically to one another.

The survey found in the middle part of the book gives the impression that the closer a choice is to determining the range of alternatives that in fact will govern subsequent choices and the closer a decision is to influencing the structural context that will contain future decision-makers, the more important it is. At first glance it might seem that the implications that emerge from the terms of the author's own analysis are more congenial to the position of the elitists who, emphasizing the limiting role of ideology and social structure, contend that control over the important decisions is not widespread at all. But McFarland resists this suggestion. The elitists, he argues, over simplify; they assume before the fact their own conclusions, as when they approach conflict as inherently dualistic. But I do not see that the pluralists too are not guilty of this same behavior from time to time. What, after all, really is the difference between assuming conclusions before the facts and hypothesizing? The really important questions is: Do the facts support the conclusion informed by the assumption that makes the facts interesting and worth collecting in the first place? The difference between assuming conclusions and hypothesizing lies in one's respect for *all* the relevant facts and their *limitations*. On the basis of this test, I am not convinced by McFarland's view of the pluralist model as having a better fit. Whenever I engage in radical activity at the issue boundaries of the system, the "establishment" does acquire a sudden visibility and cohesiveness, or, at the very least, I suddenly become very much aware of my impotence over the critical decisions affecting my own life. The conditions of activity located well within these boundaries, however, more often conform to the expectations of the pluralist. As the author himself notes, "one can find complexity (and simplicity?) almost anywhere from one perspective or another." (p. 222) But if the test of democracy is widespread control over the *important* decisions, and the important decisions are structural or inclusive in their import, boundary decisions as McFarland implies, then do not the critics of pluralism (Walker, Kariel, Bachrach, Lowi, Bottomore, *et al*) stand on solid ground when they argue against the claim of democracy made in its behalf? McFarland is not unmindful that this question might occur to the reader, and he deals with it in his discussion of leadership in a pluralist system in the last part of the book. There he suggests that the cumulative momentum of the routine or incremental bargaining decisions of pluralist politicians may have long-run boundary or issue scope implications; therefore, these decisions are as critical or important as the innovative decisions advocated by charismatic, anti-establishment leaders (p. 173). In attempting to save pluralism's democratic bone fides, however, McFarland fails to satisfy one very important test of power as causality that he himself insists upon, viz., *intent*. Pluralist politicians do not always *intent* their decisions to possess that cumulative innovative thrust necessary to concluding pluralist politics do adequately organize the people to give them control over those making important decisions. In fairness to McFarland it must be emphasized that he in fact admits structural innovation usually is *not* the goal of politicians negotiating in a pluralist setting, but this concession hardly serves to change the facts of the matter.

McFarland's emphasis on democracy as individual control over *political* decision-makers and his preoccupation with leadership phenomena are also reflective of what might be considered serious shortcomings of a discussion of pluralism, elitism, and democracy. For to some, democracy involves the making not only of political decisions, but of other kinds as well, with participation valued not only as a mechanism of control, but more importantly as a means to individual growth and change through the discovery and development of the public self. Pluralist theory examined through these perspectives on democracy would focus not on leadership but rather on *citizenship*. In the absence of these perspectives, the likely possibility that pluralism is a variant of elitism remains unexplored.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, this book *does* contain some valuable theoretical stocktaking, conceptual clarifications, and many analytically rich and illuminating illustrations. In regard to these attributes and the spirit of balance and fairness that pervades the author's formulations, it sets a standard of scholarly sophistication pluralists and elitists would do well to observe as they continue their debate.—DARRYL BASKIN, *Windham College*

*Beyond Nihilism: Albert Camus's Contribution to Political Thought*. BY FRED H. WILLHOITE, JR. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968. Pp. 225. $6.50.)

Professor Willhoite admires Camus and therefore places the latter's political views in the most favorable possible light. The result is a book which is useful and interesting even to those who, like this reviewer, feel that the author has assessed "Camus's contribution to political thought" too generously.

By referring in the subtitle to Camus's "political thought," Professor Willhoite seeks to sidestep the question of whether Camus deserves to be called a political philosopher, but it is clear that he is tempted to answer that question affirmatively. Thus he does not hesitate to attempt what may be called a philosophical reading of all of Camus's works—including the plays and novels. There is certainly much to be said for such an attempt, for it would be arid pedantry to argue that one cannot find wisdom about things political among the poets. In the case of Camus, however, one may well wonder whether it might not be equally fruitful to begin by reading all of his Works poetically—including *The Rebel*, which seems to present itself primarily as a kind of noble rhetoric, a passionate call to political decency.

Whether or not Camus can be called a political philosopher depends in part on the extent to which his thought is more than simply derivative from earlier thinkers. It would therefore be worthwhile to determine how much Camus took from, and understood of, Rousseau, Marx, and especially—in a book called *Beyond Nihilism*—Nietzsche. Professor Willhoite has not attempted to do this fully. He has, to be sure, summarized Camus's estimates of his illustrious predecessors, but basically the author has chosen to illuminate Camus's political thought by comparing, confronting, and contrasting it with the ideas of contemporaries like Buber, Sartre, Freud, Marcuse, Arendt, Oakeshott, Michael Harrington, George Kateb, and others.

The author employs this procedure skillfully enough to permit a fair and fairly comprehensive picture of Camus's politics to emerge. He views Camus as a thinker who employs a profoundly existential philosophical method—he eschews "*a priori* concepts and categories"—to "attempt to overcome the contemporary threat of nihilism by reestablishing norms for human conduct in the political realm." Such an attempt presupposes that contemporary man confront "the world of absurdity," which exists because of "the radical disjunction between the natural world we perceive every day and the inescapable perspective of modern science," as well as because of "the disjunction between man's desire for unending happiness and the inescapable fact of death." But "the world of absurdity" is merely the starting point of Camus's analysis. While it cannot be fully overcome, it can be transfigured; to contend against absurdity is not itself absurd. The genuine rebel will fight against all that degrades and alienates man. His rebellion will be in the name of man's common humanity and for the sake of "what Camus considered the highest human good—dialogical life in communion." Camus, of course, was well aware of the fact that few revolutionaries and radicals are genuine rebels in this sense. Therefore, he engaged in a trenchant critique of ideologists who wish to play God in human affairs, absolutists who certainties do violence to the fundamental ambiguities of the human situation, terrorists who perpetrate unspeakable cruelties in the pursuit of unattainable (or even attainable) ends, and utopians who fancy that all human problems are amenable to political solutions. Camus was a steadfast opponent of all totalitarianism, whether it emanated from the Right or the Left, but he never blinded himself to the grave shortcomings of the Center. Above all, he was very much his own man in politics, as is perhaps best exemplified by his courageous refusal to adopt a simplistic position in regard to France's involvement in Algeria.

Such a bare summary scarcely does justice to Professor Willhoite's exposition. Suffice it to say that the author dwells with suitable enthusiasm on the assets of Camus and that, conscientious as he is, he enables one to see Camus's limitations as well. Unfortunately, there are a number of limitations to see, only two of which can be mentioned here. For one thing, Camus's thought appears as curiously abstract, coming as it does from someone who opposed the abstractions of traditional political philosophy. What, for example, is one to make of the central concept of dialogical communion? One cannot be sure that it is anything more than a vague compound of friendship, love, and the fact that man is by nature a political animal. A more fundamental objection is that it is hard to see how Camus got "beyond nihilism" in any real way. Nietzsche might well have accused him of having recourse to moral principles rendered groundless by the death of God and the concomitant loss of all transcendent standards; it is hard to frame an effective reply on Camus's behalf to this hypothetical charge. Thus Camus spoke of the need of *creating* values; apparently he was insufficiently aware of the fact that the meaning men must create is a paltry substitute for the meaning which, while it may be discovered, is beyond creation by man.

Nevertheless, Camus was an admirable man. One cannot but agree with Professor Willhoite when he insists that today's social science, and social scientists, can learn a good deal from this man.—WERNER J. DANNHAUSER, *Cornell University.*

*John Locke: Problems and Perspectives. A collection of new essays.* EDITED BY JOHN W. YOLTON. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969. pp. 278. $9.50.)

This volume of essays is remarkable for its high standard of scholarship. Most of the contributions reveal an awareness of the fact that Locke wrote several drafts of his more important works and made revisions in later editions of them. This attention to the internal detail of Locke's intellectual development is complemented by a familiarity with the context of that development in terms of his correspondence, associations and the significant philosophical and political issues of his time. The result is not a series of interpretations which attempt to establish that Locke was a philosophical or political radical driven by an *idee fixé*. Rather, the Locke that emerges from these studies seems much more conventional and traditional—a significant thinker and actor in his time who articulated certain views which transcended the particular situation for which they were formulated, but by no means a devious writer who consciously set out to be a mover and shaker on a world-historical scale. It is this quality of these essays which perhaps justifies the editor's description of them as "new". For after the numerous recent interpretations and reinterpretations of Locke, it is refreshing to read a volume which for the most part, is not reinterpretation but re-presentation of his life-world.

The contributors address themselves generally to three areas of concern. Yolton's essay, "The Science of Nature" and von Leyden's on "What is a Nominal Essence the Essence of?" are concerned with the tenets and problems of Locke's epistemology. There are several historical essays, dealing with events and intellectual currents of Locke's time, such as Axtell's "Locke, Newton and the Two Cultures" and a contribution by Esmond De Beer in which he discusses the contemporary social and political issues and concludes that Locke's political views antedated their publication in the *Two Treatises* although they were expressed in more topical form in the published draft due to the revolutionary setting. An essay by John Dunn argues for the relatively diffuse influence of Locke's ideas on English and American politics in the eighteenth century and Peter Laslett deals with a specific historical event in his essay "John Locke, the Great Recoinage, and the Origins of the Board of Trade: 1695–1698."

Of most interest to political theorists, however, are those contributions which deal with Locke as a political philosopher. In this category, the first essay by Raymond Polin on Locke's concept of freedom, is rather disappointing in terms of the fruitfulness of a close textual analysis. Polin first considers metaphysical freedom and then analyses Locke's views on social and political freedom, concluding that for Locke freedom is politically meaningful only within the context of morality, rationality and plurality. Moreover, such a view is said to lie "at the bottom of any true and efficient liberalism". Such a conclusion is both obvious and banal; it is a point of departure for the critical examination of the extent to which Locke's specific political recommendations give a distinct content to this doctrine so that it is truly made politically meaningful. Did Locke, for example, propose great freedom differentials correlated with rationality differentials? Such questions are not considered and therefore the essay is inadequate for the amplitude of its topic. Another essay by Seliger on "Locke, liberalism and nationalism" suggests that Locke's liberalism adumbrates a rationale for nationalism and that the most important aspect of this is Locke's treatment of the phenomenon and form of consent. This essay is well written and the connection between liberalism and nationalism—two doctrines often considered antithetical—is well documented and soundly argued.

There are two essays, by Gordon Schochet and Hans Aarsleff, which are exceptionally valuable. Schochet discusses the relationship between paternal and political authority in Locke and makes a strong case for the view that Locke saw a historically contingent coincidence of them which was quite distinct from Filmer's genetically based theory of obligation. Locke saw the necessity for the presence of consent and trust between ruler and citizen. This essay is very well done and shows how an apparent similarity of approach between Filmer and his critic can easily tend to obscure the fact that, for Locke, a patriarchal derivation of political obligation is normatively irrelevant in addition to being scripturally questionable." Aarsleff's essay on "The State of Nature and the Nature of Man in Locke" is concerned to argue that there is reciprocity between a prudential and a moral basis of obligation. The basic point is that Locke's account of man in a state of nature is based on a view of man as essentially rational but requiring the use of pleasure and pain by a providential God to ensure that man learns the law of nature as well as observing it as best he can. Since God is the author of man, of the law of nature and of the pleasure and pain man experiences, there is no dual account or justification of human behavior in Locke.

Richard Ashcraft's essay on the relationship between faith and knowledge is an excellent documentation of Locke's fundamental commitment to Christianity. Ashcraft disputes and effectively disposes of the view that Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* and *The Reasonableness of Christianity* were both intended, although in apparent opposition, to discredit the gospel. Rather, Locke emerges as a devout believer for whom faith is required to remedy the defects of philosophy. This conclusion is related to an egalitarian imperative which Ashcraft mentions but the implications of which one wishes he had pursued.

The most delightful essay in this volume is by Rosalie Colie. Analysing the style of Locke in his *Essay*, Professor Colie utilizes a phenomenological methodology which is sensitive to the nuances of words and phrases as they mirror and focus the process of thought of which they are a part. This essay, partly because of its subject, is an esthetically pleasing high-fidelity representation of Locke.

The concluding piece by Hans Aarsleff considers the quality of recent Locke scholarship and contends, among other things, that such scholarship has been much too concerned with psudeoproblems. Once can heartily agree. But this leads one to note the deficiency of this volume of essays: it lacks critical political thrust and relevance. As an academic exercise it is generally superior to most collections and many of its contributions are intellectually stimulating. One suspects, however, that many political theorists will not be completely satisfied with its offering. There is a notable omission of consideration of problems such as those raised by C. B. MacPherson. Who are the people? Who are rational? What is property? Some serious consideration of these problems might have livened up the action.—KEN RESHAUR, *University of Manitoba.*

*Technological Man,* BY VICTOR FERKISS. (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1969. Pp. 336. $7.95.) *Values and the Future.* BY KURT BAIER AND NICHOLAS RESCHER. (New York: The Free Press, 1969. Pp. 527. $14.95.)

These two books provide excellent examples of what happens when, on the one hand, as in the Ferkiss book, a single individual attempts to encompass all that is significant about a topic in the work of a great number of writers, and on the other editors, such as Baier and Rescher, set out to build a theory which, it is hoped, will be exemplified in the work of a selected set of experts each of whom presents his own findings.

Ferkiss demonstrates a mastery of a very wide range of literature and is able to distill the major contributions of its authors. He presents no methodological or theoretical framework upon which others may build. Baier develops a theory of the ways values may be studied so as to bring them into the purview of science. Some of the writers seem to have utilized his framework in preparing their own chapters, while others show little or no apparent need to resort to it in making their presentations.

The extent and variety of the materials presented show wide concern about what technological change has done or is doing to our culture and to our future values. The student is provided with excellent bibliographies in both books.

Ferkiss is intent on demonstrating that Technological Man is both real and mythical. He shows how new techniques of this age have had a major impact on some elements of modern life. Juxtaposed also is the evidence of continuity in much that men feel and think. Conflict may occur at the level of social interaction or be internalized, but conflict is not regarded as being necessarily pathological. For Ferkiss the central danger is not that man will, in response to the demands of technology, abandon old values and institutions, but rather that in the effort to preserve elements of the past he will prevent the use of technology which would make it possible to achieve a life far superior to that which men shared at the time when many of our institutions and our values were developed.

He holds that the rise of the nation-state was accompanied by that of science and technology and the two were mutually dependent. It was feedback from technological achievement that energized the nation-state and produced the power to overcome its agriculture based forerunners. The new civilization produced a rootless, nomadic man, often alienated from loyalty to the major institutions through which he must survive. This freedom from the ecological limits which characterized earlier man requires the creation of a new discipline, new institutions, and a different set of priorities than that sustained by the culture of the past. Some see the new system as totalitarian, destroying freedom. Ferkiss emphasizes the checks and balances which grow out of the diverse sources of power as a means through which the freedom technology makes possible might in fact be realized. However, one great barrier must be overcome: the expansion of population must stop or only a few, if any, of the world's peoples will ever turn the myth of technological man into reality. The probability that this stability in population will be achieved remains moot.

The title of Baier and Rescher's work is "Values and the Future" and they are concerned not only with such value change as can be traced back to technology but with all of the sources of such change. Baier heads a project designed to examine the roots of change, using a theory which he has developed. Rescher utilizes it extensively. The work of other contributors reflect its use in varying degrees. The position taken is that the prediction of values in the future is not only possible but absolutely necessary. Man can choose whether or not to use science or to depend on faith, hope, or blind trial and error, but in any case he has to assume that values will continue to have real effects.

Baier abandons hope of finding in any object "intrinsic" value. Rather value is an expression of relationship between various objects and human beings (whether treated individually or collectively). Sets of objects are imputed to have value because they contribute to some large generalized conception of the good life and can therefore be objectively measured on the basis of their contribution to or interference with the achievement of these generalized goods. To discover values then we need to observe people and the responses they give (putatively or in real time) when confronted with given sets of objects in given sets of conditions. To test the degree to which a particular object or activity serves in this way, we must resort to the findings of psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics and numerous other disciplines. Presumably, we can, when the evidence is in, make an objective assessment of which values ought to persist or be enhanced and which should be given a lower priority. The rest of the chapters in this book provide evidence of various kinds from some of the necessary disciplines, but there are others which will have to be included if the model is to be explored fully. Even these chapters demonstrate the paucity of hard facts that can be used to show just how specific technological changes led to specific alterations in the values men held or pursued.

Rescher develops the theory further by showing that "value change" may mean several different things, and the means of demonstrating them may require the use of different instruments. Both the primary authors demonstrate far more familiarity with "values" than with the numerous kinds of technological change to be related to value change. The consequences which follow from altering the biological and physical worlds constitute hard facts which must be given a place in any assessment of the future. We can hope that the promise which the use of the proposed theory holds out will be sufficient to attract the means to support or reject it.

Two kinds of evidences of the substantive changes man is likely to encounter in the future are also presented in this work. One uses the "Delphi" method in which outstanding authorities are asked to present lists of what each considers to be the major changes man will face in the future. These lists are then compared and a summation drawn showing the trends upon which the experts have evidenced a given degree of agreement. The other method utilized here required the various contributors to participate in a simulation, with the computer helping to "predict" what would be the effect of various decisions. Both these methods have been and are being used by others and need no further comment here.

Finally there are a series of chapters in which each contributor makes his own assessment of what has been going on in the world and what is likely to result from it. As usual these vary in their quality and in the means used for assessment. Almost all the authors have written extensively and the positions they take here are not significantly different from the stance a reader would expect. The advantage for the student is that their findings are presented side by side in summary form so that he can more easily compare them. Both books are stimulating and thought provoking.—W. FRED COTTRELL, *Miami University*.

*Zwischen Reformismus und Bolschewismus. Der Austromarxismus als Theorie und Praxis.* BY NORBERT LESER. Europa-Verlag, Wien-Frankfurt-Zürich, 1968. Pp. 600.)

Within the almost limitless literature on Marxism there has been little systematic discussion of that peculiar and fascinating variety of it, Austromarxism. In fact the question has been raised whether the term itself has any merit and whether there is anything specifically "Austrian" about the phenomenon concerned. Leser's book tackles this phenomenon with knowledge and insight. The author is a young Austrian who knows it only from historical studies and recent conversations, but this precisely gives him the advantage of perspective. He plans to supplement this work by a second volume on "Austromarxism as a Conception of the World and of Life."

The organization of the present volume is rather unusual. Part I deals at length with the two pivotal figures in Austromarxist theory and practice, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer. Part II, entitled "Unity at Any Price", discusses the formative processes of Austromarxist thought and policy from the 1860's to the 1930's. Part III is concerned with the social philosophy of Max Adler, that lonely figure on the fringe of Austromarxism. The three parts do not hang together too convincingly, yet add up to an overall view as a result of the author's many fine psychological insights.

His own position and conclusions are made clear almost from the beginning: "not that Austromarxism played, in the destruction of Austrian democracy, a part equal to that of the forces active in such destruction: but that it merely facilitated, rather than hampered, these activities through its own tactics" (p. 21). Austromarxism succumbed time and again to "the temptation to project desired and accepted values into the analysis of a given historical situation and thus to prejudice its analysis, even to put into question its guiding function, and at the same time to supply with the help of a political theory a later justification for specific judgments and decisions" (p. 26).

Leser's sympathies are clearly, though by no means uncritically, on the side of Karl Renner with his belief in socially-minded democratic processes, tolerance, human rights, an application of the democratic principle to the economic scene, an affirmative interpretation of the state, and a pragmatic approach to socialism. Nevertheless Renner considered himself a Marxist who merely wanted to humanize the class struggle; but Leser feels that Renner actually had more in common with Hans Kelsen than with Karl Marx.

Otto Bauer, on the other hand, took over from the founder of the Social Democratic Party, Victor Adler, the vision of a revolutionary final struggle at some future date along with hesitation in concrete crisis situations to make full use of the powers of the movement. To some extent Leser traces the contradiction between revolutionary theory and a hesitating practice back to Marx and Engels themselves, but to his mind all these earlier contradictions were compounded and systematized by Bauer. His strong humanistic and libertarian feelings prevented him from accepting the Bolshevik interpretation of revolution and proletarian dictatorship, yet he considered Bolshevism a great revolutionary phenomenon. As political leader he himself showed a "tendency to non-action which sought a refuge in Marxian theory" (p. 135). He neglected the subjective factor in politics in favor of objective influences which invariably impeded action. Here again he merely brought out a belief in historical necessities which basically was present in Marxism itself. From this there followed a pattern of self-deception which was bound to result in defeat.

A brief section on the origins and changing meaning of Austromarxism brings out the fact that only before the first World War was there real intellectual cooperation of its leading thinkers. Leser gives only passing attention to Rudolf Hilferding, a more adequate treatment to Friedrich Adler. Helene Bauer, Otto's wife and an important influence in her own right, is not mentioned at all. Leser points out intelligently the non-revolutionary personality traits of most of the leading figures even when they used revolutionary phraseology, the legacy of the unity urge resulting from the initial split in the 1880's, and the quasi-religious nature of many Austromarxist beliefs.

We can only mention here the lengthy historical part of the book, which is not aimed at factual completeness but at analysis of the various political and ideological phases. Leser discusses especially the elements of individualism and collectivism in the movement, the frequent tensions between reform and revolution, the expectation of an inevitable crisis of class society when the time is ripe and not before, and the strange mixture of genuine convictions and tactical considerations. Leser claims that "the existence of a tactical reason supporting non-action was used with relief as an opportunity to evade action and to prevent the revolution professed as a principle from ever becoming a serious matter in society" (p. 216). "The fixation upon the future relieves one psychologically from the necessity to act in the present" (p. 237). There was a "socio-psychological circuit": the leadership waited for the masses to act, but when they did they were told that the objective conditions were not right.

When the Republic was established in 1918, more as a result of the military and ethnic disintegration of the old empire than as a result of Social Democratic action, the initial coalition with the Catholic forces did not last long. The 20's were characterized by the political contrast between the Marxist Otto Bauer as leader of one party and the Prelate Ignaz Seipel as leader of the other, and the contradictions discussed gave Seipel the opportunity to increasingly weaken the Social Democratic position. Dollfuss' creeping Fascism and the civil war of February, 1934, marked the end of the old Social Democracy, though it was to emerge in new forms after 1945 in an essentially non-Marxist version.

In attempting an immanent critique of Austromarxism Leser comes to the conclusion that "Austromarxism in all of its forms was not really a revolutionary theory and practice and cannot therefore be characterized as a Marxist force in its basic meaning" (p. 496). But "even though it has perished as a phenomenon of reality, it is indestructible and effective as *Idealtypus*" (p. 507).

The last part of the book discusses the social philosophy of Max Adler who tried to combine and re-interpret Kantian and Marxian thinking, especially in his concept of a "social *a priori*" in the human mind. Leser points out the religious element in Adler's thinking, his "materialistic interpretation of history without materialism" (p. 529), and his combination of all these elements with extreme left-wing politics within Austromarxism.

This is an important book for the study of political philosophies and their implementation. It is interesting to observe the influence of the non-Socialist Kelsen on Leser's brand of socialist thinking. In a future English edition, which would be very desirable, the "endless" German sentences will undoubtedly be broken up and repetitions will be eliminated. More important, the psychological roots of the great self-deception under discussion, and the differences in basic personality between Renner and Bauer might be treated more fully. Leser might also reconsider his interpretation of Bauer's mentality and doctrine as the real villain in the piece; why did the others follow his leadership to the bitter end? Perhaps we shall find some answers in the second volume promised.—ALBERT LAUTERBACH, *Sarah Lawrence College.*

*Democracy and Totalitarianism: A Theory of Political Regimes.* BY RAYMOND ARON. TRANSLATED BY VALENCE IONESCU. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Pp. 257. $7.50.)

This volume is a collection of 19 lectures delivered by Professor Aron at the Sorbonne in 1957–1958, and published in France in 1965 under the title *Democratie et Totalitarianisme.* None of the essays has been revised or updated and, as the author himself concedes in the introduction written for the original French edition, the book "bears the inevitable traces of the lecture room and of improvisation" (p. vii).

Readers who are well acquainted with Aron's general works on politics and society, particularly his *The Industrial Society and Progress and Disillusion,* will therefore find little that is new or interesting here, except for what is contained in the few essays devoted explicitly to his "theory of political regimes." On the whole, this is a fairly representative sampling of a wide-ranging, stimulating and polemical mind. As usual, Aron is at his best in synthesizing the ideas and concepts of other writers; he glides effortlessly—though often too effortlessly—over the writings of diverse theorists, from Aristotle to Montesquieu to Pareto. And, characteristically, he is at his weakest when it comes to political analysis, which is what the core of this book is supposed to be. A major part of the trouble stems from the author's inability to calm his passion for the blessings of the new technocratic liberalism which has presumably come to Western Europe for good, destroying in its wake the old, anachronistic left-wing "utopias."

The basic task which Aron sets for himself is to analyze political regimes in modern industrial societies. After defining politics as the arena in which individuals or groups, each having divergent policies, aims and interests, come to grips, he plows through three lectures of discourse on nearly every general aspect of political life before he gets down to the business of constructing a typology of modern political systems.

All regimes operating in highly industrial settings are divided by the author into constitutional-pluralistic and monopolistic types, a scheme roughly equivalent to the once-prevalent cold war dichotomy of democracy and totalitarianism. (Despite the title of his book, Aron never gets around to discussing, let alone defining, the concept of totalitarianism until page 193.) Pluralistic systems are those in which "the peaceful rivalry for the exercise of power exists constitutionally" (p. 41); the "spirit" or logic (montesquieu) of such regimes is legality and compromise. Monopolistic regimes, of which the Soviet Union is the clearest and most advanced type, are characterized by the monopoly of power by a single party and by the absence of tolerance for opposition; their "spirit" is faith and fear. The "antithesis" between pluralistic and monopolistic systems is explained according to four criteria: (1) competition vs. monopoly; (2) constitution vs. revolution; (3) pluralism of social groups vs. bureaucratic absolutism; and (4) state with parties (secular state) vs. party-state (ideological state). Of course, these are highly normative categories. The major difficulty, however, is Aron's failure to provide us with some set of empirical indices for distinguishing existing regimes according to these categories. For example, how do we know when a given political system ceases being monopolistic and revolutionary and becomes competitive and constitutional? We are given no clues for this, primarily because Aron is not interested in formulating propositions that are amenable to empirical verification. Other problems arise when we consider the fourth criterion. Here we are asked to believe that monopolistic regimes are the only ones that behave in accordance with "ideological" precepts or, as Aron puts it, that "the renunciation of violence becomes, so to speak, the ideology of the non-ideological [i.e., pluralist] state" (p. 236)—an astounding statement for a Frenchman to make at the peak of the Algerian war.

The vague and haphazard quality of Aron's framework becomes all the more visible as we examine more closely the respective types. Pluralistic systems can be compared in terms of five "main variables"; constitution, party system, functions of parliament, pressure groups, and leadership. How these variables are derived, and the way in which they relate to the four criteria, is not made clear. At other points, Aron mentions the role of "social infrastructure", "historical environment," and "national psychology" in the analysis of pluralistic regimes, but these are actually residual categories which are never integrated into any analytical scheme. Aron does not attempt to construct subtypes of pluralistic regimes based upon these or any other categories, though he does wrestle with the problem of developing subtypes for monopolistic systems. The Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and Portugal are seen as three main variants of monopolistic regimes, which vary according to doctrine, scope of goals, violence of methods, and ideal image of society. There is some ambiguity here also—Aron is not really sure how or even whether the third type actually fits in—but at least he shows less inclination than most theorists of totalitarianism to lump together Fascist and Communist regimes.

Perhaps the strongest section in *Democracy and Totalitariansim* is the one that is furthest removed from Aron's formal scheme: his study of the "corruption" (degeneration) of the French Fourth Republic. The corruption of any regime develops where there is too much oligarchy, and hence the loss of legitimacy, or too much "democracy," and hence loss of efficiency. In postwar France, of course, the balance persistently swung toward the latter, toward immobilisme, which Aron silhouettes with some very good historical analysis that has little to do with his framework.

The chapters on monopolistic regimes are almost exclusively devoted to Soviet politics. Included are essays on the Soviet constitution, terror and ideology, totalitarianism, and an assessment of various theories of the Soviet system. Particularly annoying is Aron's tendency to make generalizations about Soviet politics, Communist systems, or monopolistic regimes that are based upon the historically specific phase of Stalinist development in the USSR. And then there is the old and tiresome game of pointing up the inconsistencies between classical Marxist theory and Soviet political practice. Certainly there is nothing any longer puzzling about the primacy of politics in Soviet development; but rather than dwell upon the triumph of voluntarism over the "doctrine of determinism," Aron might have proceeded ahead with an analysis of the evolution of the party within the larger context of the transformation of Soviet society. Here, as with the pluralistic regimes, we find a very cavalier attitude towards conflict and change, and there is never more than a very cursory attempt to link up economic, social and cultural conditions with the processes of political development.

The subtitle to Aron's book is misleading. What we have is not a "theory of political regimes," but rather a simple typology of modern political systems that is supplemented by a series of loosely-connected and theoretically unrelated essays.—CARL E. BOGGS, JR., *Washington University, St. Louis*

## AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

*Party, Constituency and Congressional Voting: A Study of Legislative Behavior in the United States House of Representatives.* BY W. WAYNE SHANNON (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968. Pp. 202. $6.50.)

In terms of number of studies undertaken, the literature on congressional voting based on roll-call analysis is already extensive. But in this new roll-call analysis of four House sessions in the Eighty-sixth and the Eighty-seventh Congresses (1959–1962), Professor W. Wayne Shannon provides a substantial addition to our knowledge in this area. Although based on relatively straightforward research techniques, the book reflects throughout a meticulous attention both to method and to research strategies designed to produce useful substantive findings. And more than most such studies, Shannon has made a genuine effort to explore, confirm, or reject hypotheses raised by earlier roll-call studies, and to build cumulatively on the established findings of earlier work.

Shannon first reviews four major congressional voting studies—A. Lawrence Lowell, Julius Turner, Duncan MacRae, and David Truman. (His examination of the methodology Turner employed in *Party and Constituency* is one of the best such treatments to appear thus far.) He then explores much of the existing congressional voting literature in search of "strands of continuity"—cumulative and generally consistent findings concerning: (1) descriptions of the congressional parties, especially their voting cohesiveness, the frequency with which the parties differ, how much, and on what kinds of policy issues; and (2) factors such as constituency characteristics that are associated with congressional voting.

Shannon then examines party differences in the Eighty-sixth and the Eighty-seventh Congresses. The roll calls were divided into three categories: "modified party votes" (75% or more of one party versus 75% or more of the other party); "majority opposition votes" (majority of one party versus a majority of the other); and party agreement votes (majorities in each party voting the same way). He then explores the most common policy content of the differing types of roll calls. The modified party votes, those exhibiting the sharpest inter-party cleavage, occurred overwhelmingly on domestic economic issues. Party opposition votes also were concerned predominantly with domestic economic, regulatory, and welfare measures. Most major foreign policy roll calls fell into the party agreement category, as did all important civil rights bills and civil liberties votes during this period. Seventeen Guttman scales, constructed for nearly all Congressmen and covering a variety of issue areas, supplement and expand the policy analysis.

Shannon then attempts to examine the potency of the "conservative coalition" (votes on which a majority of southern Democrats and Republicans voted against a majority of northern Democrats). His major finding is that in 1959–1962 southern dissidence from policy positions taken by the majority of congressional Democrats had increased markedly since the four sessions (1933, 1937, 1941, and 1945) analyzed by the late V. O. Key.

Shannon next explores the relationships between constituency characteristics and party control of House seats, and between constituency characteristics and intra-party voting differences. To what extent do special constituency characteristics seem to "explain" the votes of Democratic or Republican Congressmen who do not go along with the majority of their party? As earlier studies by Turner, MacRae Truman, and Froman have suggested, Shannon concludes that this type of analysis indicates only that there are "some relationships at some times" between constituency characteristics and intra-party differences. The findings are complex and sometimes conflicting. They suggest very few straightforward relationships between intra-party differences and constituency characteristics; but at the very least, he concludes, they indicate that the congressional parties are far more than simple reflections of constituency differences.

Shannon then analyzes a problem that has attracted considerable attention in past studies of congressional voting behavior—the relationship between electoral margins and the Congressman's party voting and/or policy choice. He relates his findings to earlier work by Froman and Huntington, and concludes that outside the South in 1959–1962 the differences between the parties were greater where electoral competition was less severe.

The foregoing summary gives some indication of the terrain Shannon has explored, though it by no means does justice to his actual findings. By building cumulatively and comparatively on other work, he has made a number of firm substantive contributions. He has also pointed up some areas where the data, and findings, are confusing and sometimes conflicting. Perhaps there are several ways out of this dilemma which confronts roll-call studies generally. First, greater attention to the time dimension. Shannon shows, even using only the fragmentary, disjointed evidence currently available, that patterns of party cohesion and party opposition have varied widely over time since the nineteenth century. As he aptly suggests, earlier roll-call vote studies, like early electoral behavior studies, may have been timebound. He makes the interesting suggestion that there may be systematic relationships between major electoral realignments and congressional party voting cohesion. Clearly a strong case can be made for a comprehensive study of congressional voting patterns over time, something existing research technology now makes possible.

Second, Shannon advocates closing a gap that is sometimes noticeable in varying approaches to the study of the legislative process. In effect, he calls for a common meeting ground between "congressional insiders" and those researchers who stress relationships between Congress and the political system as a whole. "Congressional insiders" become knowledgeable, by detailed observation and sometimes by direct participation in legislative work, in the day-to-day intricacies of the Congress. They stress log-rolling, the personal influence of colleagues, other forms of bargaining behavior, the norms of the legislature, actions of formal party leaders, activities of the executive, the perceptions and attitudes of the members themselves, and many other factors—all elements of the legislative process that can be important to legislative outcomes, *and* are very difficult to quantify.

The "congressional outsiders" have relied more heavily on roll-call votes, and, while coming up with some conflicting findings, have also made major contributions to our understanding of Congress in the last two decades. Shannon relies heavily on roll-call analysis. But he also shows sensitivity to the importance of other factors that could sharpen and expand the insights that roll-call analysis, as it has usually been conducted, can provide.

There is "little doubt," Shannon declares, that "some of the most important questions dealing with the congressman, his party, and his constituency can only be settled by other modes of inquiry." He calls for a more sophisticated concept of constituency, embodying the notion of "the constituency" as the Congressman sees it. He also advocates a survey approach to Congress that focuses attention on the representative, his own perceptions of his constituency and issue preferences, and his concept of his role in the representative process—conceptual concerns that may in part be answered by the forthcoming book on *Representation in the American Congress* by Warren Miller and Donald Stokes.

It is Shannon's hope that further inquiries that blend the concerns of the congressional insider and the congressional outsider will help "explain much that remains mysterious in the aggregate data-roll call studies." If his book helps stimulate further research approaches of this kind, it will contribute even more than it already has as a highly creditable example of roll-call analysis.—Milton Cummings, *The Johns Hopkins University.*

*Pedagogues and Power: Teacher Groups and School Politics.* By Alan Rosenthal. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1969. Pp. 192. $3.50, paper.)

Professor Rosenthal has written a book which is both "timely" and of more lasting significance. The "facts" in the book should (although, unfortunately, they probably will not) come to the attention of school board members, teachers, and administrators. The theoretical underpinnings and the interpretation of the facts should (and, fortunately, probably will) come to the attention of social scientists. In short, this is a good book which is a pleasure to read and to review.

The book is concerned with the role of teacher organizations in the formation of educational policy. Given this particular objective, Rosenthal could have labored through the wealth of propositions which exist in the literature of interest groups. Instead, he relys more upon a common sense approach which, while making the book less pretentious, does provide some tentative answers to the questions which the author seeks to answer. He wants to know how effective teacher associations are and, if they are effective, why. Rosenthal suggests a variety of ways of exploring the question. He analyzes interviews with leaders of various teacher organizations and he provides an anthropological-type description of particular educational settings in New York, Boston, and San Francisco. These cities are a sub-set of the larger sample from which the interviews with leaders of teacher organizations were drawn.

Before discussing some of the more intriguing findings of the book, let me say something negative—so that the traditional responsibilities of the reviewer may be justified. It seems to me that the devices employed by Rosenthal to explain the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of teacher organizations are not especially helpful in organizing the data or in explaining what they are supposed to explain. Briefly, he suggests that organizational strength, organizational opportunities, organizational behavior, and organizational influence are the independent variables upon which he intends to rely. In assessing the net contribution made by these variables, I am forced to conclude that the book could have been just as well done without them. But, so what? Even if the explicit formulation of a theoretical framework does not satisfy this reviewer, the implicit assumptions which guided the research seem quite adequate. In other words, I think Rosenthal has done an excellent job in explaining the relative strength of educational associations.

He begins his description of teacher organizations with a brief history of the clash of doctrine between the dominant National Education Association and the smaller, but more rapidly growing American Federation of Teachers. He is especially concerned with what has become to be known as the "new militancy" among teachers and addresses himself to the question of which organization is, in fact, more representative of this new militancy. His conclusions are that the American Federation of Teachers, as we would expect, is more militant but that, probably as a consequence of the growing strength of the AFT, the National Education Association has revised its conservatism to the point of encouraging political activity among teachers. However, even if the official ideology of the two major teacher organizations is becoming more compatable, Rosenthal's data suggest that the attitudes and behavior of leaders of the organizations has not caught up with the party lines.

In an especially well done chapter, Rosenthal examines the motivations of the leadership of the AFT and NEA local affiliates in New York, Boston, San Francisco, and Atlanta. He correctly asserts that the question of the extent to which teachers shall share in the determination of educational policy is at the heart of the new militancy. On this particular dimension, Rosenthal concludes that "leaders belonging to AFT are far more disposed than their Association counterparts to prescribe for their own groups a major or equal voice in the formation of public school policies." Why are AFT leaders more militant? Traditionally, a variety of explanations has been offered. Others have argued that AFT affiliates are more attractive to men and younger teachers, for example. However, Rosenthal asserts (by the inclusion of appropriate controls) that the most important factor contributing to a militant outlook is organizational affiliation, irrespective of other confounding variables. Organizational socialization, we might conclude, is sufficient to overcome whatever personal or sociological factors might contribute to or detract from a militant attitude. Consequently, a shift in the NEA ideology has had virtually no impact upon its local leadership. Basically, the NEA emphasizes the unity of the educational enterprise and allows administrators to hold membership in the organization. The AFT, on the other hand, stresses the inherent conflict between teachers and administrators. The traditional differences between the organizations appear to have been so sufficiently established that recent modifications in NEA ideology has simply not filtered to the local level.

When Rosenthal addresses his efforts toward an assessment of the effects of the new militancy upon the government of education, he concludes that teacher organizations are at the bottom of the rung with regard to power in educational decision-making. No matter what the ideology of the leadership, the organizations play a negligible part in determining school policies. They are substantially weaker than mayors, school boards, superintendents, or "whoever happens to dominate in a particular policy domain."

Interestingly, there seems to be some association between the relative strength of teacher organizations and the strength of the superintendent. In Chicago, where the superintendent clearly dominates, teacher organizations are weakest. There is some support, then, for the idea of an inherent conflict between teachers and administrators, which will no doubt become exacerbated as the militancy of teachers increases. For instance, the single exception to the rule of the impotence of teacher organizations is the United Federation of Teachers in New York in the single domain of salary negotiations. However, no teacher organization seems to have been able to achieve much in the area of curriculum, which is especially ironic in view of the fact that teachers assert that they are professionals. If they are professionals, then surely they ought to be able to influence if not control the substance of the courses they teach. However, they cannot. If Rosenthal is correct in his conclusion that organizational affiliation is the single most important factor contributing to militancy, the crucial problem becomes one of assessing the extent to which the American Federation of Teachers will continue to grow and the extent to which it will be able to develop strategies for dealing with competitors for power who have traditionally been able to dominate the resources of the political struggle.

In his concluding chapter, Rosenthal addresses himself to the problem of explaining the limited effects of teacher militancy as consequences of the behavior and attitudes of other participants in the educational system. This seems to me to be an especially fruitful way to attack the problem. The practices of educational authorities, particularly school boards and administrators, seem to structure organizational opportunities and provide militant groups with opportunities which, given appropriate leadership, they can exploit. In virtually no case have educational authorities reacted with acquiescence to demands by teachers for an extension of their authority. In some cases there has been overt resistance and in others there has been a policy of benevolent concession granting. Of course, the behavioral response of school authorities is determined to some extent by the political style of the community in which the competition takes place. If the example of New York can be taken as an illustration of relatively intense conflict, the steadfast opposition of the educational establishment to UFT demands has certainly proved ineffective and suggests that in the politics of education, as in political life in general, head-on confrontations do not necessarily decrease the power of either participant. Rosenthal's conclusions that the impact of teacher groups on public education will increase—which is presumably based upon his finding that organizational affiliation is the crucial variable—might be subject to some qualification, depending upon the varieties of behavior which Rosenthal has described on the part of administrators.

In summary, the book is well researched, well written, and well thought out.—Harmon Zeigler, *University of Oregon.*

*Social Insecurity: The Politics of Welfare.* By Gibert Y. Steiner. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966. Pp. 270. $6.00.)

Gilbert Steiner's opening words, "This book has been written because I could not find one like it. . . ", are descriptive of the paucity of political science literature discussing much of the social welfare activity of government. There has recently been a resurgence of attention paid by political scientists to the substance of policy. However, despite this, the political scientist, politician or citizen who wants to learn about the politics of medical care, of public assistance, of social insurance, or of other social services (with the exception of education), can very quickly exhaust the political science literature available.

Steiner's book is an excellent introduction to the politics of public assistance, the second-largest federal grant program in the United States, and one which is generally conceded to be a failure. Steiner explains the reasons for this failure by describing the process by which public assistance policy is made and explaining the relationship between this process and the policy that results. In the process, he provides a history of the program, a discussion of Congressional attitudes toward and supervision of public assistance, a critique of the attitudes of the social work profession, a description of many of the basic problems and issues in the program, and some proposals for change. Although most of the book has a national focus, a chapter is devoted to public assistance politics in Illinois in the early sixties.

One of Steiner's principal themes is that the nature of the program's clientele and the public image of that clientele have changed, while at the same time the legal outlines of the program have remained the same. The present public assistance program began as an ad hoc effort to deal with the "deserving poor"—those whose poverty was due to no fault of their own—the elderly, the blind, and widows with children. Public assistance recipients were expected to dwindle in number as more and more of the population attained coverage under social security. However, the number of recipients has increased, rather than diminished; at the same time, the image of the recipient has changed from that of the white elderly respectable person to that of the black ADC mother with illegitimate children. With the change in image and the increase in number has come hostility from Congress and the public. Interestingly, this hostility has been largely directed towards the public assistance recipients, rather than those running the program. The hostility has been expressed by means of payments that are often inadequate to meet the state's own minimum standards, constraints imposed on the recipients' behavior, and loss of privacy. The recipients have not been able to protect themselves from the expressions of this hostility: they have no sanction available to enforce their claim on the public, and neither they nor anyone else has effectively organized on their behalf. Although the social work profession purports to speak for both itself and its clients, it has not done so effectively because of the irrelevance of the profession's interests to the reality of public assistance.

The federal public assistance program is based on the taxing power. This means that Congressional supervision of the substance of public assistance is in the hands of the Ways and Means and Finance Committees. The broad scope of concern of these committees, with public assistance of much less importance to committee members than other issues, has meant that neither committee members nor staff pay it much attention. Nor does it receive much attention in the appropriations process: the open-ended authorization and the obligation felt by Congress to appropriate funds to match state expenditures in accordance with past Congressional promises add up to a situation in which public assistance policy and expenditures are considered by the Appropriations Committees to be beyond their control. Congress thus devotes little effort to public assistance policy, and the program continues on its way.

Moreover, the effect of Congressional action on the actual contours of the program is limited because public assistance is not simply a federal program, but a federal-state program in which the federal government pays most of the bill, but the states make many of the important policy determinations. This has been true from the very first, when Congress defeated proposals for restrictions on state programs in 1935. With time, the federal bureaucracy began to assert more control over the program, but the states have the upper hand in most cases.

This is a description of the situation three years ago, when Steiner's book was published. The situation since then has changed somewhat, although Steiner cannot be faulted for not discussion what had not yet happened when his book was written. Indeed, his description and analysis help one to understand what has happened more recently. The recent rise of the welfare rights movement and the increasing demands for participation by the public in governmental decision-making, mean that the recipients are no longer unorganized, and the inadequacies of the program no longer go unnoticed. The black rebellions, increasing amounts being spent for public assistance, and the resulting financial pressures on the states, have forced Congress, the President, and the intellectual community to pay greater attention to public assistance. By the time this review is published, it is likely that the President will have proposed innovations in the program.

Steiner's book is clearly written. His presentation is topical, rather than chronological, with some resulting confusion for the reader who is not already familiar with the history of public assistance in this country. In his discussion of Congressional action, he sometimes equates increases in the extent of federal sharing of expenditures with increases in the benefits received by public assistance clients. Although there may be a close correlation between the two, it is easier to understand Congressional generosity towards a program whose recipients Congressmen regard with hostility if one realizes that the Congressional action is aimed at helping the states meet their financial burdens, rather than at increasing benefits for recipients.

What we have here, then, is a helpful introduction to the politics of public assistance, one that discusses the basic determinants of public assistance policy and most of the major issues in the program—EUGENE FEINGOLD, *University of Michigan.*

*Majority Party Leadership in Congress.* BY RANDALL B. RIPLEY. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1969. Pp. 187. $5.00.)

This is the second volume in what promises to be a valuable series of monographs on Congress, sponsored by the American Political Science Association and under the direction of Ralph K. Huitt and Robert L. Peabody. It has as its modest goal a discussion of majority party leadership patterns within Congress in this century.

Randall B. Ripley divides the 33 Congresses that met between 1901 and 1966 into four categories. The most easily defined category is that of the "truncated majority," when the House, the Senate and the Executive were not controlledy by the same party. This occurred seven times. The remaining Congresses are divided into those with a "presidential-partisan majority" (8), those with a "presidential-bipartisan majority" (11), and those with a "congressional majority" (7). The outside boundaries of these groupings are evidently established by the size of legislative majorities. Though the author doesn't make a point of this, the three Congresses in which the dominant party held two-thirds of the seats in both houses (the 74th and 75th under Franklin Roosevelt and the 89th under Johnson) clearly produced presidential-partisan majorities. The three in which the dominant party held less than 55 percent of the seats in both houses (the 68th under Harding, the 70th under Coolidge and the 83rd under Eisenhower) clearly produced congressional majorities. Beyond this, the categorization is concerned with whether Congress or the President tends to dominate, and in the latter case, whether the President works primarily through his own or legislative parties.

The author then singles out ten representative Congresses for study in greater depth. For each he discusses the nature of presidential and congressional party leadership, analyzes their relations with each other and with the members of the legislature, describes the handling of a particular measure by way of illustration, and assesses the legislative accomplishments of the two-year period.

All this he does in a workmanlike fashion. Clearly this monograph is an addition to the literature on Congress. My problem is that I want more. His handling of each Congress would have been more valuable to me if it had been less sketchy and repetitious. The conclusions concerning each type of party majority do not seem in all cases to follow inevitably from the text. The book would have been stronger if the author had written more on the development of legislative party institutions, though he has filled part of this gap elsewhere in his *Party Leaders in the House of Representatives.* I would have liked more on the growth of large dissident blocs within the dominant parties: the middle-western progressive Republicans during much of the first half of the period and the southern conservative Democrats during the second half. It would seem almost inevitable that a strong president should operate under a presidential-bipartisan model when the dominant party is so divided internally.

I also wish that he had explored further his finding that the most successful Congresses are those when a party has just come into power.

The examples he chose for expanded discussion were the Democratic takeovers under Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. There were, however, two other periods when Congresses had presidential-partisan majorities when there was new presidential leadership but no change in the dominant party or in the legislative party leaders (under Theodore Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson). Perhaps he should have made more simply of the importance of new leadership. His data does support a "honeymoon" thesis. No President has succeeded in maintaining a dominant position for his entire term of office. Franklin Roosevelt's record was the most successful, for he dominated three Congresses under conditions of national economic emergency. Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson each dominated two and Lyndon Johnson only one. Could the 22nd Amendment actually help promote strong executive leadership? Would there be any advantage to encouraging more frequent change of legislative leaders by placing some limits on their tenure?

I can see advantages to the organizational pattern which the author follows: discussing Congresses according to their type of majority rather than chronologically. Yet this makes it more difficult to draw generalizations concerning the development of institutions and traditions in the national government, and to contrast majority party leadership in the earlier Republican-dominated portion of the century (1901–1932) with the later Democratic-dominated era.

Perhaps this could have been handled by a longer last chapter with more historical perspective. The data show that during the Republican period the most frequent pattern was that of the congressional majority. Theodore Roosevelt was the only Republican President in the period (or in the succeeding era) to work within a presidential-partisan majority. The Democratic era saw a marked trend away from the congressional majority and an increase in the presidential-bipartisan majority model. As Ripley notes, this reflects the development of the institutional Presidency and the wider expectation that the President would lead and that the legislative party leaders would act as his loyal lieutenants.

The author prefers the presidential-partisan majority model:

> The most successful majority party is likely to be a presidential majority with a large majority, newly come to power, with a President actively involved in legislative tactics, and with innovative leaders. The least successful is likely to be a congressional majority with a small majority, concluding a long tenure in the majority, with a hostile President, and with complacent and unimaginative leaders. (p. 187)

This study will be useful in the continuing debate over the possibility of moving in the direction of greater party responsibility. It would seem that the nation, by moving from a norm of congressional government to one of presidential government has taken a giant step toward party responsibility. The fact that the system continues to provide truncated majority government and only rarely provides a chance for presidential-partisan majorities shows how far we still are from its achievement.—George Goodwin, Jr., *University of Massachusetts, Boston.*

*Bureaucratic Behavior in the Executive Branch.* By Louis C. Gawthrop. (New York: The Free Press, 1969. Pp. 276. $7.95.)

The study of public administration in the United States has been greatly enriched since World War II by the development of a unified theory of organizations which embraces both public and private institutions within its scope. Louis Gawthrop's *Bureaucratic Behavior in the Executive Branch* is a very useful addition to this literature. It attempts to illuminate the salient characteristics of government agencies by analyzing the way in which they differ from private organizations.

This does not always prove to be an easy task. For example, Gawthrop argues that hierarchical authority is much stronger in private than it is in public organizations. This is certainly true, at least as far as American bureaucracy is concerned, when attention is centered on the difficulties political executives have in controlling the activities of their career subordinates. The heads of executive departments in the United States have clearly not had as much authority over the units under their jurisdiction as the heads of major industrial firms.

But if attention is shifted to the structure of authority within the career ranks of public bureaucracy, then hierarchy often appears to be much weaker in a private than it is in a public setting. Nowhere in the private sector of society is it possible to find a more hierarchical set of arrangements than those which bind together the uniformed personnel in the armed forces. Military bureaucracy exemplifies hierarchy in its most extravagant form.

Illustrations of a significantly greater degree of hierarchy in public organizations can also be found in civilian administration. Private universities are commonly less strongly centralized in administrative structure than public institutions of higher education. Social workers often seek employment in private welfare organizations precisely because of the network of hierarchical controls which limit professional discretion in public welfare agencies. Herbert Kaufman's *Forest Ranger* has demonstrated that even a nominally decentralized government agency can weave a web of informal controls that leaves very little actual decision in the hands of subordinate officials.

The most interesting section of the book is Gawthrop's discussion of organizational change. He distinguishes between consolidation, which is change induced by pressures from the internal or external environment, and innovation which he describes as change occurring at the initiative of administrators in an effort to avert impending crises. The executive branch he concludes, is much too prone to focus upon consolidative change and to ignore where possible the need for innovation.

From the perspective of Lindblom's now dominant incremental analysis of organizational change, Gawthrop's concern on this score may seem to be unwarranted. The absence of pressure for change can be viewed as the absence of need for change in the best of all possible administrative worlds that incrementalism often seems to portend. But events of recent years, particularly in foreign affiairs and in the administration of urban programs in the United States, suggest that Gawthrop's misgivings are justified. The Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, and the crises in urban education and housing administration point up the mournful consequences that ensue when bureaucracies fail to plan ahead to anticipate troubles before they arrive. Gawthrop's emphasis upon the need for calculated innovation by administrative agencies thus seems amply supported by the recent history of policy-making in the United States.—FRANCIS E. ROURKE, *The Johns Hopkins University.*

*Minorities and the Police: Confrontation in America.* BY DAVID H. BAYLEY AND HAROLD MENDELSOHN. (New York: The Free Press, 1969. Pp. 209. $6.95.)

This book is a worthy addition to the growing literature on the police in American society. Through the use of several opinion surveys, it seeks to explicate the attitudes, experiences, and emotions of both the police and urban ethnic groups as a means of understanding the texture of their relationship. It is the authors' thesis that this complex relationship can best be understood by examining the constraints, or more accurately, the predispositions of each side. In pursuit of this goal they have chosen to focus on the relationship as perceived by the principals rather than as viewed objectively by a detached observer. This is a useful tack because, as is so often the case, the problem is more a function of the perceptions of the participants than of objective reality. In any event, the picture they paint is not an encouraging one.

The minorities' regard for the police is not high. Very few thought that the police enjoyed a high reputation or did an excellent job in their neighborhoods and almost half of the minority population believed that police treatment is often unfriendly or prejudiced toward them. They believed the widespread charges of police brutality and a substantial proportion said that they or someone in their family had been badly treated by the police.

These perceptions have important consequences for police-minority group relations. One can easily understand the fact—borne out by the data—that minority group members are less likely to contact the police than those in the rest of society despite their demonstrably greater need for services provided by the police. Thus, minorities approach the police with reluctance and low expectations. This difficulty is, in the authors' view, exacerbated by the policeman's status as a symbol of "the backhand treatment [minorities] receive from society as a whole." (P. 141)

The survey indicates that there is corroboration for minority views of the police. Twenty-seven percent of the police officers interviewed admitted witnessing an incident in which a fellow officer had been guilty of excessive use of force or unjustified harassment of a citizen. Moreover, one-third of the policemen admitted that they believed stricter law enforcement desirable in minority communities.

Despite the justification for some of the minorities' views, the position in which the police find themselves when working in ghetto areas is not an enviable one. Police perceive substantially greater danger of violence to themselves in such areas and the majority claim to have been victims of physical or verbal abuse. Importantly, their perceptions are probably justified by the facts, as an examination of the geographical distribution of instances of assaults on officers and cases of resisting arrest will demonstrate in nearly every major city. (The authors did not make such an analysis for Denver, the sample city.) Moreover, the consequences of a misstep in the ghettoes are potentially serious, for even byond the possibility of personal violence lies the threat of civil disorder or formal complaints against the officer by aggressive minority group members.

The important conclusion to be drawn is that fear is the controlling force in police-minority group relations. Minority group members fear the police: they fear unfair treatment, they fear personal abuse, and they fear physical brutality. The police, on the other hand, fear physical attacks when working in ghetto areas and fear having their conduct subjected to official scrutiny.

In this atmosphere of mutual distrust, what can be done to relieve tensions? What is required, of course, is a solution to the problem of securing true equality for all our citizens. Aside from this fundamental change, however, the authors have little to recommend. Short-term approaches must naturally, as they indicate, take account of the respective "worlds" of the police and the minorities. However, no hard policy alternatives are offered—and this is the weak point of the book For having sketched with some sensitivity the nature of this difficult relationship, the authors leave us without much analysis of the policy implications of their study.

There are a few additional problems with the book, though of rather less import. The surveys were done in Denver, a city wracked by a police scandal during the early sixties. This may bias some of the results concerning community regard for the police. In addition, the questionnaires are not appended and there are very few tables. Consequently, some data and most of the questions appear only incompletely and sketchily in the text and the precise results and interview schedules are often unavailable.—Lewis A. Kaplan, *Bureau of the Budget, City of New York.*

*An Act of Congress: The Legislative Process and the Making of Education Policy.* By Eugene Eidenberg and Roy D. Morey. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969. Pp. 256. $6.50.)

One of the costs of our status striving as an academic discipline is a growing disposition to denigrate the case study, and to exalt the study with a wide data base. The timid, therefore, whose research direction follows a careful sensing of the profession's unwritten canons of the moment, often will forego a deeper understanding of political processes in favor of the extensive registry of surface characteristics for a large number of research objects. One should expect, though, that a mature scholarly enterprise would be sustained by the simultaneous production of intensively and extensively focused research. The two ought to be complementary as the author of a case study is mindful of his obligation to theory, and to the extent that the broad data scholar does not confuse breadth with depth, or description with understanding.

Eugene Eidenberg and Roy D. Morey have written a very good case study, introduced with a slight nod to theory, and concluded with a smattering of general observations that should have theoretical utility. It is the best thing that has been written on educational policy making. Indeed, it is difficult to name a study in any domestic policy category that is superior to this one with respect to its expert and detailed analysis of the substance, behavior and nuance which constitute the process of policy making.

The major purpose of the book (which is artfully realized) is to provide a "working description of the American policy process by focusing on the issue of federal aid to education." The education focus is auspicious. There was a long history of immobilism in this policy area, during which the simultaneous influence of a variety of issue conflicts divided potential supporters of federal aid into several blocs, preventing the formation within Congress of a sympathetic majority. Gradually the conflcts were negotiated (primarily because of changes in the political and social environments) so that by 1965 the one remaining barrier was the church-state issue. Even here a precedent—overlooked by the authors—had been worked out in 1963 with passage of the Higher Education Facilities Act. Congress was conditioned by 1965 to compromise on the church-state question; it remained for the principal interest groups to reach an accord.

The authors discuss with skill and insight the formulation and implementation of strategy to (1) surmount the religious controversy, (2) tie the bill to the then popular anti-poverty drive, and (3) secure passage in both houses without amendment. Major credit for building interest group consensus (essentially between the National Education Association and the United States Catholic Conference) is assigned to Francis Keppel, who was detailed by the White House to persuade the group spokesmen to reason together, as it were. Eidenberg and Morey contend that such agreement was necessary in order for a federal aid bill to pass in 1965, and suggest that the case for accommodation had to be put to each side with equal force.

I should have thought, however, that the NEA had no choice. Through its zeal and self-righteousness it had become discredited in Congress. If ever there was to be federal aid to education legislation, 1965 was the year. The overwhelming Democratic majorities in Congress, buttressed by authentic White House enthusiasm, made a favorable decision likely. Under those conditions the NEA had little veto power; those whom it could influence probably would have favored federal aid legislation even if NEA's support were withdrawn. Organized Catholicism, on the other hand, enjoyed a potential veto, and the course of action open to NEA, therefore, was to adhere to whatever arrangements were made in order to retain the Catholic spokesmen in the coalition.

There is very little in the narrative of this excellent book that could be improved. Any book, of course, can supply truffles for those who root after minor blunders. This one is no exception. Subcommittees are incorrectly named (pp. 57, 60, 81); reference is made to a non-existent "Higher Education Act of 1962" (p. 106); the first name of a well-known syndicated columnist is misspelled (p. 152); and, in my judgment, the characterization of the past working relationship involving Representatives Edith Green and Albert Quie, and former Representative Charles Goodell, is wide of the mark (p. 108).

Conspiracy theorists will find the authors blinded by pluralist assumptions. Consider the definition of a policy system:

> The policy system that contributes to the making of education policy is primarily an elite of individuals and groups *who have a right to participate in the decisions affecting public education, based upon recognition of their particular interests in the issue.* (p. 4) (italics added)

Add to this the conclusion that

> One of the clearest impressions that results from close study of the education issue during 1965–1967 is the diffusion of power and control in the American political system. There is no single official or institution of government that was responsible for the passage of federal aid legislation. (p. 229)

And for democratic accountability? "Public opinion as a single force has no significance in the workaday world of the policy-maker." (p. 215).

Finally, as successful as the book is in depicting the policy process (as competition and conflict among elites), the authors fail, I believe, to develop as fully as they might have the theoretical potential of the data. We really need some good longitudinal analysis of the emergence, development, dissipation and decline of policy systems. We need an adequate taxonomy by which to compare policy systems in terms of their compositions, decision-making patterns, degrees of autonomy within the larger political system, and the relative permeability or impermeability of their boundaries. Eidenberg and Morey have the materials in their study for at least a modest beginning toward these, or other, objectives. With a firmer theoretical context, the book could have been a useful supplement in advanced undergraduate and graduate level courses. As it stands, it certainly is one of the best books available through which to provide beginning undergraduates a clear understanding of the legislative process and the larger policy making process.—LAWRENCE K. PETTIT, *American Council on Education and Montana State University.*

*Candidates for Office: Beliefs and Strategies.* BY JOHN W. KINGDON. (New York: Random House, 1968. Pp. 176, $1.95.)

Despite a plethora of empirical studies in recent years that bear in one way or another on the relationship between elected politicians and their constituencies, it has become all too painfully obvious that we have hardly begun to construct in our professional literature a reliable set of generalizations about this centrally important democratic phenomenon. Even if we ignore electoral politics in other political systems and look for such generalizations applicable only to American politics, the problem remains. Somehow, it seems, even in our own back yard, the linkages that operate between the electorate and the proximate policy-makers who produce what we have come to call the policy outputs of the political system have evaded successful description. This is not to say, of course, that we do not know a great deal about the American electorate. We do. Nor is this to say that we know little about the policies that elected officials produce. In fact, information abounds. What remain all to mysterious, however, are the linkages between electoral phenomena and the policy-making activities of elected officials. It is to this murky area that John Kingdon gives his attention in *Candidates for Office: Beliefs and Strategies.* While this little volume seems to me to raise a great many more important questions than the answers it provides, it *does* raise important questions. And if for no other reason than that it adds to the very little bit we know about the cognitive processes of electoral candidates and elected public officials, it deserves the attention of students of American political behavior. All too often as Professor Kingdon sees, we have somewhat simplemindedly conceptualized the elected official (especially the legislator) as a kind of inert black box between such factors as party, constituency and "group pressures" and the policy outputs of the political system. Surely, this is a woeful mistake. I see this book as a modest, but helpful addition to the still small literature that seeks to overcome this difficulty. To me, at least, it is a welcome addition that ought to help nourish future inquiry into the linkages that operate between the electorate and the policy-making activities of the elected.

What Kingdon has done here is really rather simple. He has interviewed a sample of candidates for the statewide elective offices, for the U. S. House of Representatives and for the state legislature in Wisconsin in 1964. To be precise, he interviewed all candidates for Congress and statewide offices and a sample of candidates for the state legislature—a total of 62 individuals. Through structured post-election interviews he sought to investigate their beliefs about the electorates they faced, their sources of information about them and their thoughts about campaign strategy. He has then speculated about the likely importance of his findings in relation to pre-election and post-election behavior. There is some evidence that the study was imperfectly designed to answer certain kinds of questions that turned out to be unanswerable when the data had been collected. For example, it seems that an original purpose—testing the proposition that candidates with an accurate cognitive picture of the electorate should be more successful at winning votes

—simply had to be jettisoned as it became clear that it could not be dealt with in a single, post-election interview study. There is simply no way of knowing whether the pictures of the electorate that the study revealed were there before the election or whether they had been significantly altered by the campaign and election experience. As it turned out, moreover, the more successful candidates seemed to have the more inaccurate cognitive picture of the electorate.

Kingdon argues that winners rather than losers tend to downgrade party and emphasize issues and personal appeal as the decisive factors in election outcomes. This, on the basis of past survey research studies, he reasons, is unlikely to correspond to the actual facts of the electoral situation. Faced with this finding, Kingdon *speculates* that there is a "congratulation-rationalization" effect at work. Winners, he supposes, are likely to congratulate themselves, thinking that the electorate is paying more attention to them as individuals and to the issues they raise than is actually the case. Conversely, he supposes, losers may tend to rationalize their defeat by playing down these factors, which after all reflect on their personal qualities and their campaign strategies, and explaining their defeat in terms of such factors as party which are largely beyond their control. The congratulation effect, Kingdon further speculates, may very important consequences for post-election behavior. It may, he suggests, help to expain why electoral politicians act as if the electorate is watching them very closely even though we know that in the vast majority of cases it is not. This is an interesting speculation. Unfortunately, however, there are difficulties.

As Kingdon suggests, the congratulation effect in his Wisconsin sample is largely the product of marginal winners. This being the case, it will hardly serve to explain why non-marginal candidates also act as if the electorate is watching them more closely than we know it is. Unfortuately, there is more difficulty. Kingdon has argued in an earlier presentation of these data (this REVIEW, LXI, 1967, p. 137) that candidates with a high estimate of voter interest and issue knowledge vote more in accord with their constituents' opinions than those with a lower estimate. This he bases on a secondary analysis of the Miller-Stokes Congress study of 1958. He goes on to argue in *Candidates for Office* that ". . . by virtue of his electoral victory, an officeholder (*especially a marginal winner*) [italics mine] believes that the eyes of the public are on him, that voters cast their ballots according to his actions and characteristics, and that they are comparatively well informed about the issues of an election. If an incumbent thinks the electorate is watching him, whether or not they are in fact, he will attempt to anticipate their reactions to his decisions." All of this seems to make good sense, but unfortunately the Miller-Stokes data suggest just the opposite for congressmen. In the issue areas of civil rights and welfare there is a strikingly lower degree of correspondence between congressmen's perceptions of what their constituents want and their roll call voting in the case of marginal rather than safe men.[1] Surely, this is paradoxical, but it is the case, and it directly contradicts Kingdon's point. I mention this only to show that the picture is by no means as clear as it is painted in *Candidates for Office.*

In the remainder of his study Kingdon investigates candidates' beliefs about group support, sources of information and campaign strategies. Again, there are interesting data and speculations on all of these matters, which ought to be heeded by students working in this area. Most important, I think, is the general insight that constituency is a far more subtle phenomenon than much of our literature suggests. In addition to the mass electorate all sorts of elite groups are important. And, finally, as Dexter and others have argued, it is the mind of the elected politician, ultimately, through which all "constituency factors" must be filtered. I agree completely with Kingdon that we have all too often totally neglected this insight, as obvious as it would seem to be.

In sum, this is a helpful little volume, whose speculations are often better than its hard data. It deserves to be read and pondered. I very much hope it will be taken as the point of departure for a number of other studies in both state and national contexts. Kingdon is to be thanked for a number of shrewd reflections on the problem of constituent-politician relations. Hopefully, he and others of us working in this area will soon design and execute the kinds of studies that will be necessary if we are to understand what would seem to be the most central question of democracy—how and why various elected officials do the things they do.—W. WAYNE SHANNON, *The University of Connecticut.*

*Discretionary Justice; A Preliminary Inquiry.* BY KENNETH CULP DAVIS. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969. Pp. 233. $8.50.)

In this book, built upon the Edward Douglass White lectures given at Louisiana State University in 1966, Kenneth Culp Davis endeavors to develop a partial answer to a very basic question: "In our entire legal and governmental system, how can we improve the quality of justice for individual parties; how can we reduce injustice?" (p. 215) He argues that one of the most fruitful lines of attack is against administrative discretion, or those decisional situations "where rules and principles provide little or no guidance, where emotions of deciding officers may affect what they do, where political or other favoritism may influence decisions, and where the imperfections of human nature are often reflected in the choices made." (p. v) Though the book is admittedly "a preliminary inquiry" and suffers from some repetition and a conversational rather than an analytical emphasis in many places reflecting its origin as lectures, the central argument is clear and provocative: one of the major causes of injustice to individuals and of "official illegality" in the society is unnecessarily broad administrative descretion, and something can and ought to be done about it.

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[1] See Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, *The Legislative Process in The United States* (New York: Random House, 1966, pp. 441-444.

Support is mobilized from diverse areas, including welfare, housing, lending and loan guarantee, regulatory and law enforcement programs. Two broad and especially fertile sources of injustice receive particular emphasis. The first is the selective enforcement of laws by police, regulatory agencies, and especially prosecutors, where important choices are constantly made, unfettered by traditional safeguards against arbitrary and unjust action. There is, for example, the ordinary policeman who possesses "unguided discretionary power to weigh social values . . . and make a final decision as to governmental policy . . . , despite a statute to the contrary, without review by any other authority, without recording the facts he finds, without stating reasons, and without relating one case to another." (p. 88) Davis shows that equal treatment of individuals in the enforcement of laws, despite contemporary concerns centering on minority groups, has never been and is not now solidly implanted in our notion of justice. He is fully cognizant of the varied rationales for selective enforcement, such as overreaching statutes, scarce resources, and the leniency that often results. However, he questions whether selectivity is the right approach and suggests that non-discrimination in law enforcement is an appropriate goal to seek. If this redefinition were made, if actions were taken to remove the reasons making selective enforcement necessary and practical in many instances, and if proper safeguards were adopted, he estimates that a high percentage of injustice to individuals caused by unduly expansive administrative discretion would be eradicated.

Actions bestowing gratuities or privileges are a second main source of injustice. It seems to be generally accepted that decisions about subsidies, for example, need not be surrounded by protections of the sort required when legal rights are affected. Davis feels this to be an improper distinction and one of rapidly increasing significance in the production of injustice; the value of the outcome to the individual is the important element. An injustice may occur when an application for welfare is decided, just as when a zoning matter is determined. But because of the traditional distinction, the system is designed to minimize the chances of an injustice in one type of situation but not in the other.

It should be emphasized at this point that Davis is not a foe of administrative discretion *per se*, as readers familiar with his other works will know. He appreciates the necessity of a considerable amount of discretion owing to our natural incapacity to forsee all possible circumstances and write rules accordingly. Further, he appreciates the desirability of discretion in many circumstances for stimulating flexibility, creativity and innovation. On the basis of this book, Davis might be described as an impassioned realist on the question of administrative discretion. He is passionately angry about injustice resulting from unnecessary broad administrative discretion and is extremely effective in pointing up problems which have received too little attention from scholars in recent years. He is realistic about the terrible difficulties involved in doing something about extraordinarily complex problems which have deep institutional roots and about the requirements for change and the instruments to be used.

Change is very much related to each of Davis' three major purposes. The first is to demonstrate that discretion is not just an illusive will-of-the-wisp and that it can be studied profitably. This he does. The second is to suggest further lines of inquiry, and the third is to devise a framework for additional study. Important contributions are made along these lines, but as Davis notes, many problems remain and much filling in must be undertaken.

One of the best examples concerns the first step in the change process: determining the optimum degree of discretion in any particular situation. In the Federal Trade Commission's pre-merger clearance program, so secret that even the reasons for secrecy are secret, there is obviously too much discretion. But how much is enough? What are the relevant criteria? What are the competing values, and how are they to be balanced? Davis identifies problems such as these, but he cannot be said to provide much in the way of specific direction for future analysis or the development of operational answers.

Limitations of the type just indicated also apply to the discussion of the next step in the change sequence, which is to reach the desired quantum of discretion by use of the appropriate combination of structuring and checking instruments. Some imaginative new departures are suggested, such as that government lawyers cease relying on ripeness and standing doctrines and other technical defenses under certain circumstances, but by and large the means discussed are traditional and formal in character. Structuring, or limiting the range of choice within agencies, can be achieved by employing a mixture of plans, policy statements, rules (which Davis considers especially valuable), statements of findings and reasons in particular cases, and openness and fairness in informal procedures. The means for checking discretion to insure that it is exercised properly run the gamut from normal hierarchical controls to various forms of external review.

A number of interesting points are implied by these portions of the book. One is that contemporary enthusiasms such as decentralization, community control and citizen participation in the administration of programs provide no ultimate answers to the problem of injustice, though they may be alleviative, so long as discretion remains unstructured and unchecked. That is, increased citizen control of police will not necessarily in and of itself eliminate injustice resulting from selective enforcement of law, but may only alter the pattern of selective inforcement and shift the incidence of injustice.

Overall, however, description of particular means and particular situations is accentuated, rather than the development of a framework for determining how the proper combination for any situation might be development, much less suggesting criteria for telling what that combination might be.

With some justification, Davis gently chides students of public administration and political science for their contemporary lack of concern about administrative injustice, suggesting that a major reason is a preoccupation with "science." One of his subordinate purposes is to encourage scholars from other disciplines to bring their expertise to bear on the problems he discusses. There is a modest irony here. It seems that the book would have been much stronger in its assessment of problems, in dealing with the intricacies of change, and in its prescriptive aspects if the rather extensive relevant literature, both theoretical and empirical, produced by those whom he chides, had received more attention. To cite only one of the many possible examples, Davis judges normal hierarchical controls to be the most significant check on the exercise of discretion. However, his discussion on this point is not only truncated, but it evidences no familiarity with the knowledge and insights that have been developed in recent years not only by students of public administration, but also by others such as sociologists, as to how people behave in organizations. Certainly there is rich material here for use in analysis.

Nevertheless, *Discretionary Justice* is a powerful and stimulating argument for more systematic attention to administrative discretion. It deserves to be read and pondered by all of those concerned with administrative justice—which today, it should be added, is a most "relevant" matter.—DAVID M. WELBORN, *The University of Kansas.*

*The Politics of the Bench and the Bar: Judicial Selection Under the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan.* BY RICHARD A. WATSON AND RONDAL G. DOWNING. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1969, Pp. 393. $10.00.)

This book comprises a comprehensive study of the mode of judicial selection commonly referred to as the "Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan." The Plan was examined in its "mother" state. The study of judicial recruitment within the context of comparative state political systems has been advanced very substantially by this intensive six year investigation of the Missouri judicial system. The authors not only trace in competent fashion the historic antecedents of the modern Missouri Plan; they also investigate thoroughly the links between lawyers, the legal profession, law-oriented interest groups, governors, gubernatorially-oriented lay nominating commissions and judges.

One particularly significant portion of their study embodied a comprehensive analysis of the characteristics of lawyers and bar organizations in the two major metropolitan regions of Missouri, Kansas City and St. Louis. What kinds of issues generated cleavages in the bar in these large cities? What are the attributes which are related to the development of a "two-party" system within the bar of these cities? To what extent is "style of practice" related to lawyer advocacy or participation in either political party or bar association politics? What about the process of political and/or legal socialization of lawyers? Variations in the nature and situs of legal education? Income? Watson and Downing addressed themselves systematically to the task of providing empirically verifiable answers to these questions.

More than a century ago, Alexis De Tocqueville contended that "the seat of the American aristocracy is with the judges on the bench and lawyers at the bar . . . the lawyers are the most powerful class in the community, and the only real counterpoise to the influence of the democracy." Whereupon a contemporary American reviewer opened a long lasting argument about the validity of that assertion. Commenting in *The United States Magazine and Democratic Review* of July, 1838, De Tocqueville's critic retorted that "The members of the legal profession in this country are not the aristocracy but the agents . . . of the aristocracy . . . [which] is constituted by the owners of *accumulated* wealth, and chiefly by the moneyed men of the great commercial cities." Unfortunately, much of the debate over the past 120 years merited the same sort of comment as that provided by Herbert Jacob when he said "the debate over judicial selection continues in a 'factual vacuum.'" Drawing upon the modern contributions of sociologists as well as upon the data gathered by means of mail and personal interview questionnaires, Watson and Downing provide a refreshing departure by gathering empirical evidence derived from the lawyer populations of St. Louis and Kansas City. Their evidence indicate that,

> Attorneys want certain kinds of judges on the bench who will interpret rules in a particular way because such matters affect their individual law practices . . . in judicial selection, as in the handling of legal affairs generally, attorneys act as spokesmen of the social and economic interests they represent.

Interestingly enough, the major competing intraprofessional groups, plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers, have, during the period investigated, maintained "a fairly even distribution" on the judicial nominating commissions utilized in the Missouri system.

With respect to the social and political role of the legal professional, this work is of especial significance. For in addition to providing factual answers to broad public policy questions such as that raised by De Tocqueville, the authors probed deeply many other aspects of lawyer behavior. Of salient interest were their inquiries concerning (a) "the motivations behind lawyers' seeking a judicial position, (b) the barriers, social, economic, or professional, which block judicial candidacies, (c) the objectives or goals which motivate lawyer invelvement in judicial contests, whether as candidate or lawyer activist, (d) the "social cleavages" mentioned above, and (e) the roles played by lay nominating commissioners and particularly by sitting judges in the judicial process. The researchers also sought to describe the consequences associated with the change from the old elective method of selection which was avowedly "partisan" and the new mode of judicial selection which was dubbed by its advocates as "nonpartisan." Utilizing longitudinal data, the judges chosen before and after adoption of the Missouri Plan were evaluated by the bar interviewees. Similarly, a comparison of the vistages of the older system retained in "outstate" Missouri and in urban St. Louis with the operation of the new system was made.

Because the main thrust of the inquiry was focused upon the legal profession, the rather clearly identified consequences for the political parties were not etched as clearly as were the impressions these changes made members of the legal profession. Of the five measures employed, four involved lawyers or judges, only one, the general retention vote, the public at large. Thus lawyers' opinions were determinative of evaluations of consequences or "pay-offs," while assessment of the new plan by party regulars of the system was omitted. Recognizing that the authors have indeed made a substantial contribution, and recognizing also that a broadening of the dimensions of this study would inevitably have entailed a more substantial investment of time, the following recommendation warrants consideration principally for future exploration: that the same sort of intellectual cross-fertilization from the literature and empirical discoveries of leading students of political parties which characterized the authors' analysis of the realities of judicial selection would contribute saliently to further investigation of the consequences of the basic change in mode of selection.

Just as Schattschneider posited his scope of conflict approach with respect to political parties, investigators of judicial recruitment may profitably explore perspectives which are broader than those of the legal profession and the judges chosen from the political subculture comprising the legal profession within a particular state. Such inquiry could contribute importantly to the developing explorations by Burnham and others of the institutionalization of political parties in America as well as broaden the research horizens of students of comparative judicial recruitment. Similarly, the problem of the explanation of judicial consensus—e.g., "the overwhelming amount of agreement among members of [the Missouri Supreme Court]"—may be brought closer to solution by fuller understanding based upon empirical evidence of the property oriented frame of reference of the legal profession. For example, Leon Mayhew and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., investigated a sample of nearly 800 interviewees in metropolitan Detroit to explore the social organization of legal contracts. They concluded that,

> The implication of our findings is that untreated problems exist for all segments of the community. Organized to serve property and a few other problems, notably divorces and accidents, the legal profession provides relatively little professional representation and advice in relation to a broad panply of problems surrounding such daily matters as the citizen's relation to merchants or public authority . . .
>
> It is an interesting commentary on the legal frame of reference to note that one legal scholar has argued that such interests as rights to welfare benefits, job and retirement rights, and civil rights will only be adequately protected when lawyers come to see them as property rights.

These admonitions for further inquiries are made not as severe criticisms of the current research report of the investigators, but in recognition of the solid research foundation they have provided for future expanison of the dimensions of comparative state judicial recruitment. Watson and Downing have made a major contribution.—JOHN SCHMIDHAUSER, *University of Iowa.*

*Public Opinion, The President, and Foreign Policy.* BY DORIS A. GRABER (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968. Pp. 374. $6.95.)

Public participation in the making of foreign policy is a democratic myth. Foreign-policymaking is the prerogative of the President, and in this area there is "an absence of specific concern with public opinion." At most, the citizenry has a "veto-support" function in determining America's course in world affairs. That is the way it has been since the formative years of the nation, that is the way it is now, and that is the best way to protect the "public interest." Such are the major conclusions of this book dealing with the "opinion-policy relationship as seen from the presidency's perch."

Despite the Vietnam experience, these conclusions are probably correct. But unfortunately they cannot be regarded as valid or definitive on the basis of Professor Graber's work. For while she has approached the subject systematically and has asked all the right questions, her conclusions are based on such limited evidence that they can only be viewed as hypotheses requiring further study. Her book is a serious attempt at "empirical investigation" of the foreign-policy-making process, but she builds too large a theoretical edifice on too narrow an empirical foundation.

The "data" here consist of four case studies in presidential decisionmaking: Adams and the effort to maintain peace with France in 1793, Jefferson and the purchase of Louisiana in 1803, Madison and the War of 1812 with Britain, Monroe and the hemispheric doctrine of 1823. Each is a descriptive-analytic gem—pared to the historical bone, properly focused, interestingly recounted. But these materials are not sufficient to support a general theory of contemporary public-presidential relations in the field of foreign affairs. The author states that "The political world has changed greatly since the eighteenth century. But the relationship of public opinion to foreign policy decision making in the White House has remained essentially the same." Perhaps. But certainly we are entitled to have some evidence which is less than 150 years old. As Hans Morgenthau indicates gently in his *Foreword* some reference might have been made to Woodrow Wilson and the League fight or to Franklin Roosevelt and American involvement in the Second World War, and though the book was completed before Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam experience could be fully analyzed, his opinion-policy problems—manifest as early as 1965—might have been given some attention.

Even aside from the failure to present modern "data," however, the value of this book is diminished by its cursory treatment of several crucial matters. There is virtually no mention of secret policymaking by Presidents, the "representative" role of Congress in the formulation of foreign policy is hardly discussed, and there is no serious analysis of the impact of radio and television on the public-presidential and opinion-policy relationships. If the behavior of Presidents in making foreign policy has not changed "essentially" since Washington's time, certainly there have been significant changes in the way public opinion is communicated to Presidents and in the way Presidents attempt to influence, mold, or control public opinion. Moreover, Professor Graber fails to discuss why it is (if it is) that democratization, industrialization, and urbanization—not to mention technological, institutional, and educational development—have had no significant effect on the "policy-opinion relationship." Again, it may be true that despite the vast changes in America and the world during the past 150 years that relationship has not changed in any important way. But so sweeping an argument challenging the validity of so fundamental a tenet of American democracy deserves the fullest discussion and analysis.

This book is valuable not because it answers questions, but because it raises them. A democratic society must constantly examine the issue of public participation in the making of foreign policy. And such an examination is particularly desirable now. For, given the nation's leadership role in world affairs and the sensitive nature of foreign relations in the nuclear age, that issue is more critical today than it has ever been before. Professor Graber has not answered the questions raised in her book, but she has done well to remind us of the continuing dichotomy between democratic theory and governmental practice in the formulation of American foreign policy.—ROBERT S. HIRSCHFIELD, *Hunter College, City University of New York.*

*The Politics of Religious Conflict: Church and State in America.* BY RICHARD E. MORGAN. (New York: Pegasus, 1968, Pp. 156, paper.)

When many of us write or think about religion and politics, we put on blinders. Many excellent scholars have produced works in political philosophy, in constitutional law, in impact, and in voting analysis considering this question, but few utilize a format of analysis adequate to see beyond the specifics. Besides, some studies are more dedicated to proving one contesting viewpoint or another "right" than in accurately describing what the views are.

This brief study is organized to present a more comprehensive picture of the complexities of religion and politics than is generally available. To summarize: Morgan briefly indicates the theological differences which serve as a partial basis of church-state conflict, spells out the resulting personal attitudes and religious institutions which serve to structure the conflicts, and suggests that "governmentalization of welfare services" and the "welfare revolution" are "trigger issues" to that conflict. He then provides original materials for an excellent description of the organizations involved in current church-state conflicts, classifying them as "Separationist," and "Accommodationist." This is followed by a systematic description of the activities of these groups in national and state, and in judicial, legislative and administrative arenas. The most interesting chapter is a case study of New York's 1967 attempt at constitutional revision which would have abolished the particularly strict "Blaine Amendment" restrictions upon church-state interactions. These are written in an intimate style; we can all become inside-dopesters.

The book describes ideas, actors and actions, but does not always show why these are important. For example, group theory is briefly explained early in the book, and methodological notes are sprinkled throughout, but the conclusion does not follow this up. There is ample opportunity to comment on the utility of that theory because it is only somewhat useful here. Two examples may suggest that the political groups weren't really political groups after all. Contestants in the central case study were classified as either "Separationists" or "Accomodationists." While the description of the leadership's behavior indicates that it fits well in such a classificatory scheme, political followers fit less well. Catholics voting on the proposed New York State Constitution acted as though those groups were not their political referents; Professor Morgan indicates that they voted like middle class suburbanites. It would have been useful for him to have speculated as to why other classifications (upper class, middle class; suburban, urban) would not have presented clearer explanations.

More important, implicit within the basic organization of the book is the hypothesis that theology affects the kinds of organizations individuals join and the behavior they follow. Thus, if the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish beliefs reflect fundamental theological differences, then one might expect Catholic, Protestant and Jewish groups to advocate polar policies and for individuals in those groups to vote differently from each other. Here, they don't; the groups aren't groups. The significance of these facts to what I assume to be a major theme of the book is not explained, nor is the opportunity taken to propose other hypotheses of belief-action, even though the excellent bibliographic notes include sources which suggest divisions within these three faiths, rather than among the faiths.

Comment upon the utility of group analysis of belief oriented groups would have seemed to me to be a logical conclusion to the book. Such a conclusion could have reiterated the importance of the method and, through it, of the subject matter. Instead, this basic organizational theme is dropped and the concluding chapter merely hopes that religious conflict will subside.

The descriptions of the groups involved in religious politics and the case study of New York's attempt to replace its constitution are particularly well done. The break from more limited and more stodgy analyses of church and state allows us to remove our blinders for a short, fresh view of religion and politics. I have used the book in an undergraduate course and found it valuable to my students. In the particular subject matter of religion and politics, such a brief, direct book can be very useful to professional readers.—J. P. Jones, State University of New York at Buffalo

*Double Jeopardy: The Development of a Legal and Social Policy.* By Jay A. Sigler. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969. Pp. 264. $9.75.)

The Supreme Court's recent decision in *Benton* v. *Maryland,* which incorporated the double jeopardy provision in the Fifth Amendment into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, emphasizes anew the need for a clear and explicit understanding of the meaning of double jeopardy in American law. By analytically delineating the major issues surrounding the double jeopardy problem, Sigler does much to clarify the options presently open to policy makers who favor reform in this area of the criminal law.

This book will very likely appeal to both lawyers and political scientists. The double jeopardy concept is initially described in terms of its common law development and is then explored with regard to both federal and state policy. In the two chapters on federal and state policy, the various tests which have been used by the courts in applying the double jeopardy concept are defined and their various weaknesses are revealed. Lawyers may find these largely descriptive chapters to be of special interest for they canvass much of the available case law. On the other hand, political scientists may find themselves somewhat more interested in the chapter in which there is a generalized comparative treatment of double jeopardy as it has appeared in the world's legal systems. Similarly, in a following chapter there is an analysis of the policy issue raised by double jeopardy. The policy issue is, as Sigler perceives it, one which "resolves around the decision whether the community is well served by the restriction upon the prosecutor's powers to initiate and pursue the prosecution of criminal suspects" (p. 155).

A comparative examination of double jeopardy reveals that the concept, although present in most legal systems, has been variously understood. In addition to a frequent lack of agreement as to the precise meaning of double jeopardy, many of the newer nations have not accepted the concept nor has double jeopardy been accepted in the civil law countries. An essential purpose of a comparative analysis of double jeopardy is, Sigler suggests, to facilitate reformation of the concept. Accordingly, one of his several conclusions which may be of interest to students of countries with federal systems is that "no definite solution to the problem of overlapping federal and state jurisdictions seems [elsewhere] to have developed" (p. 153).

The policy issue presented by double jeopardy involves fundamentally the nature and extent of the discretion which ought to be entrusted with the public prosecutor. Double jeopardy is a limitation upon the prosecutor's power, since it serves to restrict the initiation of charges which can be brought against a given defendant. However, the prosecutor still has considerable control over the number of crimes a defendant may be accused of having committed. This discretion is especially significant because of the steady tendency in the United States to proliferate by statute the total number of possible criminal acts. Although his discussion of the policy issue involved is restrained and judicious, Sigler does favor a revitalization of double jeopardy in part because of the growing strength of the prosecutor in matters of criminal procedure.

Not everyone is persuaded that double jeopardy is "a constitutional principle under stress" (p. 189). There are those who take the view that double jeopardy is a lingering anachronism from an earlier time when unmitigated severity in the punishment of criminal offenses was alarmingly common. Consequently, since the harsh punitive spirit which once pervaded the administration of criminal justice, and which gave rise to the double jeopardy doctrine, no longer prevails, the doctrine is said by some critics to fall for want of a viable rationale. Sigler does not find this view persuasive—and, I think, properly so—favoring instead reforms which would halt the decline of the doctrine, although he emphasizes that major changes in double jeopardy policy should be initiated by legislators rather than by judges.

There is a decided need for books of this kind in public law. Case analysis, when supplemented with a broader social science perspective, continues to be an indispensably valuable tool in public law research, especially where, as here, questions of social policy are at issue. The selection of a research design thus depends largely on the nature of the questions with which the researcher is concerned. Rigorous case analysis is in this book combined with a broadly gauged interdisciplinary approach which draws heavily on law, criminology, and political science. The result is an able and admirably balanced treatment of a highly significant constitutional doctrine.—David N. Atkinson, *University of Missouri, Kansas City.*

*Participation of the Poor: Comparative Community Case Studies in the War on Poverty* By Ralph M. Kramer (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969, Pp. 273. $3.95 Paper.)

*Participation of the Poor* is a study of "the inception of the Community Action Programs in the San Francisco Bay Area to see how various communities would implement the legislative mandate to secure the maximum feasible participation of the groups and areas to be served." (p. v.) The volume, therefore, is not a description and analysis of all phases of the CAP programs in the five communities chosen for study (the cities of San Francisco, Oakland and Berkeley, and Santa Clara and Contra Costa Counties). Rather, the focus is on the implementation of the controversial "maximum feasible participation" clause of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. In the author's words, "it is an analysis of some of the consequences of an innovative but ambiguous social policy and, on another level, of an attempt by various groups to translate social and political ideologies into action." (p .1) In format the work is similar to Edward Banfield's study of Chicago, *Political Influence.* As in that volume, *Participation of the Poor* begins with a theoretical introduction, which is followed by detailed case studies and concludes with comparative analysis of the case materials presented.

The author, a professor in the School of Social Welfare at Berkeley, obtained his data by means of direct observation of hundreds of meetings as well as by interviewing participants in community action projects. These data were supplemented by newspaper clippings, official government documents (including a wide range of CAP materials), and a large number of relevant scholarly and quasi-scholarly writings. The description and analysis of such new, complex, and fluid organizations as the CAP's and their neighborhood arms (target area organizations) is fraught with many difficulties. Not the least of these is the problem of assessing the reliability and validity of the findings. Given these difficulties, one cannot help but be impressed by the magnitude of Kramer's research effort and the appropriateness of the data gathering techniques, given the stated goals of the study.

The author argues that four modes of resident participation evolved in response to the "maximum feasible participation" clause of the legislation creating the War on Poverty. Participation took the form of involvement in CAP policy making at the community level, assistance in program development in the target areas, social action (organizing the poor to affect power redistribution), and/or employment in the program. Underlying these various modes of participation were two opposing conceptions of the causes and possible cures of poverty: (1) a notion of individual deficiencies with a resultant emphasis on social service programs, and (2) a notion of structural weaknesses in the society with a resultant emphasis on organizing the poor for a restructuring of power. The case studies make clear that OEO sanctioned all of these modes of participation at one time or another.

The community responses to the prescription to involve the poor varied tremendously. Differences were due to such variables as the political culture of the community, the level of civil rights activity, the type of governmental structure, the scope of previous anti-poverty efforts, the pattern of community decision making, among others. The author characterizes the process of conflict resolution in the five communities as either a debate, a game, or a fight (a la Anatole Rappoport), thus focusing the reader's attention on general questions of conflict resolution and demonstrating the relevance of these questions for the understanding of policy making processes. Contrary to some expectations, "the feared political insurgency of the poor did not really develop in any substantial way" (p. 235) as a result of the mandate to involve the poor. In part, this was due to the fact that the CAP's did not have the independence from the political structure to develop a power base that many believed them to have. For this and other reasons, the author expects CAP's to spend more of their time and money in the future on promoting services rather than on organizing the poor.

Kramer concludes the work by arguing "that there is great need to organize the poor around community development and social action objectives," (p. 268) although he does not see the CAP as the vehicle for attaining these objectives. Instead, he favors the autonomous neighborhood corporation, while at the same time arguing that low-income indigenous organizations (social, religious, civic) that already exist should be strengthened. His prescription seems valid if one accepts the idea that a major problem of the poor (and especially poor minorities) is personal alienation. This alienation is the result of basic dissatisfactions with one's everyday life situation (housing, job, education, family situation, etc.), and may lead to a withdrawal from the political sphere. It may lead to withdrawal of support for political institutions and thus may threaten the legitimacy of these institutions, if the sense of alienation is widespread. Participation in politics and in other organizational facets of life, as suggested by Kramer, may offer the best hope for eradicating feelings of personal alienation among the poor. It is to be hoped that his excellent volume will stimulate more research on organizational efforts among the poor and the functions of this participation for the citizenry and the system alike.—LYMAN A. KELLSTEDT, *University of Illinois-Chicago Circle.*

*Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty.* BY DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN. (New York: The Free Press, 1969. Pp. 218. $5.95.)

*Poverty, Planning and Politics in the New Boston: The Origins of the ABCD.* BY STEPHAN THERNSTROM. (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1969. Pp. 199. $5.95.)

These two books add further to the growing literature on the problems and politics of social reform in America in this particularly turbulent period of our national life. The principle issues of that reform with which we are concerned revolve around two basic and highly interrelated questions. Can the political system, in the larger sense, produce an operational equality which our political ideology posits? Can we achieve it within a reasonable time span and with means that will not in themselves be destructive of that which we are trying to save? Much of this literature which deals with our recent experiments and experiences in social and political reform offers a recounting of or an evaluation of the "experiments" or demonstration programs launched by the Ford Foundation through its "gray areas" programs, the Kennedy Administration's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime and, of course, with the poverty programs and efforts spawned originally under the authority of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. To this literature these two books make a valuable, interesting and engaging further contribution.

The Thernstrom volume is devoted to a history of the formation and early years of Action for Boston Community Development (ABCD). At its genesis it was envisaged by local leadership (principally Edward J. Logue, then the new head of Boston's urban renewal enterprises) as the social planning counterpart of, and as a support vehicle for, the physical renewal activities of the Boston Redevelopment Authority. In the mind's eye of its local initiator it was to be an action agency from the word go, and it was to be tied closely to the political leadership and objectives of the administration in City Hall. The interaction of private and public politics and the external forces which shaped the life of ABCD resulted in none of this happening quite as originally planned or conceived. What did happen and why it happened is carefully and thoughtfully detailed by the author in an excellent historical reconstruction accompanied by an insightful and carefully constructed commentary and analysis of why what happened came to pass. In so doing he adds considerably to our knowledge of the politics of community planning.

Thernstrom gives his attention to a period preceding the formal advent of the war on poverty as a Great Society offensive while Moynihan concentrates on how the policies and programs represented by the Economic Opportunities Act came into being, how it (or particularly the "community action" part of it) came to be something that was perhaps unintended and not consciously proposed by Congress and how and why it failed or is failing. (That is, one must infer, until the reforms of the new administration with the author's influence will correct its bearings and bring it back on course.) The two studies intersect in that they both examine the phenomenon and practice of community action, although from different perspectives, and they both explore activities and ideas that were clearly antecedents to and influences upon the anti-poverty program as mounted under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.

Thernstrom's study has as a principal concern the tracing out of the influences on current urban policies of the experiments of the early sixties. These were the "gray areas" projects of the Ford Foundation and the "demonstrations" of the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime. Both of these efforts sought to find and fund new types of community action vehicles through which to get the cities of the United States to give sustained and dynamic attention to their urban problems, thus making real and meaningful change possible. While this had already been looked at in a comprehensive macro-way by Marris and Rein (*Dilemmas of Social Reform: Poverty and Community Action in the U.S.*), the early history of ABCD presents a view from the bottom up and, ". . . will yield a different and perhaps no less valuable perspective." One thrust of this study, then, is "to indicate the gulf between local realities and external conceptions of the local scene." (p. x.) The second major theme is to demonstrate, at least via the early story of the ABCD, (the study covers the period from 1960 to 1964 before ABCD became the OEO-CAP vehicle for the Boston poverty program) the limitations of scientific social planning by experts. The author discerns from the ABCD saga, "that the root problems of the modern metropolis are not technical but political, and that expertise is largely irrelevant to their solution. ABCD was a novel and ambitious effort to create a new kind of institution that would both devise and demonstrate the efficacy of new "scientific" solutions to the pressing problems of the city, an effort launched under highly auspicious circumstances. It had political support, civic respectability, professional competence, and a good deal of money. Not only the top political leadership of Boston but the civic elite and key social-service professionals were eager to see this experiment succeed. Both the Ford Foundation and the federal government, in search of a new point of leverage from which to press for the reform of central city institutions, were happy to foot the bills. This promising venture, however, failed to accomplish its central objectives." (p. x.)

The first part of the Thernstrom exposition (from the Fall of 1960 to the Spring of 1962) charts the quest for Ford Foundation funding and the neat adjustments that were made in local thinking and action in order to produce a proposal and an institutional arrangement that would satisfy the funders even if violative of the original intentions of the local initiators. In the process of recounting this story much is revealed about the internal workings of the political system, the theoretical and practical foundations of the Ford program, the interaction of local and national actors and tie-ins of private sector programs with the emerging program at the public level represented by the program of the President's Committee. (The Moynihan volume deals with similar materials.)

The quest for Ford funds overlapped with and was complemented by the struggle for a federal delinquency planning grant. Again the interplay between the local and national actors and the impact upon the local institutional arrangements and ultimately the self-defeating forces that were set in motion by the external forces are fully explicated. In the detailing of this process Thernstrom clearly demonstrates the interconnections between the President's Committee and the Ford Foundation and how this was used to further influence (coerce) the local community to move in a given program and organization direction.

Thernstrom concludes that the kind of institutional change that was the goal of the Ford program was not possible because the political power in the vehicle for planning that change and coordinating its implementation internalized contradictory forces that could not be mitigated and lacked the political power to effectuate the needed decisions. He argues, furthermore, that a model which required a lengthy and a careful period of planning with built-in research and evaluation techniques propounded by both Ford and the President's committee was unrealistic in respect to the needs and the forces at work—such rational processes and social experimentations are not suitable to the facts of life (as we are finding out again in the Model Cities program).

How could programs have been formulated and initiated that would have more successfully recognized the requirements of a politics of social change and produced a coalition that could have been "dedicated to changing the institutional structure of Boston in ways that would improve the lot of disadvantaged social groups?" Thernstrom observes (even with the hindsight of ABCD's later involvement with citizen participation community action) that while ABCD could probably not have created a new constituency for itself, it "could have listened more carefully to the voices that were being raised in Boston as early as 1963." He certainly parts company with the inferences one draws from Moynihan when he says, "The real choice may not be order or disorder, but rather creative disorder or destructive disorder. . . " (p. 179) For Moynihan our misunderstanding of "maximum feasible participation" has already brought too much disorder to the local and national political scenes.

Moynihan's main line of argument has appeared in various places previously. Since the release of the book coincided with his entrance into the Nixon Administration it has received especially wide publicity. That great effort at social change exemplified by the war on poverty, he maintains, had by its very nature internal contradictions; and these were aggravated by misinterpretation and/or deliberate misconstruction by OEO administrators. The contradictions and the misconstructions, he further propounds, were not recognized early enough or given sufficient attention by political leaders from the President on down (except for the big city Mayors who did know the score right from the outset). This was mainly so because the whole program was not truly a response to a need demanded by an active and powerfully political constituency. Such being the case it follows that politicians in crucial places did not really participate in the making of the policy. It all occurred because of the professionalization of reform and because social scientists somehow became policy makers and foisted untested, unproved and fuzzy theories or social science doctrine on an unsuspecting or unsophisticated public and national leadership in Congress and the executive branch.

The author also maintains that the misemphasis on maximum feasible participation and the kind of community action it produced—mostly organizing the poor and the dissident against city hall with public funds—dissipated energies, caused loss of support and took attention away from developing the programs that were needed. What was needed were workable and massive employment programs and an income maintenance effort of some kind (mainly to put money in the hands of the poor so they wouldn't be poor and so they would then "participate" as normal actors in the political process). The income strategy as opposed to the service strategy has been propounded vigorously by others too. The question, however, is why were there not such programs? Certainly the proponents of "maximum feasible participation" and a politicized community action program were not opposed to such, and perhaps if adequate money had been put into the poverty war and consequently greater emphasis on jobs and income programs the "excesses" of community action might not have occurred. Indeed, the minimal amounts of community action dollars unearmarked for such programs as Headstart, Legal Aid, etc. might very well have been only a palliative in substitute for the larger amounts that were needed and upon which the poverty program had been predicated. In this respect, then, perhaps failures should be attributed to the Viet Nam war and the priority and attention which the President gave it, rather than to the misinterpretation and maladministration of the "maximum feasible participation" part of the community action programs.

Perhaps this is too hasty a summary and somewhat of a caricature of the Moynihan thesis. Basically the points he makes are well-taken and well-made. The record *would* seem to indicate that the "maximum feasible participation" requirements of the Act were principally intended to provide the entrance wedge needed to insure that Southern Negro needs would not be ignored. That the community action components of the Economic Opportunities Act embraced many possible approaches, that they were perhaps hastily drawn together and that they were primarliy intended as a device to insure coordination of programs and efforts at the federal level through the coordinated comprehensive demands that would be thrust upon the federal establishment from the bottom, are also sound observations. That it became something else, that it took in reality "the form of denying the legitimacy of those institutions of electoral representation that had developed over years the—indeed, the centuries, and which nominally did provide community control" (p. 182) (if such were the case) cannot all be attributed at least by this reviewer, to social scientists stepping out of their proper roles as measurers of the results of policy and acting instead as policy formulators, or to poor or sloppy administration and an inadequate organizational setting for the poverty programs. Perhaps it took the form it did as a reaction or a response to the fact that people were not being represented. A struggle for a sense of community in the midst of complexity (a point which the author himself makes) was really occurring and institutional change at local levels of a radical kind and at an accelerated pace was needed. Presumably the Model City program, with which Mr. Moynihan is now wrestling, had carefully modulated citizen participation features with program responsibility and operation clearly resting with the traditional local institutions of government rather than with paragovernmental agencies (a phrase Moynihan has recently used). Somehow, however, even including the effects of some pretty obtuse federal guidelines, there are still strong pressures for changing existing local government arrangements and adversary proceedings to effect shifts in power and a greater control by constituencies over how and by whom services will be rendered. To say that all of this is just a perversion of what ought to be the way of democratic self-government, does not fully deal with the question of what is happening with local self-government, what the turmoil is all about and what we should do about it. Nor does it face up fully to the basic questions of democratic theory in respect to current practice which, many argue, needs reexamination.—SEYMOUR Z. MANN, *Hunter College, City University of New York.*

*The Korean War and American Politics: The Republican Party As a Case Study.* BY RONALD J. CARIDI. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Pp. 319. $10.

This is a disappointing book. Written by an historian, it tells us little new about either the Congressional Republican Party's criticism of the Democrats' Far Eastern policy after Chiang Kai-shek's demise or its impact upon the conduct of the Korean War. And its central thesis—when finally stated after 15 pages—is a dubious one. Finally, while the publisher claims the "author's provocative conclusions are particularly applicable today, for it was the experience of Korea that led to the United States' growing involvement in Asia and to her greater reliance on the concept of wars of limited objectives," no tentative comparisons are offered on Vietnam. Indeed, Caridi shows no familiarity with recent political science research on "linkage politics".

His story is by now familiar: the collapse of Nationalist China, its coincidence with Senator Vandenberg's death, the new prominence of conservative Congressional Republicans who were anti-European, unilateralist, and pro-Asian in their orientation, and believed that Democratic domestic and foreign policies ought to be attacked in order to augment their Congressional representation and recapture the White House in 1952. Caridi, like others before him, shows how their charges of "appeasement" and "softness in Communism" made it impossible for the Truman Administration to dispose of Formosa or recognize the new Chinese regime, propelled us across the 38th Parallel and exercised great pressure on the Administration to adopt MacArthur's strategy after Peking's intervention. Finally, having failed to obtain Taft's nomination as their Presidential candidate, they only reluctantly accepted Eisenhower's Korean peace terms.

The thesis is however, novel. Caridi agrees with the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association which in 1950 advocated a greater centralization of both parties that would clearly express fundamental policy differences and be more publicly accountable. Recognizing that American parties are decentralized and that normally it is difficult to say who are the out-party's spokesmen, he nevertheless asserts that between Vandenberg and Eisenhower the Congressional conservatives presented the Republican foreign policy alternatives. He then concludes that the "party was neither consistent nor sincere(!) in its development of an alternative to the policies formulated by Truman and the Democratic party." First supporting Truman and the intervention, it later fluctuated between suggesting a complete withdrawal from Korea and that we should never have intervened, and supporting MacArthur's philosophy of "no substitute for victory." Finally, the party nominated a man who rejected this viewpoint and supported the limited war effort. "Hence the conclusion that when the nature of a party's dissent indicates that its members are motivated more by political expediency than by a desire to present a consistent and viable alternative to Administration policies, censure is in order."

What can one say about such a value judgment? Even if one deplores the Republican conservatives' criticisms, does the author intend to suggest that in British disciplined party system the Republicans would have acted more on "principle" and presented responsible alternatives? Even before Waltz's devasting attack on Britain's political institutions and post-war foreign policy record, for instance on defense and European unity, this conclusion would have been doubtful. Or is his reference to party expediency meant to imply that an admonition to place the "national interest" above partisan advantage is the solution? But can a party in a democracy avoid being concerned with the next election, and will it not "sincerely" equate its position with the "national interest"? It is one thing to argue that the out-party's criticism should be "constructive" rather than "destructive", but whether it is one or the other is surely a matter of individual judgment. Caridi does however make it clear, although he seems unaware of it, that the bipartisanship he favors can function best when Administration policies are successful; it cannot survive major setbacks. The resulting critique is bound to seem "destructive" to an Administration. In any event, the author's acceptance of James McGregor Burns' four party thesis defeats his own argument. If both Presidential parties are to the left of their Congressional wings and it is the former who ensure the continuity of American domestic and foreign policies, then one may question whether too much emphasis has not been given to the latter; in the three preceding Presidential elections, the Republican eastern wing selected the nominee and paid little attention to its Congressional party's record.

Lastly, one can only reiterate the disappointment that a book purporting to be a case study whose conclusion(s) presumably apply to other similar cases, and appearing after domestic forces had such a significant impact upon the Vietnamese War, and raised fundamental issues about our foreign policy and allocation of resources, makes no reference to that conflict. The post-Korean limited war advocates of the 1950's had a case; but their strategic prescriptions were always divorced from any analysis of the interactions of American domestic politics and foreign policy in a less than total conflict. This proved to be a fundamental weakness. Unfortunately, it remains so.—John Spanier, *University of Florida.*

## COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

*Beyond Eagle and Swastika: German Nationalism Since 1945.* By Kurt P. Tauber. 2 vols., (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1967, Pp. 1598. $35.00.)

Professor Tauber began his research for this work with the intention of analyzing "the factors that make for the survival of nationalism in postwar Germany" and of explaining "why Right-extremism has so far failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough." He came to realize, however, that available sources could not supply plentiful and accurate illustrative materials for this analytical purpose, that "even basic facts were frequently entirely unknown," and that much of the existing data was inaccurate. He therefore decided to produce a comprehensive work of reference as well as an analysis.

The result is an enormous book with a mine of information on right-wing nationalism in postwar West Germany. The entire second volume, some one-third of the whole work, consists of notes and references, appendixes, and bibliography. The bulk of the book consists of a detailed chronicle of the activities of right-wing groups in West Germany after 1945, many of them by now faded from the view of even the most diligent observer of the German political scene. There are also substantial sections about "the antiliberal tradition" in Germany and about the fate of nationalist conservatives under Hitler. The text reflects the third purpose of the author: to show that there are many forms of antidemocratic and antiparliamentary nationalism which are not identical with Nazism, and that "most current generalizations about 'neo-Nazism' " are misleading.

Armed with *Beyond Eagle and Swastika,* the reader could confidently expect to confront a possible resurgent German nationalist dragon with an armor of intricate information at his disposal. This is true despite the fact that the manuscript was essentially completed in 1964, considerably before the electoral successes of the NPD (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*) in state elections in 1966. The name of Adolf von Thadden, chairman of this new party founded in 1964, recurs frequently in Tauber's book in association with earlier postwar right-wing parties or groups, and the author notes in a brief allusion to the founding of the new party that "the NPD stands symbolically as the crown of von Thadden's years of unrelenting effort to pry open the gate to the lush fields of German bourgeois nationalism."

The book is a vast and careful compilation of information, its materials are presented with admirable thoroughness, and its author is very well attuned to the characteristics of conservative nationalist ideologies and political practices. *Beyond Eagle and Swastika* is a substantial accomplishment, and one may predict that it will remain a work of importance for some time to come. Yet both the subject matter and mode of treatment should be viewed against the perspective of other knowledge about postwar German politics and other modes of approaching the significant features of the West German polity. There is in the book a certain tendency to assume that German nationalist movements will come to occupy a far more central role in West Germany in the future than they have in the earlier postwar years.

While this may become true, the materials in the book do not permit one to make such a prediction, nor was it the author's intention to do so. However, the very fact that he has written what is probably the longest work on West Germany to appear in the English language conveys the impression that nationalist movements are somehow central to understanding the potentialities of West German politics.

Had it appeared during the Weimar Republic, a book such as Tauber's would have been extremely informative and useful in comprehending events and their ultimate direction. Whether Tauber's book will be equally useful as a *Baedeker* to future German politics is uncertain. In fact, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika* does little to shed light on possible answers to this question. The impression one gains of the potential central importance of nationalist movements arises less from demonstrated evidence than from the sheer bulk of the materials presented and from the author's use of analogies drawn from earlier German political and intellectual history. The author never says that such movements will come to occupy center stage; indeed, he stresses that he is not dealing with the question "How alive is democracy?" but with the inquiry "How dead is antidemocratic nationalism (and why)?" It was not his intention to "present a full-length portrait of German political life" or to deal "with those massive democratic, social, political, and cultural forces which can be counted on to resist (and are resisting) any recurrence of authoritarianism and integral nationalism." Nevertheless, the author's conceptual framework rests on certain assumptions which are not themselves critically examined, reinforcing the impression of the reviewer that there is some discrepancy between the careful presentation of evidence on the activities of nationalist movements and certain *a priori* views about the significance of these movements for the future of German politics.

Tauber is eminently clear on the variety of views which characterize the nationalist groups. An entire chapter, for example, is devoted to exploration of ideas of nationalist neutralism or "East orientations" among some of these groups. There are long and thorough chapters on the ideas and literature of nationalism, on right-wing youth groups, and on the relation between nationalist ideas and activities and the foreign and domestic policy choices of the Bonn Republic up to 1964. Nevertheless, one is left somewhat in confusion concerning the relative importance or lack of importance of the various views and activities.

The book also contains a number of assertions and assumptions which sound plausible, but whose relationship to the phenomena Tauber describes are speculative, rather than demonstrated on the basis of reference to other aspects of the West German political system and political culture. The author writes confidently of "the extinction in the West of the fire of ideology, after decades of politico-religious fanaticism and paroxysms of homicidal frenzy." Yet he also notes: "We have traced the political failure of the extreme Right as an independent, organized contributor to political decision making in postwar Germany, but we have also recorded the vitality and spread of nationalist thought, ideals, and ideology." His general conclusion is that the potential for realignment of West German politics exists, because of the continued strength of nationalist ideas, because of the growing mobility (or open-endedness) of West German politics, both internal and external, and because an acceptance of liberal democratic values, or a "liberating catharsis never took place among broad layers" of elite or public.

As indicated, these remarks have the ring of plausibility, but one is not sure whether this may only be because they (and particularly the last) are rather fashionable. *Beyond Eagle and Swastika* does not help one to judge whether they are more than that, because its material is not integrated with the dynamics of West German politics. Nevertheless, it provides an indispensable adjunct to the study of stability and change in West Germany.—George K. Romoser, *University of New Hampshire.*

*The Nadars of Tamilnad: The Political Culture of a Community in Change.* By Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 314. $8.75.)

Caste is one of the bed-rock institutions of Indian society, and students of Indian affairs have for some time tried to indicate the impact of caste on politics and *vice versa*. A number of studies, not only by political scientists, but by anthropologists, sociologists, journalists, etc., are already available; and quite reasonably they approach this general problem with varying degrees of emphasis on historical development, on different levels of analysis, on the broader environment within which castes function, and so on. To the very meager list of studies which examine caste groups over a rather wide area (vs. village- or district-based studies), over a long time span, and with a concern for the changing environment over time and space within which castes function, Prof. Hardgrave now makes a very significant contribution, indeed, through his study of the Nadars of Tamilnad, one of the major caste groups of South India (already treated in more limited fashion by L. I. and S. H. Rudolph). In his effort to utilize anthropological, sociological, and political perspectives in tracing the evolution of this wide-spread community over a span of roughly 150 years, Hardgrave has obviously been unable to deal with each facet of his problem in lavish detail; and doubtless specialists concerned with each of the narrower disciplinary perspectives will enter pertinent *caveats* (some of which I shall suggest below). In the nature of the case, this is inevitable, and the shortcomings of this study should not obscure its very substantial merits.

Hardgrave's concern is with the Nadars, a rather far-flung, numerous, and, at the time his inquiry begins, a very low status community in South India. Following a brief but pertinent introduction on the general role of caste in Indian public life, the main body of this study begins with a statement of the position of the Nadars *circa* 1800, with due attention to internal differentiation (characteristic of most, if not all castes), "before substantial change had occurred." Hardgrave then examines "the process of change itself" as the community was (differentially) affected by a variety of forces, including Christianity (to which a number of Nadars converted), education, improved communications and transportation, urbanization and expanding economic opportunities, the rise of national as well as local political movements, and so on. These gave rise to altered community consciousness and self-definition, to new organizations to press Nadar interests, to new occupations, to new and varied perceptions of and involvement in the political environment.

Hardgrave traces the process of change through three stages: (1) the localized, parochial orientation of the "traditional" Nadar community (which still no doubt characterizes a proportion of contemporary Nadars), through (2) an "integrated" phase in which there was considerable social mobilization (which linked together Nadars of different regions, religions, economic conditions, especially through certain caste associations, in the interests of general community advance, first through emulation of higher caste Hindu norms, then through a more secular orientation, which in some cases involved an explicit rejection of these norms), and, finally, (3) to the stage of "differentiation" in which the community became more diverse occupationally, politically, and otherwise, and in which the capacity of the caste associations to speak for all Nadars over a broad range of public issues was severely restricted. The various transformations are well set forth, both in general and through pertinent case studies; and we are confronted with an account of the general, but not universal improvement of the lot of the Nadars, symbolized politically by the position of Kamaraj Nadar as a luminary in the Congress Party. (It should be noted that in making the ascent, the Nadars were involved in considerable violence, which is often overlooked by students of change in India but which here receives great stress.) The concluding chapter of the main body of the work (there are appendices), "The Nadars: An Overview", provides an excellent summary and may profitably be read first by those who want an idea of where Hardgrave's argument will lead them.

There are some difficulties, however. While Hardgrave notes the internal differentiation among the Nadars before substantial change occurred, and while he points at different junctures to increasing differentiation, there is something of a "success story" quality to his account which in my view pays insufficient attention to those Nadars who were left very far behind their "progressive" brethren. (Some brief biographical sketches, illustrative of different Nadar subgroups, help a bit here, but the picture still remains rather vague.) Further, Hardgrave indicates the nature of the conflict (often violent) which accompanied the rise of (a segment of) the Nadars, and in defining the Nadars' own view of the world, he emphasizes their increasingly secular, anti-caste orientation. Yet he does not dwell extensively on the actual behavior of the Nadars towards those non-Nadars who remained below them on the Hindu social hierarchy; and I find it difficult to believe that the Nadars were as generous towards other depressed communities as Hardgrave suggests. Further still (but on a different subject), Hardgrave will not satisfy those who expect to find Almond-Verba type analysis of the political culture of the Nadars, even for the contemporary period. In these and other areas, Hardgrave would have had to expand his analysis in many directions (e.g., to include the sort of intensive, more conventional anthropological studies which would illuminate the first two problems noted above); but this would have been an enormous undertaking, indeed, given the range of Hardgrave's concerns.

One could extend the list of points which would have benefitted from further attention, depending on one's principal concerns and orientations. *Chacun a son gout.* But as it stands, this is an important book for students of Indian affairs (although I would be less enthusiastic than the author of a tribute on the dust-jacket, where we are told that it is "one of the most important and exciting studies in the Indian field in recent years.") Moreover, this work's significance extends beyond the India field, as it delves into the transformation of "natural" or "traditional" associations which are confronted with forces of "modernization". Even if one were to assert the uniqueness of caste as an institution, Hardgrave's study should certainly be of interest to those who are concerned with, for example, the role of tribes in recent African history and even with the evolution of various ethnic minorities in the United States. Thus, broadly speaking, this volume has comparative significance as well; and it may be read with great profit by specialists whose domain is not India.—HOWARD L. ERDMAN, *Dartmouth College.*

*Bureaucrats Under Stress: Administrators and Administration in an Indian State.* BY RICHARD P. TAUB (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 235. $6.75.)

*From Zamindar to Ballot Box: Community Change in a North Indian Market Town.* BY RICHARD G. FOX. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969. Pp. 302. $12.00.)

The two studies considered here engender considerable uneasiness about the capacity of the Indian political system to stimulate rapid economic and social modernization. The pathos of this condition lies in the distinct possibility that the Indian style of politics and administration, while democratic both in form and content, may not be conducive to the promotion of societal change.

Thus, one of the prime instrumentalities of the Government of India in attempting to modernize that society has been the elite cadre of administrators recruited into the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) mainly by national competitive examinations. The fewer than 2,000 men enlisted for this directive corps of the national and state bureaucracies are relatively westernized in their orientations and trained to assume an activist role. But the IAS today operates in a cultural and political environment where many of the bureaucratic values incorporated in its recruitment, training and service patterns contribute little—if they do not actually impede—the successful pursuit of economic and social change. This situation constitutes an important theme of Professor Taub's valuable study of the IAS cadre assigned in 1962–63 to duties in the State Secretariat of the relatively backward state of Orissa.

Taub's book, as a whole, provides important insights into the attitudes and patterns of behavior of the Indian bureaucratic elite—a subject which has received surprisingly little systematic study heretofore. Extracts from his indepth interviews with the 28 IAS officers "attached" to the Orissa Secretariat and his observation of the activities of the state bureaucracy are the most striking features of the book. These materials are supplemented by elite interviews with forty other persons: members of the Orissa (State) Administrative Service; leading state politicians; businessmen; academics; and government engineers.

While the salaries and perquisites of the IAS officers are large and they remark favorably upon the security provided by their positions, few derive personal satisfaction from the *content* of their work. Their decision-making authority is increasingly circumscribed by state and regional politicians; frequent directives from the national government calling for programmatic innovations must necessarily meet with inadequate administrative responses. These responses grow not only out of the political pressures exerted upon the top administrators but out of their own career patterns and the bureaucratic structures within which they function. Their generalist training and brief tours of duty at specific tasks prepare them poorly for dealing with the technical demands of development administration; the careful planning and staged execution of large projects is almost impossible for men assigned to their posts for three years or less. Since the system rewards even those who risk little (promotion is assured and discipline for poor performance is rare), few incentives exist for those who might attempt to cut through the maze of red tape and confusions of responsibility which have resulted from a rapidly expanding, but poorly coordinated and partially politicized, state bureaucracy.

Basic to the difficulties encountered by some of the IAS officers is the fact that those from outside of Orissa are treated as "foreigners" and, in turn, insulate themselves from the people of the state and from those members of the service drawn from Orissa. The latter, in contrast, tend to be implicated in inter-group conflicts characteristic of the region. Social differences within the IAS exacerbate an administrative situation in which mistrust is already rife and subordinates tend to respond to this climate by resorting to administrative inaction or by taking refuge behind rules.

Under the circumstances, Taub is justifiably pessimistic that the IAS can act as an organizational vehicle for major societal change. Recognizing that neither dissolution of the IAS (to end local resentments against "foreign" administrators) nor greater centralization of bureaucratic control is likely to be a real solution, he concludes on a somber note—a note, fortunately, which does not follow entirely from the limited scope of his data:

> Unless the bureaucratic organization can contract, emphasizing those tasks that it can do well, while creating independent sources of initiative to manage those it cannot, the administrative apparatus of the state will one day collapse, prey to the rage of its hungry and frustrated people, who will turn to demagogues to accomplish what their present national leaders have so far failed to do. (p. 203)

Whether such a harsh forecast is warranted depends upon one's understanding of the character of Indian society in general. Professor Fox's study does little to lighten the burden of Taub's conclusions, although his concerns lie less in the future than in the past.

Tezibazar is a market town of 7,200 people in the state of Uttar Pradesh. During 1963–64, Richard Fox studied its social structure, its economy and the nature of local political conflicts. He employed two surveys of businessmen to gather some of his data about the economic behavior of the town, but most of his materials are derived from direct observation and from informal and unstructured interviews.

According to Fox's informants, Tezibazar was created four centuries ago as a commercial enclave serving the interests of an agricultural region dominated by local overlords (*zamindars*). Fox argues that the town has no history of an integrated social or moral order. What integration existed prior to Independence was provided by the zamindars who controlled local positions of power and by the caste organizations which regulated the social interactions of the segmented constituent elements of the town. During the late nineteenth century, the influence of the traditional zamindars declined; they were partially displaced by descendants of the merchants they had originally induced to migrate to the town to conduct its commerce. Today, Tezibazar also exhibits a social atomism very different from the relatively coherent caste, ritual and economic structures anthropologists have found in some Indian villages.

Here lies whatever criticism might be leveled at Fox's approach. Rich in detail on such matters as caste relations, the specifics of political conflict, and economic behavior, this is a complex account of the multiple dimensions of a population aggregate stranded between village and urban forms of organization. As an anthropologist interested in social structure, however, the author tends to view the town from the perspective of its inadequacies as a village. Fox despairs over the low levels of economic cooperation and commercial morality in Tezibazar; such behaviors are matched in politics by a constantly shifting series of alliances based both on traditional and expedient intra-caste and inter-caste cleavages, conflicts between Hindus and Muslims and interpersonal feuds. The existence of such conflicts and the absence of an integrative social structure have opened the town to substantial participation in the party politics and economic life of the state and region. Yet, in a style reminiscent of Vidich and Bensman's *Small Town in Mass Society*, this is not a prospect which Fox views with any equanimity.

There may be some reluctance on a reader's part to accept Fox's standards of evaluation, but the study is in itself a major contribution to the the literature available on Indian urbanism and is likely to be of value to anyone interested in the economic organization in a transitional society. Fox's sometimes acid portrait of town life as typified by the unscrupulous behaviors of its merchant castes is hardly likely to provide comfort to those wishing to view the prospects for economic modernization in India with optimism. Caught between a subsistence economic mentality which discourages enterpreneurial activity and a social ethic which encourages a highly expedient approach to interpersonal relations and to public life, the capacity of a democratic political system to generate fundamental changes in an economy and society like India's appears at least rather limited.—DONALD B. ROSENTHAL, *State University of New York at Buffalo.*

*Egypt Since the Revolution.* ED. BY P. J. VATIKIOTIS. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. Pp. 195. $6.95.)

There has been so much unfortunate misunderstanding, as well as controversy, about Egypt under Nasser that all serious studies on the subject, such as this small volume, are to be welcomed. It includes papers prepared by a number of scholars from the United States, Britain, France and Egypt who participated in a small working conference held in September, 1966, at the Centre of Middle Eastern Studies, London University, to discuss economic, political and cultural problems and developments in Egypt since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1952.

The book is divided into four major parts. In Part I, which deals with Egypt's economy, Professor Bent Hanson of the University of California, Berkeley, discusses and evaluates the first "comprehensive" five-year plan covering the period from 1960 to 1965; Professor Galal Amin of Ain Shams University, Cairo, traces and analyzes the changes which took place in Egypt's economy after 1952; Professor Roger Owen of St. Antony's College, Oxford, reviews agricultural developments in Egypt from 1890 to 1939; and M. Riad el Ghonemy, on the staff of the Food and Agricultural Organization in Rome, examines the major changes which have taken place in Egyptian agriculture since 1952. This section contains much useful information, many valuable tables and discerning analyses and conclusions. While considerable stress is given to such major topics as economic planning, rates of economic growth growth and especially agricultural developments since 1890, one could have wished for more details and discussion on other important aspects of Egypt's economy, such as the industrial sector, the causes for foreign exchange difficulties and the impact of foreign aid, foreign relations and defense needs on the economy.

In Part II, covering the evolution of Egyptian politics, Professor Maxime Rodinson of the Sorbonne presents an astute and lively study of political developments in Egypt since 1952. He notes that the principal motivations of the Free

Officers in overthrowing the monarchy were, first, to secure complete national independence and, secondly, to modernize economic, social and political life in Egypt. He shows how politically naive the Free Officers were at the beginning and how greatly they had underestimated the obstacles to the achievement of the advanced political, economic and social reforms they had in mind. He explains how and why these officers then tightened their political grip on the country and how Nasser emerged as the undisputed leader. Professor Rodinson correctly points out that developments outside Egypt helped to shape internal developments. Nevertheless, more stress could have been given to the serious repercussions which a number of external developments—such as the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956, the various Arab-Israeli disputes and the Yemen—had on Egypt's domestic policies.

Also in Part II, Professor Malcolm Kerr of the University of California, Los Angeles, discusses and analyzes, with perception and objectivity, the most sensitive and controversial subject in the book: Egyptian foreign policy under President Nasser. On the one hand, Professor Kerr criticizes Egyptian policy for its "equivocation" and "shifting" nature and for its occasional "ambitiousness" and "activism" beyond the nation's needs and capabilities. On the other hand, he holds that Nasser's foreign policy has been more pragmatic and flexible and less influenced by "abstract preconceptions, emotions, or megalomania" than many "hostile quarters' have contended and that his major foreign policies had their "origin not in activism or ambition, but in long-standing Egyptian national interests and facts of life that no Egyptian leader of any political colour could have ignored from 1952 onward" (p. 118). He indicates that Egyptians generally have much more in common—especially culturally and ideologically—with the West than with the Communist world and that Egyptian policy is "potentially in direct competition with long-range Soviet objectives as the Egyptian government estimates these" (p. 132). Professor Kerr not only provides a great deal of essential information and valuable insights, but he also disposes of many long-standing myths widely believed in the West about Nasser's foreign policy.

In the final contribution to Part II, Kaled Mohieddin, former member of the Free Officers Executive, questions some of Professor Kerr's analyses, at times somewhat overcritically, and he presents his own personal views. He insists that Egyptian foreign policy after 1952 was not merely a continuation of former policies but was, in fact, revolutionary in character. He denies that it was either ambiguous or contradictory. He contends that to avoid being isolated and endangered, Egypt has had to support at any cost those countries in the Arab and Afro-Asian worlds committed to the same political and social objectives as she, and that Egypt would always follow a policy of non-alignment towards both the Communist and Western blocs.

In Part III, Louis Awad, cultural counsellor to the Cairo daily ALAHRAM, provides an interesting paper on cultural and intellectual developments in Egypt. He states that, while the Egyptian revolution produced little "speculative, analytical and critical theory in the fields of political science, economics, sociology and moral philosophy," the revolution has, nevertheless, "given tremendous impetus and wider scope to the creative urge in writers and artists," and the government has patronized "all forms of informal education and non-academic culture" (p. 157). He indicates that the greatest advances have been made in the fields of drama, poetry and plastic arts. Professor David Cowan of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, discusses literary development in Egypt since 1952.

Professor Derek Hopwood of St. Antony's College gives, in Part IV, a survey of some Western books on Nasser and Egypt after 1952. The survey is reasonably comprehensive, fair and useful.

Since these papers were prepared in 1966, they naturally did not take into consideration those major changes—especially political and economic—which were brought about by the June 1967 war. Nevertheless, they provide much valuable information about and insight into an important country that has played and will continue to play a key role in Middle Eastern affairs.—FRED J. KHOURI, *Villanova University.*

*Business Associations and the Financing of Political Parties.* BY ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER AND FRANK C. LANGDON. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968. Pp. 247. Guilders 32.50.)

The reciprocal relations of state and society have been a central and baffling problem of politics. Does the power of the state control the economy or do the managers of the economy (forces of production) determine the nature of the state? Since Marx's oversimplification a century ago this theme has been recurrent in traditional political theory. Nowhere do the respective contentions come into clearer focus than in the issues of political finance. The democratic multiparty state is essentially a propaganda polity with various group interests competing for the consent of the governed through the means of the increasingly technical processes of persuasion. The contemporary sovereignty of the camera makes access to the media both imperative and expensive. With neither profits nor taxes to support them how do parties and political leaders acquire funds to conduct campaigns of propaganda to win possession of the machinery of the state.

Into this controversial area of politics and economics Professors Heidenheimer and Langdon have undertaken a specialized and rather involved study of *Business Associations and the Financing of Political Parties.* Their inquiry represents an effort at a transnational investigation of a common problem in postwar Germany, Norway and Japan. The authors restrict themselves to the organized activities of business men with only passing reference to countervailing organizations such as trade unions. In fact the establishment of associations for collecting funds from business men (Capitalists) for the purpose of funneling them through the "conveyer" agency to political parties was begun by Libertas in Norway in 1947 within two years of the end of the war, while this kind of enterprise developed in Germany and Japan in the 1950's. The three undertakings lasted for approximately a decade in each country. In Norway where the reviewer studied the problem at the height of the controversy, Libertas, originally begun in secret, was established partly to offset alleged restrictions upon printing materials exercised by the existing Labor government under rationing continued in the postwar period. An investigation by the Storting instigated by the Labor Party, amounted to little. Libertas transformed itself into a pressure group more important as a propaganda agency conciously making snob appeals to Norwegian secretaries to identify themselves with management rather than with labor. However, in 1965, during parliamentary elections which unseated Labor for the first time in thirty years, the Labor Party secretary felt sure Libertas was a primary element behind the scenes in the overturn though party splintering and weariness with old hat Labor leadership was an important factor. In Germany, public subsidy helped destroy the conveyer system. In Japan, not subsidy but decline of interest helped defeat conveyerism. Even the Socialists had received funds from the centralized collections. The failure of the conveyer scheme may be attributed to many elements but not the least of these is love of independence among politicians who do not like to be considered the "kept women" of an elite of managers. In fact the resentment of conservative politicians for business men sometimes resembles the dislike of trade unionists by Labor politicians. Frequently their reaction resembles the feeling of intellectuals towards their benefactors, the Foundations. Recipients become weary of being perpetual mendicants.

Though the authors have done their research in the best traditions of political science, even accompanied by some of the patois of those scholarly imperialists, the political sociologists, they freely confess to the limitations of their findings. Certainly their conclusions do not verify the oversimplifications of the Marxists for they discover no uniform laws governing the conveyer process of political finance. Nor are there clear insights for those who still have to cope with the problem of party finance. There is a hint at public subsidy. The authors might well have mentioned the different treatment of political finance operating in economies without a Sherman anti-trust act. The Japanese were compelled to adopt American campaign finance publicity features at the instance of the great American democratic Mikado, Macarthur. Professor Harold F. Gosnell could illuminate this portion of history with what happened when the Japanese asked the practical question how or who will pay for the political parties provided for in the Japanese constitution of 1946.

All students of political finance will welcome this careful study to be added to the growing body of literature upon a primary problem in the propaganda state. In the name of more rigorous discipline a better proof reader would have avoided many misspellings which are widely distribtued throughout the volume.—J. B. SHANNON, *The University of Nebraska.*

*Federalism and Fiscal Adjustment.* BY R. J. MAY. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Pp. 192. $7.75.)

Probably no area of government has received as much attention in recent years as federalism. W. Brooke Graves is in the process of getting a bibliography on federalism ready for publication, and it is likely that it will contain over 600 items. When yet another book comes along to be added to the list, it inevitably runs the risk of being ignored or overlooked—or of being read with an especially critical eye by a bored or jaded reviewer. This little book should not meet that fate. A revised thesis for the D. Phil. at Oxford, for which the examiners were themselves leading students of federalism—Sir Kenneth Wheare and Professor A. H. Birch—it provides both an analysis and some insights which set it aside from the run of the mill studies of federalism on both sides of the Atlantic. Intrigued by the universality of differences in size and wealth among units of federal systems and by recurring problems of stability in many federal states, May sets for himself the task of answering two main questions:

1) how do inequalities in size and wealth between units affect the fiscal relations between governments in federations
2) to what extent can revenue transfers be-

tween governments be used to promote political stability in federal systems.

To answer his questions, May first examines the decision-making process in federal states, which analysis is a very perceptive one. He finds that process to be largely one of bargaining. He then turns to fiscal adjustment, which he sees as constituting one of the major factors determining the relative bargaining position of governments within federal states. Finally, he examines with a good deal of insight intergovernmental financial relations in 12 nations with particular reference to the distribution of revenue between richer and poorer units and to the role of finance as a stabilyzing or destabilizing element in the political life of the particular country. The final chapter is devoted to conclusions.

Although he finds (not surprisingly), "that every federation is to some extent unique" and thus that nothing "but fairly tentative generalizations" (p. 161) can be drawn from his analysis, he does offer new light on a couple of long-accepted dogmas of federalist lore. The evidence he has marshalled, for instance, convinces him that encroachment by the central government through the fiscal system on the powers and responsibilities of the units is either a gross simplification or entirely misleading. Much closer to the truth is a split between the poorer units, who tend to favor a strong central government with power to redistribute revenue in their direction, and the richer units, who favor fiscal and other decentralization and something close to a balance of powers between the central government and those of the units. Recent developments in Canada would seem to offer proof of his assertion. With regard to the role of fiscal adjustment (by which he means chiefly revenue transfers) in helping to secure political stability, he finds the evidence not nearly so conclusive. Nor is it clear that one type of revenue transfer—grant-in-aid, bloc grants, grants based on a fixed formula—is better than another in terms of its effect on the decision-making process in the receiving unit. The effect, indeed, of none of the ordinary types of grants on political stability is at all clear. May's final conclusion is that

> "Just as there is not in any federation a lasting concensus about what federalism implies in terms of the rights and obligations of its members, there is no universal principle according to which financial arrangements can be fixed to the permanent satisfaction of all the governments." (p. 168)

May's conclusions are thus not startling and require no readjustment in thinking about federalism. However, both his preliminary analysis of federal decision-making and his careful surveys of leading federal states—four "classic" federal models, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the United States, and eight newer models, West Germany, India, Malaya and Malaysia, Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Nigeria, French West Africa, the West Indies, and Yugoslavia—although in some cases necessarily superficial are very helpful to the student of federalism. This is not an easy book to read in either style or substance, and it will suffer from early obsolescence, so rapidly are changes taking place even in the so-called "classic" models of federalism.

With specific regard to the United States, but perhaps generally, one wonders why no attention is paid to local units of government—cities and towns—and to their role in the federal system. It is all well and good to paint a legal picture in only two colors, but as anyone familiar with the United States at least, especially since World War II, knows, cities have become claimants and on the very grounds of financial inequality, or indeed poverty, to which May addresses himself. On p. 99, in noting that "the governments of the poorer states have been relatively weak pressure groups at the federal level," he goes on to say that this has been the case because "more important pressures on the national government have been those of regional or national functional interest groups . . . ." Although he does suggest that "urban interests" have exerted some pressure, he does not define the term nor go on to demonstrate the extent to which cities are now employing lobbyists to win a greater share of federal funds for themselves or how the war on poverty or model cities programs were responses to that pressure and to the effect of such programs on balance within the American federal system. Indeed, in American federalism the struggle for fiscal adjustment has pretty much shifted to the nation's urban areas, and it is likely to remain there into the indefinite future. Thus any study which confines itself to federal-state bargaining alone misses much of the story. I suspect the same remarks could be made about a number of other federal states, probably at least of Australia, Canada, and West Germany.

But as I had occasion to note in another connection not long ago, "Federalism is a vast and complicated subject . . . To master it completely . . . [is] a project for a lifetime, if even so long be enough . . ." We are still far from understanding the phenomenon in all its parts, and May's book cannot be faulted for not by itself completely filling the void. It does bring us a little closer to understanding and opens the door of investigation to a fruitful field of inquiry. So it should be applauded and recommended, and what is more, read.—Richard H. Leach, *Duke University.*

*The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela.* By Talton F. Ray. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. 211. $7.00.)

In this valuable study of the barrio phenomenon in Venezuela, Talton Ray attempts to link patterns of barrio development, the urban environment, and the roles of municipal and state governments and political parties, to explain barrio politics. Ray's effort, the first book-length study focusing directly on this important subject, achieves commendable success.

The problems and the potentials of the urban poor, particularly as these affect underdeveloped countries, have been the subject of numerous analyses. Myriad interpretations result, ranging from the optimistic to the abysmally pessimistic. But much of the ground that Ray ploughs has been explored inadequately in previous research. Many of the interpretations and conclusions of other studies suffer from ethnocentric bias of middle-class observers or from the "standard myths" about which William Mangin and others have written.

Talton Ray bases his study on two and one-half years of work in community development in the Venezuelan environment. That experience, although perhaps lacking the formal structuring of a planned research design, at the same time lends a useful additional dimension and scope to the study. Ray also incorporates the limited available data (such as the CENDES-CIS study of the Universidad Central de Venezuela and MIT) on attitudes and behavior of Venezuelan barrio dwellers. In addition, he draws upon the project reports of workers in ACCION en Venezuela, the private community development organization, and upon censuses taken by barrio leaders. The author was thus able to observe barrio politics in a large number of different locations. Altogether 130 barrios in sixteen major cities and towns provide the setting for his analysis: however, much of the emphasis in this study is directed toward four major urban centers of Venezuela, Caracas, Maracaibo, Ciudad Guyana, and Valencia.

Ray divides his study into three parts. Part I treats the migratory patterns of barrio development in Venezuela and general social, economic, and physical conditions of the barrios. Part II analyzes the effects of the urban environment and modernization on political behavior, attitudes, and leadership patterns, particularly as the government and political parties are involved. Part III is an assessment of the role of barrios in national politics, with especial attention to the political integration of the barrios into the national political system.

Ray's analysis takes account of the vital importance of urban land distribution as a political issue in Latin American countries, a factor often overlooked in the prevalent focus on rural agrarian reform. Recognizing the permanence of the barrios (barriadas, favelas, callampas, villas miserias, etc., in other Latin American settings), he analyzes the differing approaches of political parties towards them and offers an explanation of the varying patterns of leadership characterizing different barrios. The crucial variable operating in connection with choice of leadership is seen to be the economic, social and, political character of the city where the barrio is located. Leadership appears to change as the cities are transformed by the modernization process.

Despite the power potential of the barrios in Venezuelan politics (between one-third and three-fourths of the population of major Venezuelan cities live in barrios), most cooperative action—including direct political action—is initiated by outsiders. Those outside mobilizers have been principally government agencies, labor unions, and political parties. Confirming this, Ray found that elected barrio juntas are more likely to represent the interests of the government than the barrios themselves. Widely practiced partisan discrimination has a strong effect on the political attitudes of the barrio residents.

One of the difficulties faced by Ray in his study is the problem of defining and identifying barrio influence. If specific political decisions could have been isolated, and if structured analysis of attitudes and behavior could have been focused on those decisions, Ray's study would be even more valuable than it is. Even so, he shows convincingly how the political parties have become aware of the enormous political power potentially available in the barrios, and how such power probably has restrained the military from direct intervention in the civilian governments of Venezuela since 1959. But the existence of this potential has not produced notable changes in barrio political behavior, at least not to the point where barrios become violent and aggressive in demanding payoffs for their political services. Ray speculates that this form of behavior stems in part from the fact that many aspects of barrio life are not only tolerable for first generation residents but—contrary to the mythology—are actually appealing. The future danger may reside in the frustrated ambitions of second generation residents who cannot personally appreciate the relative advantages of urban over rural life, as could their migrant parents.

In sum, Ray's book stands as an important study which represents a major step toward filling the many gaps in the area of urban politics of Latin America.—Jack W. Hopkins, *Emory University*.

*Political Parties in Action: The Battle of Barons Court.* By Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner. (New York: The Free Press, 1968. Pp. 311. $7.95.)

It is not likely that *Political Parties in Action* will become a political science classic, but it has intrinsic value which should be called to the attention of students of both British and United States political parties. The book reports the observations and analyses of the co-authors from within opposing constituency-level Labour and Conservative organizations as they vied for a marginal parliamentary seat in 1964. The authors aimed to study the impact of local party organization on election outcome, to "determine what holds the constituency organization together and explore how the systems operate." (pp. 9–10) The fly leaf tells us the book is an empirical study, and although it has its share of detail, this comes in the seventy-five percent of the text in which the case is described. The work has deficiencies as a scholarly study, but the research technique, and the sections of the final chapter dealing with internal party organization made it a worthwhile experience for the reviewer. The fact that this chapter is based not on the 1964 research but on interviews conducted in 1966 does not detract from the chapter's value.

The book has three important deficiencies and a number of minor unanswered questions. The first major deficiency stems from the research technique. It is a case study of a single election with all the idiosyncracies of historical setting. As with all case studies, this one is limited in its generalities. The authors refer to their conclusions as generalizations and hypotheses, but they are not generalizations in the true sense. They are explanations of the case at hand. An illustration of this type of generalization is the Holt and Turner conclusion "in a general election a significant portion of the most involved Tory activists are interested in becoming parliamentary candidates." (p. 264) This hypothesis follows from the fact that of the Conservative workers most active "in both the 1964 and 1966 campaigns, no fewer than nine had hopes of someday winning a seat in parliament." (p. 254) No evidence is presented to indicate that the "generalization" refers to other constituency-level Tory organizations.

This example serves to illustrate a second criticism: (aside from the misuse of a statistical term): the use and absence of data. It would be valuable to know the size of the population of which the nine Tories were a sample. Indeed, through the discussion of the dynamics of party organization, there is a conspicuous lack of detailed supportive data. We are told that the Labour organization was more effective and efficient than the Conservatives but we do not know whether this is due to the relative size of volunteer workers (not reported) or to more efficient workers (not measured). On the other hand, the background and description of the election occasionally lapses into painful and unnecessary detail.

Some of the interpretation of data is not convincing. The authors take issue with Richard Rose's dismissal of British party canvassing as unreliable, and claim they found an "amazingly high" agreement between the party's canvasses. However, the error level in the canvass results exceeds 12%. One could argue that such a high error level supports Rose. A crucial campaign decision based on such unreliable results could easily alter an election outcome in an unpredictable way.

The final important flaw in the book is the failure of the authors to link their work to the wealth of existing theoretical literature on organizations and political parties. The congruence of the parties' internal structure to Downs' model is obvious. Each party seeks only to win the election; ideology is not an end but a means to get votes; party workers are self interested only incidentally promoting the party goal, etc. Simon's and Olson's treatments of incentive systems and Olson's typology of groups would also help to put many of the study's conclusions in context. Holt and Turner offer the insights and the information for a systematic look at parties as organizations, but it is regrettable that they did not seek to couch their conclusions in a theoretical framework.

Other criticisms are minor, being questions of style or organization. Particularly frustrating is the frequent use of the term "knock up", and one does not discover until page 201 that to "knock up" a voter is to urge him to vote on election day.

The evidence is not presented, but the battle of Baron's Court probably is fairly typical of a campaign in a marginal parliamentary constituency. And campaigns in marginal constituencies determine who shall rule in Britain. As the authors point out, fewer than fifty seats were won in 1959, 1964, and 1966 by more than 1000 votes and the outcome in these determined the majority in Parliament. The book, in covering one event clearly and comprehensively, offers a model of all these campaigns.

For the student of United States political parties, Holt and Turner offer a contrast. Where in the U. S. do our parties get 200–500 volunteer workers in a constituency of 30,000 voters? Only very rarely in the United States is a 100% canvass used either for information gathering or for soliciting support, yet it is apparently common in British marginal constituencies. Other comparisons are possible, each leads to a better understanding of the respective party systems. Thus the value of the study is as a heuristic device. As such it probably will achieve some success.—John C. Blydenburgh, *Rutgers University.*

*Northwest Tanzania under German and British Rule: Colonial and Tribal Politics, 1889–1939.*

By Ralph A. Austen. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. Pp. 307. $8.75.)

Prof. Austen is representative of a new generation of historians of Africa whose work seeks not only to fill the enormous gaps in our knowledge of Africa, but even more important, to examine the colonial period from the perspectives of the Africans as well as the Europeans concerned. This is, it must be pointed out, no mean feat, since it involves painstaking recreation from highly limited written, blurred traditional, and indistinct eyewitness accounts and sources. It has been said that history is the record of the winners: that truism, cliche though it is, rings even truer for Africa: the winners not only could write, but recorded their heroic deeds, feelings, rationalizations, and interpretations *ad nauseam*. The bulk of sources for the colonial period in Africa is, then, the written record of the colonialist, the colonizer, and the imperial power. It is to Mr. Austen's credit that he seeks to present his picture of the contact and interaction of Europeans and Africans in an area of northwest Tanzania by focussing on the interaction as it affected and was seen *by each group*. And it is a fascinating story that unfolds.

The focus of Prof. Austen's study are two major ethnic groups living along the southern and southwestern shores of Lake Victoria, the Haya and the Sukuma. In a short but well constructed chapter, the author examines the traditional politics of the area before colonialism; he treats of the first contact between Europeans and Africans along the Lake beginning in 1961, and then devotes three chapters to German rule and its consequences. The Germans, it appears, were no better or worse in their colonial management than any other colonial power of the time; and their record was as spotty: military subjugation, commercial exploitation, brute coercion at some times, genuine concern, "enlightened" paternalism, willing accommodation, at others. And throughout this period both the Sukuma and Haya, though subject to an alien power, retained their ethnic integrity by timely adaptations and resistance to the demands and pressures put on them. Both groups, however, found German rule easier to bear after 1904, when the Dernburg reforms changed the policies and performance of German colonial administration. The Germans were pushed out of what is now Tanzania in 1916 after a military campaign marked by the extraordinary guerrilla resistance of Von Letow-Vorbeck, and the British took over. Among their baggage was the policy of "indirect rule"—which had been practiced by the Germans without the designation—by which the British sought to use existing traditional hierarchies for the performance of modern—i.e., their—political tasks. In any case, the Haya-Sukuma areas were to be model applications of Lord Lugard's celebrated scheme, and it is the tug and pull of the British and the Africans in relation to that set of policies that takes up much of the rest of the book.

Again, to make the point, Prof. Austen's history is as fairhanded as colonial history can be. I was impressed by the fact that he not only combed all the conventional and unconventional written and published sources, but sought out some twenty-five oral accounts by Africans, some of them going back sixty years and remarkable for their detail and accuracy. Prof. Austen's recreations have, in this sense, the stamp of a versimilitude not present in the more conventional histories. Moreover, he tells a good story, a matter which, to the non-historian-acting-as-reviewer-of-a-work-by-an-historian, still makes a deal of difference.

In all, then, this is interesting, well-done history. It gives the political scientist some novel insights into the on-the-spot workings of colonial policies and provides a welcome re-assessment of the impact of those policies upon the Africans, hitherto mute in the pages of colonial historians.
—Victor T. Le Vine, *Washington University, St. Louis.*

*Chinese Government in Ming Times: Seven Studies*, Edited by Charles O. Hucker. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. Pp. 285. $12.00.)

In spite of its derivation from a 1965 "Research Conference on Ming Government," this anthology is no symposium. The essays are on widely disparate subjects, uneven in quality, and they do not speak to one another. One essay was written for another occasion and published elsewhere before the conference. All this plus the nature of the subject suggests that an introductory essay was essential for the integrity and value of the volume. The editor was of course eminently suited to sew these essays together, to make them enter a dialogue, or simply to give the reader an indication of how the essays respond respectively to whatever common themes they share (for example, the issues of centralized vs. local political power, or monarchy vs. bureaucracy).

The first essay, by L. S. Yang, does not serve this integrating or introductory function for the volume. This is so primarily because it addresses itself to problems to which no one else here speaks directly; and again, its treatment of attitudes toward centralization and localization of power, back and forth across a millenium of Chinese history, is so meandering and choppy that it is difficult and uncomfortable to read—even for one familiar with the technicalities. This is exacerbated by the lack of a summary or concluding statement for the essay. It just ends. And that's no way to begin a volume like this which, in the editor's words, is supposed to give the nonspecialist reader " . . . gratifying glimpses into the detailed workings of a strange governmental system grappling with universally understandable problems."

To the readers of this journal, Jung-pang Lo's essay will perhaps have broader appeal than the others, for it attempts to speak in high enough generalizations with concepts generated in the ambiance of Western political studies. His subject is decision making and the issue is whether or not decision making (and implementing) power was the monopoly of the monarchy. He focuses on "issues respecting peace and war" and argues the feasibility of using R. C. Synder's *modus operandi* for this period and with the available data. Though he leads us towards a knowledge of the plurality of decision making bodies and situations during the Ming, his case is weakened precisely because he does not apply to his fourteen pages of case histories the "behavioral approach" which he trumpets at the outset, and which was to focus on the personalities, the social economic status, and states of minds of the decision makers. As a result, we see the decisions on peace and war were made outside of the court, but we don't know why, according to those abovementioned factors, nor do we know if there are attendant patterns.

Ray Huang's essay on "Fiscal Administration During the Ming" is a refreshing, ambitious *tour de force* which is the only essay in the lot that combines command of sources and detail with a sense of scope and dynamics. He knows how to analyze fiscal policy so that someone other than a Ming specialist can understand him and he is capable of using specialized data to adumbrate some of the most central of the perennial problems of Ming administration. His discussion of the role of the ministry of revenue in the gathering and disbursement of taxes is a lucid example of the relationship of the central government to local administration. Though his conclusion to the essay outruns his presented data (a fact he acknowledges), like the essay, it is full of fascinating hypotheses and questions to which future thought about the Ming polity could profitably respond. It is curious that Mr. Huang only raised the issue of the growth of a money economy during the Ming in his conclusion.

In "Academies and Politics in the Ming," John Meskill somehow seems to avoid any questions or conceptualizations that might lift his narrative above mere description. He does not, for example, as did C. O. Hucker (the editor) a decade ago, ask whether these prominent academies had some affinities along class, regional, or other extra-intellectual lines. Periodically, the central government systematically suppressed them. But why? Just what interests did the academies represent? Did they have anything to do with the burgeoning Ming economy and the shift to a money economy? Could we perhaps understand them better if we analyzed them as political parties, or pressure groups, or lobbies? How powerful were they, and in what way? These are questions begged by the essay that must be treated if the charts and tables and dates are to have any meaning for someone who wants to know something about political processes and thought in traditional China.

In "The Ming Dynasty Bureaucracy," James Parsons uses descriptive statistics to define the contours of bureaucratic structure and power. Though he has some evident troubles moving from statistical data to concepts, his description of the regional and clan backgrounds of the bureaucracy, for example, is quite instructive in a simple, direct fashion, and makes some headway toward discussions on the relationship between central and local political forces and on other questions begged in the Meskill essay.

Sinological narrowness, for the most part, will prevent the potential insights of the studies in this volume from being communicated to an audience much broader than "Ming specialists." Lax editing has permitted, among other things, the inclusion of pieces which are fragments, or marginalia and not proper essays. This volume does not reveal the considerable talents of its contributors in the most flattering light, and thereby it fails to do justice, even as a "sampler," to the young (but not necessarily callow) field of Ming studies.—LAURENCE A. SCHNEIDER, *State University of New York at Buffalo.*

*Toward Strategies for Public Administration Development in Latin America.* BY JOHN C. HONEY, with commentaries by PETER D. BELL, RICHARD A. FEHNEL, JAMES R. HIMES, AND GEORGE SUTIJA. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968. Pp. 175. $5.75.)

In his Foreword to Honey's nonbook, Prof. Fred Riggs writes that the volume represents an " . . . important study on the problems Latin American countries face in their efforts to improve administrative capabilities in relation to developmental needs." (p. v) Indeed, from his long association with public administration in Latin America, Professor Honey could perhaps produce the important study Riggs heralds. The present piece is not it. Rather, the reader finds an essay by Honey and four brief country "commentaries" by Ford Foundation staffers.

Honey's essay was prepared for the Ford Foundation as a statement of priorities and targets to which the Foundation might address its resources. His objective is to suggest strategies which will strengthen public administration in Latin America. And in the nearly universal fashion of such essays, Honey argues that strengthening public administration is a prerequisite to development.

The essay itself contains three major elements: a brief review of existing public administration development activities; an exposition of selected variables which affect the operation of administrative systems (civic culture, political socialization, pressures for rapid development, institutional competence, etc.); and a set of "action proposals" intended to remedy the major shortcomings found in contemporary Latin American administrative systems. Honey suggests that individual countries establish national councils on public service to develop comprehensive reform plans; collect data concerning institutional as well as attitudinal processes; improve pre- and post-entry education and training for administrators; obtain expanded technical advisory services in such operations as finance, budgeting, and planning from USAID and related donor agencies; and developed indigenous political leadership through seminars, out-of-country training programs, and scholarships to foreign universities. He also proposes the establishment of a Latin American Center of Public Affairs to coordinate public administration research, training, and practices; and the creation of a Latin American Social Science Research Council to serve not only public administration but broader academic interests.

The strength of Honey's contribution lies in his emphasis on improvements in local Latin American university and professional education as a major (perhaps *the* major) factor in any overall strategy of administrative development. He correctly points out that in Latin America there has been little or no research in the areas of political socialization, civic values, current political affairs and governmental functions, urbanization, and other dimensions of social science. And "as for the schools and institutes of public administration, they are, generally speaking, very modest in terms of financial resources, physical facilities, depth and quality of staff, breadth and variety of curricula, and output of research." (p. 45) Thus not only is there a general absence of empirical studies of Latin societies, economies, and polities, but there are educational and training defects that prevent bureaucrats from effectively overcoming these deficiencies. It is with the remedying educational shortcomings that Honey is principally concerned. To this end he urges greater involvement by United States universities in training North American scholars and conducting research in neglected areas. He argues that USAID should shift from its assumption that the Alliance for Progress is basically a governmental responsibility to the recognition and support of a basic role for US universities.

The essay's weakness, and it is an important one, rests in the failure to grant proper recognition to the importance of domestic politics as a factor in any strategy of administrative development. While Honey recognizes political leadership as a factor, he treats it as something that can be manipulated or shaped to conform to his strategies: "It is possible to suggest some of the steps that can be taken to aid the development of a better understanding of competent administrative performance on the part of a variety of contemporary political leaders. It is also necessary to think about future political leadership and the ways in which it can be prepared to assume responsibility." (p. 69) Having conducted research on the influence of Latin American political leaders on administrative behavior, I cannot share Honey's faith in the likelihood of shaping the attitudes of indigenous leaders to fit a gringo's notions of proper administrative practices.

But of greater significance, Honey's strategies ignore the Latin American bureaucracies as part of a political milieu in which they are both actor and acted upon. In Latin America the national bureaucracies act as primary regime support mechanisms: any reform or modification necessarily will have important consequences for national politics. Yet the politics of administrative development is not considered by strategist Honey. This failure to conceptualize bureacracy as an integral dimension of politics reflects the general failure of students of development administration to relate the role of public administration in a theory of politics. In turn, the absence of comprehensive theory has facilitated an ad hoc approach to administrative development which allows scholars and practitioners to concentrate on isolated facets of administration, generally to the exclusion of a comprehensive analysis of the interrelation between and among other variables. (e.g., the political power of modernizers and the initiation of administrative reform.)

The four commentaries which make up half the volume are sketchy and present little useful information about administrative procedures or problems in Brazil, Chile, Peru, or Venezuela. Each discusses the status of empirical social science and the efforts of administration-reform agencies in the individual country. Too selective for the general reader, these commentaries offer only occasional bits of information for the patient specialist. In sum, the volume's overall contribution is commensurate with its modest price and modest size.—JERRY L. WEAVER, *California State College, Long Beach.*

# INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW AND ORGANIZATION

Arms Control in International Politics. By David V. Edwards. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969. Pp. 200. $7.50 cloth, $4.50 paper.)

As policy scientists, few achievements will matter more than significant progress toward a systematic and feasible design to achieve arms control. As social scientists, few achievements will be more impressive than significant progress toward a theory dealing with determinants of the acquisition and use of coercive capabilities by political actors. Regretfully, this volume does not seem to me to move us appreciably closer to either of the above goals. Why not? Clearly the author was not lacking in emotional or intellectual commitment to his subject or satisfied with previous work. The reasons for the shortfalls, I suggest, lie in characteristics endemic to the customary practice of political science research and education. Until these traits are modified, it seems likely that the output from our work will be much less than the energy invested would warrant.

Professor Edwards sets himself challenging objectives: (1) to improve a situation in which the "most promising opportunities for arms control have often gone unnoticed" (p. v); (2) to "suggest much about the prospects for arms control"; and (3) to "increase our knowledge of our world, particularly the nature of and trends in international politics and their relevance to important policy problems" (p. 1). To achieve these objectives, he discusses the nature of arms control, conditions conducive to it, procedures to achieve and maintain arms control and, finally, arms control futures for the next decade. He devotes almost as much attention to the procedures section (i.e., tactics) as to the three other topics combined. In conclusion, he states that he has given us a "comprehensive demonstration of a method of analysis" (p. 161).

The approach used is that of subjective taxonomy and pre-operational hypothesis statement. The analyst makes a number of analytic distinctions and puts forth statements about relationships and trends. The analytic distinctions are intended to pick up all major possibilities and the relationship and trend statements are neither based in data nor directly comparable to empirical patterns. The reader is left with a series of lists and of assertions which are neither derived from the lists nor bound to a systematic set of observations. The assertions frequently will seem valid, moot, or invalid to one or another reader, e.g., that neither superpower has been able to gain from the Vietnam conflict (p. 146). The ways in which elements in different lists relate to each other in the framework of distinct processes (e.g., escalation, arms reduction) are open to equllay varying judgments.

It seems to me that a fruitful attempt at either systems design (in the sense of engineering progress with arms control) or theory construction will have to proceed very differently.

A powerful engineering attack on arms control as a systems problem will require: first, defining target end states (arms control outcomes); second, stating initial input conditions (current national and international attributes germane to arms control and directions and rates of change in these attributes); third, working out the sets and sequences of actions required to get from the input conditions to the end states. Because the design will deal with a nonderterministic system many of whose parts are beyond the control of the designer, uncertainty must be explicitly recognized and key points for evaluation and modification must be made salient. At whatever time the requirements no longer seem feasible or worth a variety of costs, the target end state formulations will be modified (e.g., from disarmament to arms control). At various points in the analysis, critical alternatives will receive intensive scrutiny (e.g., choice of parties between whom arms control will be sought). Critical interaction effects will be measured and modeled (e.g., between military procurements by country A and country B). The last activity will attempt to resolve the discrepancies between alternative process models and to determine the thresholds for them to work as postulated. (A useful example of a process model is Charles Osgood's GRIT formulation.) Available point and time-series observations will be used to help reduce uncertainty. (A number of important fragments are already available in the conflict research literature and in social science data banks). When needed measurements are not available of the type and quality desired, the designer will seek to have them made. If this is not realistic, he will resort to alternative aids for handling imperfect information (e.g., the family of Bayesian techniques of DELPHI procedures). The strategy outlined to this point is a terribly complex and resource hungry approach. There is little reason to expect tortuous social problems to succumb on the cheap. Arms control is such a problem and the scale and type of effort to design ameliorative strategies should be commensurate with the difficulty and importance of the problem.

A fruitful theory construction strategy will differ markedly from that outlined above; however, I suggest that it will differ to an equal extent from that pursued by Edwards. First, the theory construction excerise will not be based on the phenomena to be found in a slice of current history. Instead, the investigator will be attracted to an aspect of behavior which has manifest importance across time and across actors. Second, the investigator will not intend direct application. He will seek to develop a predictive group of axioms from which inferences applicable in principle to "real world" situations can be drawn. Before doing so, he will draw and test some parsimonious inferences in highly controlled environments. Given our current and growing ability to conduct full computer simulations, these controlled environments need no longer be those of the classic psychological laboratory. Third, the theorist will engage in rigorous analysis to determine scope conditions, i.e., that subset of possible positions on key variables to which the theory can logically apply. For example, if one wanted to determine the scope conditions of a theory of renunciation or abandonment of coercive capabilities, one may well ask the following question. Does the theory deal only with conditions in which both actors can eliminate the other? Note that conclusions about scope conditions set boundaries on the possible applications of the inferences one can draw from the theory. At this point, *my* reader may groan at the vision of such a long road to theory and from theory to practice. Long it is, but there seems little reason to expect the journey to be shorter for the social sciences than for the natural sciences. The itinerary outlined above grossly resembles that of the natural sciences.

There clearly is at least one other way for us to write about arms control which has merit. I have in mind the tour de force essay marked by compelling insight, historical and disciplinary range, and provocative statement. The volume under review occasionally seems of this third mode even though that does not seem to be the author's primary intent.

Because three different approaches can be productive in different ways does not imply that a blend of all three in a particular work has cumulative value. Indeed, partial efforts at approaches as different as systems design, theory construction, and humanistic appraisal are likely to cancel or at least heavily dilute each other. If political scientists are to make major contributions to problems of the order of magnitude of arms control, we need to engage in choice and the actions which follow our choice. The choice required involves what "our bag", i.e.. intellectual strategy, is and the actions are the program of personal and student education required to pursue any one of the three approaches noted above with power and finesse.—Davis B. Bobrow, *Office of the Director of Defense, Research and Engineering.*

*India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World.* By Michael Brecher. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968, Pp. 390. $10.00.)

One of the exciting but as yet unchartered areas of study is the personality and perceptions of top level decision makers. Everyone pays lip service to the fact that the images or world perspectives of Presidents, Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, and like, are important, indeed perhaps even critical, in the understanding of the foreign policy making process. Yet there are almost no systematic studies primarily devoted to this problem. The book under review here is an attempt to move in this direction. Though not truly systematic and only in a limited sense quantitative, this study moves away from the usual political biography towards the construction of the image of one major decision maker: Krishna Menon. That the book is not entirely successful should not detract from the significant fact that Mr. Brecher has blazed new paths for further investigation.

The book has three main components. The bulk of the study is a transcript of extensive taped interviews that Mr. Brecher conducted with Krishna Menon in November and December of 1964 (later supplemented with a number of additional interviews in May 1965). Although the transcripts were edited by both the author and Krishna Menon, the result remains a highly readable and intriguing dialogue. Brecher poses a wide ranging series of questions to Menon, and Menon, in his characteristic and honest fashion, reflects upon these topics: the concept of nonalignment, Suez, China, Pakistan, Nehru's successor, to name but five of the twenty-one areas covered by Brecher's questions. While, as often occurs when dialogues of this sort are committed to paper, some of the meaning is lost through the loss of the nuances of expression, nevertheless the character of Menon emerges in sharp and distinctive outline. To see how a man of the stature of Menon views his environment and, of even greater consequence, how he arrived at and explains his position of various issues, is fascinating. Once begun, I found the book impossible to put down. This is clearly the principle contribution of the study: an indispensable insight into the mind of a major world leader.

But while intriguing, the dialogue could have been enhanced on two points. Brecher does not explain how he determined what areas he would cover with Menon or how he choose his questions. Why, for example, did he never ask Menon about the personalities of other top level decision makers. Undoubtably there were reasons for the choice of topics, and the meaning and significance of the dialogue would have been enhanced had these reasons been explicitly put forth. In fact, the rationale for the choice of questions becomes critical in the second part of the book when Brecher presents his analysis of Menon's image, but we will turn to this in a moment.

The other difficulty with the interview is that a considerable amount of historical background is assumed on the part of the reader. While most of Brecher's readers will have a general background on such issues as Korea, the Geneva Conference, Suez, the Congo, etc., it is doubtful whether the typical reader will remember the specific details or the chronology of events of these historical episodes. Unfortunately these are instances in which Menon's reflections become significant only if one knows these details. A short discussion of the historical period being discussed along with a chronology would have been useful. Such brief historical descriptions would also have put Menon's comments into a broader context and made Brecher's subsequent analysis more meaningful.

The second part of the book contains Professor Brecher's analysis of Menon's image. Following a presentation of a model of the foreign policy making process which shows the relevance and significance of a decision maker's image, Brecher attempts to pull together what he takes to be the main themes of Menon's world perspective. Unfortunately, this is not simply a summary of Menon's perceptions and positions. Brecher wishes to go beyond this to show "irrationality" in Menon's positions, "inconsistencies" in his arguments, and "rigidity" in his ideology. Had these concepts been carefully defined the reader might have been willing to at least entertain this rather clinical appraisal. But no definitions are given and the concepts are frequently used in their negative, value-laden sense. Thus the reader begins to feel that Brecher is condemning rather than analyzing. Consider, for example, Brecher's claim that Menon is "irrational" in his views on nuclear weapons. This conclusion is based on Menon's position that the production and/or possession of nuclear weapons by India should not be debated in the Indian Parliament. But, argues Brecher, since so many other states, most notably China, have nuclear weapons, this position does not make sense: "Irrationality is evident . . . in his categorical refusal to debate the issue." But from this reader's point of view Menon explained it quite well:

> "The debating of this issue means that we are showing the world that we are in two minds about it, that if the majority decides or if something happens we are prepared to use the bomb. Moreover, we are proceeding on a fundamental fallacy; just six months ago we signed an agreement, only to say now that we don't adhere to it. Only three or four months ago we made a declaration that under no circumstances would we use it. Who is going to trust us afterwards? We shall have shaken everybody's confidence."

The last section of the book presents a content analysis of the Menon interview, as done by Janice Gross Stein. The purpose of the analysis is to " . . . derive Menon's perception of the environment . . . " To accomplish this end, the interview data are subjected to three stages of analysis: First, the frequency of occurrence of each of seventy-one content categories (e.g. references to the various states in the systems, different symbols, values) is observed and conclusions are drawn from these frequencies about the relative salience of the topics. The second stage involves another content analysis using the concepts of hostility, friendship, change of the status quo, and satisfaction with each occurrence of one of these themes being further scaled for its intensity. Comparisons are then made among the four themes and the intensity levels. Here it is found that "hostility was by far the predominant attitude of Krishna Menon." The third stage of the study involves a factor analysis of the original seventy-one content categories to determine "patterns of association along several basic indicators."

Thus this analysis is essentially a quantitative description of the Menon interview. Where Brecher intuitively felt that Menon made many references to the United States, Stein can quantitatively support this contention. Whether this amounts to a derivation of Menon's perceptions of the environment is perhaps questionable, but the analysis is nevertheless an interesting adjunct to the overall study. There are, however, a number of difficulties in the execution of the analysis. Like so many content analytic studies, this one neglects to report the details of the content analytic procedure. There is no discussion of the operationalization of the "content categories" or the themes of hostility, friendship, etc. Furthermore, the reader is not told whether the analysis was done by hand or computer, and if by hand the reliability of the coding process. These problems are added to by the fact that the author, in a footnote, indicates that a weighting procedure (unexplained) was used which makes it impossible for the reader to check any of the tallies in the tables. Using the intensities of the four affective categories, various indices are derived which the author claims will predict foreign policy behavior especially in terms of the individuals propensity for violence. But the rationale supporting this contention is omitted. Finally, the meaning and purpose of the factor analysis is not clear. Apparently, the correlations, upon which the factor analysis was based, were computed using the frequencies of reference to each of the seventy-one content categories as they were distributed over sixteen interviews which related to foreign policy (this is never explained). The factors then show, *for this specific set of interviews*, the extent to which the frequency of reference to any one content category co-occurs in the interviews with the frequency of reference to any other content category. Professor Stein would like to conclude that this shows some meaningful relationship between the content categories that load highly on a factor. But the precise meaning of this relationship is not clear. What can one conclude from the fact that in those interviews in which atomic weapons are heavily referred to there are also many references to such values as respect, affection, etc.? And to what extent are these co-occurrences an artifact of the type of issue being discussed rather than, as Professor Stein suggests, a demonstration of how Menon linked these concepts in his own mind?

In short, like most first studies the results presented here are suggestive rather than conclusive.—Dina Zinnes, *Indiana University.*

*The Politics of Force.* By Oran R. Young. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. Pp. 437. $12.50.)

A number of recent studies of international crises have used case materials in order to assess the options and constraints of the superpowers in periods of extreme tension. Oran Young's ambitious new volume builds on the previous works of Thomas Schelling, Fred Ikle and others in an effort to illuminate the role of force in international politics by examining aspects of "bargaining under conditions of international crisis." While the book is appropriately read in the context of Young's earlier study of the behavior of third-parties in international crises, it also offers fruitful speculations for those unfamiliar with *The Intermediaries* (1967).

Since the case materials are organized around "hypotheses" rather than presented sequentially, a conventional portrayal of the four crises chosen is avoided. Young carefully delineates the limited "universe of cases" to which his hypotheses are presumed to apply: crises involving the major powers in systems characterized by "autonomy among the component units", "the presence of weapons of mass destruction", and "at least some superiority of offensive over defensive military technology." Yet, for this reviewer, the book's central value lies in the possible utility of Young's conceptions for other types of crises and other time periods.

Young explains his selection of four crises for detailed analysis by asserting that a "contextual unity" marked international politics in the years 1948–1962, and that therefore the Berlin crisis of 1948–1949. the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958, the Berlin crisis of 1961, and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, may be judged as parts of a complex whole. He correctly cites the shifts in the policies of the US and USSR *after* the Cuban crisis, as "common and overlapping interests" began to emerge and as "mutual co-ordination" began to supplant or at least co-exist with tendencies toward "global competition." Although Young is suitably cautious in suggesting the temporal and structural confines within which his hypotheses should be used, it would be interesting to "test" some of them with reference to cases drawn from the later phases of the 1960's, perhaps the period of the Six-Day War in 1967 and the ambiguous Soviet-Chinese border confrontation of 1969. Such additional investigations would be necessary if we are to offer convincing evidence that: "fundamental challenges to the stability of the system still arise only from two sources: direct clashes between the superpowers or escalation of lower levels of conflict into superpower confrontations."

The hypotheses themselves, as might be expected, vary considerably in novelty and scope. Some appear obvious, and not specifically relevant to "crises" as distinguished from other political interactions, for example: "conditions of crisis raise incentives, at any given moment, to utilize actions and diplomatic formulas designed to divide the issues at stake in ways facilitating the retention of freedom of choice in subsequent phases", or "conditions of crisis generate strong incentives for decision-makers to manipulate the perceptions of various parties concerning the critical aspects of the clash." Others, by contrast, are so complex that a small range of cases contributes at best a partial interpretation: "as alternatives to actions that might precipitate violence during a crisis, efforts to structure the fundamental dimensions and specific issues of the clash in order to utilize or create advantageous asymmetries are apt to become highly influential coercive procedures."

Many of Young's findings appear to be unexceptional, for example: "positions generally become harder to relinquish as they become invested with emotional commitments and as they are subjected to greater publicity over time" (p. 263); or "great powers handle crises in such a way as to preserve the basic arena of conflict in an area even while terminating the physical confrontation that has arisen in a specific clash." (p. 204) Nevertheless, the general reaction of scholars of international politics to the book is likely to accord with the author's stated preference: the production of new concepts, questions and hypotheses about forms of coercion short of war. Indeed, for those who would examine crises involving middle-rank or smaller states, as well as the superpowers, Young's study is a well-argued point of departure.—Linda B. Miller, *Wellesley College and Harvard University.*

*Of Powers and Their Politics: A Critique of Theoretical Approaches.* BY ARTHUR LEE BURNS. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968. Pp. 299. $7.50.)

In this book, which is built upon and incorporates half a dozen of his published essays which have appeared during the past decade, Professor Burns undertakes to critique some of the basic presuppositions of behavioral and quantitative research and theory in international politics. Because the informed criticism necessary for scientific progress in a field has been slow in coming to the scientific study of international politics, and because the author raises issues of profound importance for the activity of creating a science of international politics, the critique should be welcomed. It is to be hoped that the arrival of this book will help raise philosophical controversy in the field from the level of questions of technique, and from the sterile controversies on the relative merits of "method" and "judgment" in political research which have passed for philosophical analysis in the field.

The book deals with many aspects of international political theory, but three themes stand out: the nature of political action and its proper explanation, the relationship between scientific and historical explanation, and the place of evaluation in theorizing about politics. On each of these themes, Burns argues positions which political scientists with positivist and behavioralist beliefs are likely to find misconceived.

In treating the first of these themes, the nature of political action, the author takes the position that "politics is action, not behavior" (p. 171). Unfortunately this statement neither follows from nor introduces any precise analysis of the concepts and arguments that would be involved in defending such a position. It is, rather, used as an axiom upon which to build an argument about the proper form of explanation of political action. The argument is that political behavior, which is passive and which follows from political action, is explicable only if action is explicable. But "action. . . is not numerable." Therefore, "anything worth calling a science of politics must be qualitative." Furthermore, because action is explained by reference to the ends it seeks to achieve, explanations of politics require mention of the particular ends that actors pursue in given historical situations. The explanation of political action, therefore, must not only be qualitative but historical.

This leads to the theme of historical explanation of political phenomena, and its relationship to scientific or general theoretical explanation. Burns argures that general theory is appropriate in the explanation of phenomena occurring in "system-dominant" systems (those characterized by numerous actors none of whom can alone much influence the behavior of the system as a whole), but that explanations pertaining to "subsystem-dominant" systems (in which the number of actors is small and their actions individually important) must refer to the actions of particular actors identified by name. International politics, insofar as it is the politics of the "Powers" is, in Burns' view, subsystem dominant. Hence explanations of power politics are necessarily particularistic—that is, historical.

On the third theme, the importance of evaluation in theorizing about power politics, Burns characterizes as both misconceived and impractical the belief that theory should be value free. At least in subsystem-dominant systems, it is possible to assign responsibility for the consequences of actions. Where responsibility can be assigned, the "critic" of political practice can evaluate the skill with which it is executed, once he has identified the ends that the practice seeks to achieve. This evaluation, the author argues, is simultaneously "objective" and "evaluative" (p. 265). Burns further finds the student of power politics committed to the value of humanizing power politics.

On each of these themes, the author's positions seem reasonable, although perhaps overstated: but the arguments which support these positions are often inadequate. There is surely something to be gained in the explanation of power political and other strategic activity by using the language of action—that is, by referring to the actors' intentions, to the purpose of their activity defined by its rules, and so forth. But it is mistaken to argue, as Burns does, that the explanation of action is necessarily qualitative: game theory provides a familiar example of a quantitative theory of action. Finally, whether one chooses the language of "action" or of "behavior" would seem to depend upon what aspects of a situation one wished to explain.

Burns is at his best in arguing the case for historical explanation and in discussing the limits of general theory, and it is to be hoped that what he says about these matters will contribute to the realization that much of international politics can scarcely be understood outside of its historical context. However, Burns' arguments depend largely on the assumption that there is only one world-political system: it then makes sense to argue that one should name actors and processes rather than create almost empty classes, and to stress the abstractness and irrelevance of theoretical explanations which ignore the historical and particular. But there is much to be explained in power politics where individuals, or international subsystems, or classes of events such as crises or international conferences, rather than the world-political system, are the unit of analysis: and here, it would seem, there are fewer obstacles to generalization and to scientific explanation.

On the theme of evaluation in political theory, the author quite rightly stresses the inescapability of judgments of value in building empirical theory, but fails to give a clear and sound argument for this position; the arguments which are given seem muddled. Here the proper direction would be to demonstrate the need to analyze how important concepts of empirical political theory, such as "modernization", "pluralist", or "international stability" are used to commend, to condemn, or to ascribe responsibility, as well as to describe, and are thus in varying degrees evaluative.

Burns offers a much-needed critique of scientific theorizing in international politics. Unfortunately, the force of the critique is undermined by the weakness of Burns' arguments and by his style. This is a badly written book: too often vague, disorganized, hard to read, and difficult to understand. Those who would engage in the scientific study of international politics must seriously consider the unfashionable positions that Burns argues, but they are not likely to do so until a more adequate treatment of these positions appears.—TERRY NARDIN, *State University of New York at Buffalo.*

*Contending Approaches to International Politics.* EDITED BY KLAUS KNORR AND JAMES N. ROSENAU. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Pp. 297. $7.50.)

Reviewers of collections of essays on the state of a discipline seem often to find the experience depressing. The depression I felt upon reading this collection is heightened considerably by my inability to avoid discussing this same topic in my review rather than devote all my public attention to the agreement and disagreement, the strengths and weaknesses, of the 12 essays which constitute this volume.

The volume itself arose as a somewhat staggered—and staggering—reaction to Hedley Bull's much noted article on "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach" in *World Politics*, April 1966. It includes responses by Morton Kaplan and David Vital which appeared subsequently in that journal; pieces by Michael Haas, Robert Jervis, and Robert North which appeared in approximate form in the *International Studies Quarterly* for December 1967; a review of Raymond Aron's *Peace and War* by the prolific Oran Young, also from *World Politics*; an essay by David Singer written specially for this volume but, as the author grants, essentially a restatement of an argument he has made various other places, addressed in this instance to Bull's arguments; a general essay on social science by Johan Galtung; and specially prepared essays by Marion Levy and Richard Brody which merit further attention.

If this table of contents engenders a feeling of deja vu, well it might and well it should, for the fights and debates of the essays are both old and tired, and as most of the authors agree, it is time we got on with it.

The trouble is, there is not yet agreement about just what getting on with it would involve. Many of the authors, like their alter egos and subalterns in our academic world, are generally concerned to show, or at least to claim, that there are significant differences between most self-proclaimed traditionalists and most self-proclaimed modernists (or behavioralists, as they are often but somewhat misleadingly termed)—and well there are. The image of the emperor (consider his clothing) has recently become popular; and while the term implies a grandeur and a significance generally lacking (most of us are more like tribunes), the analogy is a propos. The trouble is, perhaps, not just that too many of us have become industrious tailors (to borrow Oran Young's appellation for Bruce Russett), but even more that not enough of us have seen and reconciled ourselves to (if not appreciated) the Living Theatre. My point is that nudity, if not becoming, may well be functional, precisely because it reminds us of the gap between precept and practice *and* often demonstrates its insignificance to all but our conventional-attitude-ridden minds and images.

If we really knew what we were doing, or wished to do, we would not need to spend so much attention on method and rationale and their justification and purity, for these questions would be resolved by our success and failure in doing it. But only, we should realize, if we do have accepted and justifiable standards of verification or confirmation. It is lamentable that scholars in international relations have not addressed themselves to this problem—and indicative of the extremely primitive state of our deliberations on methodology that most have not realized the crucial importance of this. It seems clear to many of the contributors to this guttenbergian symposium that traditionalists and modernists need not work at cross purposes, if even they cannot work at shared purposes. The trouble is that the possibility of progress even within one of the approaches, let alone that of mutual contributions, depends upon each side knowing just what it is desirable to attempt to learn and knowing how and when to conclude that something has been learned, if even just until further research proves it too simple or misguided or incomplete.

All the old allegations—that available method determines inquiry and tends to force trivial investigations; that complexity of subject matter forces either simplemindedness or development of conceptual frameworks rather than actual efforts to venture beyond frameworks to explicit, testable and disconfirmable propositions; etc.—all these criticisms are of course substantially true of virtually all our contemporary work. And if they are not so true of the work of the traditionalists this seems to us to be because traditionalists are so unaware of these problems that they conduct themselves as Bull recommends, in a way that denies either the possibility or the practicability of intersubjective knowledge.

The quickest confirmation of this contention lies in the challenge offered often by sociologist Levy in his essay. Following an impressive statement of "the rules of the scientific game" and a catalog of fallacious employments of them (arising originally out of his chastisement of one of our foremost scientists, Morton Kaplan), Levy challenges anyone to cite a work which is "playing this game"—which meets the minimal canons of scientific enterprise. He wishes he could, and so do I. He and others recognize that this may be unlikely at this stage of our endeavor. But the ominous implication of this collection of essays, and of the works by these and other modernist scholars with their obvious limitations, is that we do not seem to be progressing satisfactorily toward such a capability.

The point is not that we need eternal truth. No one believes that possible any longer. But most scholars still seem tied to the desire to produce something of semi-eternality. Thus we rarely if ever get efforts to explain why wars occur in the nuclear age and why these wars vary in their form, but rather standardized lists of states which have engaged in or might engage in wars. Etc. What work we get on war tends to be still of the traditionalist sort typified by Aron and subject to all the difficulties indicated by Young in his review.

It was remarkable that Quincy Wright was able to produce his monumental *Study of War* in 1942. But it is even more remarkable that it could be reprinted unchanged 25 years later—and not for the same reasons that we reprint Harvey's treatise on the circulation of the blood. We know that most of the work appearing in our major journals these days will not be reprinted in the future; but unfortunately this will not be because it has been transcended so often as it will be because it has not addressed substantial parts of the crucial questions of our discipline, whether those questions be put in terms of the causes of events or of the motivations of actors. And perhaps worst of all, in this age of drastic change, we have successfully ignored the most crucial question of all—the nature and causes of system transformation. Whatever ways our system survives or changes will not be attributable to, and may not be understandable through, the work of our scholars. Nor will the survival of our discipline be due to the contribution of books like this or even of the "contending approaches" they attempt to memorialize or even institutionalize.

This is not actually much of a criticism of the authors of the volume, for I have clearly been unable myself to escape the trap. If it is an entropic trap, as I believe it is, so much the worse for us all. We can benefit from the discussion in the volume between North and Jervis on the Stanford studies, as we can from the analysis of motives of scientific scholars by Richard Brody. And we may even benefit from, and in any event will be amused and often delighted by, the polemics of others. But how much our discipline benefits is another question. And one that should probably be answered by being honored in the breach through commission of studies written to be transcended and thereby contribute to the cumulation of significant intersubjective knowledge and suspicion.—DAVID V. EDWARDS, *University of Texas.*

*The Global Partnership: International Agencies and Economic Development.* ED. BY RICHARD N. GARDNER AND MAX F. MILLIKAN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. Pp. 498. $9.50.)

The Winter 1968 issue of *International Organization* contains twenty essays on international agencies and economic development edited by Richard N. Gardner and Max F. Millikan. The issue has been published in book form with no apparent changes. The purpose of the volume is "not to celebrate past accomplishments"—although much space is devoted to doing this—it is rather "to examine, in a critical and realistic way, the potentialities and the limitations of international agencies in the struggle for economic development." Included are essays on individual agencies or groups of agencies, such as ECOSOC, IMF, GATT, the World Bank Group, UNCTAD, OECD, and regional development banks, as well as problem oriented essays on private foreign investment, education, population control, food, and technological development.

How is one to evaluate in one book review a book consisting of twenty articles by nineteen authors? The articles do share the assumptions that economic development is desirable and that international agencies can and should help further this goal, but beyond this there is scant evidence of a common intellectual approach. This is hardly surprising, since coordinating the efforts of nineteen authors is a nearly impossible task for any editor.

Uneven quality is to be expected in such a compendium as this. Only a few of the pieces would be likely to meet the editorial standards of *International Organization* if submitted by the authors for anonymous evaluation. The article by Robert W. Cox on "Education for Development" and that by Sherman E. Katz on "The Application of Science and Technology to Development" are especially good examples of thorough and creative scholarship. Several other essays are interesting, provocative, sometimes brilliant, treatments of often neglected topics. Especially appealing to this reviewer were the pieces by Richard N. Gardner on UNCTAD, Stanley D. Metzger on private foreign investment, Frank M. Coffin on the prospects for multilateral assistance, Goran Ohlin on the OECD, and Robert E. Asher on an overview of the role of international agencies in economic development. Many of the articles, however, are rather unexciting combinations of conventional history and conventional wisdom. Editors of scholarly journals should be cautious about inviting articles. The anonymous screening process helps maintain scholarly standards. Let us be wary of endangering these standards in order to enjoy the alleged—but rarely demonstrated—benefits of bringing together a number of articles on the same topic.

In the preface the editors note that they wanted their authors to focus "not only on the economic issues but also on the equally important political and administrative questions involved." In view of this explicit emphasis on the importance of political scientist is among the contributors. Almost all of the authors are economists and/or former government officials. One reads an essay on ECOSOC by one who has been associated with that body since 1947, an essay on UNCTAD by the vice-chairman of the U. S. delegation to the first UNCTAD, an essay on the IMF by the former research director of that organization, and an article on the "Nine Wise Men" of the Alliance for Progress by the former chairman of the group. In a similar context, John H. Kautsky has observed that "it is one thing to be an entomologist and another to be a beetle." Likewise, it is one thing to be an objective observer of international organization and another to be a participant.

It is hardly an exaggeration to describe the political dimension of this book as nonexistent. With the notable exception of Frank M. Coffin's essay, domestic politics is virtually ignored. Neither intra-agency nor inter-agency politics receives much attention. And the bargaining aspects of international aid transactions are often obscured. International agencies tend to be treated as technical problem solvers rather than as political entities. For example, Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan suggests the creation of a "nonpolitical" international committee "of recognized prestige and expertise—like an International Court of Economic Justice"—which would apply "purely functional criteria" in evaluating the adequacy of national development "efforts" and in recommending aid allocations. (pp. 225–26). Such a committee "would remove any suspicion of political strings and make aid truly a mutual partnership." It is a little difficult to imagine Raul Prebisch, Harry Johnson, Gunnar Myrdal, Milton Friedman, and Paul Baran all agreeing on how to apply "purely functional criteria" in evaluating a nation's aid needs. It is even more difficult to imagine the "nonpolitical aid" administered by "nonpolitical organizations" presented in this book.

All this is not to say that this is not a worthwhile book. A book of little value to one audience may be quite useful to another. Although the specialist will find little to interest him in this volume, the layman, the undergraduate, and the generalist policy maker can all benefit from it. It is not a book to be read from cover to cover, however. It is one to be read selectively when one needs a brief general introduction to a particular aspect of the relationship between economic development and international organizations.

The title, *The Global Partnership*, correctly implies an emphasis on cooperative rather than conflictive aspects. This emphasis obscures many problems likely to interest the political scientist. Perhaps the editors of *International Organization* should publish another symposium on international agencies and economic development entitled "The Global Squabble."—DAVID A. BALDWIN, *Dartmouth College.*

*Stalin and his Generals: Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II.* EDITED BY SEWERYN BIALER. (New York: Pegasus, 1969. Pp. 644, $10.00.)

In the last year or so A.J.P. Taylor and C. P. Snow, following the footsteps of E. H. Carr and Isaac Deutscher, have been loud in their pronouncements on the greatness of Stalin, who, after all, did win the greatest clash of arms in history. Careful study of the campaign on the Eastern front, however, makes it abundantly clear that the victory was won rather by the superior Soviet economic and population resources and the tremendous sacrifices of the Russian people. In the final analysis, the victory was won despite, rather than because of, Stalin's military leadership which came close to losing the war.

Professor Bialer's book makes an attempt to shed some light on Stalin as a war-time leader through translations of memoirs of Soviet military officers. Most of the memoirs were written during the Khrushchev years, and some show refreshing candor. The Brezhnev-Kosygin regime has discouraged such tendencies toward objectivity, and the Soviet military historiography, mainly through omission of unpleasant facts, has become once again highly unsatisfactory.

The reader's first impressions of the memoirs are of the total subservience of the Red Army to a dictator who had reshaped it by massive and bloody purges and then replaced the professional leadership with incompetent hacks whose deficiencies were known even to him. Combined with this was a disastrous foreign policy whose cornerstone was the trust of Adolph Hitler. It suffices to say about Stalin as a military leader that it took the Soviets, despite superior forces, nearly three years to push back the Germans to the prewar Russo-German border from the Leningrad-Rostov line, which the invaders had reached in less than six months.

Stalin had cowed the Red Army to an extent that he never had to worry about a military conspiracy and in the process destroyed the command initiative so essential to the conduct of military operations. He rewarded military excellence, but dealt harshly with those who had failed or could serve as convenient scapegoats for his own mistakes. In defeat Stalin tended to interfere overmuch in military affairs and even to show signs of panic, whereas in victory he gave his commanders freer hands. He was frequently torn between moods of resolution and vacillation; he had a total disregard for human losses and put political factors ahead of military considerations; he relied on intuition and was often wrong. The best example of this was the complete failure of Stalin and Soviet Intelligence to assess the German intentions during the summer of 1942. It is quite popular today in West Germany to claim that Stalin through Soviet espionage was aware of German military decisions; yet as Marshal Vasilevskii's memoirs show, the Soviets were totally ignorant of German plans in the summer of 1942, and Stalin's wrong guess turned out to be disastrous.

The book, although of value to historians and students of strategy and foreign policy, suffers from some serious defects. Some of its selections have already been translated by the Russians themselves or have appeared in the JPRS "Soviet Military Translation" Series. The title is rather misleading because many of the chapters have little to do with Stalin; the book may even more appropriately be called "Stalin's Generals." The selections are rather arbitrary; Professor Bialer, for instance, omits Marshal Zhukov's memoirs of the Battle of Kursk (*Voenno Istoricheskii Zhurnal.* 6-9-1967) with its commentary on Stalin, both defending and criticizing him. The author's introduction and commentaries avoid too much generalization and even avoid basing the Soviet post-war military politics on alleged war-time rivalries between different generals—a popular myth of several years ago. The commentaries, however, contain numerous factual errors, indicating that the author is not quite at home in this field. One example is the comments on G. I. Kulik in which non-existent units (8th Assault Army, p. 633) and battles (the Kharkov disaster of 1943, p. 575) are mentioned. Professor Bialer to the contrary, Rokossovskii was not the only man to voice opposition to Stalin's military ideas: two less significant officers, Generals Lopatin and Vol'skii, did the same during the Battle of Stalingrad. Also, the Soviet military advisors to Spain had a fairly high survival rate during the purges, and A. I. Rodimtsev is certainly not the same man as P. A. Rotmistrov. (p. 644). An index, a must for a book of this nature, is also lacking.—MICHAEL PARRISH, *Indiana University.*

*The Broken Triangle: Peking, Djakarta, and the PKI.* BY SHELDON W. SIMON. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. Pp. x, 210, $6.95.)

The intent of "The Broken Triangle" is of interest: for the period of the 1960's, to cast light on Indonesian and Chinese "national perceptions" of one another, and on the influence of each party's policies, statements and actions on the other's. The author's desire for illumination is but dimly fulfilled.

Three fundamental defects marr this study: a lack of clarity as to the meaning of "national perception;" a severely limited information base; and personal prejudices.

The meaning of "national perception" remains unclarified. Does it mean the perception of the average citizen, of the government, or of the major political forces within a state? And how does one ascertain the *real* perceptions of any individual political group or government in the circumstances of a dictatorial or totalitarian regime? How can one separate *real* from politically calculated, publicly stated perceptions? Did Sukarno *really* believe his republic to be encircled and threatened by neo-colonialism-emperialism?

The nature of Professor Sheldon's sources prevents him from approaching with authority either of the two basic subjects embraced by his study. His sources are very largely translations from the Indonesian and Chinese press and radio. In and of themselves they are inadequate for an analysis of national perception, however defined. More seriously, by themselves they provide little, and often misleading, insight into the domestic and broader international situations from which political actions and perceptions emanate. And Professor Simon exhibits little knowledge of his subject other than that provided by translation clippings. Thus he falls into innumerable errors of supposed causal relationships. Examples are legion.

The decision of the Indonesian government against a full-scale assault on West Irian "may well" have been caused by China's refusal to undertake a diversionary attack on Taiwan, an attack that Sukarno "may have encouraged" during his June 1961 visit to Peking (p. 36). Exclamation! A hypothesis founded on two unsubstantiated "mays" and ignoring completely the complex constellation of domestic forces and the other international factors which in fact produced that decision. A second example, supported by no references: the Japanese Communist Party and the Korean Workers' Party "decided to pursue a more independent course of action when they perceived that the PKI received no aid from Peking during its time of need" after the October 1, 1965 coup attempt (p. 169).

Or take Chapters Four and Five on NEFO and the PKI. The author's sources as usual prove incapable of providing any enlightenment on the basic questions that arise from that period of official Sino-Indonesian amity. What *was* Chinese influence, if any, on Sukarno: did it persuade or dissuade with regard to heightened confrontation, increased anti-Western vituperation, a pro-PKI domestic stance, or a policy of radical societal change? What *was* Chinese influence, if any, on the PKI, on the PKI's domestic and foreign policies? What *was* Chinese influence on the politically diverse Indonesian officer corps, on the Moslems, the PNI and the other political forces? And the obverse: in what way, if any, did the actions and statements of the Indonesian government, the PKI and other Indonesians affect the words, actions and perceptions of the Chinese government or elements within the CCP?

From his choice of language, Professor Simon manifests his dislike of Sukarno, the PKI and the power holders in Peking. Such a dislike may, of course, be based on an informed value judgment. It emerges as prejudice, however, when he moves beyond his limited knowledge in order to incriminate, villify or scron the enemy. Some examples from the discussion of the period around the October 1, 1965 coup attempt: when the PKI demanded arms in December 1964, "It is likely that Peking was consulted. . . " (p. 104); "much circumstantial evidence. . . pointed to a Chinese role in the coup attempt" (p. 152); the PKI "had become intimately associated with both the CPR and the Overseas Chinese" (p. 124); shortly after October 1, "Suharto and Nasution were creating a new government. . . faced with violent insurrection. . . " (p. 112); "Waves of terror spread. . ., focussing particularly on the Overseas Chinese, who had become tied in the popular image with the assassination of the generals" (p. 124).

Professor Simon makes much of Peking's "effort" to "hide" the death of Aidit, the PKI chairman, although, as the author seems not to know, Aidit was secretly murdered by the army and reasonably certain confirmation of his death was months in emerging. A great deal is made, too, of the Chinese publication and discussion of the "supposed," "alleged" PKI Politbureau Self Criticism issued on August 17, 1966—a document described as "Peking-directed PKI self-flagellation" (p. 167). In fact, the Self Criticism was the work of Sudisman, a survivor of the pre-coup Politbureau, and was so acknowledged by him at his trial in July 1967.

"The Broken Triangle" at times attempts to display a theoretical bent. This is sometimes harmless. Where it is applied to Indonesia, the results can be appalling, most glaringly when a simple mathematical equation purports to provide "considerable insight" into why the Communists did not resist the massive butchery that followed October 1 (pp. 115–6). This is an unhappy combination of pretentiousness and ignorance.

It should be of no surprise that Professor Simon concludes from the present study that "China is still plagued by xenophobia and a national superiority complex, both of which distort its view of the intentions of others and help to promote grandiose plans." (p. 202). There is no bibliography.—DONALD HINDLEY, *Brandeis University*.

*The Challenge of World Politics in South and Southeast Asia.* BY WERNER LEVI. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968. Pp. 186. $4.95.)

This essay informs Americans that most nations of South and Southeast Asia are not yet very successful in developing collective regional solidarity, or individual national solidarity. It suggests to the leaders of South and Southeast Asia that they should concentrate on developing national solidarity and individual relations with major outside powers (especially the United States), even if this lessens regional solidarity.

Many Americans, with their noses pointed at the Vietnam war, may not have noticed the intra-regional rivalries growing in South and Southeast Asia during recent years. They may never have been aware of the enormity of the rift between the elitist leadership which controls foreign policy and the peasant masses who are largely divorced from nationalism and fragmented by racial and religious distrusts. I recommend that those who wish to survey these trends read Chapters Two, Three, and Seven. Do not skip the footnotes, which spice the generalizations in the text with statistics from behavioral research.

National leaders in South and Southeast Asia will find in Chapters Three-Five an insightful analysis of the reasons for the breakdown of the Third World solidarity which presumably characterized the first Bandung Conference.

Professor Levi discusses the rejection of colonialism, power politics, and economic subservience which made *non-alignment* attractive. Then—dotting his commentary with quotes from statesmen, conferences, and foreign policy documents of the region—he analyzes how the struggle to establish nationalism eroded both non-alignment and regionalism. "If there was a threat to statehood, it came from among the new states themselves, not from either of the two major 'camps' which had originally given non-alignment its meaning." In the mid-1950's the United States and Russia began to realize that non-alignment was not a danger to them, and dropped their resistance to it. China's increasing belligerency speeded the move to open ties with the Western powers. He approves the latter move. "The Asian reaction to the United States and China reflected the victory of realism (favoring the United States) over emotions (favoring China.)"

But the essay scoffs at the Communist's argument that the independence of the states in the region is not real, due to economic subservience. No mention is made of the West's exceptional power over industry, communications, mining, plantations, and finance in the region, or of how little good these resources have done the peasant, or of the refusal of Western nations to help redress these imbalances in any major way such as through the rejected S.U.N.F.E.D. proposal.

The author does indicate that these "weaker nations" enter the arena of power politics with no weapon other than their "votes, sympathy or antipathy, respect or disrespect, moral support or its denial" to use against the great powers. He says, cryptically, in the last sentence of the book that these nations should accept "the fact that the international fate of their states" is "largely determined by outside nations," and that they should "act accordingly."

These nations are presumably trading their sympathy and moral support in exchange for the "minimum rather than maximum" American containment of China, assistance in economic development, and security against their neighbors within the region and their political enemies at home. But there is no discussion of what the eventual costs of that containment might be to the independence of the region, or defense of the author's implied assumption that the U.S. presence in Vietnam has contributed to the independence of the region. Nor is there discussion of how these nations might insure that U.S. economic assistance will not increase the economic domination of the West over their economies. There is no discussion of why they might hope the United States will not side with their neighbors rather than themselves if intra-regional wars occur, or why a national leader should hope that American intervention or assistance against internal insurgents will strengthen his hand instead of the insurgent's. What stake has the peasant in the present political setups that would be increased by making him more nationally conscious?

One would expect such commentary in a book which urges new nations to embrace nationalism as a means to "effectively contribute to the shape of their own future."

The essay repeats itself, and is too long. The last two chapters do not bring the book to any focus. The principal thesis is not clear. Is it the notion that these national leaders should support the U.S. *only* when it is in their national interest to do so? Or is it the notion that it is always in their national interest to support the U.S.? Or that they have no choice but to support the U.S.? Or just that they should continue to support our effort in Vietnam?

One has the impression that the author has not had any critical thoughts about United States Asian policy. He simply ignores the possibility that these nations—and the United States—might achieve more independence and social progress if America were to cut back on supplying military aid to regimes in the region, or decrease her industrial investments there, or get out of Vietnam. These are alternatives which have frequently occurred to Asian leaders. Asian leaders may begin to wonder why American foreign policy experts so seldom discuss them.—ROBERT E. GAMER, *University of Missouri at Kansas City.*

*The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy.* BY JOSEPH H. DE RIVERA. (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1968. Pp. 441. $7.95.)

It is now commonplace to assume that personality almost inevitably has some effect on an individual's behavior. And currently many political scientists are giving increased attention to the psychological dimension in order to better understand political behavior. Careful empirical study of the relationships between personality and politics is a rather recent development, however, dependent largely upon advances in the discipline of psychology. This book, by a professor of psychology, makes a useful contribution to this rapidly growing approach to political analysis.

Professor de Rivera has set himself three ambitious goals: First, and primarily, to apply the findings of contemporary psychology to the study of the formulation of U.S. foreign policy in order to better understand the decision-making process. Second, to test the adequacy and completeness of psychological knowledge by attempting to apply it in a new setting. And third, to contribute, hopefully, to increasing the effectiveness of American foreign policy by helping decision makers achieve greater self-awareness of the various ways in which psychological factors may affect the process of making policy.

The basic assumption underlying the book is, of course, that the psychological dimension is essential to the understanding of all decision-making. Although the author briefly argues for the validity of this assumption, the book taken as a whole offers the reader a good opportunity to assess the validity of the premise. The specter of reductionism, however, does not lurk in these pages. Professor de Rivera states early that he does not view psychological analysis as a competing, all-encompassing approach to the study of politics, but rather as a necessary complement to other, more traditional approaches to foreign policy making.

The organization of the book is straightforward: the first four substantive chapters survey the empirical—usually experimental—psychological findings concerning first, the general processes by which individuals perceive their environment and make decisions and second, the impact of personality differences upon these and other activities by decision-makers. The next three chapters focus on interpersonal relations, including such small group processes as consensus formation and communication. A final chapter discusses interaction among diplomatic representatives of nation states, and includes a discussion of game theory and studies of the negotiation process. A brief conclusion summarizes the thrust of the psychological perspective on decision-making, notes some questions in need of further research, and suggests some specific procedures which might improve the process—and thus the policies—by which American foreign policy is made. Few of the suggested reforms appear to be novel, but it might be reassuring to those inclined toward more traditional approaches that the proposals involve institutional restructuring rather than psychotherapy.

Such a survey of social psychology may, of course, be gleaned from any of several introductory texts. A contribution of this book is to illustrate many of the basic findings with data on the making of actual foreign policy decisions. Many of the examples are taken from extensive sets of data gathered by other students of foreign policy decisions. The data include materials on how U.S. decision makers entered the Korean War, formulated the Marshall Plan, and developed both the military budget for 1950 and a subsequent alternative proposal.

Reliance upon such data gathered by other scholars helps the author deal with a possible charge of bias since he admittedly writes from a motive of dissatisfaction with current American foreign policy. Obviously, such an caveat is no guarantee of subsequent "objectivity," but the use of data and conclusions presented by others helps to work toward that end. Professor de Rivera exhibits adequate competence with the political data he uses and, in keeping with his professional eclecticism, he has wide familiarity with the pyschological materials. Nonetheless, it is virtually certain that every reader will find himself disagreeing with some statements of fact, theory, and interpretation—psychological or political. The main effort to explicate the making of foreign policy decisions stands, however, regardless of the inadequacy of specific examples or arguments.

This work may be viewed as an elaboration of an important aspect of the basic decision-making approach developed by Richard Snyder and his associates. The decision-making approach has been criticized for its general lack of rigor, including failure to specify how, under what conditions, and to what extent various factors relate to decisional outcomes. These general comments are applicable to this book as well. Although it indicates in considerable detail various ways in which psychological variables might affect decision-making, this is only a first, albeit necessary, step toward developing a theory of the psychology of decision-making. Professor de Rivera has not promised more than he has delivered, however; he notes at the beginning that he has not made highly cohesive presentations of either the foreign policy making process or of social psychology. The primary value of this book, then, lies in its attempt to outline systematically many of the relevant psychological perspectives and to show how they may be applied to actual situations. This work should help subsequent researchers by suggesting problems, variables, materials, and approaches. In short, the book contributes toward the development of a sophisticated understanding of how personality affects political behavior.

It is doubtful if this volume makes more than a passing contribution toward testing the adequacy of current psychological knowledge. When even tightly controlled laboratory experiments are almost always open to question and to alternative explanations, materials drawn from incomplete and difficult-to-research case studies hardly constitute adequate opportunity for testing hypotheses. But it is gratifying and somewhat confirmatory to find that generalizing from college undergraduates to key decision-makers is often plausible.

Surely few would object to attempts at improving the substance of American foreign policy. A book such as this might well help impress upon any reader the ubiquity and importance of psychological factors in decision-making. This is a useful general insight, but given a very incomplete science, it is most difficult to deduce situationally relevant statements from general principles.

In summary, this should be a stimulating book to anyone concerned about the process by which U.S. foreign policy is made and/or is interested in the impact of personality upon political behavior. Correspondingly, it should be useful in advanced courses focusing on U.S. foreign policy, and less so for courses dealing generally with personality and politics.—EVAN D. ROGERS, *Washington State University.*

*The Soviet Union: A Half Century of Communism.* EDITED BY KURT LONDON. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. Pp. 493. $12.00, $2.95, paper.)

Fifteen papers comprise the published product of the Sixth International Conference on World Politics which met in West Berlin in September, 1967. Topics range from a panoramic analysis of Communist revolutions, to more specific evaluations of developments in Soviet society, the Party, Marxist-Leninist ideology, military-political relationships, agriculture, industry, and foreign policy.

Posing the possiblity of constructing a typology of comparative revolutionary successes, Robert Tucker reasons persuasively that communist revolutions have not occurred on the model projected by classical Marxism: that is, industrialization was not the cause of revolution, but the result. Thus, with the notable exceptions of Czechoslovakia and the GDR, communist revolution has been a creature of underdevelopment. Insightfully argued distinctions among Soviet, East European, and Chinese experiences form the heart of his thesis that although two world wars were probably indispensable to communist victories, in no case did the thirteen subsequent ruling party states replicate the Bolshevik pattern. He concludes: "Any future communist revolutions will probably occur not in developed industrial countries with advanced social and political institutions but, as in the past, in underdeveloped countries where economic progress is slow or stagnant, where society is divided into a privileged minority and a disadvantaged peasant majority, and where authoritarian government prevails."

Dan Jacobs attempts to show that the Politburo has not been an immutable or exclusive focus of Soviet power throughout fifty years. Under Stalin, "it was only one means of disseminating power, and in many ways and at many times not even the most important means." The Politburo's evolution is traced "from aborted inception, to power, to gimcrack, and back to power, only to find its regained power in the process of erosion." Several tables of personnel statistics are assembled to explain actual and potential decision-making dilemmas.

Frederick C. Barghoorn's paper posits adaptive evolution rather than political decay or revolution as the most likely consequence of trends in Soviet political life—an outcome likely to foster policies conducive to peace and welfare. Employing the macro-analytical schemes of Pye, Almond, Powell, and others, Barghoorn quite imaginatively applies to Soviet development such concepts as crises of identity, legitimacy, participation, distribution, and penetration; system capabilities; conversion functions; and finally, processes of system-maintenance and adaptation based on political socialization and elite recruitment. Chalmers Johnson's approach to revolution is used to predict that, "the Soviet political elite will probably continue to display sufficient adaptiveness and cohesiveness to prevent either a revolutionary breakdown of the USSR or the stagnation and 'petrification' foreseen by some analysts." Evolutionary development is thus initiated and controlled by established political authorities and is compatible with established institutions and practices. The result will be progress toward a knowledgeable society; but there is also a danger that the vested interests of elite incumbents may increasingly serve as barriers to the completion of modernization.

Focusing upon communist politics as a "ceaseless flux of change beneath an appearance of changeless continuity in the forms, structure, and . . . theory of political power," H. Gordan Skilling offers an analysis of interest groups and a fourfold typology of opposition. The thesis is familiar and has received considerable deserved attention in recent years: policy-making in communist states takes place increasingly within a context of sharp group conflict; and oppositional tendencies have assumed more vigorous and varied forms. More than this, "the Party increasingly performs the role of an aggregator of conflicting interests, rather than of the exclusive articulator of its own conception of the national interests."

Boris Meissner probes the social composition of the CPSU and traces the evolution of bureaucracy, elites and the intelligentsia through the October Revolution and industrialization. He agrees somewhat reservedly that interest groups, frictions, and struggles contribute to gradual social transformation. However, "it would be a mistake . . . to assume that this development indicates that totalitarianism of the Soviet communist type is already coming to an end." (Competing with this, of course, are the revised views of Friedrich and Brzezinski, two chief proponents of the original totalitarian model so fashionable in the 50's.)

Continuing the theme on Soviet society, Robert A. Feldmesser examines the function of ideology in social—especially occupational—stratification. Probing the intriguing dilemma of distribution "according to needs" under communism, he cites Khrushchev's evasive clarification that this really means "the healthy needs of a culturally developed person." To Feldmesser, the goal is not unique to the Soviet Union, for if there is a dominant economic concern among societies, it is apt to lie in distribution rather than simply more production.

Roman Kolkowicz refers to the historical agreement among Marx, Engels, and Lenin that, "in a communist society no one will even think about a *standing army*. Why would one need it?" The reason is that communist parties which in principle condemn professional armies as an evil force of suppression cannot do without them after achieving political power.

The resultant elaborate military policy is the topic of Thomas Wolfe's paper. Resource allocation, the possibility of general war, the build-up of strategic forces, the ABM issue, preparations for conventional and limited wars, Vietnam, and the Warsaw Pact are reviewed. According to Wolfe, Khrushchev had to confront the paradox that, even as Soviet technology invested military power with unprecedented potential destructiveness, constraints upon its use have grown, tending to multiply the risks and narrow the opportunities for turning military power into political advantage. (Wolfe would, however, have to agree that the Soviet Union's punitive intervention in Czechoslovakia was remarkably successful precisely because the Soviets managed to translate overwhelming military force into decisive political power.)

Turning to foreign affairs, Kurt London relates the Soviet Union's political schizophrenia resulting from inevitable contradictions between the roles of nation-state and revolutionary power. Central to his unequivocally traditional view is the key statement: "There can be no question that his thesis [Lenin's *Imperialism*] first published in 1916, has directly or indirectly dominated or influenced the thinking of communist foreign-policy makers ever since. It is obvious that the belief in these principles forecloses a pursuit of international relations in a fashion conconsidered 'normal' among Western States." The result—persistent dualism, documentable at least from Brest-Litovsk to Khrushchev's elevation of the peaceful coexistence doctrine from a tactic to a strategy. Even if state security interest "may have been primary during certain periods," he continues, "they remained immersed in doctrinal party-oriented thinking from which no Soviet leader . . . apparently can separate himself." (True enough, perhaps. But far more important would be concrete cases in which doctrine has actually superceded Soviet state interests. A frequently cited—and weathered—example, of course, is Stalin's devastating attitude toward German Social democracy.)

Papers analyzing object areas of foreign policy include one by Andrew Gyordy, who surveys Stalin's "revolution from above"—the takeover of Eastern Europe by employing a variety of nondoctrinaire techniques—as one of several examples of nonconformity between communist theoretical perception and political reality. One controversial conclusion is that "the longer communism survives in Eastern Europe, the more sporadic and atomized will be popular resistance to it." (Would not unprecedented popular solidarity in Czechoslovakia constitute an exception?) John Armstrong illuminates Soviet dilemmas in the Middle East where the interests of local communist parties are opposed to Soviet cooperation with a bourgeois national regime. Understandably, such parties are regarded as expendable if major USSR interests are at stake. German-Soviet relations, historically affected by ten factors, are the subject of Klaus Mehnert's essay. And, finally, Harish Kapur summarizes the shifting preoccupation of Soviet diplomacy from Europe to Asia, where Soviet leaders have perforce softened Leninist formulas and accepted unorthodox varieties of socialist doctrine. More questionable is the unconditional statement about the Korean war: "When one examines the period, one is struck by Soviet complicity in the origination of the war."

Admittedly, this reviewer has a bias. No reconnaissance into a half century of communism can be complete without recognizing that the Soviet Union, notwithstanding all its revolutionary effusions about proletarian unity and internationalism, must finally own up: international communism is at best a vain dream imbedded in a collective historical memory. The confrontation with Mao and the dissidence of all too many others really mean that the context for the realization of international communism, and even the perspective from which it is viewed, are markedly narrower than Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and cohorts could ever envision. Perhaps the most significant thing about fifty years of policy is this: the Soviet inability to realize worldwide communism as consistently projected has not prevented tenacious efforts toward defending the *potential* for international communism in one subsystem—i.e., proximate Eastern Europe—a goal which is at least plausible and maybe attainable, but by no means inevitable.

Although stamped by some unevenness in quality, this book yields amost sixty pages of rich biographical footnotes and a wide range of cultivated viewpoints, making it singularly challenging for college seminars. It is a favorite and intellectually invigorating pastime to do battle with eminent scholars *in absentia*. Certainly this composite volume offers ample targets for reassessing conventional wisdoms. And in doing so, it enhances the necessary dialogue beneficial to us all.—NISH JAMGOTCH, JR., *University of North Carolina at Charlotte.*

# ANNOUNCEMENTS

## RESULTS OF THE MAIL BALLOT ELECTION FOR OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

(as certified to the National Office by
the American Arbitration Association
November 10, 1969)

| *For President-Elect* | *Votes* |
|---|---|
| *Robert E. Lane | 5474 |
| Christian Bay | 2816 |
| *For Vice Presidents* | |
| *Grant McConnell | 5622 |
| *William H. Riker | 5546 |
| *Robert E. Ward | 5185 |
| David Kettler | 2548 |
| H. Mark Roelofs | 2526 |
| Alan Wolfe | 2516 |
| *For Secretary* | |
| *Thomas R. Dye | 5739 |
| Paul Minkoff | 2319 |
| *For Treasurer* | |
| *Francis E. Rourke | 5513 |
| Robert H. Clarke | 2444 |

| *For Council (One-Year Term)* | *Votes* |
|---|---|
| *Tobe N. Johnson | 6601 |
| *For Council (Two-Year Term)* | |
| *Jewel L. Prestage | 6179 |
| *Samuel P. Huntington | 5669 |
| *Herbert McClosky | 5339 |
| *Robert H. Salisbury | 5319 |
| *Allan P. Sindler | 5102 |
| *John H. Kessel | 5008 |
| *Ellis Waldron | 4479 |
| *Henry S. Kariel | 3866 |
| Lewis Lipsitz | 3812 |
| James M. Elden | 3039 |
| Theodore L. Becker | 2849 |
| William E. Connolly | 2687 |
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The sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 8–12, 1970, at the Biltmore Hotel, Los Angeles, California.

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*March, 1970*

Barry Ames, Stanford University, "Bases of Support for Mexico's Dominant Party"

Aage R. Clausen and Richard B. Cheney, University of Wisconsin, "A Comparative Analysis of Senate and House Voting on Economic and Welfare Policy, 1953–1964"

Michael Haas, University of Hawaii, "International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity"

Howard D. Hamilton, Bowling Green State University, "Direct Legislation: Some Implications of Open Housing Referenda"

John E. Mueller, University of Rochester, "Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson"

Paul F. Power, University of Cincinnati, "On "On the Grounds for Civil Disobedience within American Democratic Thought"

Kenneth Prewitt, University of Chicago, "Political Ambition and Democratic Accountability"

William H. Riker, University of Rochester, "Rational Behavior in Politics"

Patrick Riley, Harvard University, "A Possible Explanation of Rousseau's General Will"

Stanley Rothman, Smith College, "Barrington Moore and the Dialectics of Revolution"

Barrington Moore, Jr., Harvard University, "Reply to Rothman"

Martin Shubik, Yale University, "Voting, or a

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* Production exigencies may occasionally necessitate publication of articles in issues other than those given in this listing.

Price System in a Competitive Market Structure"

Duff Spafford, University of Saskatchewan, "The Electoral System of Canada"

*June, 1970*

Joel D. Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, University of Michigan, "The Meanings of Black Power: A Comparison of White and Black Interpretations of a Political Slogan"

Steven J. Brams, New York University, and Michael O'Leary, Syracuse University, "An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies"

Steven R. Brown and John D. Ellithorp, Kent State University, "Emotional Experiences in Political Groups: The Case of the McCarthy Phenomenon"

Walter Dean Burnham and John D. Sprague, Washington University, St. Louis, "Additive and Multiplicative Models of the Voting Universe: The Case of Pennsylvania, 1960–1968"

William R. Caspary, Washington University, St. Louis, "The 'Mood Theory': A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy"

Otto A. Davis, Melvin J. Hinich, and Peter C. Ordeshook, Carnegie-Mellon University, "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society"

Ada W. Finifter, Michigan State University, "Dimensions of Political Alienation"

Bryan R. Fry and Richard Winters, Stanford University, "The Politics of Redistribution"

M. Kent Jennings, University of Michigan, and L. Harmon Zeigler, University of Oregon, "The Salience of American State Politics"

Paul E. Peterson, University of Chicago, "Forms of Representation: Participation of the Poor in the Community Action Program"

David E. Powell and Paul Shoup, University of Virginia, "The Emergence of Political Science in Communist Countries"

John Duncan Powell, Harvard University, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics"

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Michael Aiken and Robert R. Alford, University of Wisconsin, "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Public Housing"

Gordon S. Black, University of Rochester, "Some Notes on the Process of Professionalization in Politics"

Jack Dennis, University of Wisconsin, "Support for the Institution of Elections by the Mass Public"

John P. Diggins, University of California, Irvine, "Ideology and Pragmatism: Philosophy or Passion?"

Melvin J. Hinich and Peter C. Ordeshook, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Plurality Maximization vs. Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation"

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Raymond F. Hopkins, Swarthmore College, "The Role of the M.P. in Tanzania"

Chong Lim Kim, University of Iowa, "Political Attitudes of Defeated Candidates in American State Elections"

Norman N. Miller, Michigan State University, "The Rural African Party: Political Participation in Tanzania"

Edward N. Muller, University of Iowa, "Cross-National Dimensions of Political Competence"

Donald Rothchild, University of California, Davis, "Kenya's Africanization Program: Priorities of Development and Equity"

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
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

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

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

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

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



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
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
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

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